In this non-ERISA
disability case the jury awarded Ace $16.5 Million dollars in punitive damages.
Plaintiff’s LTD claim was known to be only temporary if she could get the
required surgery on her knee. However, her doctors required her to heal from
the previous surgery first. Meanwhile she would continue to suffer debilitating
pain and immobility. Aetna denied the LTD requests even though plaintiff’s
financial situation was desperate. Aetna’s investigation was very incomplete
and ignored much of the information they had requested from plaintiff. They
used policy definitions that were not legally binding and refused to answer
Ace’s questions or provide her with adjustment guidelines. Aetna lied and
claimed they had no “claim adjustment guidelines” even though a manual was
produced during discovery entitled “Proper Claim Handling Guidelines.” Ace was
forced to sell her home, most of her possessions and lived in her car for
several months. Ace’s subsequent surgery was successful and she returned to
work.
The appeals court
unfortunately thought the punitive damages were excessive although they agreed
with the district court that punitive damages were warranted due to Aetna
acting with “malice, bad motives or reckless indifference.” The Appeals Court
found that punitive damages were warranted based on Aetna’s (1) basing denial
of the claim on an illegal standard for benefit eligibility; (2) failing to
inform the claimant of the standard actually used by Aetna in evaluating
disability claims; (3) failing to investigate the claim and to seek or request
the supporting information alleged to be missing; (4) failing to assist the
claimant in presenting her disability claim; (5) relying on outdated prognoses
of the claimant’s expected recovery and disregarding recent reports of her
actual condition; (6) denying her claim based on an undefined “requirement” not
a term of her policy and contrary to Aetna’s internal claim adjustment
guidelines; (7) falsely advising the claimant that Aetna had no claim
adjustment guidelines; and (8) making a last-minute demand for an IME after
having denied the claim.”
(The Appeals Court
said:) “When an insurance company wrongly refuses to honor its obligations,
emotional distress is a natural and believable response. Insureds bargained and
paid for the security and peace of mind of knowing that reimbursement and
financial support would be provided in the event that a misfortune occurs. As
insurance payments often serve as a safety net for the insured, Aetna’s refusal
to cover Ace’s injury is foreseeably egregious.”
In an irrational
opinion however they denied Aetna’s motion for new trial on the punitive
damages only if Ace would accept $381,000 instead of the jury’s verdict of $16
Million although Judge Fletcher dissented with the following statements:
“The majority pays only lip service to the Alaska Supreme
Court’s determination that the facts, and not the ratio, drive the results of a
review of punitive damages.” “the facts of this case would support a much
higher award" …As to the 'magnitude of the
offense,' we need only look to the harm caused to Ace, harm that her insurance
was intended to avoid. She lost everything she had, including her home; she had
to live in her car; and she had to send her child away because she couldn’t
care for him. Next, with respect to the ‘importance of the policy violated,’
Aetna’s wrong and bad faith refusal to cover Ace implicated a much broader
company policy of wrongfully denying coverage to many who met the definition of
‘disabled,’ exhibiting a callous breach of trust owed to their insureds at a
time when they are most vulnerable. Finally, the ‘defendant’s
wealth' is estimated at 1.7 billion dollars and the evidence presented
demonstrates that Aetna’s assets would not be sufficiently diminished by the
punitive damages award set by the majority. Punitive damages by definition are
to be adequate in amount to punish the offender.”
The court then
issued an amended opinion stating that the amount of punitive damages could be
reduced but the amount would be determined by the district court and deleted
the dissenting opinion. They also awarded costs to Ace.
The Court found
that Aetna “by reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Brown, which
stated that a relationship that places an ERISA benefits plan administrator in
'perpetual conflict’ warrants a higher level of scrutiny. [Brown, 898 F.2d at
1561.] Aetna faces a continuing conflict in playing the dual role of
administrator and insurer of the health benefits plan. As the insurer, Aetna
has an obvious interest in minimizing its claims payments. Apparently to limit
claim payments, Aetna provides incentives and bonuses to its claims reviewers
based on criteria that include a category called ‘claims savings.’ …… Despite
Aetna’s argument that there is no evidence that Aetna has directed its
reviewers to improperly reject claims, we cannot view the fiduciary arrangement
between Aetna, its claims reviewers, and the plan beneficiaries as the type
ERISA provides as administered ‘solely in the interest of the participants and
beneficiaries.’ [29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).]
Held that insurance
company’s denial of payment for psychiatric treatment, based on the application
of standards not contained in the plan, was arbitrary and capricious.
...“To deny the
claim without explanation and without obtaining relevant information is an
abuse of discretion”
“[W]here the trustees of a plan impose a standard not
required by the plan’s provisions, or interpret the plan in a manner
inconsistent with its plan words, or by their interpretation render some
provisions of the plan superfluous, their actions may well be found to be
arbitrary and capricious.”
“Because an insurance company pays out to beneficiaries from
its own assets rather than the assets of a trust, its fiduciary role lies in
perpetual conflict with its profit-making role as a business.”
“When an insurer may promote the potential for its own
profit by denying plan participants claims, deference to its decision in a
particular case will be lessened to the degree necessary to mutualize that
conflict.”
The Court recited
the uncontroverted medical evidence that Clausen suffered from CFS and noted
that none of the independent examiners to whom Standard referred Clausen
disagreed with the CFS diagnosis. Id. at 1455-56. The Court said: “Standard’s
attempt to ignore the CFS diagnosis of Clausen’s treating physicians and to
require instead, that Clausen provide “objective” evidence of a distinct “physical disease” runs afoul of established law in this circuit.”
Id. at 1456.
Citing Sisco v.
United State Department of Health and Human Resources, [10 F.3d 739 (10th Cir.
1993)], the Court found that:
“the lack of ‘objective’ medical
evidence to ‘prove’ Clausen was disabled by her fatigue and pain cannot constitute
substantial evidence that Clausen was not disabled, i.e. that she was capable
of full-time work. I now find in addition that neither the surveillance video
nor Dr. Thompson’s report constitute such evidence.”
(Plaintiff was a
CFS patient who finished one year of Law School in three years.) The court saw
her activity as a tribute to her courage and determination in refusing to
surrender to the debilitating affects of her illness. They went on to
acknowledge that “CFS is characterized by exacerbations and remissions which
are unpredictable in nature and which make sustained work activity virtually
impossible”
“the exact causes of chronic fatigue syndrome are still
being explored.”
The insurer engaged
in tactics designed to force the insured into accepting a much lower offer than
what would have been reasonable. Ultimately the insurer terminated benefits
altogether, and the claimant sued.
The Court was
appalled by the insurer’s conduct and explicitly found that such conduct “may
be closer to the norm of insurance company practice than the Court has
previously suspected” The Court added that the facts of the case were “disturbing” and illustrated that the absence of penalties
results in “no practical or legal deterrent to unscrupulous claims practices.”
The court suggested
that the “public interest would be served if ERISA contained a statutory
penalty which could be imposed by the Court in extraordinary cases.”
Furthermore Judge
Letts stated that the plaintiff “suffered irremediable harm as a result of the
termination of benefit payments to him. He has been forced to sell stocks and
make distributions from his IRA in order to pay living expenses. As a
consequence, he has incurred taxable income which might have been deferred or
avoided. Mrs. Dishman has been required to return to full-time employment.
Finally the purpose of disability payments is to provide a disabled individual
with periodic income with which to pay living expenses. The receipt of a lump
sum at the conclusion of an appeal of this case will not compensate Mr. Dishman
for his loss of periodic income.”
Plaintiff was disabled
with Obsessive Compulsive disorder. UNUM paid two years then terminated
benefits under Mental Illness Limitation Clause of policy. Plaintiff’s doctor
and current medical science consider Obsessive Compulsive Disorder not “mental”
but neurobiological. UNUM’s claim for summary judgment was rejected by the
court on the grounds that the contract language was “ambiguous”.
The Federal District Court applied the doctrine of Contra Preferentum, strictly
construing the terms against the insurer.
Held that denial of
claim for long term disability based on objective medical evidence requirement
that was not in the plan was arbitrary and capricious and that fiduciaries may
not deny claims because physicians “cannot provide physiological proof where
the physical condition is such that physiological proof is not available.”
The Duncan court
stated that Continental cannot exclude a claim for lack of “objective medical
evidence” unless the “objective medical evidence” standard was made “clear,
plain and conspicuous enough [in the policy[ to negate layman [plaintiff’s]
objectively reasonable expectations of coverage.” Id. citing Saltarelli v. Bob
Baker Group Medical Trust et al, [35 F. 3d 382, 387 (9th Cir. 1994)]. The court
further concluded that the denial of Duncan’s claim was not sustainable under
the de novo or arbitrary and capricious standard. It stated, in pertinent part:
“[M]edical conditions that do not give rise to hard
laboratory facts or data may still be cognizable claims. In the medical opinion
of Duncan’s physician, the plaintiff has exhibited symptoms associated with
fibromyalgia or CPS [chronic pain syndrome] and has become totally disabled as
a result….Continental cannot deny Duncan’s claim because her physical condition
is such that physiological proof is not available.”
Held that denial of
benefits based upon guidelines that contradict plan language is arbitrary and
capricious
Appeals Court
upheld a jury verdict against Aetna in the amount of $292,000 in compensatory
and $8,400,000 in punitive damages in a non-ERISA case stating the following:
“Fisher’s evidence described a corporate calculated risk
which encouraged shoddy claims investigation and banked on the fact that sick
and elderly disabled claimants ordinarily don’t file lawsuits. Fisher also
presented evidence that Aetna attempted to prevent discovery of its misconduct
after he complained.
The jury construed
the conflicting evidence in Fisher’s favor, finding that Aetna acted
outrageously……Because reasonable jurors could differ regarding those
conclusions, and passion or prejudice did not unfairly influence this verdict,
Aetna’s motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, new trial or remitter
are DENIED.
Trial
by jury is a basic constitutional right.
Other evidence also
supports a finding that the investigation was unreasonable, and that Aetna’s
denial was made without a reasonable basis, including:
The evidence also
supports a jury finding that denial of Fisher’s claim was not an isolated,
honest mistake, and that Aetna acted maliciously or with reckless indifference
to Fisher’s rights as a policy holder.
Fisher’s insurance
expert Prater testified that insurers are generally aware that disability
applicants tend to give up and drop their applications if the insurer makes the
process too difficult. Aetna told Fisher that if he wanted further information
regarding denial of his claim he would have to serve a ‘subpoena.’ After Fisher
filed his suit, Aetna concluded that its denial of Fisher’s claim was likely
invalid. Yet, Aetna vigorously disputed the claim throughout the litigation,
until the third week of trial, when Ms. Gorna conceded that Aetna’s handling of
the claim was unreasonable.”
“Aetna’s employees conceded that disability applicants are
among the most vulnerable insurance claimants…. Fisher also described his fear
and anguish when his application for benefits was denied, and when his
continued efforts to convince Aetna to change its mind were unsuccessful. When
considered in a light most favorable to Fisher, ample evidence supported an
emotional distress award of $136,000. And, unfair passion or prejudice did not
influence the award.”
“As noted above, Aetna employees acknowledged that
disability applicants are among the most vulnerable of insurance claimants, that
they are ordinarily sick and unable to work, and that they are often in
financial difficulties. Thus, the jury could find that insurance bad faith in
the context of a disability claim denial is particularly reprehensible.”
“Aetna concluded early in the case that Fisher’s claim had
merit, but refused to concede that issue until the third week of trial.”
The Court then
noted that CNA believed that Gawrysh’s fatigue was caused by sinusitis rather
than CFS and it concluded that such reasoning was shortsighted:
“CNA did not deny [claimant]’s symptoms existed or had
a debilitating effect, but concluded that because the symptoms could not, with
complete certainty, be linked to a specific illness, [claimant] was not totally
disabled. The uncontroverted evidence indicates that [claimant]’s symptoms were
debilitating and were consistent with chronic fatigue syndrome. Rather than
punishing [claimant] for the inability of medicine to specifically pinpoint
that cause of her debilitating fatigue, CNA should have hired experts or used
its own doctors to examine [claimant] to determine the cause and degree of her
fatigue.”
Thus the fact that
it was unclear whether Gawrysh’s fatigue stemmed from CFS or chronic sinusitis
was an improper basis for denial in the view of the court. Instead, CNA
utilized a claims specialist who apparently had no medical training or
experience with issues of fatigue to review Gawrysh’s medical records, and that
made CNA’s claim denial arbitrary and capricious.”
The court held, in
light of substantial evidence confirming Ms. Gaylor’s disability, the reason
for denying benefits:
“reminds us of the doctor, who, when asked for a diagnosis,
responds, ‘we won’t know for sure until the autopsy.’ Gaylor at 467.
The Court held that
Ms. Gaylor presented enough evidence to establish her disability. The court
went on to hold these doctors, “did not use a crystal ball to conclude that Ms.
Gaylor was disabled; their opinions were based upon clinical, physical
examinations. The verification requirement must be treated as evidentiary in
nature. Medicine is, at best, an inexact science, and we should not disregard the
great weight of evidence merely because objective laboratory diagnostic
findings either are not yet within the state of the art, or are inconclusive”.
An ERISA case
decided under the arbitrary and capricious standard. The claimant had
fibromyalgia, lumbar disc syndrome, rotator cuff disease and severe pain. The
court was critical of the defendant’s rejection of clear medical evidence and
ignoring the side effects of medication Godfrey took for her condition.
– “it is sufficient to note that CFS has been recognized by
several courts as a legitimate basis for an award of Social Security Disability
benefits providing the patients complex is sufficiently disabling.”
The Federal Court
stated, “a disability claimant need not vegetate in a dark room in order to be
deemed eligible for benefits nor should an otherwise eligible claimant be penalized
for attempting to maintain some sort of normalcy in her life and a modicum of
independence ..The critical issue in a disability case is the claimant’s
capacity for work activity on a regular and continuous, ongoing basis…
One of the more
perplexing aspects of CFS is that sufferers often report that their condition
varies considerably from day to day. One day they can function reasonably well
while on another day they many be unable to get out of bed.”
Held that “trustees
abuse their discretion if they….construe provisions of [a] plan in a way that
clearly conflicts with the plain language of the plan”
Metlife encouraged
and assisted Ladd in applying for and being awarded Social Security Disability
Insurance (SSDI) benefits then turned around and denied her claim with them.
This case is within the doctrine of “judicial estoppel –that if a party wins a
suit on one ground, it can’t turn around and in further litigation with the
same opponent repudiate the ground in order to win a further victory.”
"Because an
insurance company pays out to beneficiaries from its own assets rather than the
assets of a trust, its fiduciary role lies in perpetual conflict with its
profit-making role as a business.’” “once the beneficiary comes forward with
evidence that the fiduciary may have acted in its own self-interest, a more
careful review must be undertaken, We explained that: (IND) principles of trust
law require us to act very skeptically in deferring to the discretion of an
administrator who appears to have committed a breach of fiduciary duty…””the
plan bears the burden of rebutting the presumption by producing evidence to
show that the conflict of interest did not affect it decision to deny or
terminate benefits.”
“Ambiguities in ordinary insurance contracts are construed
against the insurance company.”“The rule known as the doctrine of contra
proferentem, requires us to adopt the reasonable interpretations advanced by
Lang, i.e., that the phrase ‘mental disorder’ does not include ‘mental’
conditions resulting from ‘physical’ disorders.”
“negative test results or the absence of an objective
medical test to diagnose fibromyalgia cannot support he conclusion that
claimant does not suffer from a potentially disabling condition.”
“Court overturned 2 year disability limits” “in order to
justify terminating Mr. Lewis’ benefits [after 2 years], K-Mart would have to
show that its lesser plan for mental disabilities was based on ‘sound actuarial
principles,’ and that K-Mart had filed to show that.”
In this EEOC/ADA
action the court ruled that Lewis had a cause of action against his former
employer, the benefit plan sponsor and against the insurer, for providing
benefits that discriminated against persons suffering from mental disabilities.
The court agreed with the plaintiff’s arguments that such a ruling was more
consistent with both the statutory language of the ADA and the Act’s goal of
eliminating disability discrimination. Thus, the court concluded, “Both a
decision to deny coverage on the basis of a mental disability and to provide
inferior coverage for mental disabilities target the mentally disabled for
inferior treatment.
The Court found
that the administrative law judge inappropriately ignored reports of treating
physicians. The court stated “whatever the name (CFS), the disease exists.”
The Mitchell Court
found that the undisputed evidence in the claim file showed that as of the date
of disability, ‘Mitchell’s chronic and unpredictable fatigue and loss of
concentration made it impossible for him to sustain regular paid employment.”
Id. at 440.
It further stated
that: “Because the disease, although universally recognized as a severe
disability has no known etiology, [citation omitted], it would defeat the
legitimate expectations of participants in the Kodak Plan to require those with
CFS to make a showing of such etiology as a condition for eligibility for LTD
benefits. Thus is was arbitrary and capricious for the administrator to deny
Mitchell benefits because of a lack of such clinical evidence of the etiology
of his CFS.”
Despite its
acceptance of the sufficiency of the medical evidence as to the CFS diagnosis,
however, the Mitchell court took great care to point out that Kodak failed to
offer any expert reports or other evidence to counter Mitchell'’ proof and
instead choose to merely argue about its alleged insufficiency. Id. at 1054.
“Moreover, it was impermissible for the Administrator to
imply an additional ‘clinical evidence of etiology’ requirement not specified
in the Plan document in the context of CFS. It is now widely recognized in the
medical community that ‘there is no “dipstick”
laboratory test for Chronic fatigue Syndrome.” “it would defeat the legitimate
expectations of participants in the Kodak Plan to require those with CFS to
make a showing of clinical evidence of such etiology as a condition of eligibility
for LTD Benefits.
Court discussed 24
month limitation of benefits for “mental illness and functional nervous
disorder” in the context of a CFS claim and ruled:
Because of the rule that ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of the
insured, if either a cause or a symptom of the disease were physical and caused
the disability in whole or in part, then benefits are payable. Mongeluzo at
951.
Because the
critical terms of the plan are ambiguous, a genuine issue of material fact
exists as to whether Mongeluzo’s symptoms constituted a “mental illness” or a “functional nervous disorder.” Consequently we reverse the
district court’s grant of summary judgment.
The court noted an
immunologist had “submitted an affidavit submitting seven medical articles that
conclude that chronic fatigue syndrome is likely caused by an immunological
factor and that depression results from the syndrome, rather than the syndrome
resulting from depression.” Mongeluzo at 941, ftnt.1.
Also in Sisco, the
Tenth Circuit has held “a review of the medical literature in the record
demonstrates that a psychological overlay is consistent with a diagnosis of
chronic fatigue syndrome; it often develops as a secondary reaction to the
physical aspects of the disease”, Sisco at 744, ftnt.1
The Monroe Court
found the denial to be arbitrary and capricious because the plan’s examining
physician was not a fibromyalgia expert. Id. at 1315. In addition, the Monroe
court felt that there was objective evidence supporting Monroe’s claim in the
form of an abnormal sleep study performed by the treating physician and the
treating physician’s notation of certain “trigger point” that caused Monroe to
suffer. The court further noted that as the treating physician’s report was
more detailed than that of the plan’s examining doctor, the denial was
arbitrary and capricious because the plan (1) had given more weight to its
doctor’s report and (2) had failed to obtain an IME by a rheumatologist as had
been urged by the claimant and her treating physician. Id.
Stated that the
meaning of the clause "any gainful employment" or "other
occupation" clauses in a disability contract does NOT mean "merely a
job, paying any wage" but has been interpreted by an "overwhelming
majority" of juridictions" as what a policyholder would
"reasonably expect" that he would be "a job in which the insured
has been trained and has worked during his working life" and that he would
be able to earn "a living wage."
The judge said
"To hold otherwise would be to ignore the purposes for which individuals
purchase disability insurance policies."
(The law firm that
represented Moss was Richard J. Quadrino and Eve-Lynn Gisonni of Quadrino &
Schwartz in Garden City.)
Held that denial of
welfare benefits due to lack of objective medical evidence was arbitrary and
capricious; noted that “merely because we cannot see pain or fatigue on an
x-ray, or measure it in a laboratory, does not mean that it is not real.”
(also) “the medical
opinions of an employee’s doctor carry more weight than those of the insurance
company’s doctors.”
Held that a
fiduciary’s reliance on a doctor’s limited medical review, when presented with
contrary evidence from a treating doctor, was indicative of arbitrary and
capricious decision making. [Rodriguez, 876 F 2d at 762]
Claimant who could
only work four hours a day was presumptively disabled.
Given the
uncontroverted evidence that claimant suffered from CFS, blind reliance on a
lack of objective findings is wholly inconsistent with the Secretary’s policy
in such cases as expressed in the POMS and other pertinent policy statements.
The Court continued that although ‘physical examination may be within normal
limits,” nevertheless, “individual cases must be adjudicated on the basis of
the totality of evidence.” “the absence of definitive diagnostic tests for
chronic fatigue syndrome ‘does not constitute substantial evidence to support a
finding that claimant did not suffer from the syndrome’”
Claim erroneously
denied by decision maker not consulting an expert familiar with CFS.
“When confronted with an illness that is admittedly
difficult to diagnose, it is unreasonable to demand evidence of a specific kind
of impairment after experts have concluded that no definitive test for CFS has
yet been discovered. Moreover, it is unreasonable to ignore the expert opinions
of doctors who, using the best available method of diagnosing the illness, have
concluded that Sansevera suffers from a drastically debilitating disease.”
“There are no laboratory tests for Fibromyalgia” “Many
people are ignorant of the full range of available benefits, or reluctant to
undergo arduous administrative proceedings in which they are called liars,
until desperation resulting from a personal crisis or as here the cut off of
other public funds drives them to seek additional information or to overcome
their reluctance to run the bureaucratic gauntlet.”
“the tone of the administrative law judge’s opinion suggests
that she may have had an unshakable commitment to the denial of this
applicant’s claim.”
“Plaintiff could only be penalized for not availing herself
of such a test if one existed and she failed to obtain it. There are no such
tests available in CFS.”
“The National Institutes of Health prints a pamphlet for
physicians on CFS and it also prints a pamphlet for the public on understanding
Chronic Fatigue Syndrome.”
“The administrative law judge cannot substitute his opinion
for that of the congress, the Mayo Clinic, the plaintiff’s doctor, and the
entire medical community.”
Also in Sisco, the
Tenth Circuit has held “a review of the medical literature in the record
demonstrates that a psychological overlay is consistent with a diagnosis of
chronic fatigue syndrome; it often develops as a secondary reaction to the
physical aspects of the disease”, Sisco at 744, ftnt.1
The Supreme Court
resolved a split in the federal circuits and held that individual plan
participants or beneficiaries can bring claim of breach of fiduciary duty.
In Varity, the
Supreme Court had no difficulty holding that a company that acted as a
fiduciary and deceived plan participants about their benefits had breached
fiduciary duties and was liable in a claim under §502(a)(3). Lower courts have
generally held that misrepresentations by a fiduciary that deprive a
participant or beneficiary of benefits to which he or she would otherwise have
been entitled are actionable under §502(a)(3). See Anweiler v. American elec.
Power Serv. Corp., 3 F.3d 986 (7th cir. 1993); Becker v. Eastm Kodak Co., 120
F. 3d 5 (2d cir. 1997).
Held that “(1)
administrative law judge (ALJ) should have given controlling weight to opinions
of claimant’s treating physicians regarding claimant’s functional limitations;
(2) ALJ was prevented from having evidence necessary to fairly evaluate
claimant’s subjective complaints of pain and claimant’s credibility by his
improper rejection of opinions of her treating physicians; (3) ALJ committed
error of law by failing to make individualized assessment of claimant’s ability
to handle stress in workplace; and (4) by failing to consider the combination
of Weiler’s impairments in making the disability determination.”
“Non-examining doctors cannot by themselves trump the
findings from treating sources.”
Woo suffered from
Multiple Sclerosis and Scleroderma, two progressive immunologic diseases which
eventually disabled her. Her application for benefits was approved by Social
Security Disability. Hartford denied Woo’s benefits because they claimed none
of her doctors had specifically stated that she was disabled at the time she
resigned from her job.
The Appeals Court
found that Hartford not only abused its discretion but has a financial conflict
because as plan insurer, Hartford receives direct financial benefit from
denying benefits.
The court also
found that Hartford “failed to use proper judgment or thoroughly investigate
her claim” because they “merely had an in-house medical consultant review Woo’s
claim for benefits.”
Hartford failed to
use appropriate experts thereby triggering a “less deferential review.”
The court found “Hartford’s failure to use proper judgment, when combined
with the financial conflict, to be egregious conduct.” Apparently Ms. Woo’s
main problem was that she was in denial about the seriousness of her problems
and so even though she resigned from her position in Nov. 1993, she did not
submit a claim for benefits until March 4, 1995. However, despite her valiant
efforts to deny her diseases and her wish to improve, all of her symptoms had
been documented in her medical records prior to her resignation by her treating
physicians. They had just not specifically stated that she was disabled.