People are crying out for proof that Saddam has all of these terrible plagues and diseases before we go in guns blazing. They want proof that this guy really is the Dick Dastardly of the Arab states. I say that we sould ask ourselves what if. We know that he has used chemical weapons against his own people. Does anyone really believe that he is bothered about the lives of a few billion infidels.

The following is a 1998 report on Iraqs weapons capability. It was scary then and it is scary now. And science moves on an awful lot i four years.

Amid uncertainty whether the February 23 agreement brokered by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan on weapons inspections will prove sufficient to avert a military stike on Iraq ('Operation Desert Thunder'), we review once again the status of suspected Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) capabilities. These terror weapons are the root cause of the current dispute between Baghdad and the Coalition of the US, UK, Canada, Australia and others. Saddam Hussein is believed to retain a residual, yet potentially formidable, WMD infrastructure, which he has apparently managed to hide successfully from the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM). This capability encompasses the full range of WMD concerns: chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, plus the ballistic missiles to deliver them.

Chemical Weapons (CW)

A small stockpile of agents and munitions.
Quantities of VX nerve agent.

Comment: Prior to the Gulf War, Iraq had one of the largest CW arsenals in the world. This arsenal was severely damaged during the war; later, it was sharply reduced by UNSCOM destruction efforts.
Nevertheless, the US Department of Defense (DOD) believes Iraq has probably hidden precursor chemicals, agents, munitions, and documentation for future use. On 18 February 1998, US Defense Secretary William Cohen stated that Iraq retained ‘large quantities of VX.’ VX is a highly persistent nerve agent, which could be used against troops or to contaminate terrain. It would pose both short- and long-term hazards for military forces.
Any Iraqi CW threat would require Coalition forces to take appropriate precautions and operate in masks and protective clothing, which would degrade their operational effectiveness and reduce troop morale. Although CW can be extremely deadly, the effects of CW are somewhat unpredictable, as they can be heavily affected by terrain, weather and wind factors.
UNSCOM reported in October 1997 that it had confirmed the destruction of 30 chemical warheads designed for the Iraqi-modified Scud missile, known as the Al Hussein (16 of these warheads were filled with sarin and 14 with binary components). In the absence of additional data, however, UNSCOM is unable to confirm that these warheads encompassed all the CW warheads that Iraq had developed and subsequently claimed it had destroyed. Thus, it must be assumed that Iraq retains some capability to deliver CW at long-range.

Biological Weapons (BW)

Unknown quantities of agents

Comment: Iraq’s BW program has been described as a ‘black hole’ by Ambassador Richard Butler, the head of UNSCOM. DOD reported in November 1997 that Iraq ‘may still retain some biological agents and weapons.’
Specific BW agents that Iraq is believed to have weaponized include anthrax, botulinum and aflatoxin. Iraq is known to have filled 25 warheads for the Al-Hussein with BW, including five with anthrax, 16 with botulinum toxin and four with aflatoxin. Iraq also filled 157 aerial bombs with BW and deployed four airplane drop tank sprayers during the Gulf War (one of which was attached to a plane, but not filled with agent). Against this background, Iraq must be assumed to retain some capability to deliver BW substances at long-range.
Should Iraq retain such a capability, anthrax is likely to be the agent of choice. Aflatoxin produces long-term carcinogenic effects (i.e., over many years) and is not well-suited for use as a weapon. The Iraqis may have chosen this substance more to demonstrate a BW capability, than to achieve an effective operational weapon. However, alfatoxin could be effective when used simply to terrorize unprotected civilian populations.
With regard to botulinum, UNSCOM’s chief BW inspector, Richard Spertzel, has recently stated that UNSCOM is confident that Iraq retains no weapons filled with botulinum toxin because botulinum in a liquid state loses its potency over time. (It is unclear whether Iraq dried botulinum toxin or anthrax, which would allowed easier storage of these agents, but is believed to have the technology to have done so.)
Anthrax, by contrast, is a hardy substance and retains its potency during storage. Anthrax induces flu-like symptoms over a 1-5-day period and is highly lethal. Even small quantities would pose a major threat to troops or population centres. One example of the effects of an anthrax release can be seen from a 1979 accident at a Soviet military institute in the city of Sverdlovsk. In that incident, some 10 kg/22 lb of dry anthrax spores were reportedly released. The bacterial aerosol contaminated an area with a radius of at least 3-5 km. Within two weeks, a significant number of deaths occurred (at least 68 and perhaps as high as 100 or more). Those within the contaminated area contracted pulmonary anthrax through inhalation. Some may have contracted anthrax through skin contact or through consumption of contaminated food. Containment efforts were largely ineffective.
Anthrax can be combated through antibiotics and with protective clothing and related measures. In December 1997, DOD announced that all active duty US military personnel and selected reservists would be vaccinated against anthrax starting in summer 1998. Units in the Persian Gulf and South Korea would be inoculated first. Anthrax immunizations consist of a series of six inoculations over an 18-month period.

Nuclear Weapons

None
Retains research capability and some technical base

Comment: Prior to the Gulf War, Iraq was on a course to develop nuclear weapons and it is believed that Baghdad would have had a small arsenal by the mid-1990s. After the invasion of Kuwait, Iraq established a crash program to gain a nuclear capability by about April 1991. This effort was derailed by the war, which resulted in the destruction of much of Iraq’s nuclear infrastructure. The US DOD recently reported that ‘Baghdad retains the scientists needed to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program when conditions permit.’ However it would take Iraq five or more years on its own to manufacture enough fissile material for a weapon. If Iraq were successful in tapping foreign sources for such material, the weapons timeline would be much shorter, perhaps only a year or so.

Ballistic Missiles

A small force of prohibited Scud-type ballistic missiles, mainly Iraqi-modified Scuds, known as the Al Hussein, with a range of approximately 600-650 km/372-403 miles and a payload of 300-500 kg/663-1,105 lb.

A research and development effort in permitted battlefield-range ballistic missiles (less than 150km/93 miles) and prohibited longer-range missiles as a base for future production should sanctions be lifted.

Comment: In a ‘White Paper’ released on 17 February 1998, the US Government stated that Iraq ‘could still have a small force of Scud-type missiles and an undetermined number of warheads and launchers.’ Estimates of the size of this force vary but seem likely to be in the range of ‘dozens’ of missiles.
In comments carried by the Russian press on 19 February 1998, one senior Russian military officer, Col. Gen. Vladimir Yakolev, commander-in-chief of Russian strategic missile forces, placed the size of the Iraq’s covert force at approximately 35-60 Scud-type missiles.
One recent report has suggested that Saddam possesses a much larger number of ballistic missiles, but this claim is fanciful and flies in the face of all available evidence. A 15 February 1998 report attributed to the US House of Representatives Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare asserted that Iraq may retain 400 Scud-type missiles and that these may have been moved out of Iraq in 1990-91 to countries, such as Sudan, Yemen, Libya or Algeria. On 16 February, the White House stated that ‘we have no evidence that Iraq has exported weapons of mass destruction technology to other countries since the Gulf War.’ While this statement does not completely refute the Congressional report, the Task Force’s claim is at odds with all other information in the public domain, including the detailed analyses published by UNSCOM. Thus there remains no credible evidence that Saddam has retained anything more than a small number of prohibited ballistic missiles.
Saddam’s residual missile capabilities remain troubling and would clearly present a threat to Saudi Arabia, Israel and Coalition forces currently deployed in the Gulf region. But this threat is unlikely to be of the same dimensions as that faced in 1991, when Saddam had a much larger force of Scuds and Al Husseins available but launched only a limited number (93) of Al Husseins at Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Bahrain. Nevertheless, even a small missile force could be a politically effective tool and a threat to Coalition forces. It is important to recall that 28 American soldiers were killed and 97 wounded in an attack by a single Al Hussein on a US barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, on 25 February 1991. This attack accounted for 25 percent of the killed and wounded from enemy action that all US forces suffered in the Gulf War.
Iraq continues to pursue permitted battlefield ballistic missile programs, such as the Al-Samoud (150 km/93 miles), which has been described as a ‘mini-Scud,’ and the Ababil-50 (50 km/31 miles) and Ababil-100 (100-150 km/62-93 miles) programs. To the extent that any of these missiles have been produced, they are only likely available in limited numbers. Iraq is using such programs, and possibly others, mainly to keep alive a technical base for a breakout capability should sanctions be lifted. Such post-sanction activity would almost certainly return to a focus on longer-range ballistic missiles.

Outlook: Without full and complete on-site access to WMD sites and facilities, UNSCOM inspectors have no way to verify and enforce Iraqi compliance with UN mandates imposed after the Gulf War. Saddam Hussein is clearly attempting to divide UNSCOM with the goal of closing down the inspections and getting UN sanctions against Iraq lifted. Should Saddam’s ploy prove successful, future regional and international stability would be at risk, as he would most assuredly initiate a drive to reconstitute his WMD capabilities to pre-Gulf War levels, thereby posing a serious strategic threat to his neighbors and other adversaries further afield. The international community can ill-afford to see a new, more threatening Saddam Hussein unleashed in the future.

Data supplied by CDISS

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