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CHAPTER X

The New Era: Passivity and Persecution

THE Law of Nationalities met with vigorous opposition on the part of the handful of non-Magyar deputies; but it is not easy to decide whether this attitude was due to their undoubted lack of self-restraint and political judg­ment, or to a keen presentiment of coming events. Certainly, when all due praise has been bestowed upon the Act, it still seems meagre and inadequate compared with the Transylvanian Act of 1863, by which the three languages of the principality were placed on a footing of absolute equality. The Rouma­nians especially could not forget the golden era of Schmerling, and doubtless cherished the vain illusion that the Ausgleich settlement would be no more permanent than the Bach system or the Provisorium.[1]

There can be no doubt that Deák and Eötvös were genuinely desirous of conciliating the nationalities and of assuring to their languages and customs as large a measure of liberty as seemed consistent with the political unity of the State. The broad and tolerant views of Eötvös may be clearly traced in most of his political writings. The existence of a large state in this part of Europe was, in his opinion, essential to the safety of all the various races concerned; while, on the other hand, ethnographic conditions made the rise of a large national state impossible. A strict adherence to "historic right " could only produce discontent, while it would be madness, in attempting a solution of the racial question, to consult only the interests of the State as a whole, without also considering those of the individual nationalities which compose it.[2] " The supremacy of our nation," he added, " would be the greatest calamity which could happen to it."[3] " We have to deal with one of those questions which, like religion, rest not so much upon logic as upon feeling, and which cannot be solved by the imperative decision of majorities, but only by mutual understanding."[4] The just claims of the nationali­ties must be satisfied, since by a policy of Magyarization " we should no more succeed in robbing them of the con­sciousness of their individuality or of enthusiasm for their race, than others succeeded against the Magyar nationality with the same means.... The sole result would be to divert the antagonism which the Magyar language at present en­counters, against the Hungarian state and the unity of the country."[5] In building a wall, it is mere waste of time to attempt to melt the different stones into a single whole: they must be fitted together with good lime.

That Deák held very similar views upon the racial question, may be gathered from his speech in Parliament on January 23, 1872, on the subject of a newly opened Serb gymnasium at Ujvidék (Neusatz).[6] " Let us remember," he said, "what difficulties we had to contend with in our youth, when we had to study in a dead and alien language, and how greatly the studies of the younger generation have been simplified by the use of their mother tongue as language of instruction. The same is true of the nationalities. If we sought to compel their children, who know little or no Magyar, to pursue their studies in Magyar, then we should make their progress in the gymnasia impossible; the parents would spend their money to no purpose, the children would simply waste their time. Indeed, if we wish to win over the nationalities, we must not seek at all costs to Magyarize them; this can only happen if we create in them love and attachment for Hun­garian conditions. For two things are clear to me; to exter­minate them would be a godless act of barbarism, even if they were not in any case too numerous for this to be possible. And to make them our enemies is not to our interest."

Unhappily Eötvös was removed by death in 1871, and Deák, who regarded the Ausgleich as the completion of his life-work, steadily resisted all pressure to enter the political arena and only exercised a general influence upon Govern­mental policy. Thus each change of Ministry since 1869 marked a fresh step towards the accession of the Radicals to power. The short term of office of Joseph Szlávy (December, 1872, to March, 1874) was overshadowed by the financial crisis, and saddened by the virtual withdrawal of Deák from public life. Szlávy's successor, Bittó, was little more than a shadow, destined to accustom the eyes to the full glare of the sun of Tisza; and the approaching fusion of the Deákists with the Radical Opposition involved among other things the adoption of a more Chauvinistic attitude towards the nation­alities. The first blows were struck against the Slovaks — their academy (Matica Slovenská) and secondary schools, upon which all hope of progress in national culture depended, being especially signalled out for attack. As the onslaughts of the Magyar Press upon the former grew every year more frequent and violent, the vice-president, Pauliny-Tóth, and the secretary, Sašinek, in January, 1872, sent a memorandum to the Premier, protesting against the charges of disloyalty and Panslavism levelled against them. Szlávy, in his reply, (November 1, 1872) thanked them for this guarantee of their patriotic intentions, expressly approved the aims of the Society, and promised to protect it in the exercise of its legal rights.[7] This answer, however, afforded the Slovaks but a brief respite, and a foretaste was given them in the following year (February, 1873), when Francisci applied to the Minister of the Interior for permission to found a "Slovak Union." The proposed rules of the society were closely modelled on those of the Magyar Szövetség, a Magyarizing agency which has now for many years past led the campaign against the nationalities. The second paragraph laid down as the chief objects of the society "the protection of Slovak national interests, the furtherance of national culture and the foun­dation of societies for this purpose in the Slovak districts, and their direction from headquarters." No difficulties were, of course, placed in the way of the Magyar League, and indeed it had more than once received substantial support from the Hungarian Government; but the Slovak League was prohibited altogether.[8]

The first steps were taken against the Slovak gymnasia. Even as early as August, 1867, the seven Slovak professors at the gymnasium of Neusohl (which had flourished under the fostering care of Bishop Moyses) were dispersed to different schools, Slovak was declared a non-obligatory subject, and the equality of the three languages — Slovak, Magyar and German — was abolished; and thus within a few years the institution had been completely Magyarized.[9] It was such incidents as this which made the Slovak and Roumanian leaders of that day so sceptical about the advantages of the much vaunted Law of Nationalities; for it was scarcely a good omen for its execution.

In April, 1874, at the instance of Béla Grünwald, Vice­Sheriff of Zólyom county, Trefort, the Minister of Education, ordered a strict inquiry into the management of the three remaining Slovak gymnasia.[10] The Lutheran superintendents Czekus and Geduly were instructed to inspect the two Protestant gymnasia of Nagy Röcze (Revúca) and Turócz St. Márton. The latter referred the Minister to his formal reports of inspection; the former, who favoured a Mag­yarizing policy, made a fresh visit to Röcze, and though he had already visited it several times in his official capacity and reported favourably upon its activity, on this occasion he informed the synod that he had discovered symptoms of " Panslavism" in the school. The meeting of synod, which contained a Magyar majority, hereupon withdrew its recognition from the school, and on August 20, 1874, a ministerial order was issued for its abolition. In September the General Assembly of the Church, which was once more predominantly Magyar in sentiment, appointed a commission to inspect the gymnasium at Turócz St. Márton, and as its report was also unfavourable, it too was dissolved by a ministerial order of December 30. Meanwhile Trefort had instructed Barton, the school inspector of Pressburg, to inquire into the state of the Catholic Slovak gymnasium at Znio Váralja. Barton's inspection lasted four days and a half, and Justh, the Vice-Sheriff of Turócz, and other promi­nent Magyars, were present during part of the proceedings. Not merely the professors, but the boys in all the different classes, were cross-examined without result; and finally Barton submitted a highly favourable report, praising the conduct of the school and its success in teaching the Magyar language ! A second inspection by Ipólyi-Stummer, the new Bishop of Neusohl, and one of the secretaries of state, pro­duced the same result. Not merely could no traces of Pan­slavism be found, but special emphasis was laid on the fact that from the fifth class onwards everything could be success­fully taught to the Slovak pupils in Magyar. The Minister of Education then offered to take over the gymnasium on behalf of the State, and when the governing body declined to comply with this suggestion, a ministerial order was issued to the county authorities (September 21, 1874), enjoining the provisional closing of the gymnasium on the ground that the old building was inadequate and the new building not yet; sufficiently dry. Before this decision became known, some of the pupils had begun to arrive with their parents; close upon 200 pupils had been enrolled for the coming term. Under the stress of this situation, the governing body formu­lated, on October 14, the conditions for handing over the school to the State, while safeguarding the Slovak language. These conditions did not meet with Trefort's approval; for on December 30, 1874, the gymnasium of Znio Váralja shared the fate of its Protestant neighbour in Turócz. Since that date the Slovaks have made more than one effort to found a: Slovak gymnasium, but the Government has consistently withheld its permission, in direct violation of the law (§26, XLIV., 1868). For thirty-four years the progress and culture of two million Hungarian citizens have been deliberately stifled by those .whose duty it is to mete out equal justice to all the various races of the country; and the few advocates of Slovak liberty and equality have been branded as traitors to their sovereign and native land, and supporters of Russian des­potism, and have either been driven by persecution to quit the country or subjected to repeated trials and imprisonment. The very people which has for centuries past displayed the most heroic qualities in defence of its own liberties, shows itself wholly incapable of understanding similar aspirations on the part of neighbouring races.

Not long after the dissolution, Béla Grünwald met the Minister of Education, who greeted him with the query, " Well, are you satisfied with me ? " The zealous Magyarone naturally gave a highly flattering answer. " It was impossible to tolerate the Pansláv gymnasiums," the Minister went on to say, " they simply had to be closed. His Majesty, too, was much interested in the matter. If you know of any other bad gymnasium, tell me, and I will close it at once. I will dissolve all schools of that kind."[11] When a Cabinet Minister could talk in such a strain, there was obviously little hope of justice for the Slovaks.

Not content with thus depriving the rising generation of Slovaks of the most necessary means of education, the Govern­ment determined if possible to nip in the bud the tender flower of Slovak literature. On April 6, 1875, the Matica Slovenská was provisionally suspended, and on November 12, Coloman Tisza, who had just entered on his triumphal career as leader of the united Liberal Party, proclaimed its final dissolution. The entire funds of the society, amounting to £8,000 and including the Emperor-King's own subscription, were arbitrarily confiscated; its buildings — to this day the second largest in the little town of Márton — were converted into Government' offices.[12] The unique Slovak museum and library was also seized, and after lying for many years in a caretaker's attics, at length found their way to a Magyar gymnasium in a distant town.[13]

slovak pottery.

On December 15, 1875, Dr. Polit, the Serb deputy, interpellated the Premier regarding the confiscation, and argued that the funds should at least be restored, in accordance with the statutes of the society, to the original donors, in other words to the Slovak nation. It was on this occasion that Coloman Tisza made his famous retort: " There is no Slovak nation " — an answer which rendered all further dis­cussion of the incident impossible.

The action of the Government in dissolving the Matica and the three Slovak gymnasiums is absolutely indefensible, and will always remain one of the darkest stains upon Coloman Tisza's reputation. The decrees which dissolved them were arbitrary bureaucratic acts, intolerable in a free parliamentary country; no public inquiry was ever held: no incriminating proofs were ever published, and when the incident was dis­cussed in Parliament, its critics were dismissed with contempt and abuse. Moreover, even if Panslavism in the full sense of the word had been proved ten times over, this still would afford no excuse for the confiscation of the funds, but merely for purging the Matica and the schools of bad practices and for insisting that they should henceforth hold strictly aloof from politics.

The dissolution came as a thunderbolt upon the Slovaks: indeed, it is not too much to say that it reduced them to politi­cal impotence for a whole generation. The golden era of the Liberal Party in Hungary had begun: the fusion of the Déakists and the Left Centre was an accomplished fact; and for fifteen years Coloman Tisza was far more truly dic­tator of Hungary than Kossuth or Deák had ever been. The stubborn and artful Calvinist accomplished what neither Lutheran nor Catholic could achieve; he reconciled the rival­ries of Protestant and Catholic and united them in the common cause . of racial unity. This achievement, without which many of the successes of Andrássy and Kalnóky in the field of diplomacy would have been impossible, constitutes Tisza's truest claim to greatness. But his grasp of politics was surer than his hold upon ethics; and most of the evils from which Hungary is suffering to-day are to be traced directly to the intolerant racial and class policy which he pursued. To Deák and Eötvös Liberalism in the true philosophical sense had been the very breath of their nostrils. To Tisza it was merely the means to an end — a signboard designed to attract customers rather than to describe the goods of the firm; the great ideas of the modern world were as nothing to him compared with the narrow interests of his own race and class. When still in Opposition, he had declared that the Magyar State was strong enough to stamp out those who withheld their obedience, and he now proceeded to carry the threat into practice. Acting on the principle that in politics the end justifies the means, he secured the predomi­nance oi the Liberal Party by a far-reaching system of electoral corruption and administrative trickery. The Magyar popula­tion of the central plains remained consistently loyal to the ideals of Louis Kossuth; the Government had therefore to find a working majority in the non-Magyar districts, and as this could not be attained by natural means, it was neces­sary to resort to gerrymandering, unequal distribution, a highly complicated franchise, and voting by public declaration (see chapter xiii.). These were the chief features of the revised Electoral Law of 1874, which, in the words of the official Gov­ernment organ of Hungary, is so involved that " the confusion of Babel has really been erected into law. The legislation regarding the exercise of this most important of all civil rights is the delight of all pettifoggers, and the way in which the provi­sions of the law are drawn up enables even a moderately gifted lawyer's clerk to dispute any man's right to vote or to adduce good reasons for his admission to the franchise."[14] In addition to the practical difficulties created by the letter of the law, every imaginable violence and trickery was employed to secure the return of Government candidates, the whole admin­istrative machine was placed at their service, and money was poured out like water. The nationalities were " voted " as effectually as the negroes in the Southern States, and this process was rendered more easy by the limited number of educated men whom they could bring into the field. These injustices, and the memory of past hopes under Bach and Schmerling, seem to have destroyed the political balance of the Slovak and Roumanian leaders, and the impossible demands which they put forward show that their courage was greatly superior to their political judgment. Their utter incapacity to lead became apparent when they adopted the fatal policy of passivity. By acting thus they created a false impression of their own impotence, they greatly increased the over-confidence of the Magyars, and they encour­aged the demoralization of their own electors, by leaving them to the mercy of the Magyar candidates. The peasant voters lost all incentive to remain true to their own national cause, and naturally succumbed to the temptation to sell their votes to the highest bidder; to-day the younger genera­tion, in its endeavour to cure these evil propensities, is still suffering from the sins of omission of its fathers.

As a result of this passivity, Coloman Tisza acquired an almost despotic control of 250 constituencies, and commanded a safe majority in Parliament, even without the assistance of the forty Croatian delegates. These seats he bestowed upon his followers as largesse for their loyal support; and in this way many a decayed aristocrat repaired the broken fortunes of his family, many a pliant official rose to riches and honour, i Thus the solid array of Tisza's so-called " Mame­lukes " erected a veiled parliamentary absolutism which shrouded itself in the garb of Liberalism, but which did not scruple to plant its foot firmly upon the neck of the non­Magyar races.

A section of the new Liberal Party was still disposed to assure the loyalty of the nationalities by moderate concessions; but the ferment among the neighbouring races of Austria and of the Balkans provided Tisza with an excuse for severity, and nipped in the bud all counsels of tolerance. The acute crisis which arose in the Near East, in consequence of the Bulgarian massacres and the Bosnian rising, exercised an unfavourable influence upon the situation of the non-Magyar races of Hungary. The attitude of Russia filled the Magyars with alarm, and led to a recrudescence of ultra-Chauvinist feeling, which vented itself upon their defenceless Slav fellow­citizens. The very natural sympathy which the Slavs of Hungary displayed for their kinsmen in Bosnia and Servia was treated as a proof of disloyalty and sedition. When Prince Milan declared war upon the Turks, Russian volunteers flocked in thousands to Belgrade, to draw swords in the cause of Christian Slavdom; and Svetozar Miletič, inspired by their example, offered to raise a corps of Serb volunteers in the Banat, and to lead them in this new crusade against the infidel. In August, 1876, Miletič and Cazapinovič, another prominent Serb, were summarily arrested by orders of the Hungarian Government; though Miletič was a member of Parliament, his immunity was violated without scruple, and when the House met again after its summer vacation, this illegal proceeding was endorsed by an overwhelming majority. The result of his trial was a foregone conclusion, and after the usual intolerable delays of Hungarian justice, Miletič was on January 18, 1878, sentenced for separatist tendencies to five years' imprisonment. The long confinement proved too much for the unhappy man; his reason left him, and he did not long survive his consequent release. The parting words of Miletič as he bade farewell to the political world — " hodie tibi, eras mihi" — were spoken to the distant future, and a whole generation was to pass before his disciple and advocate Dr. Polit brought them to the memory of a still more Chauvinistic Parliament in the summer of 1906.

While all open expressions of sympathy with Servia were sternly repressed by Tisza's Government, the Magyar enthu­siasm for the Turkish cause reached fever pitch. Abdul Kerim, the Turkish general who defeated the Servian army at Alexinatz, was presented with a sword of honour by public subscription. Turkophil demonstrations were held in Buda­pest at the grave of Gul Baba, by crowds which seemed forget­ful of the memories of shame and conquest with which the name was associated. A torchlight procession in honour of the Turkish consul-general was only abandoned at the request of Coloman Tisza, whose dissuasive methods on this occasion contrasted harshly with the treatment meted out to Miletič. Meanwhile a deputation of Budapest students was sent to Constantinople to assure the Turks of Magyar solidarity.[15] The occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was regarded with strong disfavour by the great body of Magyar public opinion, and nothing shows more clearly the statesmanship and enormous influence of Count Julius Andrássy than the manner in which the parliamentary majori­ties of Hungary and Austria were cajoled and manoeuvred into a forward policy in the northern Balkans. For the moment the Tisza Government suffered in popularity, and at the general elections the Premier was himself defeated at Debreczen. This untoward event had not, however, destroyed the general effect of the Tisza electoral system; the Government still controlled a majority of 77, and the masterful Tisza set himself to soothe the ruffled tempers of his countrymen by adopting a policy of active Magyarization. The conciliatory principles of Deák and Eötvös, which had already been abandoned in practice, were now set at almost open defiance. The Education Act of 1879, making the Magyar language an obligatory subject in all Hungarian primary schools, and imposing quite a number of fresh qualifications on the teachers in non-Magyar schools, conflicts openly with the more liberal Act of 1868, and still more with the Law of Nationalities of the same year (see p. 216, chapter xi.). But the complaints of the nationalities fell upon deaf ears; the appeals of Mr. Mocsáry for their fair treatment were like a voice in the wilderness, and the inclusion of a large section of the foreign press within the sphere of Tisza's action prevented the outside world from learning the. truth about the non­Magyar races. The only real protests came from Germany, where the Transylvanian Saxons possessed many loyal friends and advocates; but the Triple Alliance, whose conclusion was so essential to the interests of the young Empire, lay in the gift of the Magyar statesmen, and Bismarck, who had already advised the transference of the Habsburg court from Vienna to Budapest,[16] felt that the two million Germans of Hungary must be sacrificed to the exigencies of foreign policy. These farthest outposts of Germanism, he doubtless argued, were as nothing compared to the lasting friendship of the predominant partner in the Dual Monarchy; and their protection was left to the " German School Union " and the "Gustavus Adolphus Society."

In 1883 a Secondary Education Act was passed by the Hungarian Parliament, whose object and result was the final Magyarization of all state gymnasiums and " Realschulen,"[17] in direct violation of the Law of Nationalities of 1868 (§§ 17, 18). Even the few surviving non-Magyar secondary schools were placed under the strictest governmental control; the Magyar language and literature were made compulsory for all their pupils, who had to pass their final examinations in these subjects in the language itself. Elaborate clauses were included for the control of school-books, especially those on historical subjects, for the prevention of " unpatriotic " teaching, for the removal of " dangerous individuals," and, if necessary, for the dissolution of non-Magyar secondary schools and the erection of state schools in their place.[18] Under Tisza's rule the language of instruction in all state gymnasiums became exclusively Magyar, and not content with this, the Government in July, 1889, ordered its introduction into the Roumanian gymnasium at Belényes, which had been founded in 1826 by private effort for the benefit of Roumanian Catholics. This action was all the more galling to the Roumanians, owing to the Government's refusal to permit the Roumanian Bishop of Arad to erect gymnasiums in Arad and Karánsebes.

In 1885 Tisza dealt a fresh blow at the nationalities by the dissolution of the Jury Court of Hermannstadt. A ministerial order of July 10, 1871, had established three jury courts in Transylvania for the trial of press offences; and by this new action of the Government the non-Magyar press was placed entirely at the mercy of courts which sat in the Chauvinist Magyar towns of Kolozsvár and Maros-Vásárhely and were composed exclusively of Magyars. Since that date acquittals of non-Magyar journalists have been almost unknown; they are tried by their bitterest political and social enemies, and in Transylvania suffer from the further disadvantage of being tried under an obsolete law dating from 1852, when absolutist reaction was at its height, and setting the principles of press freedom at open defiance.[19]

Tisza had now ruled supreme for ten years, securing a working majority and the means of patronage by the methods already indicated, and skilfully using the Kossuthist Opposition as a bogey to frighten the sovereign. Whenever difficulties were encountered in Vienna, administrative pressure was removed, and the Independent Party was allowed to raise its head, while the group of so-called " National " deputies under Count Albert Apponyi reasserted more loudly its de­mands for a national Magyar army. Tisza's ingenious device of using insubordination below to secure compliance above was at first completely successful, but in the course of time it became difficult to dispel the spirits which his own arts had conjured up. The Extreme Left showed signs of increasing strength, and the manner in which they were treated by the Government and its creatures provoked them to unmeasured personal attacks.[20] For while used at one time as a lever to reduce Austria to reason, at another they were subjected to the treatment meted out to the nationalities.[21] As the Opposition grew more and more embittered, Tisza showed an increasing disposition to rest on his laurels, to rely upon the executive and to occupy Parliament's attention with measures of secondary importance. The one really outstanding measure of the last seven years of Tisza's Government — the reform of the House of Magnates in 1885 — was the one least likely to encounter the resistance of an Opposition which was in those days of its adversity still genuinely Radical. The readjustment of the Local Government laws in 1886 was a fresh blow dealt by Tisza at his opponents, in the true spirit of his Calvinist ancestors; but its true significance lay in its unnamed but none the less real concessions to the growing Jewish bourgeoisie, who cunningly assumed a mask of Magyar Chauvinism, in order to gain control of the finance, the trade and the municipal government of the country. For the moment the magnates and the gentry, blinded by racial ardour, welcomed this new class as valuable allies in the national struggle; too late they have awakened to a perception of the fact that not only the towns, to which they were indifferent, but even the counties are falling more and more into Jewish hands. While it would be unjust to ascribe the decay of the Magyar gentry to Coloman Tisza, their truest repre­sentative, it is none the less true that the methods which he employed to encourage assimilation supplied the Jews with their opportunity and eventually placed his own class at their mercy.

Meanwhile, whatever animus Government and Opposition might display towards each other, they invariably presented a united front wherever racial questions were concerned, and outvied each other in their professions of intolerance and Chauvinism. A startling instance of this was supplied by the debates on the proposed Education Bill of 1887. Alone of all the Magyar deputies, Mr. Louis Mocsary, then President of the Party of Independence, protested against the prevailing Chauvinism, complained of the Magyarization of ancient placenames and the expulsion of Slovak pupils from Magyar gymnasiums, and recounted to an impatient audience, how the courts refused all petitions drawn up in any non-Magyar tongue, and how certain counties had imposed a special rate in favour of a Magyarizing League in Transylvania. After describing the Magyarization of Hungary as " a Utopian idea," Mr. Mocsary went on to say: " The Government must never forget that it is governing a polyglot country, that it is equally a Government for Magyars, Slovaks and Serbs, that . . . there are citizens of various races among whom not only the burdens but also the rights must be divided equally. . . . But the Government sees a strong power in the Chauvinist movement, and therefore dares not oppose it. ... No wonder, then, that in this country every man takes upon himself to infringe and exploit the law, and that we in this house can say in the very face of Government and Parliament, that the laws are not observed, that the Act of 1868 exists solely on paper and is not executed in any single point." Tisza, in his answer, remarked: "I cannot be angry with the honourable member for his speech, I can only commiserate him, because he has, doubtless involuntarily, succeeded in making himself the prophet of all those who here and outside the fatherland are filled with hatred against the Magyar race and the Magyar state." The pupils of the Leutschau gymnasium, he added, had been guilty of reading a Slovak newspaper which, under cover of Press freedom, agitated against the State, and of singing a song which fostered hatred of the Magyars; and such a spirit could not be tolerated in Hungarian institutions ! Thus on the one hand the Slovaks may not possess schools of their own, and if, on the other hand, they attend Magyar schools, they must carefully suppress their natural sentiments or they will find every door of educa­tion in their native country rudely shut in their faces.

As a result of this incident, the Party of Independence, on the motion of Géza Polónyi, unanimously expressed its dis­approval of Mocsáry's speech, and asked him to draw the consequences; Mocsary at once resigned, and from that day to this he has been ostracized from Hungarian politics. His writings in favour of a just treatment of the nationalities have from time to time been cited in order to delude foreign opinion, but have been consistently ignored and depreciated by. his own countrymen.[22]

Enough has been said to show that the leading motive of Tisza's administration was the Magyarization of the nationali­ties and the formation of a national Magyar State. Tisza himself publicly proclaimed the necessity of granting full powers to the Government to deal with nationalist agitation, and declared himself ready to concede similar powers to any Government which might take his place, so long as he were convinced that these would be exercised in the interests of the Magyar State.[23] In case this should not be explicit enough for the reader, I cannot do better than quote the words of Gustav Beksics, one of the ablest journalists and historians of modern Hungary, and a trusted follower and adviser of Tisza. On January 10, 1890, he defended his leader as follows, on the floor of the Hungarian Parliament: " The endeavour to convert the historical State into a national State has long been a feature of Magyar policy. Now this endeavour has attained to fresh prominence under Tisza's Government, owing not merely to its activity but also to its brilliant successes. Those who now dispute this are answered by the statistical data of the census of 1880, which prove the great progress of Magyarization, and the new census will show this even more clearly. If, in spite of all, some one should still deny thi great achievement of Tisza's Government, I need merely point to the following facts. Above all I ask, was it not under this Government that the language of justice has every­where become the Magyar ? Has not this Government delivered the courts from the confusion of Babel ? . . . Was it not this Government that closed the secondary schools of the nationalities, where their youth was being educated in anti-Magyar national spirit ? Have not the secondary schools of the nationalities sunk under this Government to a small and dwindling number, compared to the well-developed middle schools of the Magyar State ? . . ."[24] In another place Beksics has tersely described the " aim " of Hungarian policy as follows: " Either Hungary will become a great national State, or it will cease to be a State at all."[25]

In one respect Tisza's position was stronger during the closing years of his long term of office; thanks to the brilliant finance of Széll and Wekerle, the deficit at last disappeared in 1889 from the Hungarian Budget, while Gabriel Baross earned a deservedly high reputation by his introduction of the railway " zone system " and his reorganization of the Ministry of Commerce. But the intentional obscurity of the Ausgleich on the military question now began to bear its inevitable fruit; the Extreme Left, under the able leadership of Irányi, Charles Eötvös and Ugron emphasized with grow­ing violence the need of an independent Hungarian army with Magyar language of command. The unfortunate Janský incident in May, 1886 — when an Austrian general laid a wreath on the tomb of Hentzi, who had fallen in 1848 in defending the citadel of Buda against Gorgei's assault — had seriously impaired the Cabinet's reputation, and accentuated still fur­ther the personal ill-feeling between Tisza and the two Oppo­sition parties — the Kossuthists of the Left and the so-called "National Party" of Count Apponyi. The latter especially be­came the mouthpiece of extremist agitation for an independent army, and placed all his brilliant oratorical gifts at the service of this cause. The new Law of National Defence brought forward by Tisza in January, 1889, roused intense feeling among large sections of the Magyar population, and it was only by means of his "Mameluke" majority that the measure could be passed; indeed, even as it was, the obstacles to its passage might have proved insuperable, had not the tragic death of the Crown Prince silenced and distracted the hostile demonstrations. By the new law Hungary engaged herself for the next ten years to furnish the same contingent to the joint army as Austria, the numerical strength being deter­mined by the Crown and any alteration being submitted to Parliament. The most unpopular provision of the new scheme was that by which all officers must pass a German examination, failure in which involves a year's delay. Tisza, of course, defended the absolute necessity of a single language of command in a joint army; while his opponents took up the highly plausible position that the armies of Prince Eugene and Napoleon were commanded in more than one language, without thereby suffering in discipline or efficiency.

The army debates had completed the estrangement between Government and Opposition, and had roused personal jealousies and hatreds to such a pitch that a victim was necessary if Parliamentary government was not to come to a standstill. The personal factor has always predominated in Hungarian politics; men signify more than parties, and the withdrawal or removal of a leader is a more decisive event than a similar charge in most Western countries. Early in March, 1890, Coloman Tisza resigned, after holding office for fifteen years; but his successor, Count Julius Szápáry, remained little more than a dignified figurehead, while the so-called " Tisza clique " preserved its old influence upon affairs, and perpetuated what the exiled Kossuth has bitterly described as a state of ”codified illegality."

The withdrawal of Tisza from an active share in politics coincided with a revival of Clericalism, which brought Count Apponyi into renewed prominence. His opponents are in the habit of taunting this statesman with his repeated volte­faces and apparent inconsistencies: closer examination shows that he has always been consistently loyal to two ideas — clericalism and nationalism, in the narrow sense of the words. The wide European culture which he acquired as a young man was grafted upon the tenets of his Jesuit teachers at Kalksburg, and has produced a strange amalgam of genuine religious tolerance and zeal for the advancement of the Catholic faith. But even stronger was his devotion to the Cause'of Magyar ascendancy and his belief in "the idea of the Magyar state " ("a magyar állam eszme"); and thus he was'gradually led to outbid the Calvinists of Tisza in his patriotic programme. Hence the disciple and successor of the ultra-Conservative Baron Sennyey re-christened his party the " Moderate Opposition," and some years later proclaimed himself the leader of a " National Party." The Magyar Catholics of the northern plains, the pious Germans of the Banat, the Magyarized gentry of southern Slovensko, formed Count Apponyi's chief recruiting ground: but his own versa­tile genius has always offered a striking contrast to the medio­crity of his followers. The anti-Clerical campaign organized by the fallen Tisza seemed to supply Count Apponyi with his great opportunity; but an irony of fate had ordained that the born leader of a clerical movement in Hungary should fall into deep disfavour with his sovereign and thus destroy the very possibility of alliance with the court Clericals.

The Hungarian Kulturkampf opened under Count Szápáry with a skirmish for the possession of the registers; but it was under his successor, Dr. Alexander Wekerle, the brilliant financier (November, 1892), that the struggle became acute. The law introducing obligatory civil marriage was hotly debated in Parliament, and roused a storm of feeling throughout the length and breadth of the country; even two such impor­tant reforms as state registration and the recognition of the Jewish religion were wholly overshadowed by this contro­versial measure, against which the Catholic Church brought all its powers of agitation into play. In April, 1894, the Civil Marriage Bill was passed by a majority of 175, and on its rejection by the Upper House, was again returned unaltered by a majority of 166. As the monarch withheld his consent to the nomination of new peers, Dr. Wekerle resigned office; but no one could be found to replace him, and ten days later he returned to power with a reconstructed Cabinet. On June 21, 1894, the Magnates carried the bill by 128 to 124 votes. The institution of civil marriage was supplemented by elaborate rules prescribing the religion of the children of mixed marriages; this is made dependent upon a formal declaration of the parents before the civil authorities.[26]

The so-called Church Laws of the Wekerle Ministry have often been loosely described as anti-clerical; but the worst which can accurately be said of them is that they are secularist in aim. A generation will elapse before we learn the true inner history of the movement; but it has already become abundantly clear that this legislation was not merely an answer to the proselytizing zeal of the Catholic Church in Hungary. It must also be ascribed in part to the resent­ment felt by the Chauvinists at the international leanings of Catholicism, and its refusal to surrender to a policy of unre­stricted Magyarization. It was, above all, the outward and visible sign of the steady process of Judaization of the middle classes, which had marked the period following upon the Ausgleich. The Wekerle Ministry, despite the violence of the religious struggle, found time for an active policy of aggression against the nationalities; indeed, it may have hoped by taking up an ultra-national standpoint to disarm the criticism of its opponents. In March, 1892, the committee of the Roumanian National Party had petitioned the monarch in a Memorandum recounting the many grievances of their race in Hungary, and when the Hungarian Cabinet barred the deputation's access to the throne, had published the Memorandum in pamphlet form. This masterly document — which challenged the legality of the Transylvanian Act of Union, reasserted that province's claims to autonomy, and recounted the many injustices and illegalities on which the Magyar hegemony was based — brought down upon its authors the vengeance of the Government. In July, 1892, Desiderius Szilágyi, in answering an interpellation on the subject of the Memorandum, admitted the clear constitutional right of all citizens to petition even for illegal things.[27] But by the spring of 1894 the Govern­ment had changed its mind, and on May 7 of that year the entire committee of the Roumanian party was brought to trial for "incitement against the Magyar nationality," in­curred in this very petition.[28] Elaborate precautions were taken to supply the foreign press with a garbled version of the trial and to prevent the true facts from crossing the frontier.[29] On the second day of the proceedings, the Minister of the Interior, Mr. Hieronymi, sent pressing instructions to all the county authorities of Transylvania to hand over to the courts all persons agitating among the people, and to make inquiries as to the source of the money used in such intrigues.[30] The jury before whom the prisoners were tried, was exclusively composed of Magyar Chauvinists, and counsel for the defence were fined and intimidated by the judge until they laid down their office in a body. Dr. John Ratziu, the party president, read aloud in the name of the accused, a fiery declaration in which they declined to recognize the juris­diction of the court, and appealed to the public opinion of the civilized world.[31] Under such circumstances their con­demnation caused no surprise; but the imposition of a total of twenty-nine years' imprisonment on persons who had merely exercised one of the natural rights of all citizens, branded the Hungarian Government as Asiatic rather than West European in sentiment. The arbitrary dissolution of the Roumanian party by ministerial order[32] only served to confirm this verdict; for a limit was thus placed upon consti­tutional agitation, and one-half of the population was directly challenged either to renounce its most cherished aspirations or to resort to anarchical methods to secure them.

Needless to say, the Memorandum trial and the plentiful crop of press prosecutions which preceded and followed it only served to embitter the Roumanians still further, and roused them to a fuller sense of solidarity with their kinsmen across the southern frontier. Indeed, the rapid increase of Magyarizing societies in Hungary[33] and the active support given to them by the Government, had caused great alarm in the Kingdom of Roumania; for, according to the unanswer­able argument of Mr. Demeter Sturdza,[34] " if it were possible to extinguish three million Roumanians, then the danger of denationalization would have already assumed tangible form for us of the kingdom also." In 1891 a lively agitation arose among the University students of Bucarest in favour of their kinsmen across the frontier, and this bore fruit in the publica­tion of a students' manifesto which aimed at enlisting foreign public opinion on the side of the non-Magyars. A " Reply" issued by the Magyar University students led the younger generation of Roumanians in Hungary to abandon their fathers' mistaken passivity and to publish in their turn a pamphlet narrating in impressive if tactless language the many wrongs and grievances of their race. But the only result was to draw down upon their heads a peculiarly savage sentence from the Jury Court of Kolozsvár[35] — Aurel Popovici, one of the committee of students responsible for its publica­tion, being condemned to four years', and Román, the director of the printing press, to one year's imprisonment, for incite­ment against the Magyar nationality. The Roumanian press now took up the cause more hotly than ever, and in the winter of 1891-2 a "League for the Cultural Unity of all Roumanians"[36] was founded in Bucarest as an answer to the Magyar cultural leagues. The monetary support sent from Bucarest to Roumanian schools and other institu­tions in Transylvania aroused great indignation among the Magyars, though a little reflection might have convinced them that such action lay in the nature of things. Their fevered imagination credited the Roumanian Government with designs for the formation of a Daco-Romanist Empire, by the annexation of all territory inhabited by the Roumanian race. That political dreamers do exist in Roumania, who favour such designs, it would be superfluous to deny. That these fallacies were first suggested by Louis Kossuth and his reckless intrigues with Alexander Couza and Michael Obreno­vitch, is equally undoubted, though few Magyars are willing to-make the admission. As the Magyars adopted a more and more aggressive policy towards the other races of Hun­gary, the instinct of self-preservation asserted itself among the latter, and prompted them to look for allies across the frontier. The fate of the Roumanians in Transylvania is a question of vital interest to their kinsmen in Roumania, and is indeed the cardinal feature in the foreign policy of the young kingdom. To deny her claim to oppose the policy of Magyarization is in reality to deny her right to an independent national exist­ence. But not even the most active resistance to Magyariza­tion can be construed into " Daco-Romanism "; and no serious statesman in Bucarest has ever dreamt of espousing so adventurous a cause. An independent Hungary might, it is true, be at the mercy of " Rumania Irredenta "; but so long as the Magyars form part of the Dual Monarchy, Daco­Romanism must of necessity remain a mere idle dream.

The passage of the Church Laws through Parliament was a Pyrrhic victory for Dr. Wekerle, against whose person the Clericals had vowed vengeance; yet curiously enough it was a Calvinist who succeeded, in the person of Baron Desi­derius Banff y (January, 1895). The new Premier, however, soon showed that he regarded national as far more important than religious questions. The policy of Tisza and Wekerle towards the nationalities was carried to its logical issue, and Magyarization was openly avowed as the great aim which all true patriots must set before them. In Baron Bánffy's own words, " without Chauvinism it is impossible to found the unitary Magyar national State," and assimilation of the non-Magyars is essential to the future of Hungary. " Not to regard what stands in the way, only to regard the aim, to push blindly forward " — such was the policy advocated by this wildest of " patriots " towards the non-Magyar races.[37] A special department, known as the " nationalities section," was erected in the Premier's Office in Budapest, for the sole purpose of watching the slightest movements of the non­Magyars, controlling their press, their banking institutions, and above all their relations with foreign countries. The Roumanian and Serb newspapers were still subjected to every kind of political vexation, and the whole administrative machine was employed in the cause of Magyarization.

One solitary concession was made to the nationalities —  the permission to hold a political congress in Budapest — and even this was only granted because the havoc and dis­organization caused by recent persecution among their leaders made it not improbable that the meeting might end in a fiasco. On August 10, 1895, the Congress was opened by Dr. Michael Polit, the Serb ex-deputy; Dr. Paul Mudroň, an influential Slovak in Turócz St. Márton; and George Pap, a Roumanian advocate. After a telegram of homage had been despatched to the King, a new political programme was drawn up and unanimously adopted.[38] While the political integrity of the Crown of St. Stephen was frankly recognized, the idea of a Magyar national State is here described as alien to the ethnical and historical conditions of Hungary, threatening as it does the very existence of the other races. A league is therefore formed between the Roumanians, Slovaks and Serbs, and the hope is expressed that the Germans and Ruthenes will join them. The Law of Nationalities, which merely remains a dead letter, must be properly carried out and must be supplemented by a redistribution of the counties on a linguistic basis; while in the non-Magyar districts the language of the courts and of the administration must be that of the population. The unjust franchise and electoral abuses can only be remedied by the introduction of universal, direct, equal and secret suffrage, by redistribution and by the removal of official pressure during elections. Church and school autonomy must no longer be infringed, and abso­lute freedom of religion must be introduced. Proper guar­antees for press freedom must be given, and free right of assembly and association must be secured by law. The interests of the various nationalities should be represented by Ministers without portfolios, just as in the case of Croatia. Finally, the congress appointed a committee to promote harmony between the nationalities, to protest against the prevailing policy of denationalization, and to plead the non­Magyar cause in the foreign press. There never was any prospect of even the more moderate of these wishes being granted, and the meeting can only have been intended by its leaders to serve as a reminder of the existence of the non­Magyar races. The permission granted for their meeting, instead of being regarded as a concession due to political decency, has been cited as an extraordinary act of magnanimity on the part of the Magyars — a point of view which illustrates the prevailing Chauvinism. The congress was merely a brief lull in the storm of repression which reached its height in the well-known "Bánffy system."

The year 1896 was celebrated by the Magyar race as the millenary of its occupation of Hungary, and the national exhibition at Budapest was made the occasion of renewed attempts to wean European opinion from sympathy with the nationalities. Both the Government and its opponents published a crop of controversial pamphlets on the racial question, designed not so much to inform as to persuade the foreign public; and the Pan-German League displayed special activity in its attacks upon the Magyars. The millenary celebrations evoked numerous counter-demonstrations. The Chauvinists of Belgrade, enraged at the inclusion of the Serb arms among the symbols of the Partes subjectae of the Crown of St. Stephen, burned the Hungarian flag in the streets of the capital; and their foolish example was followed by the students of Bucarest, before the statue of Michael the Brave.[39] In Ujvidék (Neusatz) the Serbs refused to illumi­nate, and in Essek the Hungarian arms were besmirched with mud and paint. In the Austrian Reichsrath (May 29), Dr. Lueger, the militant Anti-Semite leader, branded as a traitor every German who made common cause with Hungary. Needless to say, Baron Bánfíy was not deterred by such inci­dents from pursuing his policy of Magyarization. To take but a single instance, Parliament in May, 1896, voted a sum of £28,000 for the erection of 400 new elementary schools; but in every one of them Magyar was introduced as the exclu­sive language of instruction.[40] These and similar incidents justified the nationalities in treating the millenary as a strictly Magyar anniversary in which they could have no share.

In the autumn of 1896 Baron Bánfíy held new Parlia­mentary elections, which eclipsed all previous records, and resulted in a net gain of sixty-nine seats by the Government. Money was poured out like water, bribery was resorted to with an openness hitherto unknown even in Hungary. Arbi­trary limits were set upon the right of speech and of assembly, and indeed many of the Opposition candidates and their supporters were arrested by the authorities in the middle of their campaign. Galicia, Štyria and Moravia were partially denuded of their garrisons, and the regiments of the Joint Army were entrusted with the task of " preventing excesses " on the part of the Opposition. " Undesirable " voters were in many cases refused access to the polls, and any attempt at resistance was quelled by a liberal use of bayonets and ball cartridge.[41] A specially violent character had been imparted to the electoral struggle by the appearance of a new Clerical or People's party, which contested no fewer than ninety­eight seats. The fiercest contests took place in the German constituencies of West Hungary, where Mr. Stephen Rákovszky secured election. But the Clerical appeal was not lost upon the Catholic Slovaks of the North, who had been encouraged by their clergy to regard the Church Laws as a fresh stage in the advance of the Jews and the freemasons. Indeed, the fanatical misrepresentations in which the Clerical leaders indulged, rivalled the unscrupulous devices employed against them by the Government and its agents.[42]

Thus it was the Clericals who first effected a breach in the traditional " safe seats " of the Liberal Party, and who were indirectly responsible for the Slovak revival of the past decade. The programme of the People's Party claimed the enforcement of the Law of Nationalities, and its leader, Count Zichy, after declaring that it is neither Liberal nor national nor Christian to oppress the nationalities, insisted that the Government's present attitude towards them must be abandoned.[43] The Slovaks were encouraged to renounce the senseless policy of passivity adopted by their leaders, and to launch their little boat once more upon the sea of politics. Henceforth the younger generation poured contempt upon the Russophil dreams of Turócz St. Márton, and bravely proclaimed the doctrine of self-help. Autocratic Russia was regarded with positive aversion: a far more natural rapprochement was sought with the young Czech democracy of Bohemia,[44] and their hands were strengthened by the moral and financial assistance of the Slovak emigrants in America. Popular savings banks and co-operative societies were started by some of the Slovak leaders — especially in the counties of Trencsén and Liptó — in the hope of stemming the excessive usury which gnawed at the very vitals of the Slovak peasantry and kept them in the thrall of the Jews and the magnates.

Self-help was indeed the only possible cure for the terrible economic condition of the country. While the Government pursued its ethnophagic policy towards the nationalities, land hunger and the rise of prices had led to an Agrarian Socialist movement of considerable dimensions. In the spring and summer of 1897 frequent collisions took place between the peasants and the troops, and in 1898 the attempt to organize a harvest strike, as a means of reducing the landlords to reason, was ruthlessly suppressed by the authorities. The Govern­ment hired labourers in the northern counties to supply the gaps, and kept a large reserve of foreign labourers at Mező­hegyes, ready to be despatched at a moment's notice to the aid of the landlords. Liberty of association and assembly was greatly restricted, scores of public meetings were prohibited, postal secrecy was violated, funds were confiscated, the ring­leaders of the movement were arrested or subjected to domici­liary visits and compulsory photography by the police. The brutal energy of the Government was successful in suppressing the movement; but no remedy has been found for the economic evils of the country, and the peasantry, despairing of a remedy at home, turned to emigration as a last resort. While the Magyar politicians wrangled over the words of command in the army, the life blood of the country has been steadily drained by emigration. Since 1896 Hungary has lost close upon a million of her population in this way, and latterly the move­ment has reached its height amongst the purest Magyar peasantry of the Alföld.

Among the many shameful actions of the Banffy Government, special stress deserves to be laid upon the campaign for the Magyarization of family names and placenames. Early in 1898 the Minister of the Interior issued a circular to all county and municipal authorities, instructing them to invite the officials under them to adopt Magyar names, and sending copies of a pamphlet on this subject for distribution.[45] In the same way, pressure was put upon the state schoolmasters,[46] and upon subordinate post office and railway officials, in order to compel them to Magyarize their names; and it became evident that those who refused to comply had little prospect of promotion. When Oscar von Meltzl, the Saxon deputy, brought forward an interpellation on the subject, so far from obtaining any satisfaction, he was taunted with his lack of patriotism and subjected to insult and abuse from a majority of the House.[47] Governmental pressure and social induce­ments, and indeed the reduction from five florins to fifty kreuzer (10d.) of the registration fee for a change of name, had long since (1881) deprived the poor man of an excuse for preserving his identity.

That a forger or a convict should seek to conceal his identity under a false name is natural enough; but it is difficult to understand how any man who has inherited an honourable name from his father should be willing to renounce it except for the most cogent reasons. Yet this demoralizing custom has played havoc with the family history of the Hungarian middle classes; and few countries will supply such a puzzle to the genealogist of the twenty-second) century. Indeed, the annals of modern Hungary are crowded with men who have adopted " shilling-names." Toldy, the author of a standard work on Magyar literature, was born as Franz Sche­del; Hunfalvy, the ethnologist, as Hundsdorfer: Munkácsy, the famous painter, as Lieb: Professor Vámbéry, the dis­tinguished Orientalist, as Bamberger: even the poet Petőfi as Petrovič. Among politicians Zsedényi, Irányi, Helfy, Komlóssy, Polónyi, entered life with the less euphonious names of Pfannschmied, Halbschuh, Heller, Kleinkind, Polla­tschek. The well-known historical writer, Fraknoi, had dis­carded his paternal name of Franki at the request of members of the Hungarian Academy, and was not ashamed to give as his reason their desire that a Magyar name should figure on the title-page "of one of his principal works."[48] A change of name naturally found special favour among the Jews, and enabled them to pose as missionaries of patriotism and Magyar culture.[49] Just as moneylenders in London have been known to borrow the name of a famous Scottish clan, so the Eier­stocks and Löwenmuths of Hungary have assumed the aristo­cratic names of Tökölyi and Báthori. Weiss, Kohn, Löwy, Weinberger, Klein, Rosenfeld, Ehrenfeld, Gansl, Grünfeld, conceal their identity under the pseudonyms of Vészi, Kardos. Lukács, Biró, Kis, Radó, Erdélyi, Gonda, Mezei.[50]

Not content with exercising pressure upon its subordinates to assume Magyar names, Bánffy's Government in December, 1897, passed through Parliament a law for the compulsory Magyarization of all the placenames of Hungary. The pro­tests of savants against this act of vandalism were disregarded, and a deputation of Saxon women to Vienna was refused access to the Emperor-King and curtly dismissed by Baron Bánffy. Henceforth the old historic names are banished from the map, and replaced by unknown and in many cases specially fabricated names. Many a link with the past is rudely severed, and the traveller who visits the famous mediae­val towns of Pressburg, Hermannstadt and Kirchdrauf, will search in vain at the railway station or post office for any sign save those of Pozsony, Nagy-Szeben, and Szepes-Váralja. Indeed, to such lengths has Magyaromania reached, that all post-office and railway notices throughout the kingdom are drawn up exclusively in Magyar, a language of which 40 per cent, of the population are unable to understand a syllable. But such external changes, however deeply they might offend the feelings of large sections of the population, were of little real assistance to the cause of Magyarization; and their sole value lay in the false impression of Magyar power which they created in the minds of foreign inquirers.

Meanwhile Bánffy's electoral triumphs had not brought him peace. The spirits of discord whom he had invoked could no longer be dispelled, and the obstruction which caused his final ruin was conjured up by his own reckless misuse of the principles of majority. To him the end always hallowed the means; and having secured an unrivalled majority by systematic violence and corruption, he resorted to the still more doubtful tactics of winning the Opposition's support for a particular law in return for some concession, and after­wards using his big parliamentary battalions to evade his pledges. In the words of Count Apponyi, " this Parliament was bred in sin and born in sin," and hence it must, according to every moral law, suffer like a fever patient from continual crises.[51] Every year the Opposition grew more unmanage­able, and the number of Dissidents from the Liberal Party increased, including such able men as Szilágyi and Andrássy the younger. The thorny question of the new commercial Ausgleich with Austria supplied the Independent Party with a convenient pretext for obstruction, and just as in the days of Tisza the personal element had dominated Hungarian politics, so the Opposition parties now clamoured for the head of Bánffy, and forced the Cabinet to negotiate with them regarding the conditions of its own resignation. At length, after a crisis of several months, Bánffy withdrew in favour of Mr. Coloman Széll, the foster son of Deák and one of Hungary's most brilliant financiers (February 17, 1899). The Dissidents returned to the party fold, and on March 3, 1899, Count Apponyi, who only a few months before had electrified Parliament by a memorable indictment of Liberal policy,[52] dissolved the National Party, and himself joined the Liberals with his thirty-two followers. A kind of armistice with the Kossuthists made it possible for Széll to conclude the much overdue commercial Ausgleich, and thus to secure Hungary's economic peace for the next eight years.

The new Premier assumed as his watchword the phrase "Law, Right and Justice " (" törvény jog és igazság "), and pro­ceeded to illustrate it by the adoption of a milder policy towards the nationalities. The prosecutions of the non­Magyar press were discontinued, the notorious " Nationalities Section " was dissolved, and rather fewer restrictions were placed upon association and assembly. In April, 1899, an elaborate law was introduced dealing with corrupt practices and electoral disputes, and much was heard of Szell's zeal for " pure elections." The general elections of 1901 did not, however, show much improvement in this respect; and if they did not attain the same scandalous pre-eminence as those of 1896, governmental pressure, bribery and even bloodshed were none the less deplorably frequent. Perhaps the most piquant incident was the treatment meted out to Count Apponyi in Jászberény, where he had sat since 1881. The voting roll had been carefully doctored under Bánffy, with a view to securing his defeat; the poll was prolonged for thirty hours for 2,000 electors (at Budapest only ten hours were allowed for 10,000), and after every possible trick had failed, the returning officer refused to declare Count Apponyi elected.[53] Such action would have been remarkable even in the case of a non-Magyar candidate: in the case of a new and powerful adherent of the Government, it becomes almost incredible. Szell's personal relations to Apponyi had become really cordial, and the incident can only be ascribed to the Tisza clique, who doubtless acted on the motto, "timeo Danaos et dona ferentes." In this attitude they were justified by subsequent events; for Count Apponyi's adhesion to the Liberal Party introduced a fatal element of discord, which bore fruit in 1903, when the military question once more became acute. Apponyi made common cause with the Party of Independence in pushing the claims of a national Hungarian army, with Magyar language of command, and thus on June 16, 1903, Mr. Széll fell a victim to the same violent obstructive tactics which had originally raised him to power. The famous Army Order of Chlopy, issued during the brief régime of his suc­cessor Count Khuen-Héderváry, was merely a crude and tactless retort to what the military chiefs regarded as Apponyi's unwarrantable attempt to dismember the joint army. It rendered Héderváry's position untenable, and paved the way for Count Stephen Tisza's accession to power[54] (3 Nov. 1903). Once: more the personal factor predominated. The duel between Tisza and Apponyi seriously weakened the discipline of the Liberal Party, and in November, 1903, the latter left the sinking ship and resumed his Opposition tactics. The true history of the great crisis of 1904-6 cannot be written for many years to come. The wild obstruction which paralyzed Count Tisza's movements; his rash attempt to restore order by means of the closure, and the disgraceful scenes to which this attempt gave rise (November 18 and December 13, 1904)[55]; the welding of the Opposition parties into an anti-Liberal Coalition (November)[56]; the crushing defeat of Tisza at the general elections of January, 1905, and his consequent resignation; the appointment of Baron Fejérváry as Premier, with a number of little known per­manent officials as his Ministers (June 19, 1905), and the repeated prorogations of Parliament — these are events which have but little direct bearing upon the racial question, except in so far as the demand for the Magyar language of command may be regarded as a last despairing effort of Magyarization. Under the Fejérváry régime, the Magyars were vividly reminded of the power and influence still enjoyed by the Crown. For forty years Hungarian Cabinets had enjoyed the whole-hearted support of their sovereign, and Hungary had been able to dictate the foreign policy of the Dual Monarchy. The aggressive action of the Coalition revealed the inherent defect of Dualism, which makes of the sovereign the mere pendulum between two scales; in self-defence Francis Joseph was driven, for the first time in a generation, to espouse the Austrian side and to turn a deaf ear to Maygar claims. In the course of the struggle, Crown and Coalition were almost equally in error; for a constitutional sovereign is not free to curtail the programme of his future Ministers, while parlia­mentary leaders have no right to dictate to him the terms on which they are ready to accept office. But the error of judg­ment lay on the side of the Coalition, who fatally over-esti­mated their own powers of resistance. Their eloquence and their abuse alike were met by the sullen indifference of the masses, who thus took vengeance for the long-neglected evils of the franchise. In their blind pursuit of " national " and party advantages, the Coalition leaders failed to reckon with the social and economic needs of the classes and races hitherto shut out from political power; and by their refusal of the royal terms, they drove the sovereign into alliance with these democratic elements in the State. An opportunity was thus presented to Mr. Kristóffy — minister of the Interior and by far the ablest member of the Fejérváry cabinet — for putting forward his famous scheme of Universal Suffrage.[57]

Mr. Kristóffy's proposal, and still more its inclusion by the Premier in his autumn programme, acted like a bombshell among the Opposition parties, whose official organs discharged the vials of their wrath upon the " unconstitutional " Govern­ment. But the reception of the new programme in the country showed the danger of their situation; and henceforth the Coalition leaders, while proclaiming their patriotic mission more loudly than ever, and filling the foreign press with appeals against perfidious Austria,[58] secretly strained every nerve to make their peace with the King, and thus if possible to render Kristóffy'š designs innocuous. On February 19, 1906, Parlia­ment was dissolved, without writs being issued for new elec­tions; and the country watched with surprising equanimity the approach of Absolutism. The secret of the negotiations was jealously kept, and the formation of the Coalition Cabinet on April 9, 1906, took the world at large completely by surprise. This Ministry of all the talents was composed of Dr. Wekerle (Premier and Finance); Mr. Francis Kossuth (Commerce); Count Julius Andrássy (Interior); Count Albert Apponyi (Education); Mr. Darányi (Agriculture); Mr. Polónyi (Jus­tice); and Count Aladár Zichy (Court). At the new general elections (April 28 — May 2, 1906), the Liberal Party finally disappeared from the scene, Count Tisza withdrew into private life, and the singular spectacle was presented of a Parliament without an Opposition.[59] The collapse of the Liberals had left a large number of constituencies free, and the unseemly rush of candidates to secure the spoils roused even the indigna­tion of the Coalition press. Many of Count Tisza's former adherents now paraded their Kossuthist principles, and the once Radical Party of Independence soon fell into the hands of the agrarian gentry, with their following of county officials, and of the Jewish capitalists, with their dependent array of professional lawyers.

The Coalition leaders, whose accession to power was greeted in many quarters with such jubilation, laid the greatest possible stress upon the transitional character of their Government.[60] Its main tasks, they declared, would be to repair the mis­chief wrought by the " unconstitutional" Fejérváry Govern­ment, and then to introduce the long delayed measure of franchise reform, which would make it possible to ascertain the will of the whole nation regarding the questions at issue between Crown and Coalition. Two years and a half have now passed since the Coalition took office, and yet the pro­posed Universal Suffrage Bill, which was to be their main achievement, still remains a jealously guarded secret in the Ministry of the Interior. Meanwhile, reaction has been spreading through all ranks of the Coalition. The shocking scandals which drove the Minister of Justice, Mr. Polónyi, from office in February, 1907[61]; the fresh scandals of the Railway Fund misappropriation and the Government subsidies to the press[62]; the frequent assaults upon such press freedom as exists in Hungary; the attempt to muzzle unpopular " deputies; the political persecution of the Socialists and the nationalities; the violation of the Croatian Ausgleich involved in the Railway Servants Bill (XLIX., 1907)[63]; the attitude of Parliament to emigration and to agrarian and economic questions, as revealed in the scandalous Agricultural Labourers Act (XLV, 1907)[64] — all these were signs of the lamentable change wrought by place and power in the once democratic party of Louis Kossuth and Daniel Irányi. Despite all talk and protestations, and in defiance of its own past record, E this Kossuthist majority sanctioned a new commercial Aus­gleich which is less favourable to Hungary than any passed by 'Liberal Governments; and for the past year the Coalition has devoted itself to the vain effort to convert a régime of transition into one of stagnant permanence. But the day of reckoning cannot be postponed much longer, and before the present volume is in the hands of the reader, Hungary may already be in the throes of a popular agitation such as that which preceded the great Reform Bill of 1832. In the Parliament of 1906 the nationalities were for the first time represented in sufficient strength to form an organiza­tion of their own; and the Coalition was guilty of a serious tactical blunder in refusing to recognize their existence as a parliamentary party. Twenty-five Nationalists have actually been elected, and as their leaders justly argue, it is absurd to refuse to admit a fact merely because it is unpalatable.[65] The little group has from the first showed marked ability, and some of its members — notably Dr. Michael Polit, the disciple of Miletič and leader of the Serb Liberals: Dr. Milan Hodža, the young Slovak leader and Dr. Alexander Vaida, a Rou­manian landowner and deputy — soon earned themselves a reputation for debating skill and knowledge of parliamentary practice.

But their reception at the hands of the majority was alto­gether unworthy of a constitutional assembly. Many of the Chauvinists argued that the political programme of the nationalities was incompatible with the office of deputy, and cited the case of Vasul Demian, the Roumanian deputy, as a precedent for annulling the mandates of the whole party. The Government was too wise to adopt a course which would inevitably have shocked European public opinion, but found other equally effectual methods of reducing the non-Magyar deputies to silence. On November 16, 1906, Father Ferdi­nand Juriga, one of the seven Slovak deputies, was sen­tenced at Pressburg to a term of two years' imprisonment and a fine of 1,200 crowns; his offence consisted in " incite­ment against the Magyar nationality," incurred in two news­paper articles attacking the Chauvinists and defending himself against the charges of disloyalty which they .brought against him.[66] Soon afterwards, two other non-Magyar deputies, Messrs. Hodža and Petrovic, were sentenced to terms of two and six months' imprisonment for similar offences. Father Jehlička, another Slovak deputy, was also charged with " incitement against the Magyar nationality," and was threat­ened by the ecclesiastical authorities with suspension from office, unless he withdrew from an active part in politics. His attachment to the priestly calling proved too strong for his Slovak sentiments; he resigned his seat, and nothing more has been heard of the charge of " incitement." The Bishop, who disapproved of Jehlička's political activity, raised no objection to a Magyar priest standing for the vacant constituency; and the growth of national feeling among the Slovak Catholic peasantry was strikingly illustrated by their election of Mr. Ivánka, a young Lutheran advocate who had only recently settled in Nagy Szombat (Tyrnau). The Government wreaked its vengeance on Mr. Ivánka by a poli­tical action for " incitement," incurred in his electoral address; and on August 2, 1908, he was sentenced to a year's imprisonment and a fine of 1,200 crowns. These experiences have taught the Slovak leaders caution. Indeed, the only means by which they can escape political extinction is to erect a system of " straw men,” who take the responsibility for articles against which the public prosecutor takes action; and young Slovaks or Roumanians regard it as an honour to go to prison in such a cause. Vivat sequens, as the Slovaks themselves say when they hear of a new victim.

dr. milan hodža, M.P.

The Magyar Chauvinists are fond of describing the oppo­sition of the nationalist group as unpatriotic; but in view of the official statements of members of the Government, it is not easy to see how any self-respecting non-Magyar could give his support to the present régime.

On June 2, 1906, the Premier, Dr. Wekerle, openly announced in the House, that he was not in a position to fulfil the lin­guistic clauses of the Law of Nationalities, especially that affect­ing legal decisions.[67]

A few days later Baron Bánffy pleaded the cause of " the Magyar national State" before a sympathetic House, and argued that the Law of Nationalities must only be carried out in such a manner as shall not endanger this national character.[68] He protested against linguistic concessions in the commune, on the ground that these would inevitably lead to similar concessions in county and central government; and this objection to the minimum of concession saved him from the necessity of condemning the whole law, the more so as he already knew it to be a dead letter. On July 11 of the same year Bánffy attempted to defend his " system " against the attacks of the Roumanian and Slovak deputies. "The legal State," he declared, " is the aim, but with this ques­tion we can only concern ourselves when we have already assured the national State. ... Hungary's interests demand its erection on the most extreme Chauvinist lines."[69] A year later Baron Bánffy spoke still more openly upon the racial question. " In a peaceful manner this question cannot be solved. An understanding cannot be .reached between us; for we wish the unitary Magyar national State, while they wish the polyglot State, with equal rights of the nationalities."[70]

Baron Bánffy's violent and tortuous policy has gradually alienated all his followers; but his pronouncements on the racial question are always sure of a favourable reception from a majority in the House.[71]

Count Julius Andrassy, the Minister of the Interior, in an important speech on the racial question (November 27, 1906), described the policy of the nationalities as " dangerous, anti­national and hostile to the State, and refused to recognize their existence as a party, because he knew their " political aims to conflict with ' the idea of the Magyar State.' " [72] Andrassy went on to admit that the principles embodied in the Law of Nationalities had been abandoned by subsequent legislation, and assured the nationalities that they themselves were to blame for the fact that this law " will shortly have to be repealed." He closed with the following definition of policy: " Kindness and justice toward the masses, but pitiless severity in the prosecution of the agitators."

Six months later Count Andrassy expressed himself even more uncompromisingly. On May 25, 1907 (in answer to an interpellation of Dr. Vaida on electoral corruption), he openly admitted the racial question in Hungary to be one of brute force. The aims of the nationalities, he argued, could only be attained, and if once attained could only be defended, by blood and revolution; for " a situation which is opposed to the wishes and interests of the Magyar nation and of the strongest factors in the country will always be untenable."[73]

Perhaps, however, the most striking pronouncement of recent years upon the racial question is that of the ex-Premier Mr. Coloman Széll, who had hitherto enjoyed a reputation 'for tolerance and moderation. Speaking on June 21, 1908, at the annual Congress of the Magyar Cultural Leagues, Mr. Széll described " the unitary Magyar State " as the foremost aim of Hungarian policy, in the furtherance of which every statesman is intransigent. " Every citizen," he declared, " is equal before the law, with the single limitation regarding language which is demanded by political unity and the unity of administration and justice." The non-Magyars are free to develop their own language and culture; only one thing is asked of them — that they should declare themselves ad­herents of " the idea of the Magyar State." In short, " this country must first be preserved as a Magyar country, and then it must be cultured, rich, enlightened and progressive."[74]

At a banquet which followed the congress, Count Apponyi, the Minister of Education, endorsed the speech of Mr. Széll with the assertion that " an energetic national policy " alone can solve the racial question in Hungary. As this statesman argued on another occasion,[75] it always has been and still is a tradition in Hungary to create a unitary Magyar nation. No one will deny the energy with which the Coalition Govern­ment has persecuted the nationalities; for it has eclipsed even the records of Coloman Tisza and the first Wekerle adminis­tration. But this persecution has only served to fan the flame of national feeling among the non-Magyar races; and the unrest and discontent is greater to-day than it has been for over a generation past.[76]

The material progress made by Hungary during the past forty years has been little short of marvellous.[77] New means of communication have been opened up in all directions; new methods of agriculture have been introduced in many districts, even if in others the soil is still managed on the most primitive principles. Banks and public institutions of every kind have sprung into existence. Though the county administration still remains mediaeval under a transparent veil of modernism, the old system of elected judges has been swept away and re­placed by a system of justice more suited to the require­ments of the world of to-day. Meanwhile vast strides have been made in education, even despite the unjust attempt to restrict all progress to a single race and language. But the very variety and number of the reforms required to convert Hungary into a modern state acted as a fatal temptation to the true Magyar. Instead of sharing in the industrial revival of his country as the great Széchenyi would have had him, he left mere commerce to the Jew, and devoted himself to the more aristocratic pursuit of politics, with the result that in the twentieth century trade, finance and journalism have well­nigh become a Jewish monopoly in Hungary. The Magyar passion for legality, of which Hungarian history supplies so many instances and which found its loftiest expression in Francis Deák, has steadily degenerated under the corroding influence of racial Chauvinism into a mere passion for legal forms; and to-day the worst crimes of political tyranny are committed in the name of the law by its own officers.

Since the Ausgleich, everything has favoured the Magyars — their strong central position in the country; their league with the dominant German party in Austria; the approval of the Polish aristocracy in Galícia; the favour of the Court and the support of Bismarck and the Triple Alliance; and last but not least the active adherence of the Jews and international Finance. But the suddenness with which complete success followed apparent ruin, seems to have destroyed all sense of proportion in the Magyars: and to-day it is part of every Magyar's political creed that the non-Magyar races are mere " foreigners," who must be assimilated as rapidly as possible. Undeterred by the manifest impossibility of six million human beings assimilating other seven million, the Magyars have pursued the phantom of a " national Magyar state," and have employed every means in their power to crush out the resistance of the other races to what they regard as their " superior cul­ture." The natural result has been that they find themselves to-day, at a critical moment of their history, ringed round by hostile races, whom the bitter memory of past wrongs renders adverse to compromise.

Meanwhile the non-Magyars, shut out from every public profession, deliberately set themselves to build up an independ­ent economic position. Starting at zero, they were long un­successful against the competition of Magyarized Jewish firms and the unfair favouritism of the Government; but the self­sacrifice of many a gallant but unknown pioneer is beginning to bear fruit. Judged by the standards of Lombard Street, the Roumanian and Slovak banks and credit-institutions, the few factories owned by men of national sentiment, are very insignificant; but such as they are they are now self-support­ing and independent of Jewish finance. The activity of the Roumanian banks — especially the Albina — in advancing loans to the peasantry of Transylvania, is creating an increasing proprietary class hostile to Magyar predominance; and the scandalous manner in which the authorities forbid Roumanian communes to invest money in Roumanian banks,[78] only serves to intensify the feeling. At the same time the returned Slovak emigrants who have saved money in the United States, are steadily acquiring small holdings in Hungary and helping to propagate ideas of freedom and nationality among their neigh­bours. The growth of Slovak banks since 1900[79] has been specially remarkable, and though still trifling compared with the large Jewish and Magyar institutions of North Hungary, they are none the less able to hold their own and extend their business. These two parallel movements hold within them more than one secret of future development, and help to explain the des­perate efforts of the Magyar caste to retain their political monopoly. From the very first they realized the difficulty of assimilating the Roumanians, but it is only in the last few years that they have condescended to speak of " a Slovak danger." This danger has come to them from America. Dur­ing the past generation many thousands of Slovak peasants have emigrated to the United States, carrying with them feel­ings of bitterness and resentment towards the authorities of their native land. They speedily learned to profit by the free institutions of their adopted country, and to-day the 400,000 Slovaks of America possess a national culture and organiza­tion which present a striking contrast to the cramped develop­ment of their kinsmen in Hungary. There are more Slovak newspapers in America than in Hungary;[80] but the Magyars seek to redress the balance by refusing to deliver these Ameri­can journals through the Hungarian post office. Everywhere among the emigrants leagues, societies and clubs flourish undisturbed — notably the American Slovak League (Národnie Slovenský spolok), the Catholic Zednota (Unity) and the women's league Živena. These societies do all in their power to awaken Slovak sentiment, and contribute materially to the support of the Slovak press in Hungary. The self-confidence and manly independence of the returned emigrants contrasts with the pessimism and passivity of the older generation, and they are doing much to leaven the Slovak population with new ideas of liberty and justice. The alarm with which the Government views this movement was revealed by its summary action against Francis Pollakovič, a young American citizen, in the autumn of 1907.[81]

Whilst national feeling is growing stronger among the nationalities, and is fanned into flame by the Magyars' insane policy of persecution, the position of the ruling caste is threat­ened in the rear by a still graver danger. For the native Mag­yar peasantry has been estranged by long years of neglect, and can now no longer be relied upon by its masters. The veiled feudalism which still prevails in the Alföld, offered a fertile soil for Socialist propaganda; and although the pure doctrine of Marx or of Proudhon is never likely to strike root amid a population whose foremost ambition is to own the soil, the new ideas are none the less a source of grave danger to the existing governmental system and must in the long run play havoc with parties committed to the reactionary class legislation of Darányi and Kossuth. The Chauvinist frenzy of the upper classes is almost unknown among the Magyar peasantry, who bear no ill-feeling towards the nationalities and are perfectly content to live and let live. Nothing illus­trates this contrast more strikingly than the fact that the non­Magyar leaders have been invited to address mass meetings of Magyar peasants; and they would undoubtedly have been greeted with applause and sympathy, had not the Govern­ment seen fit to impose its veto upon the scheme.

The Magyar clique, then, would seem to be at the end of their resources. The situation in Austria and in Europe is no longer favourable to their pretensions, and the introduction of universal suffrage cannot be postponed much longer. Count Andrássy's project for paralyzing this reform by a complicated system of plural voting is scarcely likely to obtain the monarch's sanction, and will almost certainly lead to internal convulsions such as preceded the great Reform Bill of 1832. The only hope for Hungary lies in an extension of the franchise to the nation­alities and to the working classes, both of whom have hitherto been virtually excluded from political life by the narrowness of the franchise and the corrupt manner in which it is adminis­tered. Under the stress of a new danger, the process by which Coloman Tisza and his Left Centre united with the moderate Deák Party, is repeating itself to-day. The Coalition during its period of office has realized that the means at its disposal are insufficient for the attainment of the Personal Union, and indeed that its attainment might possibly prove fatal to the country. The masterstroke of Mr. Kristóffy and his sovereign in advocating Universal Suffrage has thrown the Coalition upon the defensive, and at present it is endeavouring to fuse into a single whole the followers of Kossuth, Apponyi, Andrássy, and Rákovszky, as a preliminary step towards a desperate struggle of the privileged classes which these statesmen repre­sent, against the impatient proletariat of classes and races. Whether even the dangers of the situation will promote the fusion of such uncongenial elements is a problem which only the future can solve.

The present volume appears at a critical moment in the history of Hungary, and the uncertainty of the future warns me to abstain from further speculation. In the following seven chapters I propose to pass in review the chief institutions of Hungary in so far as they affect the racial question; and I hope to prove that in matters of education, administration and justice, of. association and assembly, of the franchise and the press, the non-Magyar nationalities are the victims of a policy of repression which is without any parallel in civilized Europe.

A slovak village church.

(the lutheran church of velka PALUDZA,)