In his article, “Norms,
Identity and National Security in Germany and Japan”, Thomas U. Berger, after
stating the German-Japan antimilitarism –contrary to what was predicted- as a
reality, explains the factors behind it. He argues that an adequate explanation
of German and Japan antimilitarism requires to look beyond international
structures and to examine the domestic cultural – institutional context in
which defense policy is made. The central thesis of the article is that Germany
and Japan have developed beliefs and values that make them reluctant to resort
to use of force. The reasons of this reluctance are the historical experience
and the way in which the domestic political actors interpreted those
experiences. He adds that rapid change in German and Japanese military cultures
of antimilitarism is likely only if they are challenged by an external shock.
After
examining the shortcomings of the structural approaches to explaining German
and Japanese antimilitarism, he explains his use of the concept of “political –
military culture”. He then analyses the historical experiences of these two
states and the development of these two cultures in the postwar period and
during the Cold War. Finally he examines the persistence of these two cultures
of antimilitarism since 1989.
Realist perspective: In the World War II both states were heavily
defeated and were dependent on the United States for their security and
prosperity. This dependence pushed the policy makers and the leaders of the two
states to ally themselves with West. A realist analysis of the German and
Japanese foreign policies emphasizes the two nations’ security relationship
with the United States to explain their relatively low military expenditures
during the Cold War.
However
from a historical point of view, it is an in adequate explanation. Berger
states that shortcoming of the realism becomes apparent when the foreign
policies of the two countries after 1960s and 1970s are examined. Both states
acted as neither power maximizers nor security optimizers that balance against
potential threats, which would be perfectly rational for Germany and Japan from
the realist perspective. On the contrary they were reluctant about any increase
in military power even when any opportunity emerged. Although they had the
opportunity to develop nuclear and military capabilities, German and Japan
decision-makers chose not to acquire such capabilities
Liberal perspective: While accounting for the origins of German and
Japanese antimilitarism, neoliberals had difficulty. War is unpopular in
liberal democracies, but Germany and Japan displayed an intense antimilitarist
attitude. Just like neorealism, neoliberalism failed to address the issue of
national identity and how identity shapes rational interest.
Berger
claims that the deficiency of both neorealism and neoliberalism is their lack
of accounting for the redefinition of national identity and its effects on
national interest in both Germany and Japan in the period following 1945, 1950s
and 1960s.
Berger
defines political – military culture as “the subset of the larger political
culture that influences, how members of a society view national security, the
military and the use of force”.
After
stating that cultures are influenced by the real world, but are not subjective
outcomes of objective reality, Berger emphasizes that cultures are transmitted
under the pressure of external and internal factors. Such change takes place
slowly. When society is under great strain, he stresses, fundamental change in
core beliefs and values occurs and this causes cultural change.
However
reestablishment of core beliefs and values which form culture, is reached as a
result of compromises to other political groups supporting the opposite idea
and once these compromises are legitimized, they can not be easily changed even
there is a shift in the balance of power among different political actors. As a
result these legitimized compromises become part of the political culture of
the country.
The
political – military cultures of Germany and Japan continue to be shaped and
guided by the ideological and political battles of the late 1940s and 1950s.
The German and Japanese defense debates of the 1950s turned around much more
fundamental questions of national identity, the definition of the national
interest and the kind of political, economic and social systems that the two
nations should adopt.
Berger
states that “the defeat in World War II dealt a lethal blow, both materially
and spiritually to these highly militaristic political – military cultures.
However the dimensions of the defeat created new opportunities after 1945. In
this period, general social attitude towards the military and the use of force
became malleable. Two sets of actors played key roles in forcing and
institutionalizing the antimilitary sentiments after the war: the American
occupation authorities and the new German and Japanese democratic elite. More
than demobilizing the vast war machines, Berger stresses, the occupation
authorities worked hard to impress upon the German and Japanese people that
theirs had been a moral defeat. The leaders of the wartime regimes were put on
trial for war crimes, militaristic passages were expunged from he school texts
and peoples were bombarded with antimilitary propaganda.
On
the other hand new leaders after the war in both Germany and Japan were
suspicious of the armed forces and were determined to prevent the armed forces
from playing the political role that they had before 1945. During the 1950s,
Berger explains, new institutional structures were created to protect the
defense policies from internal and external pressures and both states
legitimized these new national security policies through new definitions of
their national identities. Japan defined its identity as “a merchant nation”
that concentrates on economic development. At the same time Germany defined
itself as a member of a larger community of Western nations.
Public
opinion surveys 1960s and 1970s reveal an increase in West German and Japanese
popular support for the institutional pillars of the new approaches to defense
and security, including their alliances with the United States, political and
economic integration with West and the new armed forces. Besides support for
non- military means of ensuring national security grew steadily. Even after
1973, in Germany, Ostpolitik was regarded as more important that military means
for national security. Berger claims that shifts in the political – military
cultures of Germany and Japan during the Cold War led to a greater consensus in
favor of the antimilitary that had been established in the 1950s.
Berger
distinguishes three aspects of national security policy: alliance politics,
force structure and mission and civil – military relations.
Berger
describes Japan’s alliance relations as passive dependence on the US for
military security, but no entanglement in the US strategy. However German
alliance policy was to engage in alliance structures as a means of achieving
political, economic and security objectives.
Besides both Germany and
Japan have established a non-nuclear, non-aggressive force structure. While Japan’s
understanding of military mission was limited with territorial defense role,
Germany defined its mission limited with operations restricted to within the
NATO area.
In
describing Japanese civil – military relations two points are expressed by
Berger. Firstly, there is a tight bureaucratic control of Self Defense Forces
and secondly there are few connections between the military and nationalism. On
the other hand German approach to maintaining control over the armed forces was
to sustain integration of the armed forces into society through democratization
of the armed forces and through maintenance of open military through universal
mail conscription.
Berger concludes that cultural norms and
values evolve in tandem with shifts in behavior. Over the past 50 years,
external events have triggered domestic political debates over national
security, national identity and the definition of national interests. Secondly
he states that the shifts in German and Japanese attitudes indicates a consolidation
of the antimilitarism approaches to national security. As a third point Berger
concludes that a shift from the core principles of German and Japanese
political – military culture is likely only if there is a shock to the system
that persuades the countries’ leaders that their approach to national security
has been a failure.
In
an over all consideration, Berger has caught an original coincidence of the
common fate of Germany and Japan from a military perspective. He convincingly
states the significance of defining national identity and cultural background
in analyzing a state’s policy making and, in this case, military attitude.
However, his analysis of structural approaches’ perspectives about the issue is
weak. He uses concepts of realism - neorealism and liberalism - neoliberalism
interchangeably, which may mislead the readers. Also he skips liberal view with
a few sentences, while overemphasizes the realist consideration. On the other
hand the article lacks a proper organization of ideas under carefully selected
subtitles.
Argument: Germany and
Japan, as a result of their historical experiences and the way in which those
experiences were interpreted by domestic political actors, have developed
beliefs and values that make them peculiarly reluctant to use of military
force.
I.
Deficiencies of
Structural Accounts: Neither realist
nor liberal perspective addresses the issue of national identity and the way in
which the definition of national identity in turn shapes the national interest.
II.
The Concept of
Political–Military Culture: It refers
to those cultural beliefs and values that shape a society’s orientations toward
politics.
III.
The Origins of the
New Political-Military Cultures: The
political – military cultures of Germany and Japan continue to be shaped by the
ideological and political battles of the late 1940s and 1950s.
IV.
The Evolution of the
Two Political-Military Cultures:
Although there is a slight distance from the antimilitarist character of 1950s,
there is no fundamental deviation from the political-military cultures.
V.
The Evolution of
German and Japanese Security Policies