TATARSTAN AND ASYMMETRIC FEDERATION

 

Introduction

Which of the 89 subjects will be the first to secede in case of a new wave of disintegration in Russian Federation? The answer is obvious: Tatarstan. Taking most drastic actions (after Chechnya) on the way towards secession, Tatarstan managed to secure the peaceful devolution of a wide range of economic and political privileges after the disintegration of the USSR. More than any of the other 88 republics and regions of the Federation, it has defined the principles upon which center-periphery relations in Russia will be built. Resource-rich Tatarstan with its ethnically mixed population has managed to gain so wide privileges by pursuing a gradual process of negotiations that aims to provide concrete degrees of control over economic resources. Both the secessionist period just after the disintegration of the USSR and the negotiation period were successfully managed by Tatarstan so that it obtained as many privileges as it could from the center.

Tatarstan emphasises, on the one hand its traditional territorial autonomy, which led it to establish independent relations with Moscow and foreign countries, on the other hand ethnic and historic grounds on which Tatarstan’s right to autonomy is justified.[1] However the ethnic structure of the republic has to be analysed in detail and policies should be produced according to this analysis. Ethnic card is the most dangerous one to play for Tatarstan.

At the same time, the fear, at the beginning, that the privileged  status of Tatarstan gained by bilateral negotiations and treaties would be an instance for the other regions, which might follow the same route to obtain economic and political privileges, has fainted. However, considering the future of the Russian Federation, an asymmetric devolution of power within the Federation has come to the agenda. Which of the regions can develop such asymmetric relations and how much the center will approve such developments are the questions.

The future of the Federation is very much related with this issue: asymmetric decentralization. Whether it is advantageous or not, and who will or can adopt policies towards that aim will be decided by the time. However, today a struggle for power between the center and some regions of the periphery is going on. While the center tries to maintain a more centralised Federation and aims at taking back some rights given to the region, some regions and republics resist not to lose their already acquired rights and struggle for more of them.

In this article Tatarstan will be held as the case. After describing how it gained its privileged status, role of ethnicity in Tatarstan’s policy will be discussed and effects of an asymmetric devolution of power over the future of the Federation will be examined.

 

 

 

Tatarstan After the Dissolution of the USSR

In 1988-1990 various public groups and associations appeared among Tatar people. These organisations became a catalyst for public consciousness. The democratization process in the USSR and the change in many aspects of life brought about the emergence of these organisations. This was the period of the formation of the modern Tatar national liberation movement. In 1988 the Tatar Public Center (TPC) was created.[2]   

As Boris Yeltsin visited Tatarstan and beyond promising not to create inside Russia anything like old union center, proposed to take as much sovereignty as Tatarstan could, it was encouraged enough to propose “The Declaration of the State Sovereignty of Tatarstan” on August 30, 1990.[3] Tatarstan refused to take part in referendum, to decide the future of the union, held in the Soviet Union. In March 1991 and later on Tatarstan declared that the Republic would elect its own President. In June 1991 on the day of Russian elections, Shaymiyev, the only candidate and the leader of the Tatarstan’s Supreme Soviet, was elected as President. Only 36 percent of  Tatarstani electorate took part in the federal elections, of which 14 percent voted for Yeltsin. 60 percent voted in the Tatar elections, with 2/3 of the votes supported Shaymiyev. Negotiations between the republic of Tatarstan and the Russian Federation began in April 1991. During these first round negotiations Russian side proposed the idea of a referendum to determine the preferences of the population. The sole question of the referendum held in March 1992 was: ”Do you agree that the Republic of Tatarstan is a sovereign state, a subject of International Law, building its relations with the Russian Federations and other republics on the basis of the fair treaties?” 60.4 percent said ‘yes’ among 81.6 percent participants, while only 37.2 percent was against Tatarstan’s sovereignty.[4] In this way Tatarstan prevented the creation of a new powerful center.[5] 18 autonomous republics signed the Federation Treaty in March 1992, while Chechnya and Tatarstan did not.  The second round of the negotiations started in March 1992. During the second round of the negotiations, two sides had agreed on a draft treaty, which said that “Tatarstan as a state operates with the Russian Federation, but within the Russian Federation.” In November 1992, the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan was adopted. Tatarstan walked out of the Russian Constitutional Assembly in June 1993 and virtually boycotted the December 1993 federal elections.[6] The Republic of Tatarstan and the Russian Federation signed “The Treaty on Demarcation of Subjects of Jurisdiction and Reciprocal Delegation of Powers Between organs of State Authority of the Russian Federation and Organs of the State Authority of the Republic of Tatarstan” on 15 February, 1994.

This economically and politically privileged status could be gained only because of internal characteristics not shared by most other republics. From the political perspective, the lack of ethnic tensions enabled local leaders to promote Tatarstani interests without dividing the country along ethnic lines.

 

Ethnicity

The Tatarstani government has taken some steps to encourage the development of a national identity rather than an ethnic one. No extra rights are given to Tatars except equalizing all the Tatars’ and Russians’ status in the society. Both Tatar and Russian are official languages.

As mentioned above ethnicity is a very dangerous card to play in demanding more rights and privileges. Only 48 percent of Tatarstan’s population is ethnic Tatar. 43 percent of the population is ethnic Russian. There are 70 nationalities totally. So, in order to maintain stability, the last thing to do would be to revive ethnic tensions. A careful “ethnic balance politics” has to be conducted, beside struggle for increased national economic stability and independence, and influence against the center.[7]

On the other hand only, 32 percent of the Russian Federation’s ethnic Tatar population live in the borders of Tatarstan. So, an ethnic oriented policy would not be influential. Also the Tatarstani leaders’ struggle for their state cannot be understood as an ethnic motivated struggle. Beyond that, Tatarstani leaders cannot claim any ethnic right for Tatars.[8]

On the other hand, from the historical point of view, if the long historical togetherness of Russians and Tatars in Tatarstan is taken into account, a common interest around Tatarstan Republic has formed, which has become beyond any ethnic anxiety.

Khakimov’s assertion supports this idea: “The poly-ethnic and multicultural society, which is taking shape in Tatarstan is based on the principle of territorial, not ethnic, sovereignty.”[9] As a result, Kazan should solely focus on the territorial nature of Tatarstani political aims and minimize the role of ethnicity.[10]

 

Asymmetry or Symmetry?

Although the Russian mentality is always inclined to centralism, and so does not easily accept the differences in the status of the subjects of the Federation; there are always some “more equals”, just like the constitutionally equal oblast, krais which had appointed-leaders until a few years ago and “more equal” republics, which can elect their heads.

In that respect, today there is a tendency towards symmetrical federal relations with the center among the regions.[11] However it is impossible in the medium term to be established, if the center does not manage to take back all the given privileges and rights. Only with no rights and privileges all of the regions would be equal. Symmetry is impossible, because there are major disparities in the level of economic and political development of the various regions. Subjects of the Federation have their historical and regional traditions. Some can not and will not accept greater responsibility for the region. Because they are bound strictly in economical and political terms to Moscow. Certain republics have claims, rooted in their ethnic interests. It is clear that all the 88 subjects will not apply for Tatarstan’s rights and privileges. It is against the ethnic nature and economic and political conditions of some regions. Very few regions would be capable to stand on their feet. The developments towards secession after the dissolution of USSR, have strong indicators of this fact. 32 of the 89 regions exercised some kind of ‘separatist activism’. Only 15 republics adopted their own constitutions. 13 of them managed to assert rights on their natural resources. 6 republics claimed to have independent foreign policy, and only 5 of them managed to assert rights to own currency.[12] So every region can not and will not want to have same rights and privileges with Tatarstan, which has already obtained the widest rights and privileges.

So asymmetric decentralization is unescapable for the Federation. Despite the fear from the possibility that power will devolve to such a large and unequal extent that the Russian Federation will disintegrate in a manner similar to the Soviet Union, if the regions accumulate more and more authority vis-a-vis the federal government in Moscow, a devolution of power through negotiations is unlikely to cause the Federation to collapse. This is not only because of the fact that regions are bound together with a wide range of factors, but also the asymmetry itself has a binding force. A Tatarstan, which is economically independent will not intend to take the risks of secession. Considering the practical difficulties and problems of secession (high degree of economic interdependence among the regions, geography[13]) no negotiated and privileged region will take secession’s risks. Asymmetric devolution of power helps to ensure that the regions are encouraged to remain within the Federation.

In spite of all these factors that lead to asymmetric decentralization, which may end in a confederation -an alliance of autonomous republics that acts as a group-[14], the Russian centralist mentality insists on more and more centralist policies. In every possible occasion, the leaders at the center of the Federation mention taking back some of the rights and privileges and emphasize the virtues of a strong center, while many republics and regions demand more privileges. One of the last instances of this is Primakov’s statement earlier this year. Prime Minister Yevgenii Primakov had proposed that a vertical power structure should be re-established. He talked about the possibility of appointing, rather than electing, regional leaders and called for imposing more discipline on governors. Against this intention for establishment of a symmetry in a centralized manner, a ‘decentralist’ political bloc named Vsya Rossiya (All Russia) was established last month. Most prominent republic of the bloc is Tatarstan. Among the leading participants are Bashkortostan, Ingushetia, Adygeya, Chuvashya and a number of influential governors.[15] Tatarstan and its president Shaymiyev have the leading position in the bloc.

 

Conclusion

Any separatist action is hardly difficult (due to the mentioned practical reasons) to occur in the medium term. However, it is not rational to believe in a long living Russian Federation in today’s structure. The Federation is in a period of evolution and it has to choose a place for itself: a strictly centralist Soviet style Federation(!), or a looser Federation with its power asymmetrically devaluated to its members. The symmetry-asymmetry debate, which is heated up with the Russian Federation-Tatarstan Republic Treaty, will have the key role in the decision. It seems that as such centralist statements continue to exist, the number of decentralist blocs will increase, and will add to the factors forcing the center to asymmetric decentralization and in the end some kind of a Confederation.