What is special and novel about this case is the fact that petitioners minors assert  that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn.  In effect, petitioners are saying  that even those who were not yet born and who do not have legal 
personalities may be represented in a suit.

 The petitioners'  personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based according to the Supreme Court on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned which considers the "rhythm  and harmony of nature". Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization , management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations(Title XIV, Environment and  Natural Resources, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987. E.O. No. 292).

 Intergenerational responsibilty therefore implies that every generation has the responsibility of taking good care of the environment which includes taking the necessary steps and measures to ensure that the next generations may still enjoy and benefit from the natural resources.  It is a legacy that is passed on from one generation to another.
                                  
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing and maintenance of this class suit.  Membership in this "class" appears to embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the future- it appears that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of action petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus standi.

There is another legal implication in the decision of the Supreme Court in this case.  The court has declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific fundamental legal right- the right to a balanced and healthful ecology"  pursuant to Sections 15 and 16 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution.  While this right is undoubtedly "fundamental" it cannot however be characterized as "specific".

The other elements  pointed out by the court:  Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section1, Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977- all appear to be formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional statements of basic policy in Article II, Sections 16 (the right to a balanced and healthful ecology) and 15 ( the right to health).

Neither petitioners nor the Court has identified the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which gives rise to a specificlegal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce. By finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised  in the constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 and 16 of Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially enfoceable even in their present form.  The implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases.

One case came out four years after the Oposa case and this is the case of Manila Prince Hotel versus Government Service Insurance System decided on February3, 1997 reported in 267 SCRA 408 which states that a constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation- it is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates.  

Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.

The Supreme Court in that case also stated that admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles.  Their provisions command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely establish an outline of government providing for the different departments of the governmental machinery and securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens .  A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing.  But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.  Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is reffered to the legislature for action.

Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution is self-executing.  If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.