Vertical Restraint: S Act § 1
Vertical Restraint
- Price Fixing
- BLR #5: Per Se Illegal 2 Set Min. Resale
Price 4 Next Level
- Even if not part w/title, can't set min. resale
price
- Rule of rsn 4 max resale price
- Rsns 2 want min. resale price
- Create high quality image
- Elim. free riders of discount retailers
- Avoid dealer concentration
- Extensive avail.
- Eff. terr. size
- Mkt penetration
- Promote entry
- Promote interbrand competition
- Coord. among mfgr is facilitated
- Really actual hz'al restraint among dealer
- BLR #6: Per Se Lawful Sole Outlet Arr.
- Mfgr prom's dealer that that dealer would B the
only dealer +
- No attempt 2 monopolize +
- Lots of interbrand competition @ both mfgr. &
retail levels
- BLR #7: Rule of Rsn
- Vertically imposed terr., customer, / location
restrictions
- Gen'ly ok if mfgr shows benefit of interbrand
competition outweighs loss of intrabrand competition
- Agmt / Jt. Axn
- BLR #8: Unilateral Terms By Mfgr / Seller
Lawful
- Seller may dec. 2 whom & what terms it will
sell in advance
- Must have no purpose 2 create / maintain monopoly
- Seller can unilaterally refuse 2 deal in future
4 not following terms even if those terms illegal if accomplished
by jt. axn of seller & buyer
- Gen'ly used 2 avoid per se illegality 2 fix vertical
price min.
- Tying Agmt
- Def.
- Seller agrees 2 sell prod. Z only if buyer also
takes prod. Y
- Prod. Z is tying prod.
- Prod. Y is tied prod.
- BLR #9: Tying is Almost Always Illegal
if All 4 Conditions Met
- Two sep. prod's involved
- Prod's R tied so can't get prod. Z w/o prod.
Y
- Mkt pwr in mkt 4 tying prod.
- Patent / copyright of prod. but disfavor /
- Inference from forecl. /
- Suff. pwr 2 restrain appreciably /
- Ability 2 incr. price & has competitive adv.
than other competitors/
- Suff. pwr 2 make forcing buyer 2 take unwanted
prod. probable /
- Appreciable econ. pwr is most recent test
- Forecl. of seller's competitors in mkt 4 tied
prod.
- Not insubst'l amt
- Subst'l vol. of commerce is most recent test
- O'Connor's Rule of Rsn 4 Tying Formula
(not maj. yet)
- Two sep. prod's tied
- Pwr in tying mkt
- Suff. pwr 2 forecl. / create subst'l threat of
mkt pwr in tied mkt
- Forecl. in tied mkt
- Subst'l threat of mkt pwr in mkt 4 tied prod.
- Calls 4 mkt analysis
- Can't Incr. Mkt Pwr by Tying in
Sit's
- If competitive mkt 4 both tied & tying prod.,
then can't incr. value beyond fair mkt value
- If tying & tied prod. used in fixed proportions,
then can't incr. value even if monopoly pwr in tying prod.
- Patent & Tying
- Holder has monopoly of invention by prohibiting
others from using, making, / selling it
- Can't use patent in 1 prod. 2 gain monopoly of
another prod.
- Can't enforce patent 2 all if viol. antitrust
laws, even if never had dealing w/infringer
- Tying Ok 4 Quality Control If
- Specifications won't work
- Specifications will b less eff. than tying
- Motives 4 Tying
- Quality control
- Selling own prod.
- Price discrim.
- Excl. Dealing
- Def.
- Sells prod. Q but restrains buyer
- From buying prod. Q from anybody else besides
me +
- To buying only prod. Q
- Similarities 2
- Tying agmt by forcing more of unwanted prod.
- Total reqt K by forecl'ing competitors
- BLR #10: Rule of Rsn If
- Amt of mkt sh. forecl'ed 2 seller's competitors
is rsbl +
- Length of K is rsbl +
- Longer the K, more illegal
- Benefits 2 competition outweighs the disadv.
- Could have eff. in dist.
- Adv's
- Quality control
- Can sched.
- Steady stream of reliable source
- Disadv's
- Stuck w/price during K term
- Vertical Integ.
- Combine Complementary Items Needed 2 Prod.
End Prod.
- Complementary item if makes something complete
/ make up whole
- Adv's
- Assured source of supply
- Run dist. more eff'ly
- More longterm K's
- Disadv's
- Hard 2 manage
- Barrier 2 entry if entire ind. is vertically
integ'ed
- Polit. disadv. b/c workers get big block of polit.
pwr
- Methods of Vertical Integ.
- De novo where enter sep. mkt
- Merger / acq. existing co.
- Excl. dealing K's of long term total reqt K
- Charact's of Methods
- De novo & merger is perm. but excl. dealing
is less perm.
- Law pref's de novo over merger b/c more competition
- Law pref's excl. dealing over merger b/c less
perm.
- Law gen'ly law pref.'s de novo > excl. dealing
> merger
This material is copyrighted by the author. Use
of the material for profit is expressly prohibited
without the written permission from the author.
Ms. Haeji Hong
May 12, 1998
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