MOLDOVA, 1998

Betsy Gidwitz

Between Romania, Russia, and Ukraine

One of the 15 post-Soviet successor states, Moldova occupies the greater part of the territory known historically from the seventeenth century onward as Bessarabia. It is bounded on the north and northeast by Ukraine, on the southeast by the Black Sea, and on the south and west by Romania. Moldovans consider themselves descendants of the Romans, i.e., unrelated to Slavs. The official state language is Romanian. Between 1812 and 1917, Moldova was under Russian rule. It proclaimed independence from Russia in 1917 and joined Romania in 1918. The territory was seized by the Soviet Union in June 1940 under the provisions of the 1939 Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact. It was retaken by German and Romanian troops in July 1941, recovered by the USSR in August 1944, and declared its independence from the USSR on August 27, 1991. Romania has always considered Moldova to be a Romanian province, although its actual claims to the territory have been dormant for several years.

In common with its Ukrainian neighbor, much of the Moldovan economy exists on a non-cash, barter basis and is difficult to quantify. The largest sectors are agriculture and agricultural industry. The general industrial base is weak and almost entirely lacking in high technology production. The limited industry that was introduced during the Soviet period was linked to industry in other parts of the Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union collapsed, ties were severed and production ceased. A very large sector of the population is impoverished, alongside a small number of very wealthy individuals. The national parliament is riven by ideological conflicts and is unable to formulate a workable economic policy. Elections in March 1998 returned a parliament that is 40 percent Communist, 28 percent Moldovan nationalist, and 32 percent centrist. Observers predict a sharp devaluation of the Moldovan currency and further declines in the gross domestic product and living standards.

The lack of an equitable and enforced tax system plagues Moldova as it does most of the other successor states; government salaries and pensions are not paid, and various government services are never implemented. Much of the support for the Communists in the last election came from older people who are not receiving their pensions. Many city-dwellers have relatives in rural areas who help out with food. In return, the city-dwellers provide certain manufactured goods that are easier to find in urban areas.

The Secession of Russian Transdnistr

As in other former Soviet republics, Moldovan actions in the late Soviet and early post-Soviet period were influenced strongly by resurgent local nationalism that many residents of Russian ethnic background and members of other ethnic groups found threatening. Apprehension about the future course of Moldova was especially strong in the Transdnistr area, which had been part of Soviet Ukraine before World War II and was transferred by the USSR to Soviet Moldova after the war. With a majority of its population Russian and Ukrainian, Transdnistr served Soviet needs in diluting the ethnic Romanian majority population in Moldova. Soviet policy dictated the establishment of the most advanced sectors of Moldovan industry in Transdnistr and the placement of Moldova-bound oil and gas pipelines through the Slavic-populated region.

A Russian-dominated Dnistr Moldovan Republic was declared in the eastern part of the country and seceded from Moldova in 1992. Armed conflict had erupted between Moldovan security forces and Russian-controlled Transdnistr Republican Guards before secession. After secession, the latter were joined by the Russian 14th Army and Cossack volunteers from Ukraine and Russia. Russia has so far declined to withdraw the 14th Army, citing a lack of housing for troops in Russia.

According to U.S. Ambassador John Todd Stewart (in an April 1998 interview), the Transdnistr situation is a major problem for the new Moldovan government. As he explained, immediately following Moldovan independence, local Russians were justified in their fears of Moldovan nationalism and potential Romanian annexation of Moldova, including Transdnistr. Local "rabble rousers" and "Russian carpetbaggers" exploited the situation in declaring a Dnistr Moldovan Republic that was loyal to Russia. However, Moldovan nationalism and Romanian claims on Moldova have declined substantially since the heady days of early independence, and justification for the continuing presence of the Russian Army in Transdnistr no longer exists. Russian state policy on Transdnistr seems ambivalent; Russia appears to have no real desire to maintain troops in the area and might cooperate in a withdrawal if a strategy for withdrawal is developed.

In the meantime, Transdnistr has become a haven for organized crime. The Transdnistr leadership has no interest in resolving the issue because they are reaping large profits from illegal commerce in the area. Moldova is concerned because it has no control over its own borders; contraband, such as cigarettes and weapons (for Chechnya and Abkhazia), move freely through Transdnistr.

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