Paras Indonesia, November, 09 2005 @ 09:50 pm
Money & Military: A Coalition In The Poso Conflict (Part I & II)
Lian Gogali
Every time there is a bomb, a murder, or a sniper attack in Poso, Central Sulawesi,
religious conflict almost always gets the blame. Some would try to correlate the new
events to the old violence, while others would try to reject the assumption. But most
who consider that the Poso conflict is much more than just a religious conflict are still
shy in expressing their arguments. Most are still afraid to point that the perpetrators
behind all the acts of terror are the same people benefiting from atmosphere of fear in
Poso.
Since the year 2001, when religious conflict was already officially blamed for the
violence in Poso, a number of NGOs from Central Sulawesi have already tried to point
the economic-political factor of the conflict in Poso. One of the groups is Yayasan
Tanah Merdeka (YTM) which analyses the arms trade in Central Sulawesi, particularly
Poso and Palu. The group also sees that the natural resources of this part of the
island – particularly the sub-districts of Poso, Morowali and Banggai – lured
businesses and political deals with local administrations.
With businesses arriving in, came also the necessity to guarantee the security for the
investors. Such security should cover all aspect from the capital planning, exploration,
production and exploitation. But, foremost, the businesses needed some kind of
guarantee that there will be no resistance from the local community.
Those were not too hard of a task to ask. Contemporary history of Central Sulawesi
has proven that the local authority administrations have made themselves most
effective for business owners. According to the local newspaper Banggai Express,
requests for the establishment of military command stations Morowali, Parimo, Buol,
Toli-toli and Banggai were promptly taken into action in 2002. The area was covered
not only by police but also the army. At the time being, the military plans to expand
its Battalion 714/Sintuwu Maroso in Central Sulawesi. The authority has finished
building and started to function its command stations in Pendolo (Sub-district of
Poso) and Molino (Sub-district of Morowali). Along with Battalion 714/Sintuwu
Maroso, Colonel Infantry Suwahyudi said the three district command posts are
responsible to look after security issues in the oil and gas exploration in Sinorang -
Toili, which stretches from the village of Batui to Terumbu Karang Tiaka in the Gulf of
Tolo.
But security service goes beyond oil, but also marbel exploration with its
infrastructures in the Morowali Sub-district (a new sub-district that was broken-off from
Poso in 1999). To this date, there is a consortium of about 25 companies owned by
the business tycoon (and military financer) Tomy Winata that cashes in on the
Morowali project. The capitals will also be used to explore the industries of forestry,
fishery (a fish can factory is to be built with a capacity to produce 16 tones of
produced-fish per month), plantation (rubber and palm oil), mining, power, trade and
clean water. The MAL tabloid reported in that there are also talks of other service
industries such as banking, property, airport, tourism, and hotel.
With the current establishments, the Central Sulawesi Province, which extends in an
area of around 68,000 km2, will be guarded by two army battalions - Battalion
711/Raksatama which is posted in Palu (capital of the province) and Battalion
714/Sintuwu Maroso, commanding from Poso. The two battalions are under the
Regional Military Command (Kodam) VII/Wirabuana.
Another development that needs to be noted is the construction of the hydroelectric
power plant (PLTA) in the Sulewana waterfalls, about 20 km from the town of Tentena,
Poso. The plant, which has yet to retain its environmental impact clearance, was
ordered to compensate the Sulewena community a mere amount of Rp1,750 –
Rp3,000 per meter (cheaper than the actual Rp5,000 compensation officially
regulated). According to researcher George J. Aditjondro, the power plant project was
tendered to two companies PT. Hadji Kalla and PT. Bukaka – both owned by Ahmad
Kalla, younger brother of Indonesia’s second-in-command, Vice President Yusuf
Kalla. As the project started, district command posts were set up by Battalion
714/Sintuwu Maroso in the villages of Saojo, Pendolo, and South Pamona. There are
also other joint posts of police and armed soldiers appearing all over the project area.
The district command postings indeed indicated how much the authority values the
role of the investors in Morowali and Banggai. The distances between command posts
and exploration areas are walking-distance. In Morowali, the marbel project area
which will be managed by a Tommy Winata company is pinned between two
command posts. On one side, it is guarded by the Mobile Brigade headquarters in the
Korowou village, and on the other stretch, it is next to a district command post in
Molino.
So, while the Poso conflict brought sorrow to its victims, it also becomes a good
excuse for increase of military and police presence in the area. A University of Berlin
anthropologist Georg Elwert raised an analysis of "markets of violence". He said
behind every series of violence, there is always an economic interest, and therefore,
the atmosphere of fear must be maintained.
" A particular cost-effective form of mobilizing troops is to create fear. Hence,
propaganda acts as an important instrument of production. From an economic
perspective, this can give a point to what would otherwise be pointless violence. The
fear of retaliation by the victims leaves no option open but to join an army or support it
for one's own protection. Fear of revenge stabilizes the system”.
Seems like Poso is a prime example.
How did it all started?
The alternative theory to what caused the Poso conflict relates to the political
scenario in 1999 to cover up the corruption in the farmers’ credit union (KUT) which
involved family members of the Poso regent at that time, Arief Patanga. The regent
held his regency for two terms, from 1989 to 1998, and it was during his bid for a third
term that the scandal first surfaced, discovered by youth members of the Indonesian
Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P). Immediately, the local bureaucracy attempted
ways to cover up the corruption and somehow steered it into a religious conflict –
sparked by a brawl started by a Patanga supporter (a Muslim) with a supporter of a
rival candidate (a Christian).
Where does the aid go? “Refugees were given Super Mie, while local officials went
home with Super Kijang”
The Poso conflict has created a displaced community, where victims and survivors
became refugees as their houses and belongings destroyed, and loved ones killed in
the clashes. Aid for refugees eventually came in the billions of rupiah. Most were for
physical rehabilitation, movement of refugees, security rehabilitation and
reconciliation. But unfortunately for most of the refugees, they never tasted the
money. Since 2001, the central government has channeled in about Rp162 billion for
Poso rehabilitation. But in reality, the implementation was fiddled with corruption.
Nothing misses the foragers – fake payments, fake lists of refugee names and their
family members, etc. The Poso conflict was initially triggered by local corruption
scandals and transformed into a grander practice. Same act of dishonesty, just bigger
network and larger amount of money. Yayasan Tanah Merdeka in 2004 was right to
call it a “project of violence”.
After the conflict died down, a concerned group, the Coalition for Peace in Central
Sulawesi, reported that the acts of terror in Poso have been caused by parties fighting
to profit from the humanitarian aid funds. Police has filed a number of corruption
cases, such the allowance cases of jaminan hidup (jadup) - worth around Rp1.7
billion- and bekal hidup (bedup) – worth around Rp2.2 billion - for the period of August
2003. The Head of the Social Welfare Division and his network (legal authority, police,
village chiefs, and business owners) were involved in both allowance cases. The
Coalition’s press release stated that the corruption figure could be as high as Rp40
billions from the total of Rp54 billions allocated for the refugee allowances by Jakarta.
Ironically, the corruption is continuing alongside the program to rehabilitate security in
Poso. Post Malino Declaration, the government ordered the Sintuwu Maroso
Operation which involved thousands of police officers and Indonesian Armed Forces
(TNI) soldiers. The operation obviously requires billions of rupiah from the State
Budget (APBN) as well as the Central Sulawesi Provincial Budget (APBD).
In short, there are more than a few powerful parties benefiting from an un-safe Poso
and its surroundings. These people are certainly not the grassroots community, not
the farmers nor the local traders who are just trying to survive and start their lives from
scratch again.
Copyright (c) 2005 - PT Laksamana Global International. All rights reserved
|
