King, Conference of Rulers and Constitution
by Harun Rashid
Dec 8, 2000

In Malaysia the Conference of Rulers consists of the various Sultans, who, having chosen their parents well, serve for life. In rotation they serve as King, with a term of five years. The Sultans are a permanent institution in Malaysia, going back over five hundred years. It is this permanence that highlights their position of power in the affairs of the country.

The Constitution of Malaysia, though somewhat tattered, torn and tangled at the hands of a gelded parliament of midget miscreants put in place by a party past its prime, still manages to recognize the primacy of the Conference of rulers. The Sultan resident in the national palace as King, is given by the Constitution a range of powers, and he exercises these in consultation with his fellow Sultans, who, though busy with the affairs of their fief, meet regularly to tend to matters of national need.

The number of appointments made by the Conference of Rulers, with the King acting as their spokesman, is large, giving them extraordinary influence in the selection of federal officers. They have just made the appointment of a new Chief Justice, and now are in the process of selecting a new Attorney General.

The office of Attorney General carries with it broad powers, with complete discretion in regard to prosecution of those who fail to obey the established laws of the land. Poorly chosen, he may also be an instrument of political oppression, acting to misuse the law to further the interests of the temporary government in power. Such abuse has generated widespread attention in Malaysia, and it is to the redress of these failings that the Conference of Rulers now addresses itself.

The present Attorney General is deficient in the important ability to properly distinguish between the rights of the citizens and the perpetuity and prosperity of patrons in positions of political power. These failings are considered by many to be sufficiently egregious to warrant his removal for cause, but happily his term ends with the year, and the ignominious sandiwaras may soon settle into the shadows of sadness and shame.

The Constitution, in its recognition of the permanence of the Sultans, calls for consultation among themselves in the selection of new office-holders. There is provision for advice from the present prime minister, who is not permanent in his office, though the incumbent seems intent to make the office a life tenure. In furtherance of this, and in an effort to protect past and present peccadilloes from prosecution in perpetuity, he wishes to put forward the names of those he finds most supple in applying their talents to these ends.

The framers of the Malaysian Constitution seem to have anticipated such usurpation of powers, writing again and again, in various re-phrasings, the intent to vest the appointive power in the present Sultan-in-residence as King, who is the representative of the Conference of Rulers. Their appointee serves at their behest, and his continuing performance is at their pleasure. It rests therefore, for the Rulers to exercise a constant watchfulness over the performance of their appointees. It is to them the people look for redress of malfeasance in office.

The King is given by the Constitution the responsibility to oversee the general welfare of the nation, and if the rights and freedoms of the people are abridged or threatened from ANY quarter, then it is the King, acting in accord with the Conference of Rulers, who is empowered to put things right. Should circumstances warrant, the King may declare a state of emergency, and during the time of its effect bring the country back to order. This power acts to check, not bolster, the designs of persons in temporary residence in the prime minister's chair.

The King is given the duty to choose the members of the Election Commission, who must be appointed with "regard to the importance of securing an Election Commission which enjoys public confidence." In accord with 114 (1) "The Election Commission shall be appointed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (King) after consultation with the Conference of Rulers, and shall consist of a Chairman, a deputy chairman and three other members." There is no mention of any advice from the prime minister.

The King is given discretion in the selection of members of the Education Service Commission in 141A (2) " ... but after considering the advice of the Prime Minister and after consultation with the Conference of Rulers ..." The phrase "after considering the advice of the Prime Minister" appears a number of times in the Constitution, and it is clear that the King is not constrained by failure of the Prime Minister to provide the names of appointees deemed sufficiently endowed with the necessary character and preparation to perform the duties of the office. This is especially true when there is a history of continuing gratitude as a requirement for preferment. The King in making appointments must be alert to the possibility that appointees have hidden liabilities which may prevent them from acting independently in the public interest.

In the selection of the Attorney General, the Constitution states [145(5)] that the new appointee "shall hold office during the pleasure of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong ... unless he is a member of the Cabinet, shall receive such remuneration as the Yang di-Pertuan Agong may determine." The right to dismiss an Attorney General is implicit in this clause, and therefore the appointment of an unsatisfactory candidate would but result in a short tenure. The "advice of the Prime Minister" is therefore given practical limitation to those presenting acceptable qualifications, and none being put forward, the King is free to make an independent selection, the consultation with the other Sultans not being mentioned. In this case, the absence of the consultative clause suggests the possibility of an oversight, and if so, one readily rectified.

All matters affecting the rights of the Rulers must be brought by a Special Court (182), one which includes the Chief Justice, and must have the consent of the Attorney General (183). Since the Rulers are subject to malicious prosecution as well as the ordinary citizen, they have a personal interest in the protection of the judiciary against harm from this quarter. A strong argument may be made that since the Attorney General now serving is doing so at the pleasure of the King, the continuing charade in the courts calls for intervention, with the convention of a Royal Commission of Inquiry to prevent further deterioration of the national fabric.

The Conference of Rulers, according to the present prime minister, are capable of nothing beyond birthday honours. The Constitution disagrees. Along with the appointive power, the King and the Conference of Rulers are vested with powers of oversight in the administration of the affairs of state. Theirs is not all pillows and pomp, but the very regal duty of watchfulness, that poisonous snakes and feral pigs do not roam freely in the corridors of power. Where is the horn ... it is time for the hunt.


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