Differences Between Ahtisaari

Differences Between
Ahtisaari-Chernomyrdin Agreement
With Milosevic and the Rambouillet Text

At the moment it remains uncertain whether the NATO-Yugoslav agreement will survive NATO's efforts to remold it to an earlier, failed, incarnation, and Belgrade's efforts to delay. But assuming that the agreement negotiated with Slobodan Milosevic and the Yugoslav authorities by Martti Ahtisaari and Viktor Chernomyrdin holds and is in fact implemented, it is possible that some of the objectives set by the U.S., UK, and NATO may be reached - at least for a while. On the official level those goals include ending the on-going violence and instability in Kosovo; minimizing the impact of the refugee crisis on regional stability and NATO's credibility; and weakening the Yugoslav military and economy (the only goal realized so far).

Broader but unofficial U.S. goals included asserting U.S. indispensability and indeed domination within Europe, achievable largely through militarizing the "solutions" to security problems, and asserting the primacy of NATO as the global enforcer authorized both to grant credentials for and to implement international interventions. The effect would be to replace the singular legitimacy of the UN with a new, broader role for NATO. But with uncertainties remaining about whether the current agreement will actually set in motion any kind of peace and/or refugee-return process, and with UN centrality reasserted (however grudgingly) in its text, it is less certain that those unofficial U.S. goals will be met. In fact, it may turn out that this Yugoslav debacle begins a serious erosion of NATO's credibility and power, despite the U.S.-UK efforts to the contrary.

The Ahtisaari/Chernomyrdin accord was negotiated with Yugoslavia officially on behalf of the G-8 and the European Union, not NATO. While it includes many of the same provisions as the failed Rambouillet text, it differs in a number of key respects. The significance of those differences lies in the crucial question of whether an agreement, functionally indistinguishable from the current Ahtisaari/Chernomyrdin accord, might have been achievable months earlier, without the devastation of Yugoslavia and the escalation of the anti-Albanian "ethnic cleansing" in Kosovo wrought by NATO's bombing campaign. The point of such an examination lies in exposing the lie of the "humanitarian necessity defense" claimed by Washington and London to justify their illegality in waging NATO's war.

WHAT'S DIFFERENT
Rambouillet Text	Ahtisaari/Chernomyrdin Agreement
NATO force, NATO command and control; no UN oversight beyond the Security Council being "invited to pass a resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter endorsing and adopting the arrangements" made by NATO to establish the NATO force.	International peacekeeping force "under UN auspices" which would act "according to Chapter 7 of the UN Charter." International security presence to have "substantial NATO participation" and "unified command and control." Understood to include Russian, other non-NATO participation, though "unified" command structure not further clarified
NATO personnel to have "free and unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughout the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia"	The international deployment is only "in Kosovo," not throughout Yugoslavia.
Interim Kosovo autonomy, then public referendum on independence in three years in the form of "a mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo, on the basis of the will of the people."	"Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo...which the UN Security Council will decide" based on "substantial autonomy" for the people of Kosovo "within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;" no reference to future independence.
Allowed thousands of Serb military personnel (at least 2500) to remain in Kosovo	"Verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces." After the withdrawal "an agreed number of Serb personnel will be allowed to return" for purposes of liaison with international peacekeepers, marking mine fields, "maintaining a presence at" Serb heritage sites, and "maintaining a presence" at key border crossings. "Return of personnel...will be limited to a small agreed number--hundreds, not thousands."
Return of refugees responsibility of NATO.	International force authorized to "secure safe environment for all residents in Kosovo and enabling safe return of displaced persons and refugees" but "safe and free return of all refugees and displaced under the supervision of UNHCR."
No explicit mention of KLA	"Demilitarization of the Kosovo Liberation Army" as part of "political process directed at reaching interim political agreement;" does not say "disarming," and assumed to refer to giving up tanks, etc., not full disarmament.

WHO GAVE UP WHAT AS RESULT OF NATO'S BOMBING CAMPAIGN?
What Milosevic Gave Up	What NATO Gave Up
Can keep only 100s, not 1000s of troops in Kosovo Milosevic indicted for war crimes at UN tribunal	International force under UN, not NATO auspices International force deployed only in Kosovo, not throughout Yugoslavia UNHCR, not NATO, supervises return of refugees. No referendum on Kosovo independence. KLA to be demilitarized