註：後出師表可能是後人偽作，未必是出自諸葛亮的手筆！(此篇只出自出於張儼的《默記》，《諸葛亮集》並無記載！)
先帝慮漢、賊不兩立，王業不偏安，故託臣以討賊也。以先帝之明，量臣之才，故知臣伐賊才弱敵強也；然不伐賊，王亦亡，惟坐待亡，孰與伐之？是故託臣而弗疑也。臣受命之日，寢不安席，食不甘味，思惟北征，宜先入南，故五月渡瀘，深入不毛，并日而食。臣非不自惜也，顧王業不得偏全於蜀都，故冒難以奉先帝之遺意也，而議者謂為非計。今賊適疲於西，又務於東，兵法乘勞，此進趨之時也。
謹陳其事如左：高帝明並日月，謀臣淵深，然涉險被創，危然後安。今陛下未及高帝，謀臣不如良、平，而欲以計取勝，坐定天下，此臣之未解一也。劉繇、王朗各據州郡，論安言計，動引聖人，羣疑滿腹，眾難塞胸，今歲不戰，明年不征，使孫策坐大，遂并江東，此臣之未解二也。曹操智計殊絕於人，其用兵也，髣髴孫、吳，然困南陽，險於烏巢，危於祁連，偪於黎陽，幾敗北山，殆死潼關，然後偽定一時耳，況臣才弱，而欲以不危而定之，此臣之未解三也。曹操五攻昌霸不下，四越巢湖不成，任用李服而李服圖之，委夏侯而夏侯敗亡，先帝每稱操為能，猶有此失，況臣駑下，何能必勝？此臣久未解四也。自臣到漢中，中間期年耳，然喪趙雲、陽羣、馬玉、閻芝、丁立、白壽、劉郃、鄧銅等及曲長屯將七十餘人，突將無前。賨叟、青羌散騎、武騎一千餘人，此皆數十年之內所糾合四方之精銳，非一州之所有，若復數年，則損三分之二也，當何以圖敵？此臣之未解五也。今民窮兵疲，而事不可息，事不可息，則往與行勞費正等，而不及今圖之，欲以一州之地與賊持久，此臣之未解六也。
夫難平者，事也。昔先帝軍於楚，當此時，曹操拊手謂，天下以定。然後先帝東連吳、越，西取巴、蜀，舉兵北征，夏侯授首，此操之失計而漢事將成也。然後吳更違盟，關羽毀敗，秭歸蹉跌，曹丕稱帝。凡事如是，難可逆見。臣鞠躬盡力，死而後已，至於成敗利鈍，非臣之明所能逆�怳]。
(The English Version of "the second petition on taking the field") from the English version of "Romance of three kingdoms"
The late Emperor was anxious lest the rebels should set up a rival empire and the legitimates Ruler's domain be restricted. Wherefore he laid upon me, thy minister, to destroy them. Measuring my powers by his perspicacity he knew that I should attack and oppose my talents, inadequate as they might be, to their strength, for, if I did not, the royal domain would be destroyed. It was a question whether to await destruction without effort, or to attack? Wherefore he assigned me the task confidently. Thenceforward this task occupied all my thoughts.
Considering that the south should he made secure before the north could be attacked,
I braved the heat of summer and plunged deep into the wilds. Sparing not myself
nor regarding privation, urged by the one consideration, that the royal domain
should not be confined to the capital of Shu, I faced dangers in obedience to
the late Emperor's behest. But there are critics who may say that I failed.
Now the rebels have been weakened in the west and have become involved in the
east. The rule of war is to take advantage of the enemy's weakness, and so now
is the time to attack. I shall discuss the various circumstances in order.
The enlightenment of the Founder of the Hans rivaled the glory of the sun and
moon, his counselors were profound as the ocean abyss. Nevertheless, he trod
a hazardous path and suffered losses, only attaining repose after passing through
great dangers. Your Majesty does not reach his level, nor do your counselors
equal Chang Liang and Chen Ping, yet, while they desire victory, they would
sit idle, waiting till the empire should become settled. This attitude is beyond
my comprehension.
Liu Yu and Wang Lang each occupied a district. They passed their time in talking of tranquillity and discussing lpans, quoting the sayings of the sages till they were filled with doubts and obsessed with difficulties. So this year was not the time to fight, nor next year the season to punish, and, thus talking, it came about that Sun Tse grew powerful and possessed himself of all Chiangtung. This sort of behaviour I cannot understand.
In craft Tsao Tsao surpassed all men. He could wield armies like the great strategists of old, Sun Wu and Wu Chi. Yet he was hemmed in Nanyang, was in danger at Wuchao, was in difficulties at Chilien, was hard pressed in Liyang, was nearly defeated at Peishan and nearly kissed at Changkuan. Yet, after all these experiences, there was a temporary and artificial state of equilibrium. How much less can I, a man of feeble powers, bring about a decision without running risks? I fail to understand.
Tsao Tsao failed in five attacks on Changpa, and four times crossed the Chaohu without success. He employed Li Fu, who betrayed him, and put his trust in Hsiahou, who was defeated and died. His late Majesty always regarded Tsao Tsao as an able man, and yet he made such mistakes. How then can I, in my worn-out condition, necessarily conquer? I do not understand why.
Only one year has elapsed since I went into Hanchung yet we have lost Chao Yun, Yang Chun, Ma Yu, Yen Chih, Ting Li, Pai Shou, Liu Ho, Teng Tung, and others, and leaders of ranks and captains of stations, to the number of near four score, all men unsurpassed in dash and valour, and more than a thousand of the irregular horse and trained cavalry of the Sou (aborigines) of Tsung and the Tangguts of Tsinghai (Gobi Desert), whose martial spirit we have fostered these ten years all about us, and not only in one district. If we delay much longer, two-thirds of this will have dissipated, and how then shall we meet the situation? I do not understand delay.
The people are poor and the army exhausted indeed, and confusion does not cease. If confusion does not cease, then whether we go on or stand still the drain is the same. Yet it seems that attack should not be made yet! Is it that the repels are to allowed to obtained a permanent hold on some province? I do not understand the arguments.
A stable condition of affairs is indeed difficult to obtain. Once, when the
late Emperor was defeated in Chiu, Tsao Tsao patted himself on the back and
said that the empire was settled. Yet, after that, the late Emperor obtained
the support of Wu and Yueh on the east, took Pa and Shu on the west and undertook
an expedition to the north, wherein Hsiahou lost his life. So Tsao Tsao's calculations
proved erroneous, and the affairs of Han seemed about to prosper. But, still
later, Wu proved false to pledges, our Kuan was defeated, we sustained a check
at Tzukuei-and Tsao Pei assumed the imperial style. Such events prove the difficulty
of forecast. I shall strive on to the end, but the final result, whether success
or failure, whether gain or loss, is beyond my power to foresee.
