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... No, Iraq needs federalism, and the Sunnis do too
By Haytham Mouzahem
Commentary by
Friday, September 02, 2005
To understand why Sunnis reject the new constitution proposed by the Shiite and Kurdish communities in Iraq, it is important to understand the historical background and cultural issues influencing all the parties. The Sunnis reject federalism because they believe it emphasizes sectarianism and will lead to the loss of Iraq's Arab and Sunni Islamic identity. But their acceptance of federalism for the northern Kurdish region suggests their real problem is with the Shiites, not with federalism per se.
There are several reasons why Sunnis justify federalism for the Kurds yet not for the Shiites: the Kurds are not Arabs while the Shiites are; the Kurds have suffered from oppressive regimes for decades and federalism offers a barrier against this in the future; the Kurds have had theoretical autonomy since passage of the 1970 Constitution, and practical autonomy since 1991, following the ouster of Iraqi forces from Kuwait.
In addition to this, Sunnis fear that federalism will lead to Iraq's break-up into three states, leaving them cut off from Iraq's oil wealth in the north and south. Sunnis also claim that more than one million of their coreligionists in the south and center would fall under Shiite domination.
While there is some truth to these allegations, there are also problems. For one thing, Shiites have also been oppressed by a succession of Sunni regimes throughout history, particularly since the creation of Iraq in 1925; Shiites may be Arabs like the Sunnis, but there are religious and cultural differences between the communities justifying federalism. There is also a growing Wahhabi strain among Iraqi Sunnis, whose advocates believe that Shiites are unbelievers (kuffar) and "polytheists" (mushrekin) because of their veneration for the prophet and the imams. Fatwas have been issued condemning the Shiites, justifying their killing and the destruction of their mosques and holy shrines. This hatred has been obvious through the hundreds of terrorist attacks directed against Shiite civilians.
Shiites are also wary of the fact that the former Baath regime, and now Sunni leaders and parties, have repeatedly accused Iraq's Shiites of being "Persians" or "Iranians" who don't deserve Iraqi citizenship. It is true that some Iraqi Shiites are of Iranian origin, but most were born and grew up in Iraq and form only a small part of the country's Shiite community.
Hence, from the perspective of the Baathists and Wahhabis, indeed that of many Sunnis in general, the Shiites are non-Arabs or non-Muslims when it comes to finding fault with them; but when Shiites are convinced that federalism can protect their lives and interests and allows them to express their religious beliefs in freedom and peace, then Sunnis, as well as the Arab media, reaffirm the Arabism of Shiites and their similarities to Sunnis!
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The problem in Iraq today is not federalism, it is sectarianism and terrorism. The former Baath elite, which is the Sunni elite, cannot accept that Iraq has changed and is no longer a country ruled by a minority and an oppressive dictatorship. Unfortunately, the recent negotiations between Iraq's political forces over the constitution has underlined how Sunnis still deal with Shiites and Kurds in the old ways: either by seeking to impose their views on them through violence or through rejectionism and threats of boycott.
Iraq's constitution must be the fruit of a consensus between the three main communities, and Shiites and Kurds who, together, make up a vast majority of the population, should not impose their views on the Arab Sunni minority. However, it is not logical or acceptable that this minority should impose its view on the majority and possibly lead Iraq into civil war.
U.S. President George W. Bush was right when he warned Sunnis that they must chose between the draft constitution, which has been amended to address some of their anxieties, and a sectarian civil war that some believe has already started. Shiites have been very patient so far in making the compromises to avoid a civil war, despite the daily terrorist attacks targeted against them. The concept of federalism arose recently because of such attacks, which most Sunni leaders and Arab regimes have rarely denounced, and which the Arab media praise as "resistance acts."
Minorities usually see federalism as a system that protects their interests and allows them to live in freedom, while avoiding the imposition of majority decisions upon them. Since the Sunnis are worried that the Arab nationalist and Islamic - in fact Sunni - identity of Iraq will change, they should request federalism in their own areas, so they can express these views, instead of seeking to impose them on the majority.
Why should federalism lead to the division of Iraq? Federalism was created as a system to unite different groups, cultures or religions under a single central government assigned agreed-upon tasks, but also where the devolution of power allows each region to pursue its own welfare. The Sunnis fear that this will be to their disadvantage and will lead to their oppression. Yet their rejection of a federal constitution that might protect their interests might, in fact, lead to precisely what they fear most.
Haytham Mouzahem is a Lebanese analyst and researcher who specializes in Middle Eastern and Islamic affairs. He wrote this commentary for THE DAILY STAR.
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Don't bet on a U.S.-Hizbullah dialogue
By Haytham Mouzahem
Commentary by
Saturday, August 20, 2005
Following the recent statement by Lebanese Labor Minister Tarrad Hamade (whose appointment was backed by Hizbullah) that last spring he had held talks with American officials, and that these had been approved by Hizbullah, questions arose as to whether a dialogue has started between Washington and the Shiite party. Given Hizbullah's hostility toward the U.S. and the fact that the U.S. government considers Hizbullah a terrorist organization, any dialogue would reflect a sharp reversal of position on both sides.
In Washington, Hamade met with officials at the State Department, including Elizabeth Dibble, a deputy assistant secretary of state. However, an American source insisted there was no U.S.-Hizbullah dialogue, because American officials are barred from contacts with any group designated a "foreign terrorist organization" by the U.S. State Department. This doesn't apply to Hamade, a self-described supporter of Hizbullah but not a party member.
The U.S. has repeatedly criticized Hizbullah for its attacks against Israeli military positions in the Shebaa Farms area and its support for militant Palestinian groups. It has also called on the Lebanese government to disarm Hizbullah in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1559. Washington blames Hizbullah for its attacks against American soldiers and civilians during the 1980s, especially the attacks against the U.S. Embassy and the Marine compound in 1983, and the kidnapping of American citizens then and later on.
Hamade has urged the Bush administration to change its policy on Hizbullah and open a direct line to the party. However, he denied he was an intermediary and criticized "the diplomacy of closing doors and opening windows," in reference to the fact that while the U.S. does not mind talking to him, it announced it would boycott Electricity and Water Resources Minister Mohammad Fneish, who is a member of Hizbullah.
Fneish has also denied that any sort of dialogue is taking place between Hizbullah and the U.S., saying the party would not change its position toward the American administration, which has adopted "hostile" policies toward Arabs and Muslims while favoring Israel. Fneish also rejected American interference in Lebanese affairs, and accused the U.S. administration of having not "forgiven" the resistance its victory against the Israeli occupation of Lebanon. Indeed, when Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited Beirut recently, she declared that Hizbullah has a "bloody record," in reference to its attacks against Americans.
A State Department official told me in December 2004 that "the first step for Hizbullah is to dissolve its militia and end support for terrorism. Hizbullah knows what it needs to do to accommodate with our views." He added the America government did not yet have any approach to deal with Hizbullah once it became a political party.
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Another U.S. official said that there was "no way to engage with Hizbullah, no way we can have discussions with this group, no way we can view it as a positive force in South Lebanon, because they have committed violent acts against Israeli civilians." While the official recognized that Hizbullah has economic and social influence in Lebanon, and had representatives in Parliament, it had to "get out of the terrorism business, [which] might be a reason to take a look towards Hizbullah and how they do that."
He also admitted that Hizbullah had earned much legitimacy because it was viewed as a force fighting the Israeli occupation of the South; "but after the Israeli withdrawal, Hizbullah was not satisfied with just maintaining its presence [there], and there has been an extension of Hizbullah influence inside the Palestinian territories; there has been proof of its involvement in the violence against Israel." There was also evidence, he added, that Hizbullah had helped the Palestinians to launch Qassam-2 rockets against Israeli targets.
Hence, there are at least two reasons hindering dialogue between the U.S. and Hizbullah: the first is judicial-bureaucratic, the other is ideological. However, it might be fair to say that the both parties want to explore the results of a potential dialogue and also need a political truce. Washington wants to ensure stability and security in Lebanon now that the Syrians have left, and knows that confronting Hizbullah would destabilize the country. So, keeping pressure up to implement Resolution 1559 will not help the newly-elected Lebanese government and could cause a civil war, which would allow Syria to interfere once again in Lebanon's affairs. Furthermore, instability would threaten the relative status-quo on the Lebanese-Israeli border, which the U.S. has tried to maintain, particularly prior to the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza.
Hizbullah also seeks to absorb international pressure aiming to dissolve and disarm its militia through Resolution 1559. It's for that reason that the party allowed the meetings between Hamadeh and U.S. officials. But that also underlines how, for the moment, the maneuvering is tactical; it is far too early to talk about a reconciliation between the U.S. and Hizbullah, nor do regional developments, particularly the movement rightward of the Iranian regime, make this any more likely.
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Don't bet on a U.S.-Hizbullah dialogue
By Haytham Mouzahem
Commentary by
Saturday, August 20, 2005
Following the recent statement by Lebanese Labor Minister Tarrad Hamade (whose appointment was backed by Hizbullah) that last spring he had held talks with American officials, and that these had been approved by Hizbullah, questions arose as to whether a dialogue has started between Washington and the Shiite party. Given Hizbullah's hostility toward the U.S. and the fact that the U.S. government considers Hizbullah a terrorist organization, any dialogue would reflect a sharp reversal of position on both sides.
In Washington, Hamade met with officials at the State Department, including Elizabeth Dibble, a deputy assistant secretary of state. However, an American source insisted there was no U.S.-Hizbullah dialogue, because American officials are barred from contacts with any group designated a "foreign terrorist organization" by the U.S. State Department. This doesn't apply to Hamade, a self-described supporter of Hizbullah but not a party member.
The U.S. has repeatedly criticized Hizbullah for its attacks against Israeli military positions in the Shebaa Farms area and its support for militant Palestinian groups. It has also called on the Lebanese government to disarm Hizbullah in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1559. Washington blames Hizbullah for its attacks against American soldiers and civilians during the 1980s, especially the attacks against the U.S. Embassy and the Marine compound in 1983, and the kidnapping of American citizens then and later on.
Hamade has urged the Bush administration to change its policy on Hizbullah and open a direct line to the party. However, he denied he was an intermediary and criticized "the diplomacy of closing doors and opening windows," in reference to the fact that while the U.S. does not mind talking to him, it announced it would boycott Electricity and Water Resources Minister Mohammad Fneish, who is a member of Hizbullah.
Fneish has also denied that any sort of dialogue is taking place between Hizbullah and the U.S., saying the party would not change its position toward the American administration, which has adopted "hostile" policies toward Arabs and Muslims while favoring Israel. Fneish also rejected American interference in Lebanese affairs, and accused the U.S. administration of having not "forgiven" the resistance its victory against the Israeli occupation of Lebanon. Indeed, when Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited Beirut recently, she declared that Hizbullah has a "bloody record," in reference to its attacks against Americans.
A State Department official told me in December 2004 that "the first step for Hizbullah is to dissolve its militia and end support for terrorism. Hizbullah knows what it needs to do to accommodate with our views." He added the America government did not yet have any approach to deal with Hizbullah once it became a political party.
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Another U.S. official said that there was "no way to engage with Hizbullah, no way we can have discussions with this group, no way we can view it as a positive force in South Lebanon, because they have committed violent acts against Israeli civilians." While the official recognized that Hizbullah has economic and social influence in Lebanon, and had representatives in Parliament, it had to "get out of the terrorism business, [which] might be a reason to take a look towards Hizbullah and how they do that."
He also admitted that Hizbullah had earned much legitimacy because it was viewed as a force fighting the Israeli occupation of the South; "but after the Israeli withdrawal, Hizbullah was not satisfied with just maintaining its presence [there], and there has been an extension of Hizbullah influence inside the Palestinian territories; there has been proof of its involvement in the violence against Israel." There was also evidence, he added, that Hizbullah had helped the Palestinians to launch Qassam-2 rockets against Israeli targets.
Hence, there are at least two reasons hindering dialogue between the U.S. and Hizbullah: the first is judicial-bureaucratic, the other is ideological. However, it might be fair to say that the both parties want to explore the results of a potential dialogue and also need a political truce. Washington wants to ensure stability and security in Lebanon now that the Syrians have left, and knows that confronting Hizbullah would destabilize the country. So, keeping pressure up to implement Resolution 1559 will not help the newly-elected Lebanese government and could cause a civil war, which would allow Syria to interfere once again in Lebanon's affairs. Furthermore, instability would threaten the relative status-quo on the Lebanese-Israeli border, which the U.S. has tried to maintain, particularly prior to the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza.
Hizbullah also seeks to absorb international pressure aiming to dissolve and disarm its militia through Resolution 1559. It's for that reason that the party allowed the meetings between Hamadeh and U.S. officials. But that also underlines how, for the moment, the maneuvering is tactical; it is far too early to talk about a reconciliation between the U.S. and Hizbullah, nor do regional developments, particularly the movement rightward of the Iranian regime, make this any more likely.
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Hizbullah and Al-Qaeda: Friends or foes?
By Haytham Mouzahem
Special to The Daily Star
Friday, August 20, 2004
The final report of the Sept. 11 Commission in the US argued that Al-Qaeda had ties with Iran and Hizbullah, but it also concluded there was no collaboration between Iraq and Al-Qaeda, one of President George W. Bush's central arguments in favor of launching an invasion of Iraq last year.
The report noted that "the relationship between Al-Qaeda and Iran demonstrated that Sunni-Shiite divisions did not necessarily pose an insurmountable barrier to cooperation in terrorist operations." But the report also found "no evidence that Iran or Hizbullah was aware of the planning for what later became the Sept.11 attack."
It is true that Sunni-Shiite differences are in no way obstacles to cooperation between Islamist groups such as the Shiite Hizbullah and Palestinian Islamist movements such as Hamas or Islamic Jihad. But the Sept. 11 Commission did not observe that Al-Qaeda was a very different Sunni group than the Palestinian ones; it is an extremist Wahhabi movement that considers Shiites nonbelievers, referring to them as rafidha, or those who reject mainstream Islam.
In 1998, the Taleban regime in Afghanistan, which was harboring Al-Qaeda and its leadership, committed atrocities against Afghan Shiite Hazaras in Mazar al-Sharif, killing thousands, as well as eight Iranian diplomats. The crimes very nearly led to a war between Iran and Afghanistan, and helped explain Iranian support for the northern Afghani groups in their battle against the Taleban and Al-Qaeda - and later (if more circumspectly) for the US invasion that led to the Taleban's overthrow
The relation between the Iraq's Baath regime and Al-Qaeda began in 1998, when Saddam Hussein allowed the group to establish training camps in Iraq. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was reportedly the broker of this connection. The alliance may have resurfaced after the US invasion through the unexpected cooperation between the two parties in attacking coalition forces, Iraqi policemen and civilians and Shiite leaders and holy shrines. The tight organization and apparent logistical network behind the Al-Qaeda suicide operations suggest there may have been preparation for those attacks with the Baath regime, which provided Al-Qaeda with organizational and intelligence assistance as well as money and maybe combatants.
It was bizarre indeed that Al-Qaeda and Saddam's followers should have focused their attacks so strongly against Shiite religious and political leaders and cadres, and against their holy shrines in Najaf and Karbala, as well as the Qazimiyyeh Mosque in Baghdad, killing thousands of civilians, instead of focusing on targeting the occupation forces. That strongly implied both a deep a hatred for the Shiites and a desire to prevent them of playing any major role in post-war Iraq.
Wahhabis consider the Shiites unbelievers (kuffar) and "polytheists" (mushrekin) because of their veneration of the prophet and the imams. Since the late 18th century, the Wahhabis launched three military campaigns to conquer Shiite regions in Arabia, leading to the destruction of their mosques and shrines. In 1803 and 1806, the Wahhabis entered Iraq and sacked the tombs of Imam Hussein in Karbala, an act of incredible desecration. In 1927, senior Saudi religious scholars issued fatwas condemning the Shiites, and these were reasserted as late as the 1990s.
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Given all this, Hizbullah cannot be indifferent toward the terrorist and sectarian attacks against their Iraqi brethren and their shrines. The party's secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah, condemned these killings and warned Al-Qaeda fighters last March that such behavior would damage the Palestinian cause because it would lead to Sunni-Shiite sectarian strife, an apparent goal of Zarqawi's as it appeared in a letter he is said to have addressed to Osama bin Laden seized by US forces.
In an interview with Middle East scholar Asaad Abu Khalil in June 2004, Nasrallah expressed strong fears and concerns about the so-called "resistance" in Iraq, and strongly condemned its methods, for example the use of car bombings. As he put it, they are "willing to kill 90 Iraqi civilians in order to kill one US soldier." Nasrallah asserted, "the Wahhabi network is very active in Iraq, and it has a strong sectarian agenda." He said he believed that "Saddam's Baathists and even Wahhabis are willing to negotiate with the Americans all in order to prevent a rise in Shiite power." He worried that this Wahhabi network "will strike at Shiite targets in the Arab world, outside Iraq, very soon."
Hizbullah has condemned attacks targeting civilians by Al-Qaeda and its allies. Nawaf Musawi, who is in charge of Hizbullah's international relations department, said in an interview that his first comment following the Sept. 11 attacks was "this is (Israeli Prime Minister) Ariel Sharon's lucky day," because "Sharon would be able to kill the Palestinian people under the pretext of 'fighting terrorism.'" He added: "I believe that those kinds of condemnable terrorist operations have done great damage to the struggling Palestinian people."
There are several barriers hindering the cooperation between Hizbullah and the Wahhabis. Religious and historical divisions play a major role in this, but are not the only factors. Hizbullah and Al-Qaeda have very different political priorities, strategies and agendas. Whatever the Sept. 11 Commission said, all the signs are that Al-Qaeda and Hizbullah are foes rather than friends.
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Does a Hizbullah-Sadr axis exist?
By Haytham Mouzahem
Special to The Daily Star
Wednesday, July 21, 2004
Following the assassination of Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin last March, the young Iraqi cleric Moqtada al-Sadr declared that he and his followers were at the service of his brothers in Hizbullah and Hamas. This came after a week of conflict with American forces over the closing down of a Sadrist newspaper. The statement was the first public mention by Sadr of a prospective relationship with Hizbullah.
Sadr's followers have often raised pictures of Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah at their rallies and demonstrations. In turn, Sadr's picture was also raised at a mass Hizbullah rally held in Beirut's southern suburbs on May 20 to protest against US actions in the Shiite holy cities of Najaf and Karbala.
These overt signs of sympathy aside, Iraqi Shiite sources have said that the connection between the two groups isn't a political alliance, or one involving military cooperation. They have described the relationship as one that is normal between two Arab Shiite parties that have the same religious background as well as a common vision for opposing the foreign occupation of Iraq.
Indeed, this relation may be similar to past links established between Shiite groups in Lebanon and their counterparts in Iraq. When the Islamist Al-Daawa Party was formed in 1958 by Ayatollah Mohammed Baqer al-Sadr, Ayatollah Mohammed Baqer al-Hakim and others, several Lebanese religious scholars who resided in Iraq at the time joined the party and the political opposition against the Iraqi regime. Among them were Ayatollah Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah and Ayatollah Mohammed Mehdi Shamseddine. Both moved to Lebanon in the 1960s and maintained relations with Al-Daawa and the Shiite marjaiyyeh (religious leadership) in Najaf, and they became Lebanese representatives of Ayatollah Abu al-Qassem al-Khoei.
Shamseddine later joined Imam Musa Sadr's movement in Lebanon and became his deputy at the Higher Shiite Council, while Fadlallah and others formed a Lebanese branch of Al-Daawa. Fadlallah, preserving his independence and pursuing his religious and political activities according to Al-Daawa's principles, established with colleagues the Muslim Students' Union as a cover for the party. Fadlallah claims he was never a member of any group. Iraqi sources, however, note that he left Al-Daawa in the early 1980s, and it is no secret that the party considers Fadlallah a "spiritual guide," a term once used to describe his relationship with Hizbullah.
In the summer of 1979, Al-Daawa formed a "Jihad" leadership committee of three members, which included Sheikh Sobhi Tufayli, who later became the first secretary-general of Hizbullah. In the fall of that year, following the assassination of Mohammed Baqer al-Sadr by Saddam Hussein's regime, Al-Daawa formed a new five-member leadership that included a Lebanese cleric, Sheikh Hussein Kourani, who later became an official in Hizbullah.
In the aftermath of the Iranian revolution in February 1979, Iraqi and Lebanese Islamist Shiites moved closer to the Islamic Republic headed by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. A year later, the Iraqi Baath regime began its eight-year war against Iran, and thousands of Iraqi Shiite clerics left for Iran or Lebanon, while maintaining relations with their Shiite brethren back home. Indeed, Iraq's Shiite opposition was dependent on Iranian support in its struggle against the Iraqi regime. Soon, too, Lebanon's Shiites needed Tehran's support in their resistance against the Israeli occupation that followed the invasion of summer 1982, which led to the emergence of Hizbullah. Not surprisingly, many of those linked to Al-Daawa and to the Muslim Students' Union became a major force in the new party.
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As for Iraq, in 1983 Tehran backed the creation of a new umbrella organization that brought together Iraqi Shiite parties, including Al-Daawa. This was the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), headed by the late Mohammed Baqer al-Hakim. Hizbullah and SCIRI were once close, as both subscribe to the Velayet-e Faqih (guardianship of the jurisconsult) concept developed by Khomeini, and now represented by Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Relations between Shiite groups in Lebanon and Iraq are based not only on religious links or on political alliances and organizational cooperation; they are also based on historical, personal and social ties that have existed in some cases for centuries. For example, the Sadr and Hakim families have branches in Iraq, Lebanon and Iran, and Fadlallah was the cousin of Mohammed Baqer al-Hakim.
Any effort to determine a relationship between Sadr and Hizbullah must also take into consideration Sadr's relations with Iran. A year ago, Moqtada al-Sadr was invited to Tehran and met senior leaders including Khamenei. The Iranians reportedly found him immature politically and feared that his unpredictable behavior would cause them trouble with the Americans in Iraq. Other sources believe that Sadr refused to become a follower of the Iranians due to his Arab background, his independent personality and his desire for absolute leadership.
Iraqi Shiite sources, in turn, explain that the failure of cooperation between the two sides resulted from SCIRI objections - the Supreme Council is Sadr's main adversary in Iraq. This prompted the Iranians to change their mind because they feared losing their alliance with the SCIRI with no guarantee they would win Sadr's loyalty.
Hence, when members of Sadr's Mehdi Army raise pictures of Nasrallah or Hizbullah flags, this is mainly an attempt to derive legitimacy from Hizbullah's regional reputation after its victory against the Israeli occupation in South Lebanon. On the other side, Hizbullah's statements backing Sadr against the Americans could be a way of managing its embarrassment over a situation in Iraq where the party has found itself in a dilemma - simultaneously sympathizing with Iraq's Shiites, whose attitude toward the Americans has been ambiguous, while also advocating an Islamic and nationalist discourse that is staunchly anti-American and that pleases Iraqi Sunnis who most fervently oppose the occupation.
This said, Iran and Hizbullah have reportedly played a major role in persuading Sadr to wind down his uprising against the Americans. In this context, some analysts don't exclude secret military and intelligence cooperation between the three parties now or in the future.
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Hizbullah's missives to America
By Haytham Mouzahem
Special to The Daily Star
Wednesday, June 02, 2004
Within the space of two weeks in May, Hizbullah and Syria sent several messages to the United States concerning Hizbullah's future role in Lebanon and the region. These messages were delivered mainly through the party's victories in the municipal elections in the Bekaa Valley, Beirut's southern suburbs and the South, but also through a highly symbolic Hizbullah rally.
The first message from Hizbullah was electoral. The party's considerable popularity in the three regions of Lebanon (as representative of the country's largest religious community) was designed to underline that it is not a terrorist group. Consequently, the party implicitly emphasized, the US must stop demanding that Syria and Lebanon disarm Hizbullah and marginalize it.
The second message, this time sent by Syria, was that Damascus still holds several bargaining chips in Lebanon and the region, and can use them if the Bush administration intensifies its pressure on Syria. Thus the Syrians, by allowing Hizbullah more leeway in general, underlined that the party's militants could again attack the Shebaa Farms or positions along the border with Israel and destabilize the status quo in Lebanon and the region.
Hizbullah's success in the elections also showed that Syria was willing to allow the party to raise its domestic political profile. This now means Hizbullah is in a better position to reinforce its alliance with its primary ally, President Emile Lahoud, and perhaps use this axis against the president's Christian enemies as well as Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and Speaker Nabih Berri.
This would allow the Syrians to enhance their influence in Lebanon even after a possible (if unlikely) withdrawal under US duress. At the same time, Syria will continue to maintain good relations with other politicians, especially Berri and Hariri, and to pursue a pragmatic policy of playing the Lebanese balance of power by sustaining rival leaderships, parties and religious groups.
Hizbullah has been accused of focusing too much on the conflict with Israel and, because of this, avoiding a confrontation with the government over declining socioeconomic conditions. As the revolt of Sheikh Sobhi Tufayli showed several years ago, there can be a political price to pay when the party ignores the daily difficulties faced by its supporters, most of whom are poor or from the middle classes. That's why Hizbullah's victory in the elections will force it to get more involved in domestic affairs. This means, at the least, challenging the state's social and economic policies. The clashes between the Lebanese Army and protesters in Hay al-Sellom last Thursday will be a test for the party in this regard.
A third message sent to Washington, again by Hizbullah, was both religious and political. The party issued a strong warning to the Bush administration regarding post-war Iraq at a massive rally held in the southern suburbs on May 20, and which brought out (according to Hizbullah) 500,000 people. Wearing white shrouds symbolizing their readiness to die, the participants expressed solidarity with Iraq and protested against American actions in Najaf and Karbala, where the US is fighting forces loyal to Moqtada al-Sadr. Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah threatened that "the occupying forces would pay heavily for any aggression against the holiest Shiite sites in Iraq."
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However, Nasrallah was also very careful, as Iraqi Shiite groups were highly critical of Hizbullah's attitude toward Iraq both prior to the US invasion and afterward. The party had tried to please Syria by supporting a proposal for reconciliation between Saddam Hussein's regime and opposition parties in an attempt to avert a US invasion. In the aftermath of Saddam's removal, Hizbullah appeared to change tack by saying it would not interfere in Iraqi affairs. That's why Nasrallah told those at the rally: "The Iraqis can decide when, how and where to fight for the liberation of their country." But he added, in a phrase that reflected the party's ambiguity on involvement in Iraq: "(W)hen it comes to Najaf and Karbala, the tombs of Imam Ali ibn Abi Taleb and his son Imam Hussein, we consider ourselves directly involved. In wearing our death shrouds, we show the enemy our readiness to fight and die in defense of the holy shrines and sites."
Hizbullah's warning to the US mainly came across as a religious admonition, since the Iranian supreme leader Ali Khamenei, who is Hizbullah's religious guide, had warned the US against attacking Najaf and Karbala. Thus, Nasrallah urged American forces to withdraw from the two cities to avoid widening the scale of confrontation with the world's Shiites. Ironically, the Shiite religious leaders of Iraq, especially Ayatollah Ali Sistani, urged their followers not to organize demonstrations that would move on Najaf and Karbala and criticized the presence of Sadr's Mehdi Army in those cities.
Despite the Shiite religious dimension of his warning, Nasrallah did not forget to remind the Americans of Hizbullah's own struggle against the Israeli occupation of Lebanon after 1982. He declared the party's readiness to defend Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Iraq and Iran against the "Zionist alliance" of Israel and America. It was evident that by speaking of Hizbullah's potential involvement in Iraq, Nasrallah was sending an Iranian and probably a Syrian message to the US that the situation in Lebanon and Iraq could turn against the Americans.
The Iranians specifically sought to underline the fact that they would challenge US attempts to contain Tehran's influence over Iraqi Shiite parties and a future Iraqi regime.
Haytham Mouzahem (hmzahem@yahoo.com) is a Lebanese analyst and researcher who specializes in Middle East and Islamic affairs. He wrote this commentary for THE DAILY STAR
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