Asia Times, Sep 28, 2005
Indonesia opens fire
By Jeffrey Robertson
On September 19 the Indonesian Navy fired on a Chinese fishing vessel poaching in
Indonesian waters - the most recent event in a series of recurring violent outbreaks
that say a lot about the changing role of the military in modern Indonesia.
The Fuyuan 123 was one of four Chinese-flagged fishing vessels allegedly using illegal
nets and poaching valuable marine resources from the Arafura Sea, off Papua province
and within Indonesia's exclusive economic zone. After a short chase, the refusal of
the Fuyuan 123 to stop and several warning shots, the Indonesian Navy fired on the
vessel. The result was one dead sailor and two wounded.
In the pursuing diplomatic row between China and Indonesia, the illegality of the
Fuyuan 123 was never questioned. Its license to
fish in Indonesian waters had expired a week before the incident. The focus of China's
anger was the Indonesian Navy. China claimed Indonesian naval forces had used
"excessive force" in the pursuit of the fishing boat - just as they have recently been
doing from one side of the archipelago to the other.
In March, Indonesian military forces went on high alert over the disputed maritime
border with Malaysia. The navy was in the lead of what could only be considered as
the closest Indonesia and Malaysia have come to conflict since the end of Konfrontasi
(Indonesia's 1963-66 effort to disrupt the new state of Malaysia, which Indonesian
leaders regarded as a front for a continued British colonial presence in Southeast
Asia).
The dispute, which saw the deployment of warships, infantry reinforcements and even
four F-16 fighter jets, was over the Sulawesi Sea maritime border, just off Indonesia's
East Kalimantan province and Malaysia's Sabah state. At the heart of the dispute was
of course the resource-rich seabed beneath the disputed border areas. But bubbling
over the surface was the Indonesian military asserting its sovereignty in a display of
nationalistic fervor.
Other recent incidents may have as much to do with displays of naval strength as
designs for naval profiteering. Local officers' desire for a little extra income is always
an issue in such a large and sometimes inadequately paid military. In September
2004 an Indonesian naval vessel approached and sought to board a tourist diving
vessel in East Timorese territory, off Atauro Island. Whether it was a display of naval
strength against the fledgling and recently independent East Timor, or just a little
off-the-record piracy, will never be known.
East Timor played down the incident, citing the current permeability of the East
Timorese-Indonesia border. Negotiations on setting the border have been ongoing
since 2000. The Indonesian Foreign Ministry and its naval command in Jakarta denied
knowledge of the incident. The most obvious conclusion is that even if boarded, the
tourist vessel could well have gotten off with an on the spot "fine".
But the navy has also been at the forefront of more obvious and blatantly ostentatious
demonstrations of Indonesian sovereignty. In May 2002, six navy ships and more than
120 troops accompanied Indonesian president Megawati Sukarnoputri to East Timor's
inaugural independence ceremony. With foreign dignitaries such as United States
president Bill Clinton, Australian Prime Minister John Howard and United Nations
Secretary-General Kofi Annan maintaining a security presence counted in the dozens,
the Indonesian entourage seemed excessive at best, and an outright affront at worst.
Increasing professionalism or restraining modernization?
The Indonesian military has an important choice to make. As the military's role in
Indonesia inevitably declines with strengthened democracy, the military can follow one
of two paths - toward an increasingly professional and respected military under civilian
control or toward a distrusted, feared and ultimately despised military restraining
Indonesian modernization.
The former has already demonstrated limited success. The military has proven
particularly restrained in its presence in West Papua despite secessionist elements
ramping up efforts in the wake of East Timor and Aceh rebellions. On October 10, the
Papuan People's Assembly will commence work. The establishment of the assembly
aims to empower indigenous Papuans and deflate local support for separatism while
simultaneously avoiding the need for overt military involvement. As Aceh and East
Timor have demonstrated, overt military involvement only hardens local populations
against central control.
There is also hope the military will be attracted to the first path through potential gains
in training and resource cooperation with external powers. The United States is keenly
watching the human rights situation across the archipelago with the intention of
reestablishing military cooperation with Indonesia. This has the potential to provide a
much-needed morale boost as well as a guiding influence toward greater
professionalism.
But the threat remains that as the role of the military declines, reactionary elements
will seek to encourage conditions that support the latter path.
As if predicting such moves, in a speech to higher ranking officers on September 8,
during a visit to military headquarters, Indonesian President Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono emphasized the need for the Indonesian military to remain professional
and refrain from political acts.
Morale in the Indonesian military has been in steady decline since democracy ended
the long rule of the Suharto family and its associated military backers. Arguably, it
took its harshest blow with the loss of East Timor. But it is now facing another
crushing blow with the peace settlement in Aceh. As the troop ships depart Banda
Aceh, the most prevalent expression on soldiers' faces is that of shame. With this
shame comes threat that the Indonesian military will look to other areas to distract it
from the inevitable decline in morale following the Aceh pullout. One such distraction
could be maritime Southeast Asia.
However, this could prove highly dangerous. Maritime Southeast Asia is a bubbling
cauldron of potential misunderstanding - a combination of resource wealth, overlapping
territorial claims and preciously guarded post-colonial sovereignty. If it were not the
Indonesian Navy jealously protecting its sovereignty over fishing rights, it may as well
have been Malaysia and Brunei, Taiwan and the Philippines or China and just about
anyone. The fact is that the region could potentially prove to be the greatest threat to
regional security. Unlike the Taiwan Straits where the potential for conflict is widely
appreciated and problems are dealt with both carefully and consistently, maritime
Southeast Asia is hostage to populist decisions and only intermittent half-hearted
attempts to defuse tensions.
How it responds to incidents in maritime Southeast Asia, such as the Fuyuan 123
incident, may prove to be the real indicator of which path the Indonesian military will
take.
Jeffrey Robertson is a political affairs analyst focusing on Northeast Asia, currently
based in Seoul.
Copyright 2005 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved.
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