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Stationed: King's Cliffe, UK
(AAF Station F-367-England)
26 August, 1943 to 11 October, 1945
- Assigned To The 8th. AF: 25 August, 1943
- First Mission: 28 December, 1943
- Final Mission: 25 April, 1945
- Wing/Command Assignments:
VIII FC 25 August, 1943
VIII FC, 67 FW 6 October, 1943
1 BD, 67 FW 15 September, 1944
1 AD, 67 FW 1 Jan 1945.
- Distinguished Unit Citation: 8 April, 1944 for sweep over Germany.
- Oldest USAAF group to be assigned to the 8th AF for extended
period of time.
- Best P-51 maintenance record of any 8th AF group for final months
of the war.
- Two highest scoring P-38 aces of the 8th.AF (James Morris and
Lindol Graham)
- Station Callsign: "Churchpath"
- Group Callsign: "Denton" (up to 22 April, 1944)
- Group Callsigns: (after 22 April, 1944)
"Walnut" (A Group) "Oatmeal" (B Group) "Katie" (C Group)
- 232 Confirmed Victories
- 400 Locomotives Destroyed
- 125 Battle Casaulties
- 312 Combat Missions Flown
- 15,862 Aircraft Dispatched
- 56 Prisoners of War (10 Evaders)
- 69,112 Operational Hours Flown
- 987,618 Rounds of Ammunition Fired
- 683,680 lbs. Of Bombs Dropped
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20TH.
FIGHTER GROUP HISTORY |
When
the 20th arrived in England in late August 1943, Eighth Fighter Command
boasted 6 P-47 Thunderbolt Groups, the 4th, 56th, 78th, 352nd, 353rd
and 355th Fighter Groups. Although the P-47 proved more than a match
for German Fighter types in air to air combat it lacked one all important
characteristic that events in the fall of 1943 showed to be the key
to success of the whole American daylight bombing offensive in Europe-RANGE.
The steadily improving fire-power of German fighters was making the
daylight air assault extremely costly and the situation reached a
crisis on 14 October 1943 when 60 of 293 Fortresses dispatched against
the ball bearing works at Schweinfurt were destroyed by the Luftwaffe.
So the arrival of the 20th with P-38's meant not only a numerical
strengthening of the 8th Fighter Command, but an extension in miles
of the escort it could render to 8th Air Force bombers. By the end
of September another P-38 Group, the 55th, had been added to the long
range escort strength of Fighter Command.
At the time there was a shortage
of aircraft, and because of its higher experience level, the 55th
Group received its planes first and was the first to begin active
operations. In November the "plane starved 20th" mustered enough
airplanes to supplement the strength of the 55th and until a veritable
flood of Lightnings arrived at pilots gained valuable 4th Squadron
of the King's Cliffe late in December our operational experience
flying as a 55th Group.
Stiff enemy air opposition
was generally encountered on long range escort missions and though
the pilots of both Groups acquitted themselves with valor and skill,
losses were severe. Perhaps the most important cause during this
period was the fact that they were the only long range fighter Groups
then operating in this theater.
The 20th emerged from 4 months
of exasperating idleness to enter the scene on 28 December '43 as
a fullfledged operational combat Fighter Group. In rapid strides
the Group took its place alongside the 55th as the spearhead of
American fighter operations against the Luftwaffe. On December 31
the 20th provided target support to heavies bombing in the Bordeaux
area. the longest fighter escort mission ever attempted up to that
time, a round trip flight of 1300 miles. Of the 31 planes that participated
only 14 had sufficient fuel to return directly to base.
The next 90 days of operations
saw the 20th survive its worst crisis. It was a period of disillusionment
and tragedy. The skill and gallantry of our pilots too often saw
no reward in terms of victory over the enemy. 52 German planes were
destroyed in air combat. 54 of our pilots failed to return. Among
that number were Major John C. Wilkins. Lt. Col. Robert P. Montgomery.
Lt. Col. Mark Hubbard. Major Richard Ott. Major Carl E. Jackson
and Captain Lindol F. Graham.
Several Factors of Key Importance
Must Be Understood:
First: It soon became
apparent that the P-38 Lightning was not equal to the extreme cold
and moisture conditions that prevailed at operating altitudes (20.000-33.000
feet) over Northern Europe. Despite the tireless efforts of our
ground crews (the finest engineering and maintenance personnel in
the 8th Air Force) and the skill and determination of our pilots,
no satisfactory answer was found to the technical problems encountered
until the weather itself had substantially improved. By far the
greatest proportion of the Group's casualties were caused by engine
failures. At high altitudes the sudden application of full power
often resulted in thrown rods and explosions, and the loss of power
resulted in an immediate tactical disadvantage which the enemy was
always quick to exploit.
Second: The P-38.
though equal to any German fighter at altitudes below 15.000 feet
was no more than an even match above that altitude. It could not
pursue the enemy to altitudes over 28 to 30,000 feet, and its rate
of roll and diving characteristics were such that the enemy could
be followed down from those altitudes only under ideal conditions
of surprise and altitude advantage.
Third: The primary
object of German fighter attack was always our bomber formations,
not our fighters; and in attacking the bombers the enemy always
sought out points along the bomber stream where fighter escort was
th'nnest or where there was none at all. The P-38, of course, was
the most distinctive and easily recognized of all American fighters.
It could not be confused with any German operational type, whereas
the P-51 and P-47 bore marked resemblances to the. Me 109 and FW
190. The result was that the enemy seldom moved within range of
bombers under escort by P-38's, and consequently far fewer engagements
resulted between P-38's and German fighters than between P-51s,
P-47s and enemy fighters |
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