Did FDR knowingly allow 2,897 of our boys and seven of their warships to be obliterated on December 7, 1941? This is a summary of what, in my mind, were the most striking evidences of treason presented by Robert Stinnett in "Day of Deceit” (2000, The Free Press). The thing to remember about Stinnett is that he is NOT doing a hatchet job on FDR. He sympathizes with, if not totally supports, FDR's alleged arrangement of Pearl Harbor; partially because the Axis was getting more and more dangerous and because at the same time Americans were very anti-war. Stinnett gained unprecedented access to various government files using the Freedom of Information Act. He also interviewed some key players, including some who had never been heard from in any previous investigations. Each point, taken alone, could perhaps be dismissed. But to a rational mind, I think the points taken together comprise at least a serious, maybe even a convincing case for Washington’s foreknowledge. In some cases, I visited websites to supplement my knowledge and to check out the author’s claims. I also am omitting some of his points because, even though they seemed convincing, they did not seem solid enough. Consider, then, the most damaging evidence:

· Page 4: T. North Whitehead, a British Foreign Office official, wrote in 1940 to Churchill about America’s unfortunate isolationist leanings. But he advised “…President is engaged in carefully calculated steps to give us full assistance.”

· Carefully calculated steps? How about the memo (Appendix A) released by Lieutenant Commander Arthur McCollum (Head of Far East Desk, Office of Naval Intelligence) in 1940. It detailed 8 action items to prepare for war against the Axis. He closes with, “If by these means Japan could be led to commit an overt act of war, so much the better.” Although there is no official record that FDR saw the memo, McCollum was directly connected to FDR, and all 8 items were completed by November 23, 1941. They included sending U.S. cruisers into Japanese imperial waters and embargoing all trade with Japan.

· Page 31: In January 1941, Max Bishop, the third secretary at the American embassy in Japan, got a tip from the Peruvian ambassador to Japan that a surprise attack was being planned on Pearl Harbor in case negotiations broke down. Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State, personally read the intelligence from Bishop.

· Page 21, 38: The Purple Code was used by the Japanese Foreign Ministry for encoding diplomatic messages dispatched by radio between Tokyo and selected overseas embassies and consulates. It was broken fall 1940, along with Code Book D (aka 5-num code, the main naval radio system). Strangely enough, the solution to the code was not given to Husband Kimmel (Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet). He asked for more intelligence repeatedly but was rebuffed. Ironically, part of the processing was done at Fort Shafter in Hawaii.

· Page 76: The 5-num code solution was finally sent to Kimmel aboard a ship sometime in fall 1941, a year after it was broken. Somehow, it did not arrive until after the attack.

· P. 45 Yamamoto messages: The following order was issued by the Commander of the Imperial Navy (Yamamoto) on 25 November: "The Task Force, keeping its movement strictly secret and maintaining close guard against submarines and aircraft, shall advance into Hawaiian waters, and upon the very opening of hostilities shall attack the main force of the U. S. Fleet in Hawaii and deal it a mortal blow. The first air-raid is planned for the dawn of X day (exact date to be given by later order).” This is clear, unmistakable evidence of an attack. Did we know about it? Consider the intercept records from Station H (U.S. intercept station on Oahu). Records show that Yamamoto sent 13 radio messages between 1:00pm 11/24 (time of message 606) and 3:54pm 11/26 (time of message 620). But the thirteen were missing from the intercepts released by Jimmy Carter in 1979. Apparently they are still missing. Now, the above message was sent between the above times. Is it one of the missing thirteen? In other words, was it intercepted at all? Homer Kisner, the radio traffic chief at Oahu, testifies to the author that he and his men rarely missed Japanese naval radio messages, partially because each message was broadcast several times.

· In summer 1999, the US Senate passed a resolution exonerating Kimmel and Short (he was the Army chief at Hawaii) of any fault in the Pearl Harbor attack (they were disgraced after the attack). The resolution says they were professional and competent and were denied vital intelligence available in Washington.

· Page 145: Two weeks before the attack, Kimmel ordered a search for a Japanese carrier force north of Hawaii. He was ordered to return his ships to Hawaii by Washington.

· Page 144: Rear Admiral Richard K. Turner, US Navy War Plans Officer in 1941, explained the Vacant Sea Order (removed all US shipping from Pacific, November ‘41) by Roosevelt: “We were prepared to divert traffic when we believed war was imminent. We sent the traffic down via Torres Strait, so that the track of the Japanese carrier force would be clear of any traffic.” Somehow the significance of this shocking statement has escaped previous Pearl Harbor inquiries.

· Page 149: Rear Admiral Walter Anderson, appointed directly by Roosevelt as Commander of Pacific Battleships, protested Kimmel’s plans to do long-range reconnaissance of the North Pacific, saying his planes did not have the range (they did). This was two weeks prior to attack. Anderson spent the weekend of the attack at his Diamond Head Road residence.

· Page 154: Washington ordered some last-minute rearranging of ships before the attack. When the bombs fell, the warships at Pearl Harbor were mostly 27-year-old relics of WWI.

· Page 183: The very fact of censorship of 60-year old intelligence should raise eyebrows. Included in this list are seven messages sent by Yamamoto between 12/1 and 12/5 to the attack force. Duane Whitlock, a radio traffic analyst at CAST, and Navy facility on Corregidor, has confirmed the existence of the messages.

· Radio Silence? Page 209: Between 11/15 and 12/7 Commander in chief of Firs Air Fleet, Chuichi Nagumo, sent 60 transmissions. Two decorated cryptographers confirm their existence.

· Page 235: After an investigation, Three Army generals faulted General George Marshall (Chief of Staff of Army) for not quickly communicating to General Short intelligence indicating an immediate war with Japan. He successfully sent the message to Macarthur in the Philippines through Hawaii. Then, just 12 minutes later, Hawaii radars allegedly malfunctioned and he had to use Western Union, then RCA.