The battle
for Monte Cassino
Background: The Allied advance in Italy had been halted at the town of
Cassino, 100 miles south of Rome. The rugged mountains, winter weather, and
outstanding soldiers had enabled the Germans to hold out against far superior
Allied forces. Allied attempts to break through had failed in January, February
and March of 1944. The fourth attack began on 11 May. This time, the Allies
drove the Germans back, capturing the ruins of the monastery of Monte Cassino.
This article, from the Nazi Party's daily newspaper, puts the best
interpretation on the situation.
For another interesting perspective
on the battle, see a book titled Paper War: Nazi Propaganda in One Battle, on a
Single Day, Cassino, Italy, May 11, 1944 (Mark
Batty Publisher, 2005). I wrote the introduction to the book, which reproduces
Nazi leaflets dropped on Allied troops during the battle.
The source: "Der Sinn der Abwehrschlacht in Italien," Völkischer
Beobachter, May 22, 1944, pp. 1-2.
The Meaning of the Defensive Battle in Italy
For eight days, the Americans, the British, the Indians, the Gaullists and
other auxiliary peoples have been storming German positions on the Italian
front. They have reinforced the forces with which they began, and in recent
days the strength of their attacks has increased. In the face of enemy
pressure, the Germans have withdrawn at various points. On Wednesday, German
forces withdrew from Cassino without a fight, which had long been fought over,
and which even at the end the enemy was unable to take by military force. On
Friday, the city of Gaeta was given up. The general line of the front now runs
from the west coast to the hills north of Itri — north of Campodimele — north
of Esperia — both sides of Pontecorvo — north of Cassino, and from there along the
old front line. The German retreat was essentially a withdrawal from the east
to the west. That is a result of the lay of the valleys. It is to be expected
that in the near future, the enemy will move north again from the middle and
eastern sections of the front, since that is the direction forced by the
valleys.
The Germans withdrew from parts of
the fortified line that existed until May 12 under direct tactical enemy
pressure, from other parts by the free choice of the military leadership.
However, behind the trenches and machine positions taken or occupied by the
enemy are many more. Enemy accounts note, with some discomfort, the fact that
after advancing a few kilometers, one faces still another and toughly defended
confusion of positions for artillery, mortars, machine guns, and infantry. They
give these positions rather remarkable names that owe less to military custom
than the needs of propaganda. They know that they must continue the attacks,
and that the heavy losses of the first weeks are only a part of the cost in
blood that they will have to pay for their offensive. German positions on the
hills are always so placed that they can fire easily on the approaching enemy,
whether they attempt to attack the hills themselves or to pass through the valleys
beneath. The narrow roads force the enemy’s motorized forces to concentrate in
a small area, sometimes several hundred tanks in a single valley. That thick
concentration gives their attack considerable strength, but also gives the
defender’s artillery opportunity for a rich harvest.
That will not stop the enemy
leadership from ordering that the attacks continue. The attacks are an
important part of the enemy’s operational plan, as we have known since the
Teheran conference and other information we have.
The extraordinary fierceness of the
battle and the extent of the energy and military sacrifice on both sides should
not make one forget that, in view of the total situation, Germany is fighting
his battle with its left hand. The German troops there are performing in an
extraordinary way, but they are only a fraction of the total German forces.
They may be only two or three percent, perhaps a little more, perhaps a little
less — but they are in any event only a small branch of Germany’s fighting
forces. For the German leadership, southern and central Italy — like North
Africa — have always been a military sideshow. They do not see central Italy as
the place where real operational decisions will occur. The public does not know
where the real main defensive line in Italy is, the line that defends areas
important for the whole war effort, but it is clear that this line does not run
through Gaeta and Cassino.
The clear goal of the enemy
leadership is to force the Germans to change this view. Their goal is to make a
main battle front out of a sideshow. They want Germany to fight in central
Italy not with its left hand, but with a major portion of its strength. If the
Germans do not wish to see central Italy as a major theater, the enemy wants at
least to force a preliminary decision here. They should be encouraged to throw
as many divisions as possible to the south, so that when the major battles
occur somewhere else, German forces will be too weak. Thus although they have
used large numbers of troops and masses of material, and constantly run up
against German mountain positions, the large losses of the first weeks of
attack will not stop them.
It is clear that the leadership
needs nerve and cold-bloodedness to respond to the enemy’s goal. It is not, for
example, easy to give the order to leave a place like Cassino, for which the
troops have so many proud memories. Should one not leave an infantry unit and a
few artillery batteries behind to hold the ruins of the city? Such a choice
would be possible, but would contradict military necessity. It would mean
playing the enemy’s game. The enemy’s troops would be unhappy to find German
troops in Cassino, but the enemy’s military leadership would be pleased to hear
that news. That is why the order was given to leave Cassino, and why yesterday
Gaeta was given up. Later military histories will justify the decision.
It is, however, also clear how much
military strength it demands of the troops to defeat the enemy’s goal. Without
significant reinforcements from Germany’s operative reserves, they must stop
the enemy from breaking through. They may withdraw fighting, but must only do
so after they have compelled the enemy to use new forces. The enemy’s goals
must be turned upon him by forcing him to expend new and strong units that will
therefore not be available to him one day elsewhere.
The battle is of considerable
severity. It is a preview of the great and heavy battle that will be fought
this summer. The decision as to the outcome of the war will be made elsewhere.
However, the brave grenadiers and paratroopers to the south of the Apennines
are fighting bitterly against the enemy, forcing him to send new columns of
military force onto the battlefield. They are doing their part to prepare for
the great battle for their fatherland and for Europe — in a different way than
the enemy had imagined.