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Jacob Arnold

"America's Attempt to Justify Its Role as a Superpower By Ignoring the Moral Consequences of the Persian Gulf War"
by Jacob Arnold


Early in 1991, the United States and other Western nations started a war in the Persian Gulf. On January 17, 1991, a massive campaign of bombing runs began--2000 sorties a day. February 23, 1991, the U.S. began its ground assault on Iraq. Five days later a ceasefire agreement was reached. Eight months later, Newsweek revealed horrific details about our military's methods. During the initial stages of the ground assault, U.S. troops used two lines of armored earth movers to bury alive thousands of entrenched Iraqis, crushing them under tons of sand (Clark 51-52). This event was hidden from the American public, but there were many more widely televised examples of cruelty by the U.S. military which Americans ignored. United States pilots heavily bombed a fifty mile stretch of highway north of Kuwait, though they knew it contained fleeing civilians as well as troops. The road became known as the "highway of death." The squadron leader, Commander Frank Sweigart, said the victims were "basically just sitting ducks" (qtd. in Smith 204). Mike Ange, a North Carolina GI, described the scene:
I actually went up close and examined two vehicles that basically looked like refugees maybe trying to get out of the area. You know, you had like a little Toyota pick-up truck that was loaded down with the furniture and the suitcases and rugs and the pet cat and that type of thing, all over the back of this truck, and those trucks were taken out just like military vehicles. (qtd. in Clark 53)
The United States was also responsible for massive bombings of civilian areas, for killing soldiers seeking surrender, and for targeting installations known to contain dangerous chemicals (Clark 264-265). For the most part these incidents were all ignored by the American public, and even today the Persian Gulf War is considered a high point in our military's history.

Americans must ask themselves why they allowed such terrible acts to occur, and why misconceptions about Operation Desert Storm still exist. The American public was silent while propaganda systematically dehumanized the Iraqis through anti-Asian racism and humiliation of their leader Saddam Hussein. To some extent, the public's acceptance of the war resulted from the way the war was depicted. The U.S. government covered up many of its questionable activities and twisted those stories which it did reveal. Government officials invented new terms to shape their portrayal of the war, depicting it as a conflict between technologies rather than humans. Despite protest from human rights groups during and after the Persian Gulf War, Americans ignored the destruction of another culture by their military because images of Desert Storm justified their idea of American superiority.

The government and the media began dehumanizing the Iraqis by stereotyping their race. False stories which surfaced just before the war depicted the Iraqis as cruel and heartless terrorists. One of the best known tales of Iraqi brutality was the "incubator story." On October 10, 1990, a fifteen year old girl told the Congressional Human Rights Caucus she had witnessed Iraqi soldiers taking premature babies from their incubators and "leaving them on the cold floor to die" (qtd. in Clark 31). The Bush administration quickly picked up on this tale, and claimed 312 children had died this way (Clark 31). According to President Bush, "There's no horror that could make this a more obvious conflict of good versus evil" (qtd. in MacArthur 67). In the Senate, where the war resolution was passed by a five vote margin, six senators referred to the incubator story in their speeches as a reason to vote for war (MacArthur 70). Later it was revealed that the Kuwaiti witnesses who testified had all been lying about their identities. The fifteen year old girl turned out to be the daughter of the Kuwaiti ambassador to the United States, a fact known by those who organized the hearings (Clark 32). Had Kuwait (with help from the United States) not created and manipulated this propaganda, there would have been a lot less support for the war.

Results of the American government's racist campaign were clear. During the Persian Gulf War, Pan American airlines refused to sell tickets to people with "Arab-sounding" names. The F.B.I. questioned hundreds of Arab Americans about their political beliefs and harassed and intimidated the Arab community in an attempt to suppress anti-war movements (Clark 118). Many Americans started to believe the Arabs were a race which could not be trusted.

The Bush administration also created a great deal of prejudice by portraying Saddam Hussein as uncivilized. The media quickly latched on to this image, and transformed Saddam Hussein into a monster. Asu Aksoy and Kevin Robins, in their article "Exterminating Angels: Morality, Violence, and Technology in the Gulf War," observe that "For Bush, the upstart Arab [Hussein] embodied the forces of irrationality and barbarism, and Bush was ready, in the name of civilization, in the name of reason and humanity, to discipline those alien forces" (Mowlana, Gerbner, and Schiller 204). In February, 1991, the New York Times ran a political cartoon by David Levine titled "The Descent of Man." From left to right were drawings of Clark Gable, a gorilla, a chimpanzee, a cobra, and finally a tiny Hussein wading through a puddle of oil (Gray 36). Newsweek (March 11, 1991) summed up American opinion best when it stated "The chain had to be pulled, to flush Saddam away" (qtd. in Mowlana, Gerbner, and Schiller 203). The western press's propaganda left Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi people less than human in the public's eyes.

This allowed the government to downplay human aspects of the war. Although Lieutenant General Pagonis bragged "This is the first war in modern times where every screwdriver, every nail is accounted for," the military neglected to count Iraqi casualties (qtd. in Clark 42-43). General Colin Powell, when asked about the number of Iraqi civilian deaths, replied "It's really not a number I'm terribly interested in" (qtd. in Clark 42). According to Ramsey Clark, General Schwarzkopf's policy was not to count Iraqi casualties (42). Without a number to go by, the American public was only vaguely aware of its military's destructiveness.

Even when Newsweek broke its story about the burial of live Iraqi troops, there was little public reaction. The military acknowledged the story, but spokesman Major Peter Keating downplayed the number of deaths by suffocation, labeling them "isolated incidents" (qtd. in MacArthur 202). Pentagon official Pete Williams said "I don't mean to be flippant, but there's no nice way to kill somebody in war" (qtd. in MacArthur 202). If this is true, why were the burials against army doctrines, why were reporters forbidden to approach the scene, and why are chemical weapons viewed any differently?

It seems strange that the American public would so readily accept a conflict over oil without questioning the moral implications. Apparently U.S. citizens felt the need for a common cause to pull America together. William Fore states that coverage of the Persian Gulf War met the psychological needs of American viewers:

to feel powerful and in control, to experience extreme emotions in a guilt- free, non-threatening environment, to share emotionally charged experiences with others, to gain a sense of identity, to gain information, to satisfy a belief in justice, to see others make mistakes, to participate in the drama of history (vicariously and without risk) and to affirm moral values. (qtd. in Denton 33)
A direct result of the public's craving for unity was a propaganda phase called the "yellow ribbon factor" which emerged right before combat began. It started when George Bush emphasized the need to support "the boys and the girls" in the Persian Gulf (qtd. in Greenberg and Gantz 81). The notion was that people could support the U.S. troops despite their feelings towards the war. This helped Americans ignore the moral questions involved.

Added to this was a larger propaganda campaign which portrayed Operation Desert Storm as a "clean war." Rosalind Silver, editor of Media & Values, blamed the media for focusing on "flashy technology while ignoring its impact on humankind" (qtd. in Denton 33). Most television coverage showed images of "smart bombs," Patriot missiles, and futuristic vehicles while ignoring scenes of destruction and death. New expressions were invented to dodge the usual connotations of warfare terminology. For instance, civilian deaths were called "collateral damage." Indiscriminate bombing of large areas was labeled "carpet bombing." Hostages were known as "guests" (McCain and Shyles 48-49). These terms hid the human side of the conflict, so the public did little to protest. Asu Aksoy and Kevin Robins observe:

It was as if our moral senses had been taken out and neutralized. The 'smartness' or 'brilliance' of computer-controlled rocket systems and of Tomahawk missiles seduced us into thinking that Iraq's murderous violence was being confronted by efficient and rational systems whose objectives were, not to murder, but simply to 'clean out' enemy targets. (Mowlana, Gerbner, and Schiller 205-206)
Instead of remembering Desert Storm as a slaughter, Americans see it as a technological victory. In part, the media's focus on weaponry was a result of America's need to validate its drive towards technological and military superiority--a drive which shaped its role this century. George Bush could appeal to the public with the phrase "we're going to kick some ass" because U.S. citizens were living through a period of economic hardship and wanted reassurance that America was still a superpower which could exert its sense of justice on nations that misbehave (qtd. in Greenberg and Gantz 84). Today we would rather celebrate a clean Gulf victory justifying the nature of our competition-based society than question our values and way of life.

Despite the one-sided coverage of the war by the media, many international organizations and responsible individuals protested the war, and campaigned afterwards for a better understanding of what went on. The International War Crimes Tribunal held a hearing February 29, 1992 and found George Bush, Dan Quayle, Richard Cheney, Colin Powell, and Norman Schwarzkopf guilty of "nineteen separate crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the First Protocol thereto, other international agreements and customary international law" (qtd. in Clark 267). Although foreign media covered this trial and its verdict, it was ignored by reporters in the United States, leaving Americans blind to their responsibility as part of an international community.

It is important to question our motives because even now U.S. policy is responsible for horrific conditions in Iraq. The continuing embargo is crippling Iraq's economy. Iraq lost many of the facilities necessary for civilian life, including such necessities as hospitals and sewage plants, during the Persian Gulf conflict. Between the end of the war and May of 1992, over 150,000 Iraqi civilians, mostly children, died as a result of the bombing and sanctions (Clark xxxvii). Hussein is not being affected, and surely Iraq's citizens don't deserve such hardship.

Americans today should reexamine the moral consequences of Operation Desert Storm. Hopefully they'll realize the United States is narrow-minded in considering its sense of justice superior to the values of international law. America must tame its desire to be a superpower, or redirect its competitive nature in a way that benefits others. Until Americans see themselves as part of a global human community, they risk taking part in more crimes against humanity.

Works Cited

Clark, Ramsey.The Fire This Time, U.S. War Crimes in the Gulf. New York: Thunder's Mouth Press, 1992.

Denton, Robert E. Jr., ed. The Media and the Persian Gulf War. Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1993.

Gray, Paul. "The Man Behind A Demonic Image." Time 11 February 1991:36.

Greenberg, Bradley S. and Walter Gantz, eds. Desert Storm and the Mass Media. Cresskill: Hampton Press, Inc., 1993.

MacArthur, John R. Second Front. New York: Hill and Wang, 1992.

McCain, Thomas A., and Leonard Shyles, eds. The 1,000 Hour War, Communication in the Gulf. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1994.

Mowlana, Hamid, George Gerbner, and Herbert I. Schiller, eds. Triumph of the Image, The Media's War in the Persian Gulf--A Global Perspective.San Francisco: Westview Press, 1992.

Smith, Hedrick, ed. The Media and the Gulf War.Washington, D.C.: Seven Locks Press, 1992.

Copyright © 1996 Jacob Arnold.


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