Congressional Staff
27 August - 6 September 1999
Staff Members of
Office of Danny Davis (D-IL)
Office of Sam Gejdenson (D-CT)
Office of Earl Hilliard (D-AL)
Office of Cynthia McKinney (D-GA)
Office of Bernard Sanders (I-VT)
Table of Contents
Introduction 3
History of Congressional Involvement in Iraq 4
Goals of the Congressional Aides Delegation 4
Details of the trip 4
Humanitarian Effect of Sanctions
5
Overview 5
Education & Effect of Intellectual Embargo
6
Medical Conditions
7
Public Health Issues
9
Children's Issues 10
Food & Distribution of Goods 11
North-Center/South Disparities 11
Economic Issues 13
Depleted Uranium (DU) & Gulf War Illness 16
U.S. Grain Imports 18
Iraqi Officials 19
United Nations Agencies' Work 21
Partial List of Meetings 22
United Nations Officials 22
Iraqi Officials, Institutions & Agencies
22
Baghdad 22
Amara 22
Basra 22
Al-Nassyria 22
International Non-Governmental Organizations in Iraq 22
Accompanying the Delegation 23
Sponsors 24
Signatures 25
CONGRESSIONAL STAFFERS' IRAQ TRIP REPORT
INTRODUCTION
In late August 1999, five congressional staff members travelled to Iraq.
It was the first congressional visit since 1991, shortly after the
Gulf
War. The delegation's primary focus was the impact of U.S.-UN economic
sanctions on the humanitarian situation facing Iraqi civilians; they
also wanted to examine the question of depleted uranium's continuing
effects, and the impact of sanctions on U.S. exports, especially grain,
to Iraq including potential exports post-sanctions.
The members of the delegation included:
Brian Sims, office of Danny Davis (D-IL)
Amos Hochstein, office of Sam Gejdenson (D-CT)*
Jack Zylman, office of Earl Hilliard (D-AL)
Peter Hickey, office of Cynthia McKinney (D-GA)
Danielle LeClair, office of Bernard Sanders (I-VT)
Plans for the delegation grew out of increasing concern in Congress
and
among the American people about the humanitarian impact of U.S. policy
in Iraq. The unchanging U.S. policy of maintaining economic sanctions
far beyond their potential viability in influencing Iraqi government
positions, along with the repeated statements by U.S. government
officials and spokespeople that sanctions would remain in place until
Saddam Hussein was overthrown, or “until the end of time” as President
Clinton said, in violation of the actual terms of the United Nations
sanctions resolution, increased the concern.
In October 1998, 43 Members of Congress, following the initiative of
Congressman John Conyers, signed a letter to President Clinton calling
on the Administration “to de-link the economic sanctions, which have
been a complete failure, from the military sanctions…” It went on to
state that “We hold no illusions about Iraq’s overall record of
compliance with weapons inspections. It is clear, however, that
continued economic sanctions allow Saddam Hussein to exploit the
suffering of his people to his political advantage.” Several ad hoc
hearings were held in Congress during which witnesses provided expert
evidence as to the immediate and long-range damage sanctions are causing
to Iraq’s civilian population. Those witnesses included former United
Nations Assistant Secretary General and UN Humanitarian Coordinator
in
Iraq Denis Halliday, inspection team leader for the Food and Agriculture
Organization nutritionist Professor Peter Pellett, and others.
The Members signing the Dear Colleague letter ended with a plea to the
Administration “to look squarely at the economic sanctions, which have
outlasted their political utility. They now serve only to extend the
human suffering of the population.” Unfortunately the aides delegation
observed that one year after the letter, human suffering continues.
*Mr. Hochstein did not participate in drafting the Trip Report.
History of Congressional Involvement in Iraq:
During the nine years that UN economic sanctions have been in place,
the
U.S. Congress and the American people have paid an economic, political
and social price – in billions of dollars of direct costs and lost
export revenue, in diminished influence with our allies who view the
economic sanctions as increasingly unsustainable, and in a dangerously
growing hostility to America by people throughout the Middle East among
whom the economic sanctions are seen as devastating Iraq's population
rather than its leadership.
But throughout those nine years there has been no independent
examination by Congress of the impact of that sustained policy. The
August 1999 aides’ delegation to Iraq was envisioned as a first step
in
conducting such an independent congressional examination.
The Aides’ Delegation’s goal was to bring home to their Members of
Congress a first-hand look and as much information as possible on the
following issues:
1) The effect of economic sanctions on the civilian
population of
Iraq, especially
children and other vulnerable sectors.
2) The possible effect of depleted uranium on cancer rates,
birth
defects and other
health problems, and the potential for information-sharing between
Iraqi
and U.S. health professionals concerned about DU’s effect on Iraqi
civilians and American Gulf War veterans and their families.
3) The role of economic sanctions in the decline of U.S. grain
exports
to Iraq, and the potential for increasing such exports after
economic
sanctions are lifted.
4) Other relevant information regarding the effect of U.S. policy
in
and towards Iraq.
Details of Trip to Iraq:
The delegation left Washington on Friday, 27 August. Because of the
economic sanctions regime, air travel to Iraq is prohibited. They flew
to Amman, Jordan, from where they travelled overland by car across
the
desert to Baghdad; the trip took approximately 10 hours. Arrival in
Baghdad was on Sunday afternoon.
The aides remained in Baghdad from Sunday through Wednesday morning,
when they travelled south to the town of Amara, and then to Basra,
Iraq’s second largest city, close to the Iranian border. They spent
one
night in Basra, and on Thursday morning travelled to the small city
of
Nassyria, and then the ancient city of Ur, legendary birthplace of
the
prophet Abraham, before returning to Baghdad on Thursday evening.
They remained in Baghdad until Saturday morning, when they left for
the
drive back to Amman, arriving that evening. The flight out of Amman
was
delayed ten hours, so arrival in Washington (via New York) was on Monday
morning, 6 September 1999.
Humanitarian Effect of Economic Sanctionss
Overview
Background of the Sanctions:
The UN sanctions that were put in place in Iraq in August 1990
prohibited all oil exports from Iraq, halting virtually its entire
foreign trade. The “oil for food” program that began in 1996 allowed
Iraq to export limited quantities of oil, with all payment sent not
to
Iraq but to an escrow account administered by the UN. With those funds,
Iraq was permitted to contract with suppliers for food and medicine
and
a very limited amount of other humanitarian goods. Only in the more
recent period has Iraq been permitted to contract for supplies and
equipment to repair its severely degraded oil infrastructure.
Because of the deterioration of its oil drilling equipment, prior to
October 1999 Iraq had never managed to produce the maximum amount,
or
cap, set on its oil exports. With insufficient oil being pumped,
insufficient funds were available for food and medicine, and virtually
none for larger-scale requirements for repair and rebuilding of the
water purification, sewage treatment, and electrical generating capacity
destroyed during the 1991 war.
The oil for food program was not designed to improve the Iraqis’ rapidly
deteriorating health and wellbeing; it was designed to stop further
deterioration of those conditions. To accomplish that, and because
of
the overall poverty does not allow Iraq to import sufficient foodstuffs,
the food that is available is distributed on a strict rationing basis.
Each Iraqi receives a “food basket” on the first day of each month,
distributed through local food agents in a system closely supervised
by
UN agencies. The rations include flour, rice, lentils or other beans,
cooking oil, sugar, tea, soap and little else. Powdered milk and cheese
have been included sporadically, but there is no other animal protein,
no fresh fruits or vegetables, and insufficient vitamins and minerals.
The food basket, distributed once each month, is estimated to last
from
20-23 days.
Information Learned:
Throughout the aides’ visit, the most consistently useful, nuanced and
comprehensive information came from briefings by staff members of the
United Nations agencies working in Iraq. Assistant Secretary General
Hans Von Sponeck, the UN’s Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq, provided
a
broad overview of the humanitarian crisis facing the country.
He described “the less visible, less dramatic non-material side of the
economic sanctions’ impact,” He identified the many coping methods
used
by Iraq’s once-dominant middle class to deal with the economic crisis.
“Many of those methods are illegal,” he told the aides, and reliance
on
them is “creating in Iraq a generation of fixers, manipulators of the
system, rather than thinkers or strategists.”
The UN’s Food & Agriculture Organization Director Amir Khalil described
rising prostitution, corruption, and theft resulting from economic
collapse.
“Everything is tired,” Von Sponeck said. “Iraq’s social fabric is under
serious attack.”
Education & Effect of Intellectual Embargo:
Several people discussed the "silent exodus" of Iraqis, especially the
educated class, and the resulting erosion of Iraq's knowledge base.
This
brain drain is having severe consequences on Iraq's once-advanced
scientific, technological and academic progress. With no access to
the
Internet, the U.S. and British prohibitions on access to medical,
academic and other intellectual journals impose essentially total
deprivation of global intellectual communication on Iraqis.
The oil for food program funds are barely enough for Iraqis’ urgent
and
immediate physical needs, with nothing made available for intellectual
needs. The result is complete intellectual deprivation. At the physical
level, schools are deteriorating, and a university professor reminded
the aides that Iraq’s textbooks from elementary school through
university are almost all ten years old. A UNESCO report prepared for
the Security Council's panel on humanitarian issues in Iraq notes that
literacy rates by 1987 "had increased to 80%. This is attributed to
the
success of the massive literacy campaign conducted during the late
seventies and early eighties. ...In 1995, the rate of illiteracy was
estimated at 42%, a major shift in favour of illiteracy."
The UN also noted the problem of "deprofessionalization," including
incomplete education, and those with advanced degrees working outside
their fields, usually in menial jobs, because of a lack of employment
possibilities. This phenomenon "also raises the serious issue of lack
of
opportunity for Iraqis, particularly youth, to prepare for
nation-building responsibilities and participation in an international
world which is increasingly leaving Iraq behind in terms of knowledge,
technology and cooperation."
One result is a narrowing of vantage point born of international
isolation. As a political consequence, a generation is growing up in
Iraq lacking in the cosmopolitanism, language skills, and the
familiarity with the outside world that once characterized Iraqis.
A
particularly dangerous outgrowth of this reality is the growth of
political extremism among the young generation coming up in the Ba'ath
Party. As xenophobic and narrow-minded as is the regime of Saddam
Hussein, almost all of the top leadership of the current generation
in
power studied abroad, mainly in the U.S. or Europe. The younger
activists, educated poorly and without any access to colleagues, friends
or academic contacts, denied travel even in the neighboring Arab
countries let alone in the wider world, are emerging as an even more
extreme force within Iraqi politics. It is from these younger Ba'ath
figures that pressure on Saddam Hussein is emerging from the right,
challenging his "too accommodating" stance towards the UN and the West.
Medical Conditions:
The image of emaciated babies and malnourished young children ill or
even dying in Iraq is by now well-known in the U.S. The staff
delegation, visiting hospitals in Baghdad, Amara and Basra, found that
reality unchanged, with most of these children dying from treatable
diseases, usually the result of unclean water and exacerbated by
malnutrition, for which basic medications and treatments are
unavailable.
According to the director of the Al-Mansour Teaching Children's Hospital
in Baghdad, "986 [the oil for food funding] never supports all our
needs
- it only meets 30% of the real needs for our patients. In the last
phases of life, where more advanced medicines are needed, it only meets
5 - 10%." There is not sufficient money available to purchase the needed
supplies, many contract applications are held up in the Sanctions
Committee, and there is inefficiency- and bureaucracy-related delays
in
distribution of medicines.
In a post-visit but related instance, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan
confirmed on October 27, 1999, the problem of contracts being held
and
delayed by the Sanctions Committee. "These holds are having an
undesirable impact on our humanitarian activities.”
The Director of the children’s hospital noted that most of the children
he sees are under-developed and not well-nourished, and therefore become
immune-depressed and more vulnerable to diseases. Once rare diseases
are
on the rise since sanctions were imposed – including typhoid fever,
typhus, measles, chicken pox, Kwashiorkor & marasmus. The oncology
numbers, especially for leukemias, were down in 1991-92, but up again
in
1994-97, the last available data period. Cholera is also being
seen,
not traditionally found in Iraq.
In treating cancers, the hospital lacks chemotherapy drugs, so there
are
frequent relapses. Doctors often give only 50% of the recommended
dosages to treat pneumonia, diarrhea, even meningitis because sufficient
drugs are unavailable. Patients begin treatment already
immune-compromised. Infant and child-sized catheters remain impossible
to obtain.
All the hospitals face a serious problem of the lack of nursing care.
During the 1970s and 1980s, Iraq relied largely on foreign nurses,
almost all of whom left the country when sanctions were imposed and
they
could no longer be paid. The UN staff doctor described how cultural
sensitivities and Iraq's high development level led most women
interested in medicine to want to be doctors. There are some male
nurses, but in her view they are not well qualified or experienced
yet.
Specialized nursing care is needed, but no training is available. The
result is that even in intensive care or neo-natal units, there is
no
monitoring by nurses, and ordinary bedside nursing tasks are routinely
carried out by families.
According to UNICEF’s most recent report, the deteriorating health
conditions since sanctions were imposed in 1990 have led to the deaths
of over 500,000 children under five years of age. In Baghdad's
once-medically advanced pediatric teaching hospital, the director told
the delegation that “these children’s deaths are a tragedy for us.".
The director mentioned the effect of the infrastructure collapse: "we
have a problem with disposal of dirty water and sewage; the cooling
system is bad, it creates an unhealthy environment in the hospital;
and
we can’t get spare parts for hospital equipment. The oxygen factory
was
destroyed; we have 200 empty oxygen cylinders." The lack of clean
water
is causing widespread diarrheal diseases. Empty oxygen cylinders were
in
fact visible in a number of hospital areas. The outside temperature
in
Baghdad in August was 110 degrees; in Basra and Amara, close to 120.
The
hospitals had no functioning air conditioning systems, and the inside
temperature was probably 90 degrees; mothers used hand-held fans to
try
to cool their children.
Hospitals outside of Baghdad are in even worse condition. In Amara,
many
children are hospitalized with severe malnutrition. The delegation
was
told there are only two lasers available for eye surgery in the country.
After intensive therapy they are sent home with special food supplements
and arrangements for follow-up monitoring, but hospital staff told
the
congressional aides that they often see the same children relapse and
return for treatment but the food ration is simply insufficient.
Amara's general hospital has only one dialysis machine that must serve
the entire governorate (county). The director told the delegation that
with kidney diseases requiring reliance on blood products and dialysis,
the anticipated life-span in Iraq is now about 10 years; in Cyprus,
with
identical diagnosis, the usual prediction is for a perfectly normal
life. He said that bone marrow transplants are no longer done for
leukemia or other patients; they are too expensive.
Beyond the individual tragedies, perhaps even the more significant
danger is in the long-term effect of the erosion of Iraq's medical
technology and health system. Once relied on by patients needing
advanced heart, brain and other surgery from throughout the Middle
East,
and once used by the World Health Organization as a teaching model
of
how developing countries' public health systems should operate, Iraq's
medical infrastructure since the imposition of sanctions has
deteriorated to the level of under-developed Third World countries.
The
once-accessible scholarships for advanced medical study abroad have
disappeared, and Iraqi physicians and medical schools now find only
limited, occasional access even to medical journals.
The deterioration of the physical hospital infrastructure combined with
lack of funds means that advanced surgical techniques are rarely if
ever
performed. The result goes far beyond the individual human tragedies
of
dying patients and their families. It means that an entire generation
of
Iraqi medical students will not have the opportunity to learn those
advanced techniques, since they cannot observe or train in how to carry
them out. The future for Iraq's once world-class medical establishment
is bleak.
Public Health Issues:
The Baghdad director of the World Health Organization (WHO), Ade
Koleade, told the delegation that "before the [1996] 986 Memorandum
of
Understanding, the health situation was bad; the MOU prevented more
deterioration." However, numerous UN officials affirmed that the oil
for
food program had not been designed to improve the humanitarian
situation, only to, as the WHO director described, prevent future
worsening.
The public health infrastructure, in particular water and sewage
treatment facilities, has badly deteriorated. Several non-governmental
organizations working in Iraq are focusing on the rehabilitation of
water treatment plants, but the overall system remains vastly
underequipped. Most diarrheal diseases causing the illness and death
of
children are water-borne, so the lack of water treatment facilities
is
taking especially severe toll.
In areas where the Iraqi government had not installed or not improved
functioning water and sewage treatment facilities in the past, the
current sanctions-era impoverishment has prevented current improvements.
Thus the 1980s-built internally displaced persons camps, primarily
in
the south of Iraq, have running streams of raw sewage between housing
blocs, and pond-size pools of untreated standing sewage water with
enormous potential for disease.
The WHO director described the problems of items that were late arriving
or non-existent because the contracts remained on hold from the "661
committee" -- the UN sanctions committee that must approve Iraq's
procurement contracts. He told the delegation of one example of the
problem, chemical reagents for cholera testing, remain unavailable
because the contract is still on hold.
The WHO director also spoke of the warehouse stockpile issue. This has
been a frequent issue raised by U.S. officials who assert that the
Iraqi
government is deliberately stockpiling medical and other goods in
warehouses, refusing to distribute them. The director described some
of
the complex set of reasons that warehouses often remain full. Many
of
the parts for medical equipment, he said, fail Iraq's rigorous quality
control testing. There is a problem caused by a lack of staff training
in inventory techniques and a shortage of computers to carry out the
programs, and problems in staff motivation. He raised the problem that
the UN itself, even the humanitarian agencies, are still viewed as
part
of problem by some Iraqis, so information is sometimes not available.
When the inadequate computer system goes down, no reports are generated
at all. He also raised problems the delegation heard several times
from
UN officials of various agencies: the lack of sufficient, especially
refrigerated transport; and the lack of a cash component in the oil
for
food program in the Center/South, resulting in an inability to hire
or
train local workers in distribution tasks. While some refrigerated
trucks have now been approved for Iraq, the long lag time with
insufficient transport caused serious problems.
[The issue of the discrepancy in conditions between the North and
Center/South regions of Iraq emerged in a number of contexts. See
North/South section below for a fuller discussion.]
The director of the Food & Agriculture Organization (FAO), Amir
Khalil,
also described problems leading to goods being warehoused for long
periods of time. He described problems with the 661 Committee, including
the problem of contracts being on hold. In the last two years, he said,
all irrigation items remained on hold; his agency is fighting harder
because of the drought conditions facing Iraq. He spoke of the
interconnectedness of supplies they receive, because of which the
absence (through a contract on hold or insufficient supplies arriving
or
inadequate quality) of one component makes it impossible to usefully
distribute the rest.
Other UN officials described other examples of contracts withheld. A
frequent reference was to insulin -- a large shipment had been approved
and arrived, but the contract for hypodermic syringes had not been
approved, so the insulin remained stockpiled since it could not be
administered without the needles.
Children's Issues:
In the late 1980s, according to UNICEF director and physician Dr.
Anupama Rao Singh, UNICEF viewed Iraq as a "transition country" on
the
verge of gaining First World levels of child health, education and
general welfare indicators. The UN children's agency was about
to end
its aid program in Iraq, replacing it with the kind of national
committee for UNICEF that functions in the U.S., Europe and elsewhere
to
do advocacy and fundraising work. Now, with the impoverishment brought
about by war and sanctions, UNICEF's program through the oil for food
arrangement is the second largest in world.
However, it is important to note that UNICEF's actual aid budget for
Iraqi children is quite small -- only $25 million. It is used for
studies to track the condition of children and women in Iraq. The rest
of UNICEF's large-scale program is funded solely out of Iraq's own
oil
revenues, organized through oil for food.
Dr. Rao Singh discussed in some detail UNICEF's new 1999 report,
indicating a steady increase in child mortality after 1989 in the
South/Center region of Iraq, with a net decline in those figures for
the
North. In both North and South/Center, figures for underweight
children, chronic malnutrition, and wasting diseases remain high.
She described the non-physical effect of the sanctions regime on
children. There has been, she said, a serious deterioration of the
quality of education; less than one in two Iraqi schools operate at
acceptable standards. The curriculum has been pared down to the basics;
the quality of and access to books, and teaching itself, have
deteriorated. This kind of academic/intellectual isolation facing Iraqi
students is more significant now because the growth of information
on a
global basis is happening so fast now; the Iraqi children are being
left
behind..
She urged the delegation to look at the situation facing children now,
and how these economic problems caused by sanctions will have a major
impact on their future. She pointed to examples of civil unrest in
Africa and elsewhere, usually caused by disaffected youth with no hope
of education, job, or a future. There is just such a generation of
Iraqis growing up now, she said, with no hope, no connection to the
outside world, isolated. And that will be very dangerous.
Food & Distribution of Goods
Overall food shortages remain a serious problem in Iraq. The World Food
Program country director, Jutta Burghardt, told the delegation that
70%
of household income goes for food: by UN and world standards, that
is
considered an indicator of imminent famine. Through oil for food,
they
now have about $1 billion every six months for food, soap, baby food
for
the entire population of almost 23 million Iraqis.
The oil for food program, she said, is shielding but not reversing the
accumulated effects of sanctions: Iraq's middle class is disappearing,
the stunted children will never recover. The monthly food basket lasts
only about 21 days. Many families have no other income, and so are
living in a situation of complete deprivation.
The WFP's Burghardt described the urgent need for income-generating
programs in Iraq. She tried to initiate such programs, but said her
ideas "did not fly" in headquarters. The U.S. is the biggest donor
to
the WFP, and played a key role in preventing the new plans. She said
that the Government of Iraq deals with the food question solely on
an
emergency basis, and has been reluctant to go forward towards a full
solution. The government wants to show the full effects of the
sanctions.
In Basra, the delegation watched the monitoring system run by the World
Food Program. Their observers check the work of household level food
agents at grain pick-up points. The day before each month's
distribution, television and radio broadcasts announce what is missing
or short in the food ration, so people know what they should be
receiving. That seems to insure that any graft at the food agent level
is kept minimal.
A WFP staff member described how "we are working in an unfriendly
environment, because we are seen as part of the sanctions problem."
There are also problems because of low food quality -- in the North,
people think WFP buys the food and accuse it of being responsible for
low quality. Iraq tried to get a retention clause in their contracts,
allowing them to retain part of the payment until quality control was
confirmed, but the 661 committee refused, so they have no recourse
when
countries send inferior quality food.
North-South Disparities:
At the political level, the largely Kurdish North functions under the
Western protection, and the food, health, and economic life of the
three
governorates are managed by local Iraqi Kurdish officials under the
control of the UN. In the Center/South the Iraqi government maintains
sovereign control of food rationing, health infrastructure, the economy,
etc., although it remains under close and constant supervision by the
UN. Economically, the North is far more productive: it is the
traditional agricultural center of the country, its border with Turkey
is thoroughly porous for both legal and clandestine trade, it has
sufficient indigenous water supplies, officials are permitted to
purchase local food and other commodities, and it has access to a cash
component out of its oil for food funds that can be used to hire local
workers or buy local materials for reconstruction. It currently receives
a higher per capita amount of money from the oil for food program.
The UNICEF director spent some time explaining to the staff delegation
the question of disparity in health and other social indicators between
the North and South/Center of Iraq. This has been a consistent issue
in
U.S. and other policy debates, with the assertion made that "the” reason
for the discrepancy is the fact that the UN controls distribution in
the
North, and the Iraqi regime in the South/Center.
Dr. Rao Singh made clear that the issue arises from a complex set of
factors, not any single issue, and is certainly not only because the
UN
is responsible in North and Iraq in Center-South. There are many
reasons:
1) There is a significant per capita disparity in oil for food
money
available for education, infrastructure, etc. in favor of the North.
This is because the 13% component of the oil for food funds reserved
for
the North is taken off the top; the Center/South's share is not 87%,
but
is only what is left over after deducting the required 30% off the
top
guaranteed to the Kuwait reparations fund, and the amount deducted
to
cover costs of the UN operation. The result is the 87% population living
in the Center/South have access only to about 53% of the oil for food
money.
2) In the North, the program includes a cash component,
through which
oil for food money can be used to pay local labor or to purchase local
goods (food or supplies). In the Center/South, no oil for food money
can
be used for local purchases or labor, creating additional problems
in
transport, installation, and use of imported goods. Therefore in the
North that cash component allows a much more efficient use of money.
3) Human resources are a serious problem in the Center/South.
There
are many highly trained professionals left there still working, but
they
work for government wages which now average $10/month.
Other UN officials provided additional insight to the complexity of
the
disparity. Non-governmental humanitarian organizations with large-scale
financial and political support from Western governments, began working
in the North immediately after the Gulf war in 1991; there are now
more
than 30 agencies working there. In the Center/South, partly because
of
Iraqi government restrictions and other difficulties, most NGOs began
working only after 1996, and there are only 11 there now, mostly with
much smaller-scale resources. Additionally, the North was the
traditional agricultural center of Iraq; almost half (48%) of Iraq's
arable land is in the North, populated by only 13% of the people, and
locally produced food is far more abundant. The availability of fresh
water is also far higher, and the North’s longstanding traditional
agricultural methods were far less vulnerable to coalition bombing
during Desert Storm than was the newer high-tech, industrialized
electricity-dependent agricultural systems in the Center/South.
There are certainly related problems having to do with the role of the
Iraqi regime. It seems clear that the government has access to some
amount of money (generally thought to be between $300 and $400 million)
obtained from smuggled oil sales. That money is generally not being
used
for civilian assistance, although the palace-building projects provide
WPA-style construction work for Iraqis, using local cement, local labor,
and payment in local currency. However, it is likely that it is not
a
sufficient amount of money to be able to play a major role in the
broader sanctions-driven impoverishment.
The UNICEF director told the delegation she believed it was reasonable
to question whether the government of Iraq is doing enough. There
are
problems, she said, with how the government uses its money. She also
mentioned that few use the same benchmarks to assess the finances of
the
local Kurdish leadership in the North. UN estimates are that the Kurdish
Democratic Party (KDP) gets $1 - 2 million/day from its informal tax
system. [A member of the delegation told her that KDP and Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leaders are questioned about that issue in
Washington.]
The UNICEF director, Dr. Rao Singh, described the Iraqi government's
definition of equity in access to food, medicine, etc. "Their official
goal is to provide everyone with exactly the same amount of the
[however insufficient] goods." In her personal capacity, she critiqued
that definition, saying that she believes it more appropriate to define
equity as providing to each according to what they need -- meaning
that
those who suffer need a special focus. She said Iraq was not the only
country to use such a definition; other officials indicated they
understood Iraq's fear of being accused of favoring any particular
region, sector or community. But it is still a problem.
Economic Issues:
The overall economy of Iraq is in crisis. The dinar, once stable at
almost $3.00 to the dinar, now trades at 2,300 dinars to the dollar.
Families spend large proportions of their meager salaries on
supplementing the insufficient food basket.
The director of UNCHS (Habitat), Victor Wahlroos, described the impact
on Iraq's civilian population of the economic collapse. "In the 1980s,
the dinar was strong, families were okay," he said. He arrived in
Baghdad in October 1993; the dinar was trading at 50 to $1.00.
By
February 1994, it was 500 dinar to $1.00. By 1996, before the
oil-for-food program began, the dinar was at 1000 to $1.00. When the
oil-for-food plan was announced, it went briefly to 450 to $1.00, then
back down to 1000. And now it's at 2,300 to $1.00. "Now," he
said,
"people live on $10 per month salaries. People are selling jewelry,
carpets, air conditioners. The middle class is in poverty now; they
have
had to sell their houses, apartments, etc.”
There is a small wealthy neighborhood of new and opulent houses visible
in Baghdad. But the staff delegation saw indications that the layer
of
Iraqi officials benefiting from the sanctions regime appears to be
very
thin. Even relatively high-ranking officials described experiences
of
spending hours in the market, seeking to sell one or another food item
from their family's ration basket in order to purchase another more
favored item. One official described his family as hating beans, so
he
would sell their monthly allowance of beans in order to buy extra rice.
The UNICEF director mentioned a UK proposal designed to encourage
private enterprise. She believes such programs would be important,
because under oil for food guidelines the Iraqi government is not
allowed to purchase any locally produced goods (except under the cash
component provision in the North alone). Wheat, once produced in some
significant amounts, is now imported instead of produced. The result
is
the creation of more internally displaced persons (IDPs), when people
flock to the cities to try to find work instead of returning to
agricultural production. It also discourages return to newly de-mined
areas to resume agricultural work, since there is no longer a reliable
market.
Dr. Rao Singh described the need to encourage, while monitoring, a
return to local production, including local production of medicines.
The FAO director, Amir Khalil, described the damage caused by
agricultural sanctions to Iraq. Once a developed country, Iraq had
earned about $600 million in agricultural production before 1990; now
it
is about $50 million. They have access to no new agricultural
technology, and as a result animal diseases are on the increase, water
salinity is up to 90%.
Problems are magnified because agriculture is highly electrified and
thus dependent on electrical generating capacity, electrified water
pumps, etc. More "dual use" items needed for agricultural production
are
on hold now. "Does the UN's 661 Committee lack confidence in
our
monitoring?" Khalil asked.
He told the delegation that agricultural chemical spraying had been
done
by FAO helicopters under UNSCOM inspection for 5 - 6 years in the
No-Fly-Zones. He stayed in contact with the military commanders of
Southern Watch and Provide Comfort. On August 18 or 19, 1999, Khalil
was
contacted by the Southern Watch commander, and told to stop his
helicopters from flying to spray sugar cane fields in a particular
area,
although the schedule required one more week to complete the anti-Hoof
&
Mouth disease spraying. He recalled the helicopters to Baghdad,
and the
next day an airstrike hit the airport where his helicopters usually
were
kept. The Hoof & Mouth disease spraying was required because the
disease
was spreading in region, to the Russian border and North Africa, because
of the lack of vaccine. The FAO proposed rehabilitating the vaccine
factory destroyed by UNSCOM, to deal with the current lack of domestic
vaccine production.
Many UN officials described their view that the overall economic
conditions do not appear to be improving under the oil for food program.
Particularly with 30% off the top of all oil revenues allocated to
the
UN reparation fund for Kuwaitis and other victims of Iraq’s occupation
of Kuwait, and the approximately 4% allocated to other UN expenses
in
Iraq, the money obtained through oil for food simply is not enough.
Depleted Uranium (DU)
Iraq's medical and public health officials have not been able to conduct
a comprehensive controlled scientific study of the effect of depleted
uranium (DU), which was used by the U.S. during the Gulf War. Effects
have been seen among U.S. veterans as well as Iraqi civilians.
On November 30, 1993, the President signed the Defense Authorization
Bill, Public Law 103-160 (see Section 271, Subtitle E, Title II).
The
new law required the Department of Defense to provide funding to study
the health effects of inhaled, ingested, and implanted DU.
To date, the Armed Forced Radiobiology Research Institute (AFRRI),
working on behalf of the Department of Defense, conducted implanted
DU
research on rats that found significant findings related to a possible
link between DU and cancer. AFRRI called for more research, including
research on inhaled DU. Yet Bernard Rostker, the Army Undersecretary,
refused.
To date, the VA has found neurological problems associated with elevated
DU in urine. DU was also found in the semen of some Gulf War
veterans
with DU shrapnel in their bodies.
Gulf War veterans suffer from neurological, immunological, and other
systemic disorders that remain difficult to diagnose and treat.
The
refusal of the DoD to conduct research on inhaled DU continued after
DoD
acknowledged that more than 400,000 U.S. Gulf War veterans entered
into
and encamped in DU contaminated areas -- sometimes for up to two months.
The Iraqi health professionals have much anecdotal material, but do
not
have the resources required to conduct a thorough study that would
prove
unequivocal causality. They are eager to share the information they
have
amassed with U.S., British or other international researchers in hopes
that such a definitive study could be completed. They are trying to
test
for DU in urine, by measuring DU particulate matter in a radioactive
analysis procedure. But they still have a shortage of the specialized
equipment needed to test tissue.
The director of the Al Mansour teaching hospital in Baghdad described
the new cancer cases emerging in areas after exposure to DU missiles.
The lymphatic system is the first part affected by radiation, and Iraq's
medical professionals believe that DU is one of the factors of these
higher rates, particularly with lymphomas (which have a better
prognosis) and leukemias (a worse prognosis). Most of these new
rising
rates are in southern Iraq, where the use of DU weapons was heaviest
during Desert Storm.
In a meeting with Deputy Minister of Health Shawki Sabri Murqis, he
described the 300 + tons of DU used in southern Iraq during the war.
He
described how DU is stable before firing, but the danger of DU when
it
explodes, and is blown around as powder. The doctors are seeing rising
levels of congenital deformities; Dr. Murqis reminded the delegation
of
the similarity of those deformed children to the child in a
widely-distributed photo of the child of an American GI who had been
exposed to DU.
U.S. Grain Imports:
The manager of the main grain silo and distribution center in Baghdad
described the problems his facility faces with lack of spare parts
and
equipment. There are high level of impurities in the grain purchased
from abroad. The grain they are now using is 30% barley and 20% corn
mixed with wheat. The wheat is more expensive so the other grains are
mixed with it to produce bread.
Iraq relies on different countries of origin for imported wheat -
Australia, Russia, France, and others. It is shipped to Um Kassar,
the
main Iraqi port, or Aqaba or Syria, and then trucked to central
silos
and then to local mills. The quality control laboratories run by the
Ministry of Trade carries out the grain inspection, but all instruments
all pre-1991, and the science director believes they are not accurate.
They also have milling problems because the mix of wheat with corn
and
barley means different size grains must be milled together.
Before the imposition of sanctions, he was aware that Iraq imported
a
large percentage of its grain from the U.S. About 5% of total
grain now
comes from the U.S., mostly winter wheat. There have been some problems
with insects because of length of shipping process from U.S., but need
new instruments for full examination. In general the quality of the
U.S.
wheat has been fine.
Iraqi Officials:
MEETING WITH TARIQ AZIZ*
Tariq Aziz is the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs,
and major player in Iraqi diplomacy. The meeting included Ambassador
Nizar Hamdoon, Iraq's former Permanent Representative at the United
Nations and former Ambassador to the U.S.
Aziz began with a description of the history of U.S.-Iraqi relations.
In the 1970s, he said, there was not enough U.S.-Iraqi contact. In
the
1980s, ties were better and more clear. The 1982-83 period was of more
intense ties, and closer links with higher U.S. officials.
"We are ready to receive whoever wants to talk with us; we will talk
with whoever wants to listen," he said.
He described how the same government is in power in Iraq now as during
the pre-1990 period, but there was a serious deterioration in conditions
and relations with the U.S. after sanctions imposed. He reminded the
delegation that Iraq had made its own comments to Congress regarding
the
earlier White House report to congress on relations with Iraq.
Aziz said he is aware that humanitarian concerns by themselves do not
change policies. In 1990, he said, the U.S. could get a resolution
passed by the Security Council in hours; now it takes months, and
sometimes fails.
He emphasized paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 687, the Iraq
ceasefire and sanctions resolution call for "the goal of establishing
in
the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction
and all
missiles for their delivery and the objective of a global ban on
chemical weapons." He said "we have said we have fully complied,
there
is no evidence of the UNSCOM claims. After eight years of economic
sanctions, they should have lifted them. No one took any steps to touch
Paragraph 14."
Aziz was asked about the British-Dutch proposal under consideration
in
the Security Council. That proposal would raise the levels of oil Iraq
could produce and allow at least consideration of foreign oil company
investment, but would leave most of the current economic sanctions
regime in place. Aziz described it as "old wine in a new bottle. We
would be fools to accept." He said there is too much pressure
being
brought to bear.
Aziz was asked whether he would accept monitoring if the offer comes
to
lift the sanctions. He said "the offer cannot be suspension of
sanctions, it must be a full lifting. ... What will our people say
if I
don't accept a reasonable offer?"
Aziz was then asked about the French proposal, which envisions an
entirely different framework for sanctions than the current regime.
It
would establish a new monitoring mechanism on the ground in Iraq, aimed
at preventing future re-armament, while increasing border controls
to
deal with dual use concerns, and would end most import and export
restrictions. Aziz said the proposal indicated good intentions, but
was
not good enough. "It would be difficult to refuse if it should come
back
with improvements." He added "we understand the concerns about
dual use
goods - the focus should be on exports and imports."
"We would accept monitoring to confirm disarmament [in context of
simultaneous beginning of lifting of sanctions]. ... If they decide
to
lift sanctions and say they just want to come to inspect the military
for that, it would be hard for our people to understand if we rejected
that."
Asked about the potential for a democratization process in Iraq after
the sanctions crisis, Aziz said, "this are a progressive government,
because we are more democratic than its predecessor. We are not a
liberal democracy, but it is better than in the past, we are moving
forward."
He said that Pinochet's government was a dictatorship because he
overthrew an elected government; Hitler was a dictator because he banned
political parties after election. "The Iraqi people are capable of
changing us if they don't like us. ... We don't want to be called stupid
by our own people."
* Due to illness, Danielle LeClair of Rep. Bernard Sanders’ office did
not participate in the meeting with Tariq Aziz.
Problems Facing UN Agencies' Work:
The UN agencies working in Iraq do so under extraordinarily difficult,
daunting, circumstances. Their work and living conditions are tightly
constrained, and they face enormous obstacles from a number of sources.
Dr. Rao Singh, the UNICEF director, described two serious problems.
A
30-year, multi-posting veteran of UNICEF, she told the delegation she
had never faced these problems in a field environment. First, serious
dialog on social policy in Iraq is effectively constrained. Since the
economic sanctions are officially UN sanctions, the UN is often seen
as
part of the problem. As a result, there is little or no dialog.
Second, she raised the problem of post-analysis. There is distrust by
some in the international community in what UN agencies say.
She spends
about 20% of her time demonstrating UNICEF's objectivity to those in
headquarters and various capitals. This time should be spent on
substantive work, not proving my case, she said, and this is a new
problem, one she never faced before.
Partial List of Meetings:
United Nations Officials:
Hans Von Sponeck, UN Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq
Amir Khalil , Food & Agriculture Organization (FAO)
Anupama Rao Singh, UN International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF)
Jutta Burghardt, World Food Program (WFP)
Victor Wahlroos, Habitat (UNCHS)
Ade Koleade, World Health Organization (WHO)
Joseph Wenkoff , UN De-Mining Program (UNOPS)
Prabhakar Addala, UN Observer Unit
Iraqi Officials, Institutions & Agencies:
Baghdad --
Al Mansour Pediatric Teaching Hospital - Director
Grain silos & warehouse complex - Director
Ministry of Trade director of quality control lab at grain warehouse
Deputy Prime Minister & Minister of Foreign Affairs Tarik Aziz
Amara --
Amara General Hospital director
Basra --
IDP camp residents & director
WFP-monitored food distribution center - WFP's Alia Zarif
Al-Nassyria --
Water treatment plant director
INTERNATIONAL Non-Governmental Organizations working in Iraq:
International Federation Red Cross & Red Crescent
Premiere Urgence - (French) - since 1997
Esquilibre - (French) - since 1996
Middle East Council of Churches - (U.S.) since 1991
Life for Relief and Development - (U.S.)
Mennonite Central Committee - (U.S.)
Accompanying the Delegation:
Phyllis Bennis, Institute for Policy Studies, Washington DC
Logistical assistance & participation in some meetings included
Kathy Kelly & Jeff Guntsel, Voices in the Wilderness
Mouthana al-Hanouty, LIFE for Relief & Development
Michel Nahal, Middle East Council of Churches
Carmen Pauls, Mennonite Central Committee
Sponsorship:
The fiscal sponsor for the delegation was the American Friends Service
Committee.
The NGOs and individuals sponsoring the delegation included:
Arab American Institute (AAI)
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC)
American Muslim Council (AMC)
American Friends Service Committee (AFSC)
American Muslims for Global Peace & Justice (AMGPJ)
Bishop Thomas Gumbleton, Archdiocese of Detroit
Michael Ratner, Center for Constitutional Rights
Center for Economic and Social Rights
Conscience International
Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR)
Adolfo Perez Esquivel, Nobel Peace Laureate
Margaret Galliardi, OP, Dominican Order of North America
Education for Peace with Iraq (EPIC)
Mary H. Miller, Executive Secretary, Episcopal Peace Fellowship
(organization listed for identification purposes only)
Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR)
Friends Committee on National Legislation (FCNL)
Good Samaritans of the Knights Templar (GSKT)
Institute for Policy Studies (IPS)
Iraq Action Coalition
Jubilee Partners
Mairead Maguire, Nobel Peace Laureate
Mennonite Central Committee (MCC)
Metro Detroit Against Sanctions (MDAS)
Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC)
National Association of Arab Americans (NAAA)
National Gulf War Resource Center (NGWRC)
NETWORK, A National Catholic Social Justice Lobby
Pax Christi USA
Peace Action
Peninsula Peace & Justice Center, Palo Alto, CA
Presbyterian Church (USA), Washington Office
San Jose Peace Center
Shiifa International
The Honorable Senator Paul Simon
Sinsinawa Dominicans Justice and Peace Office
Voices in the Wilderness (VitW)
Veterans for Peace (VfP)
WAND, Women's Action for New Directions
Women's International League for Peace & Freedom (WILPF)
Respectfully submitted,
________________________________________________
Brian Sims, Office of Rep. Danny Davis (D-IL)
_______________________________________________
Jack Zylman, Office of Rep. Earl Hilliard (D-AL)
__________________________________________________
Peter Hickey, Office of Rep. Cynthia McKinney (D-GA)
___________________________________________________
Danielle LeClair, Office of Rep. Bernard Sanders (Ind-VT)