Editorial on Iraq's armament building misses target

As a former weapons inspector with the U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM), I
read with concern your April 3 editorial "Saddam's rogue alliance." While I
am not inclined to speak up in defense of the regime of Saddam Hussein, the
issue of Iraq's disarmament obligation is too important to be shaped by
information that, when examined under the light of fact-backed logic,
simply does not stand up. Unfortunately, this is the case with the
information in your editorial concerning a supposed joint effort that has
North Korea building a Scud missile factory in Sudan, financed by Iraq.
Despite what your editorial suggests, Saddam has never attempted to
establish a strategic industrial capability for manufacturing weapons
outside of Iraq. Nor, as William Safire suggests in his related column in
the New York Times ("Saddam's Sudan?" March 23), has Iraq ever secreted
away any of its missiles in Sudan, or any other nation, in an effort to
escape U.N. detection. The history of Iraq's pre-Desert Storm relations
with the former Soviet Union, China, North Korea and Libya reinforces this
point. While Iraq has made numerous efforts to procure technology, know-how
and materials related to ballistic missiles abroad, including efforts to
purchase complete factories, in every single case, Iraq planned to use
those purchases to enhance its indigenous capacity to produce missiles.
Building an Iraqi factory in Sudan not only makes no sense, but runs
against the grain of everything Iraq has ever done in this regard.
I spent seven years as one of UNSCOM's leading investigators of Iraq's
ballistic missile programs and efforts used by Iraq to conceal aspects of
this program from the inspectors, and I can make such statements with
absolute certainty. This model holds true in the post-Desert Storm period
as well. In 1995, I headed efforts inside Jordan to intercept shipments of
Russian-provided missile guidance and control devices, along with tools for
testing and assembly, before they were shipped into Iraq. In 1997 I worked
closely with Ukrainian security services to shut down the activities of a
Ukrainian middleman who was brokering missile-related technology to the
Iraqis, again for use inside Iraq. In 1998 I spearheaded a complex effort
to foil Iraqi efforts to purchase controlling interests in a Romanian
aerospace company, which Iraq planned to use to transfer technology and
materials into Iraq in order to enhance its capabilities in the field of
missile production.
Despite this record of illegal activity, the reality is that for all of
this effort at covert procurement, the missile system for which the Iraqis
were working to acquire this technology was not, as some would like to
believe, a 1,200-mile-range behemoth that could threaten Europe, but rather
a battlefield support missile possessing a range of 90 miles. While the
efforts made by Iraq to acquire technology to assist in the production of
this missile were illegal, the missile, known as the Al-Samoud, is, in
fact, a legitimate system allowed under the provisions of relevant Security
Council resolutions.
Touted by many Western intelligence analysts as a "mini-Scud," the
Al-Samoud has a long way to go before it can live up to its more famous
predecessor. The performance of the Al-Samoud was, and is, abysmal. I have
videotapes of the last few Al-Samoud flight tests conducted in 1998, all of
which were failures. UNSCOM assessments regarding the Al-Samoud placed it
at least five years away from reaching operational capability under ideal
circumstances. Yet this is the same missile that, because Iraq has had the
audacity to rebuild associated factories bombed during Operation Desert Fox
in December 1998, the Pentagon and State Department would lead us to
believe represents a real and imminent threat to regional peace and
security. The Al-Samoud represents a threat to no one.
If the report of an Iraqi-North Korean-Sudanese axis proves to be accurate,
at best it represents an attempt by Iraq to acquire missile technology for
use by existing factories inside Iraq. It is somewhat ironic that the same
factories Iraq is refurbishing today were under stringent monitoring by
UNSCOM inspectors on the eve of Desert Fox. If anything, the information
written by Mr. Safire reinforces how critical it is to get weapons
inspectors back to work in Iraq. An effective monitoring system such as
existed before Operation Desert Fox would be able to detect and interdict
any effort by Iraq to illegally acquire missile-related technology. My
personal experience proves this. The return of a viable weapons-inspection
regime to Iraq should be the overriding priority of the United States and
the Security Council, even if this means trading the lifting of economic
sanctions. With inspectors back in Iraq, the world would be able to rest
easier and not be absorbed in bouts of unsubstantiated missile madness.
SCOTT RITTER
Hastings, N.Y.
Scott Ritter was an UNSCOM weapons inspector from 1991 to 1998.