Introduction: Beyond Reductionist Analysis and Atomization

              When one addresses a complex issue such as what is happening in Iraq, it is
              imperative to deal with the problem holistically and put it in its wider context.
              To view an issue from a narrow time and space window simply leads to
              erroneous conclusions or, at best, an incomplete picture. Historical and
              geo-political aspects of a problem are necessary to better understand it and to
              expose related hidden agendas and goals. The global dominative force, in this
              case the U.S., through its media, reduces the conflict to the "liberation of
              Kuwait," or confrontation of a dictator who "kills his own people." Thus all the
              suffering that the Iraqi people have been enduring, including the death of
              hundreds of thousands of Iraqi children, is "worth it," as judged by US
              Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. Sanctions and military strikes with their
              "collateral damage" (well over a million Iraqi deaths) are justified to achieve
              the "noble" cause of elimination or, at least, "containment" of the dictator.

              Deliberate fragmentation of the issue into various elements, de-linking those
              elements, and finally focusing on one or two of them easily leads to elusive
              solutions that bypass fundamental problems, and thus justification of the
              criminal genocide against the people of Iraq. Moreover, this approach serves
              as intimidation to those who oppose US policies and stand to be labeled
              pro-Saddam. The goal of "eliminating weapons of mass destruction" in Iraq
              used to maintain and prolong sanctions, and to compromise the sovereignty of
              Iraq appeals to many. Linkage to regional realities, notably Israel’s possession
              of a significant nuclear, chemical and biological weapons arsenal, is not
              permissible according to the atomistic, no-linkage approach. Thus the upper
              limit of justifiable opposition to sanctions is centered on humanitarian
              dimensions of the complex tragedy. Conveniently, the issue becomes no more
              than a matter of improving the management of the Iraq humanitarian
              programme, the Oil for Food Programmeme cum "smart sanctions" or
              "humanized sanctions."

              In spite of the humanitarian pretense of US officials and their global media
              allies, ordinary people in Egypt and the rest of the Arab World fully realize
              that the US government, well served by Israel, its regional surrogate, is the
              real threat. They are well aware that their weak governments are submitting to
              the US’ dictates. The US/UK military strikes of December 1998 sparked
              massive demonstrations throughout the Arab World, in spite of repressive
              regimes’ efforts at containment. Also outside the Arab region, progressive
              forces are well aware of the true objectives of sanctions and military strikes on
              Iraq. The Columbus exemplifies this, Ohio meeting when anti-war/sanctions
              protesters confronted the trio of Cohen, Albright and Burger, representing the
              US administration.

              Holistic analysis allows us to relate what is happening in Iraq to sanctions and
              military strikes against Yugoslavia, the decades long embargo imposed on
              Cuba, and the punishment of Libya and Sudan, among other non-compliant
              sovereign nations. Placing the case of Iraq in its broader historical and regional
              contexts illuminates the connection between the purposeful
              destruction/de-development of this Arab country and the Middle East Project
              (the Israel-centered regional variant of globalization, NAFTA style). More
              generally, such conceptualization reveals the relationship between the selective
              demonization of the Iraqi regime and the process of consolidation of US
              global hegemony, now under popular challenge, as demonstrated by the
              emerging anti-WTO movement.

              Against the foregoing background a discussion of the functions and limitations
              of the Oil for Food Programmeme (OFFP) becomes more meaningful. In this
              paper I will provide an account of the OFFP based on documented
              information as well as my experience. As a former head of the observation
              team of the UN World Food Programmeme (WFP) in Iraq for over a year at
              the beginning of OFFP, from March 1997 until May 1998, I had the
              opportunity to gain first hand knowledge of various facets of the
              programmeme. This includes: the efficiency of food distribution, questions
              related to adequacy, nutritional status of children, work atmosphere, concepts
              guiding the programmeme, inherent and deliberate obstacles that hindered the
              programme and limitations and its achievements. A brief assessment of OFFP,
              its achievements and limitations, the genocidal impact of sanctions on the Iraqi
              people, in particular the latest UNICEF report and the ensuing media reaction,
              will also be given.

              OFFP Observation System

              The UN established the observation system in order to assess the equitability
              and the efficiency of distribution of food and other humanitarian items
              (medical, educational, agricultural, etc.). The "three-tier" system was based
              clearly on the suspicion that the government of Iraq (GOI) would divert items
              purchased under the programmeme for its own purposes and would therefore
              deprive segments of the society from these necessary items. Accordingly, a
              costly and redundant observation system consisting of Sectoral observers
              administered by various UN agencies (WFP, WHO, FAO, UNICEF,
              UNESCO, UNDP etc.…), Geographic observers (managed directly by
              UNOHCI - the UN Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq) and
              multi-disciplinary observers were designed to expose the presumed deceit and
              manipulation of the government. It is indeed ironic that after nearly three years
              of OFFP implementation the redundancy of the observation system is still
              maintained at the same level even though it is evident that distribution is both
              equitable and efficient.

              It is noteworthy that 30% of the proceeds of oil sales go to a compensation
              fund; thus, in effect, only 66 cents of each dollar of Iraqi oil sales go towards
              the purchase of the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people. One of the main
              tasks of WFP was to follow food distribution administered by the GOI in the
              15 governorates in the Center and South. WFP responsibilities also included
              management of the warehouses and the actual distribution of food in the three
              northern governorates. Regular weekly visits were made to the distribution
              warehouses, silos and mills in each governorate. WFP also conducted food
              agent and household surveys which were based on a randomly selected
              sample with a small margin of error. All the data were stored and computer
              analyzed. Conclusions thus obtained are valid and difficult to dispute especially
              that the entire methodology was explicitly stated and subject to scrutiny by
              independent UN missions. It has been clearly demonstrated that food is
              distributed efficiently and equitably; this is well recognized by UN officials.

              Obstacles Facing OFFP

              The fact that the GOI has been distributing food equitably and efficiently does
              not mean that the Iraqi people obtained their full ration as stipulated by the
              Programmeme. It became clear early on that delays in food deliveries from
              abroad constitute one of the main obstacles to the Programmeme. High
              expectations of the people were quickly transformed to frustration because the
              distributed monthly ration was consistently incomplete due to delays of arrival
              in Iraq. This was even more so for most other items such as agricultural and
              medical supplies. Our data analysis team calculated the average approval time
              by the 661 Sanction Committee (using the Committee’s own records of
              submission dates of food contracts by the GOI and their approval dates). It
              turned out that such an average was 66 days from the start of the Programme
              until October 1997. It took another 59 days on the average for arrival at entry
              points in Iraq. By comparison, WFP observation records showed an average
              of one week for internal food distribution to the various warehouses located in
              governorates of the Center and South.

              The reporting of this information was not well received by some UN officials
              in New York because it put the blame of erratic and incomplete delivery of
              the food ration to the desperately awaiting Iraqi people squarely on the
              shoulder of the Sanctions Committee. In fact, out of the first 22 months of the
              Programme, the food basket was incomplete for fourteen months providing an
              average of 1854 Kcal per person instead of the planned 2030 Kcal. This is in
              spite of the fact that the GOI partially supplemented the ration from its own
              strategic supplies. The Committee also rejected some food contracts such as
              sugar from Sudan and rice from Vietnam, with no reasons given.

              While the situation has improved as far as food contracts are concerned, long
              approval delays by the Sanctions Committee continued for other items such as
              medicines and agricultural inputs. Delays in delivery of seeds sometimes meant
              missing the entire cultivation season. Approving only part of interdependent
              contracts in the category of medical supplies meant an inability to use them
              until other necessary components were approved and delivered. In the
              meantime the GOI was accused publicly and in UN humanitarian reports of
              not distributing badly needed medical supplies and allowing their accumulation
              in warehouses. In reality delays resulted from a multitude of factors among
              which is the lack of special delivery trucks and adequate testing facilities. An
              inescapable conclusion reached by UN staff in Iraq was that in spite of all their
              efforts to achieve the inherently limited objectives of the Programme there
              were those who were deliberately hindering it.

              One should point out that while the monthly food ration represented a definite
              improvement (2030 Kcal) over the ration that was provided by the GOI prior
              to the programme (1372, 1705, 1093 and 1297 Kcal in 1991, 1993, 1995
              and 1996, respectively) it remained nutritionally incomplete. The theoretical
              ration covered only partially the recommended daily requirements for Calcium
              (13%), iron (69%), some vitamins (no vitamin C) and minerals; no animal
              protein was provided. These figures apply to the ration in the early phases and
              still remain generally true. Needless to say that for the vast majority of the
              Iraqis fresh vegetables and fruits, as well meat, are not accessible because of
              hyperinflation. The most vulnerable families, lacking any additional resources
              sometimes had to sell portions of their ration to meet emergency requirements,
              for example medicines. One must stress also that meager funds allotted for
              Agriculture, Medicine and Education, particularly in the early phases of the
              programme, hardly meet the needs of a country whose infrastructure has been
              deliberately destroyed by the war, and continuous (almost daily) military
              strikes by the US and the UK.

              OFFP: A Humanitarian Programme With a Small "h" or With a Capital
              "H"?

              From the very beginning of the programme there were divergent views
              regarding the nature of the OFFP. Some top UN officials characterized it as a
              sanctions regime; others diminished its humanitarian nature by emphasizing that
              it is only humanitarian with a small "h." There were others who insisted on its
              humanitarian objectives, quoting security council resolution (SCR) 986:
              "convinced of the need as a temporary measure to provide for the
              humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people…." and emphasizing the fact that
              OFFP is not an aid programme but rather a vehicle to allow the Iraqi people
              to use part of their own resources.

              In some cases attempts were made by high UN officials to change the
              cumulative report based on inputs from all UN agencies in Baghdad in
              November 1997 to give it a different twist. It must be stressed that the report
              presented findings based on international observers’ visits, on the ground, all
              over Iraq, and on spot check surveys. At that time under the leadership of
              Denis Halliday, discussions during the preparation of the second 180-day
              report brought into question the concept of adequacy. Does adequacy mean
              the prevention of further deterioration and thus maintaining the status quo
              (which means excessive child mortality rates, contaminated water, improper
              sanitation, etc.…), or does it mean a reversal of a dire situation resulting from
              war and several years of sanctions? The conclusion favored the latter so the
              recommendation was made to double the amount of sales of Iraqi oil so that
              $4 billion of revenue would be generated every six months.

              A high UN official came to Baghdad after the preliminary report was sent to
              NY. He clearly attempted to pressure the UN staff in Iraq to modify the
              report. At that time the US was strongly objecting to any increase in the
              amount of permitted oil sales. In a meeting of the heads of the UN agencies in
              Baghdad the UN official from New York failed to change their
              recommendations, which were based on concrete evidence. At this point I
              made it clear to the UN New York official as well as to the Humanitarian
              Coordinator, that I would resign and expose the truth if our findings are
              modified and our recommendations deleted from the report. This report would
              eventually be submitted by the UN Secretary General for action by the
              Security Council. These developments may give some indication of the
              dynamics and the working of the OFFP, and point to the reality of power
              politics within the UN itself, including its humanitarian programmes.

              Malicious Reports

              The politically charged atmosphere was periodically heightened by accusations
              that the GOI is manipulating the Programme for its own purposes, delaying
              deliveries of humanitarian items, pocketing the money collected to cover
              internal transportation costs, depriving certain Iraqis’ from receiving their
              rations and requiring lengthy steps for ration collection registration. Those
              accusations appeared in a report written by B.J. Stapleton entitled Security
              Council Resolution 986: A Disaster Waiting To Be Contained. In the
              report inaccurate figures were given regarding the cost of the ration paid by
              each recipient to cover local transportation (around 0.075 $ in 1997) and the
              allegation was made that these meager amounts are "financially benefiting
              GOI." More important are the periodic reports by the UN Special Rapporteur
              (SR) of the Commission on Human Rights, Max van der Stoel. The latter
              reports are of critical importance due to the fact that the UN had to certify that
              Iraq’s human right situation has improved. I will limit my remarks to those
              sections pertaining to OFFP. In the report dated 24 September under the
              section entitled "The rights to food and health care" the report states, "whereas
              hitherto private pharmacies in Baghdad had received 32.9 of (medical)
              supplies for approximately 29 per cent of the Iraqi population, this has now
              increased to 40 per cent." The report goes on to state that "….. the GOI has
              persistently failed to act to the maximum of its available resources…to respect
              and ensure the rights to food and health care…" Taking the SR ‘s figures at
              face value, the asymmetry in the distribution of medicines in favor of Baghdad
              (the capital which serves more than its resident population) is hardly unique to
              Iraq. Any objective observer would acknowledge that probably there is no
              country in the world where food is distributed as equitably as in Iraq. This
              certainly includes the US, the richest country in the world, which has
              thousands of homeless people, and millions of its own citizens deprived of
              health benefits.

              The SR’s report states in paragraph 43 that "Insofar as the ‘oil for food’
              programme has been implemented in a discriminatory and not fully equitable
              or efficient manner, the Special Rapporteur observes that the Government of
              Iraq is solely responsible for distribution programme." Moreover he states in
              paragraph 47 regret "that the situation remains precarious notwithstanding the
              availability of significant resources pursuant to the enlarged ‘oil for food’
              programme. In this respect, the Government of Iraq bears primary
              responsibility for the continuing suffering of the Iraqi people." One cannot help
              but deduce that the SR intended to reach his conclusions regardless of the
              facts in order to rationalize the continuation of sanctions on Iraq. The grossly
              inaccurate statements conceal the reality that the delays in approving contracts
              by the Sanctions Committee is the primary cause for the slow and incomplete
              deliveries of humanitarian items. Moreover they contradict the observations
              and the aggregate experience of all UN agencies in Iraq over a long period. It
              will suffice to mention the written comments by Prakash Shah, the Special
              Envoy of the Secretary- General to Iraq: " Even though the Rapporteur puts
              the blame solely on the Government of Iraq, the implication is that UN,
              UNOHCI and OIP are all collaborating, or at least turning a blind eye to this
              "discriminatory", inequitable and inefficient implementation and thereby are
              parties to human rights violations. I wonder if Special Rapporteur even
              consulted UNOHCI or the Coordinator on the matter before pronouncing his
              judgment." Furthermore, Mr. van der Stoel’s statements contradict those of
              Kofi Annan in the SG’s latest report of August 1999: "Overall, the
              Government has distributed these supplies(referring to food) efficiently to
              registered beneficiaries." With the demonstrated bias of the Rapporteur in
              relation to food distribution, how can we give credibility to his other allegations
              of human rights violations? This does not mean that human rights violations do
              not occur. In my long experience as a human rights activist in the Arab World
              I well recognize how inaccuracies and exaggerations in reporting human rights
              violations are detrimental to the cause of human right.

              Dual usage: A Concealed Obstacle to Human Rights

              A main obstacle to the Programme relates to the concept of dual usage. Items
              that can have both civilian and military usage are banned; therefore Iraq
              cannot import them. On this basis the GOI’s request of pencils, school buses,
              ambulances, some medicines and numerous badly needed commonly used
              items have been denied. Clearly the concept of dual usage, which presumably
              is intended to prevent Iraq from getting military items, is used to justify
              withholding basic humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people. In a UN statement
              of January 1998 from Baghdad during the process review of Implementation
              of SCR 986 it was stated that "The over stretched definition of "dual-use
              items" served as yet another stumbling block for the approval of many vital
              items. This factor immensely compounded the problems when the holding of a
              "dual-use item" rendered useless a whole range (of) other inter-related and
              complementary items………But, we cannot help express surprise at the
              inverted logic that the very meager quantities of nitro (heart) tablets would not
              be approved for they might be used as raw material to manufacture bombs!!
              Need one explain that the total quantity of nitro ordered by Iraq is barely
              sufficient for producing a hand grenade…."?

              Iraq’s Children are Dying: The UNICEF 1999 Report

              Last July, UNICEF published a report based on its Child and Maternal
              Mortality Survey. Child mortality is a critical measure of the well being of
              children. The significance of the report lies in the fact that it is the first
              comprehensive account of the subject since 1991.The report indicates,
              quantitatively, the excess deaths of children since the Gulf War and the
              imposition of sanctions .The size of the random sample, approximately 24,000
              in the Center and South of Iraq and 16000 in the North of Iraq, insures a
              small margin of error. The report shows that in the Center and South the rate
              of mortality for children under the age of 5 (U5MR) has more than doubled,
              compared to ten years ago, i.e., before the war and sanctions. It increased
              from 56 (deaths per one thousand live births) in 1984-1989 to 131 in
              1994-1999. Likewise, the Infant mortality rate (children deaths in their first
              year) has increased from 47 to 108 within the same time frame. The report
              shows that in the North the U5MR increased from 80 in 1984-1989 to 89.5
              in 1989-1994 and then decreased to about 72 in 1994-1999.

              According to the UNICEF report, the combined data for the whole of Iraq
              shows that if the rapid decline in U5MR had continued through the 1990’s the
              rate would have been around 30 per 1000 live births; the actual mortality rate
              is around 130. Commenting on the report, UNICEF’s Executive Director,
              Carol Bellamy, stated that "If the substantial reduction in Child Mortality
              throughout Iraq during 1980’s had continued through the 1990’s, there would
              have been half a million fewer deaths of children under five in the country as a
              whole during the eight year period 1991-1998." UNICEF also quoted the
              March 1999 UN Security Council’s Panel on Humanitarian Issues, which
              concluded: "Even if not all the suffering in Iraq can be imputed to external
              factors, specially sanctions, the Iraqi people would not be undergoing such
              deprivations in the absence of prolonged measured imposed by the Security
              Council and the effects of war." In the accompanying figure taken from the
              report I have shaded the area that represents those children that died, I call
              this area the Zone Of Death.

              Kofi Annan Report 1999

              In the SG’s report of 1999, Kofi Annan appealed "to the council to request
              the security council committee to proceed expeditiously in its consideration
              and approval of applications for oil spare parts and equipment submitted….
              and to review further all applications placed on hold" He continued to state
              that he "remained convinced that more can be done…through expedited
              implementation of targeted nutrition programmes and expeditious approval by
              the Security Council Committee of applications in water and sanitation and
              other key sectors such as health, which have a direct bearing on the
              unacceptably high malnutrition levels." The SG welcomed the cooperation of
              the GOI on several points but he also urged the Government to do more, for
              example with regard to the foot and mouth epidemic and procuring better
              quality commodities through more reliable and reputable contractors. More
              fundamentally, the SG stated in the report that "… resolution 986 (1995) was
              never intended to meet all the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people,"
              Although left unelaborated by the SG his statement contradicts the charter of
              the UN which he represents, together with several UN conventions of human
              rights including, for example, the Convention of the Rights of the Child and the
              Genocide Convention. This underlines the duality of the UN’s role towards
              Iraq. On the one hand the UN imposes sanctions, latest report: "There has
              been a significant increase in the number of holds being placed (by members
              of the UN Sanctions Committee) on applications" for humanitarian supplies,
              with serious implications for the implementation of the humanitarian
              programme." In this regard it is important to point out that most of these holds
              are related to the rehabilitation of the infrastructure destroyed deliberately,
              mainly by the US and the UK military. It is also worth recalling the story of the
              ‘Iraqi soldiers snatching infants from hospital incubators and leaving them on
              the floor to die" recited by the Kuwaiti girl crying in front of the TV cameras
              while testifying before (the U.S.) Congress, under the watchful eyes of her
              father, Kuwait’s Ambassador to the US. A U.S. public relations firm, Hill and
              Knowlton, fabricated the entire story, which caused tremendous damage at a
              critical time when many in the US were opposing the war. Here I am
              reminded of a statement by George Orwell: "at a time of universal deceit telling
              the truth is a revolutionary act." It is accurate to state that the manipulation of
              news in the age of global media or Spin, in short, has indeed become an
              effective weapon of Mass Deceit.

              Degrading the will of the Iraqi Population

              It is revealing to refer to a US government report issued by the General
              Accounting Office (GAO/NSIAD-(95-116) 04/20/95). This report entitled,
              Cruise Missiles: Proven Capability" clearly identifies "Five basic categories
              of target -command and control, industrial production, infrastructure,
              population will, and fielded forces-were encompassed in the plan." The report
              goes on to state, "Attacks on targets such as television and radio stations and
              electrical power generation and distribution facilities would degrade the will of
              the civilian population (emphasis added)." Another equally important report,
              posted on the GulfLink web site (950901_511rept_91.txt), is that entitled
              Iraq Water Treatment Vulnerabilities (dated January 1991). The report
              states that: "1. Iraq depends on importing specialized equipment and some
              chemicals to purify its water supply... 2.With no domestic sources of both
              water treatment replacement parts and some essential chemicals, Iraq will
              continue attempts to circumvent United Nations sanctions to import these vital
              commodities. 3. Failing to secure supplies will result in a shortage of pure
              drinking water for much of the population. This could lead to increased
              incidences, if not epidemics, or disease and to certain pure-water dependent
              industries becoming incapacitated…11. Iraq’s rivers also contain biological
              materials, pollutants, and are laden with bacteria. Unless water is purified with
              chlorine epidemics of such diseases as cholera, hepatitis, and typhoid could
              occur." All these predictions, and more, have been realized. It is not necessary
              to make any further comments; the official U.S. reports are self-explanatory
              and are consistent with the US’s declared intentions to bomb Iraq to the
              pre-industrial age. It follows that consideration of vital items such as chlorine
              (which is essential to purify drinking water) would be considered a "dual
              usage" item, consistent with the basic motivations behind imposition of
              prolonged sanctions. So much for US Presidents’ claims that they care for the
              Iraqi people and that they have no quarrel with them.

              This article is based on a presentation at the November 1999 International
              Conference Interventionism Against International Law: From Iraq to
              Yugoslavia. Recourse to Economic Sanctions and War in the ‘New World
              Order’. Madrid, Spain