The Trap That Suits Saddam--and the U.S.
By Warren P. Strobel and Kevin Whitelaw
Sunday , September 24, 2000 ; B01
In the northern Iraqi city of Irbil, greengrocer Muhammad Hadi offers
political analysis along with the bananas, grapes and cucumbers
that cascade from his sidewalk cart. Leaders in far-off Washington
"want Saddam Hussein to remain in power," he says matter-of-
factly. "This is good for their interests." It's a conspiracy theory
that's common in Iraq's souks, which makes it tempting to
dismiss. Yet there is a germ of truth in what Hadi says.
On a trip to Iraq, during which we had unusual access from the
Kurdish enclave in the north to the Persian Gulf coast in the south,
we became convinced of a dirty little secret about U.S. policy
toward Iraq: The status quo suits all parties concerned, thank you
very much. All parties, that is, except the vast majority of Iraq's 23
million people. But unfortunately for the United States, hewing to
the status quo could have disastrous unintended consequences as
well.
Both inside the Clinton administration and in Baghdad, there is a
lot of Sturm und Drang about the possibility of an election-year
confrontation. (It was four years ago this fall that Saddam Hussein
struck against the Kurds, demolishing a CIA-funded opposition
effort and prompting an ineffective missile strike from Washington.)
Earlier this month, Hussein's usual bluster was punctuated with
incursions by Iraqi jets into Saudi Arabia, and his charges that
Kuwait is stealing Iraq's oil are eerily reminiscent of 1990.
Washington has mobilized a Patriot missile defense unit for quick
dispatch to Israel and issued the now-standard warnings to the
Mustachioed One.
A new crisis is always possible. Hussein's craving for the limelight
is second only to his survival instinct. But behind the headlines, an
odd balance has settled over the standoff between Baghdad and
Washington--a sort of codependency now entering its second
decade. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright underscored this
when she announced 10 days ago that the Clinton administration
would not use force to compel Hussein to accept the return of U.N.
weapons inspectors. We can almost see Hadi nodding his head.
>From the viewpoint of all the major players, at least in the short
term, there is much to like about the current stalemate.
Consider the Iraqi leader. It's not news that the 10-year-old U.N.
sanctions on Iraq, which have done such damage to Iraqi society,
no longer seem to threaten his grip on power. But we were
surprised to discover just how much the sanctions are helping
Hussein. He would be happy to see an end to the embargo. But in
the meantime, with oil prices at their highest in a decade, he and
his supporters have come to rely on oil smuggling for their
skyrocketing wealth.
On a driving tour of the Iraqi capital, we were amazed at the Beverly
Hills-style mansions rising in the fashionable Mansour district. (No
pictures, please; too many VIPs, our ever-present "minders" from
the Ministry of Information warned us.) Walking past sparkling new
stores with cosmetics, jet skis and high-tech televisions piled high,
we saw how comfortable life has become for Hussein and his
sycophants. "You can get anything you want here if you can afford
it," says George Sommerwill, the U.N. spokesman in Baghdad.
For the perpetually neglected Kurdish minority, times are also
good. The same sanctions regime, along with the four-year-old
U.N. program that allows Iraq to sell oil to purchase food and
medicines, has, ironically, made the Kurdish areas in the north
more stable and prosperous than in decades. That's because Hadi
and 3.5 million other Kurds get a 13-percent cut of oil-for-food
revenues. They also have come to rely on a brisk oil smuggling
business across the Turkish border. Tanker trucks line up by the
hundreds to enter Iraq and fill up with the illegal export. "It's our
share!" our local guide insisted when asked whether the oil is legal
under U.N. sanctions. The Kurds also "tax" the goods that illegally
enter Iraq from Turkey. With aid workers building schools and
hospitals, and American jets patrolling the skies above northern
Iraq, the Kurds are not about to be on the leading edge of another
risky effort to overthrow Hussein.
And for the Clinton administration? Oil-for-food has muted some of
the international condemnation of the United States for the
sanctions. More importantly for the White House, it can claim to
have kept Hussein "in his box." This neutralizes what could
otherwise be an election-year hazard for Vice President Gore.
Despite occasional criticism that the administration's Iraq policy is
on autopilot, Clinton and his top aides are relieved to be beyond the
cycle of crises over weapons inspections that led to the Operation
Desert Fox bombing campaign in December 1998. This explains
Albright's having ruled out the use of force. With the Iraqi military
weakened by the sanctions and Hussein at least appearing to be
contained, senior U.S. policymakers can more comfortably ignore
Iraq and focus on other crises.
Prolonging the current policy of sanctions also helps appease a
Congress that in 1998 funded Iraqi opposition groups attempting to
overthrow Hussein. But despite isolated outbreaks of revolt over the
last two years, the Iraqi internal security services are thriving and
the regime's confidence is high. It seems every police car is a
brand-new Hyundai, and Hussein's soldiers sport crisp, new
uniforms. As American journalists, we feared the authorities would
sequester us in Baghdad, but within two days of our arrival we each
received permission to travel all around Iraq for a week before
returning to Baghdad. (Of course, we were always accompanied by
our minders. Sometimes, it seemed, even the minders had
minders.)
After interviews with several government officials, we quickly began
to understand just how confident and self-satisfied Hussein is
these days. A.K. Hashimi is a veteran regime figure, given to
bombast, and often trotted out to feed the government line to
visiting journalists. "Our situation is much better than it was a year
ago," he told us. "We are breathing better." Perhaps realizing he
had gone too far (in official Iraqi propaganda, after all, the sanctions
are supposed to be devastating), he clammed up and refused to
elaborate. Iraq's deputy oil minister even bragged about how
sanctions have been good for the oil industry in certain ways,
having forced Iraqis to develop a domestic capability rather than
rely on foreign oil firms.
The status quo might be the policy path of least resistance for
Washington, but the long-term costs for all sides are great--and
growing. Because Iraq has become so isolated, most of these are
invisible to Americans. Sanctions have decimated the middle class-
-usually the source of leaders who might challenge the government.
Iraqi schools are crumbling--UNICEF says up to half are unfit for
learning. Iraqis have just suffered through their hottest and driest
summer in recent memory--temperatures regularly topped 120
degrees--with daily power cuts in most of the country. (We did
notice, however, that certain privileged parts of Baghdad, and
Hussein's palaces, never seemed to go dark.) While food is more
plentiful these days, child mortality remains dangerously high.
Many people have sold their household belongings just to get by.
We met a man wearing 17-year-old trousers and children clad in
shredded shirts.
Life is toughest on the young, who are often obliged to drop out of
school to help their families. "There are no dreams anymore," said
Jassan Abdul-Hassan, 23, a shop clerk playing soccer on a pebble-
strewn dirt field in the seething slum of Saddam City on the
outskirts of Baghdad. A desperately poor enclave of 2 million, this
was the only place our minders grew visibly nervous the longer we
stayed. Journalists, they told us, have been pelted with rotten fruit
in the past. But we wondered whether our minders' true concern
was that we might find in Saddam City the roots of real anti-
government sentiment.
For now, the peoples' anger is directed at Washington. But current
U.S. policy risks producing an entire generation of Iraqis who hate
not just the government but the American people. "America is
sowing the seeds of hatred and one day it will harvest them," Sa'ad
Jassim, a resident of the southern city of Basra, said while playing
a game of backgammon.
U.S. officials argue that Hussein is to blame for most of the
hardship. He is spending money to build palaces, government
buildings and one of the largest mosques in the Middle East, while
failing to construct schools or hospitals. True, but it is the
sanctions, which the United States spearheaded, that permit such
manipulation. They give Iraq's leader the perfect excuse to neglect
his people. In effect, Washington has made itself the scapegoat for
all of Iraq's problems. And while many Iraqis listen to non-state
media like the Voice of America, they still blame the United
States. Even away from our minders' prying ears, the most Iraqis
would admit is that Hussein shares blame with the United States.
"It takes two to tango," one retired civil servant told us Dprivately.
Another frightening consequence of the status quo is a steady
erosion in respect for the sanctions internationally, and with it the
persuasive powers of the U.N. and the United States. Visits to
Baghdad like that of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez show how
tattered is the effort to isolate Hussein. We competed for rooms at
our gloomy Baghdad hotel with Yugoslav and Pakistani
businessmen. Iraqi entrepreneurs are traveling abroad to sign deals
to import and distribute foreign goods, and even Gulf oil sheikdoms
have reopened embassies to facilitate trade.
If the United States really wanted to make life difficult for Hussein,
it would take one simple, if politically risky, step: Lift the sanctions
on all but military items. This would restore morality to U.S. policy.
More importantly, Iraqis would suddenly have only Hussein to
blame for the country's decrepit hospitals, schools and
infrastructure. He would claim victory in the short-term, but would
quickly find it difficult to deliver on all the promises of a better life
once sanctions are lifted. (Remember, according to Iraqi
propaganda, the sanctions are to blame for every ill, from the
drought to the national soccer team's recent listless performance.)
Iraqis remember a much better, more prosperous life and will
expect real improvements immediately.
Hussein also would have a serious problem satisfying the financial
demands of the military, the government bureaucracy, his cronies
and the religious community he has come to depend upon for
support. The resulting competition would put new strains on the
regime, which could quickly be beset by serious infighting. Such
internal conflict could finally produce enough of a split to spawn
some credible high-level opposition inside Iraq.
Despite its campaign to end sanctions, the Iraqi government is ill-
prepared for change. Power stations cannot supply both homes
and factories. At the main port south of Basra, only 5 percent of
the floodlights work and fewer than one in five loading cranes is
operational. The University of Basra's medical school is turning out
half the doctors it did before the Persian Gulf War. The state's
financial system is in a shambles. While the exchange rate is
about 2,000 dinars to the dollar, the largest bill is a 250-dinar note.
That means that an inch-thick stack of bills is worth less than $25,
hardly a sound basis for healthy trade.
To check out of our hotel before the overland trip back to Jordan
took two shopping bags full of local currency. Each of the roughly
8,000 purplish notes bore Saddam's image, an inescapable part of
Iraq's landscape. Unless Clinton or his successor reexamines the
status quo of sanctions, Hussein's image may be on the currency
for a long time to come.
Warren Strobel and Kevin Whitelaw cover international affairs for
U.S. News & World Report. They recently returned from a two-
week reporting trip to 15 of Iraq's 18 provinces.