Thursday, September 28, 2000
Remembering Iran-Iraq war
 by Dr Iffat S Malik

              On September 22, 1980 armoured Iraqi divisions crossed the border with
              Iran, and moved on towards Khoramshar and Abadan on the
              Shat-al-Arab shores. That crossing started the Iran-Iraq War, a conflict
              that was to go on for eight years and prove the bloodiest since World
              War II. Two decades on its devastating effects are still being felt in both
              countries. Nonetheless it is a good point at which to look back and take
              stock.

              What caused the first Gulf War? A number of factors, some dating far
              back but most having their origin in the previous year's tumultuous
              Islamic Revolution. The replacement of the Pahlavi dynastic rule in Iran
              with a clerical government headed by Ayatollah Khomeini had a profound
              effect on Tehran's relations across the globe.

              From being America's most reliable ally in the region, Iran became its
              implacable foe. From being a source of stability for the Gulf states,
              it--and particularly its exportable revolution--became a very real threat
              to their security. And from being on good terms with its western
              neighbour, it became a very vocal opponent of the Saddam Hussein-led
              Baathist government in Baghdad.

              Iraq had more reason than any other country to fear the contagious
              spread of the Iranian revolution. As Iran's immediate neighbour, and with
              a 60% majority Shi'a population, it might even have appeared inevitable
              that it would succumb next. Khomeini's denouncement of Saddam
              Hussein as secularist, pro-western and worse can hardly have reassured
              the Iraqi leader. There was the added problem of Kurdish separatism.
              Kurds in Iran had taken advantage of the upheaval in the country to
              restart a militant insurgency against the government. Having its own far
              from submissive Kurdish population, Iraq also feared catching the
              insurgency bug from its neighbour.

              However, these legitimate security concerns cannot alone account for or
              justify the Iraqi action in September 1980. Iraqi Shi'as showed little
              inclination to follow their sectarian brothers across the border, while the
              considerable measure of self-rule granted to Iraqi Kurds by Baghdad had
              generally dissuaded them from rebellion. No, it would be more accurate
              to say that the concerns generated by the Iranian Revolution were a
              pretext for Iraq to address a longerstanding issue with its neighbour:
              sovereignty of the Shat al-Arab waterway.

              This was not actually disputed when the Revolution occurred because
              Saddam Hussein and the Shah had signed the Algiers Agreement in 1975,
              resolving sovereignty of the waterway, as well as that of three Gulf
              islands occupied by Iran in 1971 and some contested boundaries. The
              two parties had generally come out even in that deal. However, five
              years on and with the new Islamic government in Tehran battling
              domestic and international foes simultaneously, the Iraqi leader felt he
              had an excellent opportunity to forcibly improve on Iraq's share.

              For awhile he seemed to be succeeding: the invasion caught Iran
              off-guard and it took time for it to get a counter-offensive underway.
              During that period the Iraqis were able to take a 35-40 mile deep stretch
              of land that included the vital city of Khoramshah. However, having
              achieved only 30-40% of the territorial gains they had set themselves
              when invading Iran, the Iraqi war machine got bogged down. Its failure
              to advance further was due among other things to a spirited Iranian
              resistance (the war was of course projected as a jihad in Iran),
              underestimation of the difficulties in capturing cities like Abadan, and
              over-dependence on Kurdish, Arab Iranian and other insurrections
              against Tehran.

              Within two years the Iranians had recaptured Khoramshah and most of
              the other territory seized by Iraq. From then until 1988 when the war
              ended, the two sides were engaged in a futile struggle in which neither
              could overcome the other but in which hundreds of thousands lost their
              lives trying. Having waged war with the slogan 'war until victory,' the
              clerics in Iran in particular found their room for manoeuvre (ie, to back
              down) highly limited. Eventually, however, the heavy toll being taken by
              the conflict forced them to accept Security Council Resolution 598
              calling for a ceasefire. Fighting ended with neither side having made any
              real gains.

              The losses, by contrast, were very real and very substantial. As well as
              the hundreds of thousands killed, there were as many injured or disabled.
              A whole generation of women was widowed. Many thousands of families
              were displaced or made homeless. That was just the human cost. The
              material cost of the war--running into billions of dollars--drained the two
              countries' economies. Both Iran and Iraq emerged from it financially,
              militarily and as a people in much much worse shape than they entered
              it.

              Twelve years since the end of the Iran-Iraq war, the development of the
              two former protagonists could hardly have been more different. Taking
              Iran first, the war--specifically the massive debilitation it
              caused--prompted a major rethink in the country's foreign policy and
              overall priorities. Exporting the revolution was pushed onto the
              back-burner, to be replaced by economic and military rebuilding.

              Furthermore, the new leadership in Tehran (Khomeini conveniently
              passed away just after the war ended) appreciated that this rebuilding
              could only come about if Iran worked with the international and, even
              more so, regional community, rather than against them as it had been
              doing. Hence instead of the old denunciations of Gulf rulers as 'American
              puppets', 'corrupt' and 'unIslamic', one now heard calls for regional peace
              and co-operation. To a large extent Iran has managed to reintegrate
              itself into the international community.

              It has established good relations with most of its regional neighbours, is
              making steady progress with the European countries and even seems to
              be entering into a mutual tolerance and respect relationship with the US.
              There have of course been blips along the way--the Salman Rushdie
              fatwa, the US' dual containment policy and identification of Islam as the
              new enemy. But overall Iran is strengthening economically and militarily
              and is on course to become a regional power again.

              Saddam Hussein, by contrast, appeared to have learnt nothing from his
              aggression in Iran, for two years after the end of war with that
              neighbour he had invaded another. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the
              subsequent US-led attack, Iraq's defeat, the imposition of sanctions etc,
              are all recent events with which most readers will be familiar. Their end
              result is that Iraq today is a country ostracised by the international
              community; having third world (or worse) levels of healthcare,
              widespread unemployment and economic collapse; and, most
              unfortunate of all, with Saddam Hussein still at the helm. While he
              remains in power, it is difficult to see how Iraq will be able to emulate
              Iran's recovery.

              So, what are the lessons of the Iran-Iraq war, other than the obvious
              'aggression does not pay'? One could point to several: the need for some
              sort of regional security arrangement, better conflict resolution, more
              effective UN involvement, etc. Perhaps the biggest lesson, however,
              bearing in mind that this was a war between two Muslim neighbours, one
              of whom proudly claimed to be an Islamic state, is for the Muslim world.
              More specifically for those in it seeking to follow Iran's lead and bring
              Islam to the fore in government and politics.

              The lesson is that while it might be possible to follow Islam in domestic
              internal issues, implementing an 'Islamic' foreign policy will be much
              harder. For, as the Iran-Iraq War and our own in 1971 showed, when the
              bonds of religion are in competition with those of nationalism, it is the
              latter that win out. In view of this, one has to question whether the
              concept of a single global ummah still has any relevance.