Some distorsions in Eunapius' account of Julian the Apostate

di David F. Buck

The Ancient History Bulletin, 4/5 (1990), pp. 113-115

Although Eunapius of Sardis is an important source for the history of the fourth and early fifth centuries A.D., his veracity is not beyond question. He was a pagan propagandist, not an objective historian, whose Histories attempted to prove that the decline of the Roman Empire was a consequence of its turning away from the gods. Thus the hero of the Histories was Julian the Apostate and the principal villains were Constantine and Theodosius the Great.¹ A recent study has demonstrated that what Eunapius wrote about Theodosius the Great was historical fiction, the purpose of which was to denigrate the emperor's character and deeds.² It is reasonable to suppose, then, that Eunapius took liberties with Julian's reign in order to present his hero in the best possible light. This article will examine five such cases.

The first example is Julian's treatment of the Salii in 358. According to Eunapius (fr. 10) and his epitomator, Zosimus (III, 6.1-3),³ Julian was a model of clemency and statesmanship. Realizing that the Salii had only entered Roman territory because they were retreating from the Quadi, Julian ordered his troops not to kill any, but to allow them free passage. The Salii were suitably grateful. Ammianus Marcellinus relates a rather different version (XVII, 8.3-4). Pressed by the Quadi, the Salii offered peace to Julian who negotiated with them. However, as soon as their envoys had left, Julian attacked the Salii, defeated them and accepted their surrender. Libanius, for his part, says that Julian frightened the Salii so badly that they asked permission to migrate into the empire, which he allowed them to do (Or. XVIII.75).

Although F. Paschoud⁴ follows L. Mendelssohn⁵ in preferring Zosimus' account, Ammianus' version is likely the true one because it is the least favourable to Julian. Given the verbal echoes tamquam fulminis turbo (XVIII, 8.4) and άστράψας (Or. XVIII.75), it appears that Libanius used the same source as Ammianus, but glossed over Julian's treacherous attack on the Salii. Eunapius, on the other hand, suppressed it completely and composed a rhetorical portrait of a magnanimous philosopher-king.

The second example is the acclamation of Julian as Augustus by the army at Paris. Here is not the place to attempt to reconstruct the episode or to determine whether or not Julian contrived his elevation,⁶ but it is clear from Zosimus (III.9) that Eunapius tried to show that the acclamation was contrary to Julian's wishes and without his prior knowledge. It is also possible to detect how Eunapius telescoped events for dramatic effect.

The scene is set so that the picture of a spontaneous mutiny prompted by love for Julian will be plausible. The troops banquetted until late at night near the imperial palace, still unaware of the plots against Julian (III.9.1). These machinations were discovered by some of the officers who distributed anonymous letters which said that Julian would be in extreme danger if the departure of the troops for the East were not prevented. Hereupon the soldiers rushed off in a drunken fury, broke into the palace, hoisted Julian upon a shield, and proclaimed him Augustus.

According to both Ammianus (XX.4.10-11) and Julian (Ep. ad Ath. 283B), Zosimus' letters were really one letter which was tossed into the camp of the Petulantes and Celts before the army assembled at Paris. Thus Eunapius telescoped events, partly to give the impression of spontaneity and partly for dramatic effect. He formed his shield-raising scene out of three separate incidents for the same reasons. The soldiers did proclaim Julian Augustus at night and after a dinner, but the dinner was the one which Julian gave for his officers (XX.4.13). Ammianus says nothing about a drunken revel by the common soldiers. Clearly, Eunapius altered the dinner in order to remove suspicion from Julian and to explain the volatile mood of the troops. Julian did not leave the palace until daylight, and then it was only after a speech that he was raised on the shield (XX.4.14-17). Not until later in the day did the Petulantes and Celts, alarmed by a false rumour that Julian had been murdered, break into the palace (XX.4.20-22). Since Julian's own account (Ep. ad Ath. 283A-285D) agrees with Ammianus', it is valid to assume that Eunapius knew the true course of events and deliberately altered it.

The third example is the crossing of the Naarmalcha (III.16.1-17.3). Ammianus gives the bare facts as follows (XXIV.2.7-8). When the army came to the Naarmalcha, the infantry crossed on bridges and the cavalry swam. The crossing was opposed by the Persians, but they were driven off by a detachment of auxiliaries which attacked them from the rear. Julian is not even mentioned. Eunapius, however, seems to have written a piece of historical fiction for the purpose of demonstrating Julian's great ability as a field commander. His version was based upon the impossibility of crossing the Naarmalcha, for Zosimus asserts that the mud and the depth of the channel prevented fording, ignores the possibility of bridges, and states that the Persians held the other bank in force. Julian alone was a clever enough general to order Lucillianus to fall upon the Persian rear (III.16.2).

In establishing the impossibility of traversing the Naarmalcha, Eunapius gave himself the difficulty of explaining the attack on the Persian rear. Hence he substituted Lucillianus for the auxiliaries and said that he was on reconnaissance (as he was earlier [III.14.1]) in order to account for his being on that side of the canal. Julian then had to wait until dark so that Victor could take the order to Lucillianus without being seen by the Persians (III.16.3). Unfortunately for the verisimilitude, Victor shouted and blew a trumpet in enemy territory to attract Lucillianus' attention (III.17.1).⁷ Ammianus and Libanius (Or. XVIII.223-6) mention neither Victor nor the night long delay, for these are Eunapius' contributions. The crossing of the Naarmalcha clearly demonstrates how Eunapius shaped episodes to fit his own purposes.

The fourth example is the city of Nisibis. Zosimus sets the scene for Julian's revolt by imputing jealousy as Constantius' motive for preparing to destroy Julian by transferring his troops to the eastern front (III.8.3; cf. fr. 14.4). Perhaps it was to disguise the real need for reinforcements in the war against Parthia that Eunapius omitted the fall of Amida in 359 and substituted the successful defence of Nisibis which had occurred in 350.⁸ The siege of Nisibis is not recounted, but the reader is referred to Julian's work on the subject (Or. I.27Aff.). Few readers of the Histories, a half century or more after the events, would have detected the switch, and Eunapius probably thought it unlikely that any would have checked Julian's panegyric.

Lastly, Eunapius seems to have invented Julian's visit to Edessa (III.12.2).⁹ Ammianus has Julian travel directly from Batnae to Carrhae cursu propero and nothing is said of Edessa or its embassy to Julian (XXIII.3.1). Libanius says that Julian did not go to Edessa and also emphasizes the speed of Julian's march (Or. XVIII.214). Finally, Sozomen confirms that Julian rushed by Edessa (VI.1.1). There are at least two possible reasons why Eunapius would have wanted to fabricate Julian's trip to Edessa. It distracts the reader's mind from recollecting the bad omens at Hierapolis and Batnae where, according to Ammianus (XXIII.2.6 and 8), fifty men perished in each incident. Moreover, it would have been a great coup for Julian to have been welcomed by a staunchly Christian city of long standing; indeed Sozomen says that Julian avoided the city precisely because of its Christian character (VI.1.1).

It is clear even from this brief examination that Eunapius compressed, omitted, substituted and invented in order that his readers would think that Julian had been the perfect pagan emperor. He was no more honest an historian in his praise of Julian than in his denigration of Theodosius. Although Eunapis and Zosimus remain prime sources for Later Roman history — when corroborated and used with an awareness of Eunapius' bias and techniques — their greatest value might be said to lie in what they reveal about the Hellenic reaction to the Christian empire of Constantine and his successors.

Footnotes

1     Eunapius, frr. 1 and 8, and Photius, Bibliotheca, cod. 77. The fragments of Eunapius will be cited according to the conventional numbering of Mueller, FHG IV. [Cf. T.G. Elliott’s note ‘Eunapius’ Account of Julian the Apostate’ AHB 5.3 (1991) 88.]

2     D.F. Buck, "Eunapius of Sardis and Theodosius the Great," Byzantion 58 (1988) 36-53.

3     On Zosimus as a reliable source for Eunapius' Histories, see Photius, Bibliotheca, cod. 98, and F. Paschoud, Zosime Histoire Nouvelle II1 (Paris 1979) x.

4     Paschoud, op. cit., n.15, 78.

5     L. Mendelssohn, Zosimi Historia Nova (Leipzig 1887) 119.

6     E.g. G.W. Bowersock, Julian the Apostate (Cambridge, Mass. 1978) 51. Bowersock's attempt is vitiated by his trust in Eunapius and Zosimus.

7     Cf. W. Klein, Studien zu Ammianus Marcellinus, Klio, Beiheft 13 (1914) n.1, 92.

8     Cf. Paschoud, op. cit., n.19, 82.