The Trouble With Philip Arrhidaeus

di Elizabeth D. Carney

The Ancient History Bulletin, 15/1-2 (2001), pp. 63-89

 

 

Historians have ignored Philip Arrhidaeus,1 the half-brother and successor (323-317 BC) of Alexander the Great, because his mental disability led the Macedonian elite to consider him incapable of independent rule. Ancient and modern prejudice about mental disability has led to an over-simplified interpretation of Arrhidaeus’ role in the political history of the late fourth century BC) Two factors, in particular, have contributed to this circumstance: a tendency to understand mental limitations as absolute rather than relative or partial and an inclination to assume that the mentally disabled have no personality or character. Ironically, precisely because his intelligence was limited, Philip Arrhidaeus was sometimes a force with whom his various guardians and his wife had to reckon. Indeed, as king, he need have had only very modest mental ability to wreak considerable havoc.

A more nuanced picture of Arrhidaeus’ capacities suggests that certain events during his reign could be re-interpreted. Because he usually functioned as a puppet in the hands of some member or members of the elite, we have forgotten that he was an individual who could and sometimes did assert his own will. In addition, a better understanding of his career implies that we need to re-evaluate our assessment of the nature of Macedonian kingship.

Once I have established what our sources tell us about his career, I shall consider what this evidence tells us directly and indirectly about Arrhidaeus’ ability to function. Next I shall assess how well Arrhidaeus’ mental capacities match the characteristics of those today considered to have mental retardation. Then I shall reflect on what his career suggests about Macedonian kingship and about personal kingship in general and I shall conclude with a reassessment of his role in events after the death of Alexander.

My examination of these issues is inevitably limited by the quality of our sources. Not only are sources for the period after Alexander’s death scanty and spotty, but they are also affected to a degree difficult for us to assess by the propaganda wars of the Successors. The severity of Arrhidaeus’ disabilities may have been exaggerated by his enemies whereas his supporters may have painted an overly rosy image of his abilities. Worse yet, it is certainly possible that some of our much later and derivative extant sources preserve both traditions, unwittingly generating a highly contradictory portrait of this little-known ruler.2 On the other hand, it is equally possible that his skills and abilities actually were uneven and variable. Granted these difficulties with the sources, I have tried to base my conclusions on the preponderance of the evidence, rather than depending heavily on any one source.

 

The Career of Philip Arrhidaeus

Arrhidaeus was a son of Philip II by Philinna (Satyr. ap. Athen. 13.557d), one of the lesser-known of Philip’s seven wives. Arrhidaeus was close in age to his famous half-brother, although whether he was slightly younger or older than Alexander is uncertain.3 Whatever the relative ages of the two half-brothers, Philip singled out Alexander, not Arrhidaeus, for public distinction, suggesting that Philip expected Alexander to succeed him. Shortly after Philip had achieved domination of the Greek peninsula in 338, during the period in which he was planning the invasion of the Persian Empire, an incident (Plut. Alex. 9.4-5; Satyr. ap. Athen. 13.557d-e; Just. 9.7.3-7) occurred that indicated that Alexander’s position as his father’s presumptive heir was no longer secure. Attalus, the guardian of Philip’s latest bride, proposed a toast at the wedding festivities that seemed to reject Alexander’s legitimacy as heir; when Alexander objected, Philip supported Attalus rather than his own son or, at the very least, did nothing to defend him. After this public quarrel, Alexander and his mother went into self-imposed exile. A reconciliation between father and son followed (Plut. Alex. 9.6, Mor. 70b-c, 179c), but another quarrel, relating to a proposed Macedonian-Carian marriage alliance, soon happened, demonstrating that the reconciliation was hollow.4

Plutarch (Alex. 10.1-3) alone reports5 that Alexander was so worried by the news that his father planned to marry Arrhidaeus to the daughter of Pixodarus, the satrap of Caria, that Alexander attempted to substitute himself as prospective groom; Philip’s dealings with Pixodarus were part of his effort to establish a base in Asia prior to the arrival of the main expeditionary force in Asia. The result of Alexander’s intervention in the marriage alliance was a disaster: Pixodarus chose no royal Macedonian son-in-law and an enraged Philip sent a number of Alexander’s friends into exile.

According to Plutarch (Alex. 10.1), Alexander’s response to the projected marriage meant that he considered his brother a possible threat to his own accession and read his father’s dealings with Pixodarus as a sign that he himself had been supplanted as probable heir.6 The context of the projected Carian marriage alliance makes Alexander’s response understandable. Between his great victory in 338 and his expected departure for Asia, Philip arranged or attempted to arrange four royal marriages (a new one for himself and ones for all his other children of marriageable age),7 but none for Alexander. So far as we know, Philip had paid no public attention to Arrhidaeus before, but now he planned for him a marriage that Alexander’s intimates considered brilliant and politically significant (Plut. Alex. 10.1).8 Although Plutarch’s narrative has Philip, while scolding his son, refer disparagingly to Pixodarus and imply that he had preferred his half-brother as bridegroom because the marriage was unimportant, Philip’s severe punishment of Alexander’s supporters in this intrigue suggests that the marriage alliance was actually quite important,9 especially because of the critical need for support in Asia.10 Moreover, if Philip really still saw Alexander as his primary heir, his failure to arrange any marriage for Alexander before his expected departure on the Asian campaign seems curious. Given these circumstances, it is not surprising Alexander considered the marriage alliance threatening.

Apart from what it may say about Alexander, the incident implies several things about his half-brother Arrhidaeus’ ability to function: he was now of marriageable age and not understood to be incapable of marriage and procreation;11 Pixodarus, though he preferred Alexander when given that option, did not deem Arrhidaeus an inappropriate bridegroom and Alexander found it plausible that Philip seemed to include him in the succession.12 If Philip really intended to displace Alexander from the succession as Alexander feared, he could have seen Arrhidaeus as a plausible royal placeholder, able to rule at least in name until either a son of his own or a younger son of Philip’s by Cleopatra could take the throne. In short, Philip may have envisioned (or Alexander at least feared that he did) a role for Arrhidaeus not unlike that some may have expected him to play after Alexander’s death (see below). Even if we concede that an insecure Alexander somewhat over-read the significance of Philip’s plans for Arrhidaeus, one must conclude that his father, the court, and foreign powers treated Arrhidaeus as a functional part of the Argead dynasty.

We know little about what Arrhidaeus did or where he was during the years of Alexander’s reign. It is telling that Alexander did not bother to kill him, although he did eliminate other males who might have had a claim on the succession, as well as a number of other people who displeased him. With Philip dead, Alexander apparently did not consider Arrhidaeus a threat.13 Arrhidaeus was in Babylon at the time of Alexander’s own death in 323. He may have spent most of his brother’s reign still in Macedonia, under the observation of Alexander’s general Antipater,14 but it is more likely that Arrhidaeus accompanied his brother on campaign. Not a trusting man, Alexander was unlikely to leave far behind a member of the royal dynasty so obviously ripe for exploitation by others. Even if Alexander’s dealings with Antipater took a number of years to become as troubled and tense as they were in the last years of the king’s reign, the king would have wanted to keep a close personal eye on his easily manipulated brother. In Alexander’s camp, Arrhidaeus appeared as a participant with his royal brother in sacrifices and ceremonies (Curt. 10.7.2). We do not know whether these rituals were public, whether they were connected with dynastic ritual or that connected to the army or even, possibly, local Babylonian rites.15

The period after Alexander’s sudden death was a chaotic one since he had no obvious successor. Violence broke out within days of his death when the Macedonian elite (most of the officer corps and the aristocratic cavalry), led by Perdiccas, favored a regency for a possible posthumous son of Alexander’s to be born to Alexander’s first wife, Roxane (the son, Alexander IV, was indeed born a month or two after his father’s death) and the Macedonian infantry, led by Meleager, preferred Arrhidaeus as king. In the end an unworkable compromise was effected. There would be two kings, Arrhidaeus (now re-named Philip) and the infant Alexander IV, and Perdiccas would be regent.16 This confusing period is poorly attested. All surviving accounts of events in Babylon were written centuries later and most are either brief or fragmentary (Just. 13.1.1 — 4.4; Diod. 18.2.1- 4; Curt. 10.7.3 — 10.20; Arr. FGrH 156 F 1.1; Heidelberg Epitome FGrH 155 F 1.1-2). Curtius, a Roman historian probably writing in the first century AD,17 offers the only truly detailed account of the tumultuous period immediately after Alexander’s death.

Curtius’ treatment of Arrhidaeus’ role in these events differs from that of other extant sources in two respects: he never says that Arrhidaeus had a mental disability18 and, whereas the other sources describe Arrhidaeus as a mere tool in the hands of first, Meleager and later Perdiccas, Curtius’ narrative depicts Arrhidaeus as an occasional actor in events, as a diplomatic, if unaggressive, figure.19 Curtius’ Arrhidaeus, although at first the cat's paw of Meleager (an infantry officer who galvanized the infantry in support of Arrhidaeus and against Perdiccas20), gradually became more. According to Curtius, Arrhidaeus himself put on his brother’s royal garments (10.7.13)21 and tried to effect a reconciliation between infantry and cavalry (10.8.20-22). He seemed determined to keep the troops peaceful (10.8.6) and to avoid civil strife, even offering to give up his new position if such a sacrifice would prevent civil war (10.8.16-20). Curtius says that Arrhidaeus actually gave a brief speech in public (10.8.16-19). Curtius also recounts that Arrhidaeus participated in a purification ritual involving the army (10.9.11-19). Demonstrating some basic skill at self-preservation, Arrhidaeus did the best he could to, on the one hand, avoid complicity in Meleager’s attempted murder of Perdiccas (10.8.2, 6), and, on the other, in Perdiccas’ elimination of Meleager and his supporters (10.9.19).22 The picture created is one of a weak and frightened man scrambling to survive and willing to almost anything to do so.

Arrhidaeus emerges from Curtius’ narrative as considerably less than a heroic (he is consistently passive, unwilling to risk himself for either of his self-proclaimed protectors) or even decisive figure, but a man with at least a basic grasp of the realities of his own chances for survival, a man with enough sense to doubt the trustworthiness of Meleager (10.8.2) and, judging by his caution in endorsing Perdiccas’ actions, his too. The courts of Philip and Alexander were not safe places and even a man of limited intelligence who grew up in such a violent and treacherous environment may well have developed certain survival skills.23

Curtius’ account of events at Babylon has sometimes been read as a virtual allegory for Roman events. 24 Certainly Curtius sometimes explicitly refers to Roman history, as in the famous digression (10.9.1-6) placed in the middle of his narrative of events after Alexander’s death or in references to the Parthian empire. The notion, however, that Curtius’ narrative not only alludes to Roman events but is actually about them, not Macedonian matters, is implausible. Although Curtius’ entire account of Alexander’s reign was once in scholarly disfavor, most recent scholarship, tends to conclude that Curtius’ narrative, while undeniably influenced by Roman experience, also reflected his understanding of fourth century events and was the work of a reasonably accurate25 and fairly sophisticated political historian, however florid and rhetorical his prose might have been (a more favorable reading of Curtius’ sources usually accompanies these views).26

In 1999, McKechnie challenged this new orthodoxy about Curtius’ qualities as a historian, using the section of the narrative dealing with events after Alexander’s death as his primary evidence. He argued that Curtius’ account of events at Babylon should be rejected because his narrative was shaped by his ‘implied parallel between Alexander’s empire and the Roman empire’ and, more particularly, because of his ‘use of the þdebate on three constitutionsþ motif as an organizing principle in his version of events after Alexander’s death.’27 Thus, while other scholars have doubted elements in Curtius’ narrative (e.g. the speeches) and recognized references to Roman affairs in his work but believed that Curtius’ account was useful and that rhetorical embroidery and Roman coloring were easily recognized and excluded, McKechnie has argued that these two elements are so fundamental to Curtius’ version of events that the narrative cannot be used because it is impossible to sanitize it by excluding them.

McKechnie’s arguments are interesting but generally unpersuasive.28 His views seem to depend on an unfavorable comparison (implied or explicit) of Curtius’ narrative to that of other sources. Since the importance of Curtius’ narrative derives from the paucity and brevity of other extant sources,29 these comparisons are less than compelling. McKechnie suggests that we should regard with suspicion any incidents mentioned by Curtius alone, yet the very length of Curtius’ narrative, let alone the limited number of sources available for comparison, makes it almost inevitable that his account would contain material not found elsewhere.30 While Curtius’ narrative seems more colored by rhetoric than that of, say, Diodorus, no ancient historical writer was unaffected by a rhetorical agenda. Analysis of the meaning of political events by the means of fictional or largely fictional speeches had a history going back to Thucydides’ day. Moreover, McKechnie’s arguments seem to assume that other sources would not have been affected by their own historical context (or that of the works from which they derive)31 and that being so affected is, by definition, bad.32

That Curtius saw Macedonian events through a Roman lens and that he may have organized details of his account on the basis of rhetorical concerns is, however, undeniably grounds for caution.33 Certainly we must doubt that Arrhidaeus delivered the speech Curtius attributes to him (or that any of the other figures in Curtius’ narrative gave the speeches attributed to them), but the rest of Curtius’ account of Arrhidaeus’ actions is fairly believable.

Indeed, apart from Curtius’ avoidance of a direct reference to Curtius’ mental disability, his account of Arrhidaeus’ abilities seems both generally comparable to the picture provided by other sources (with one exception; see below)34 and more critical and nuanced than has been recognized. Curtius’ Arrhidaeus may be able to speak in public and briefly inspire some hopes for his rule (10.9.16-22), but he is generally a pathetic figure and recognized as such by Curtius (e.g. 10.9.21) and by the army (10.8.8-9). Curtius unflatteringly compares the mere appearance of good order at Arrhidaeus’ court to the reality of it at Alexander’s (10.8.8-9).

Once the compromise at Babylon was effected, the two kings accompanied the army and the regent. Decrees were made in their names, buildings dedicated, decisions made.35 Soon after Arrhidaeus became king, a surprising event occurred. Cynnane,36 a daughter of Philip II by an Illyrian wife, escaped the control of Antipater and managed to get to the Macedonian army in Asia, accompanied by a small military force and her teenaged daughter, Adea.37 Years before, Alexander had murdered Adea’s father, his cousin, on the grounds that he had plotted to take the throne himself (Plut. Mor. 327c; Curt. 6.9.17, 10.24; Just. 12.6.14; FGrH 156 F 9.22). Cynnane’s aim was to arrange the marriage of her daughter to Philip Arrhidaeus. Perdiccas hated the idea of the marriage and had Cynnane murdered, but the slaughter of Philip’s daughter enraged the ordinary Macedonian troops and they compelled Perdiccas and the elite to allow the marriage to go forward (FGrH 156 F 23). Adea (now called Eurydice), trained to fight in battle as women in the Illyrian elite did, tried to woo the Macedonian army away from its allegiance to the various male generals (Diod. 18.39.2-4; FGrH 156 F 9.31), until old Antipater, by then regent, managed to silence her (Diod. 18.39.4; FGrH 156 F 11.42, 44). He, Adea Eurydice, and the kings returned to Greece (Diod. 18.39.7). Thus, during this period, Arrhidaeus’ young wife repeatedly tried by speech and action to influence the course of events whereas, so far as we know, Arrhidaeus did nothing.

Back in the Greek peninsula, Adea Eurydice and Philip Arrhidaeus and Alexander IV and his mother Roxane, remained with and under the control of the regent Antipater, and later, after the death of Antipater in 319, that of the new regent Polyperchon (Diod. 18.48.4). The sources, with one exception, refer to the presence of the kings with the regent and the army but say nothing of what, if anything, either king did. Plutarch (Phoc. 33.5-7) recounts an incident38 long after Alexander’s death, involving competing Athenian embassies sent to Polyperchon, Arrhidaeus, and the court. A change in Macedonian policy toward the Greek city-states (having previously favored anti-democratic factions — in the case of Athens, that of Phocion — the Macedonians now preferred the democratic party in Athens) precipitated considerable political upset, charges and counter charges, with both sides competing for Macedonian support. Sitting under a golden canopy, Philip Arrhidaeus, his Companions, and Polyperchon listened to the speeches of Phocion’s party and to those of his enemies.

Plutarch says that Arrhidaeus reacted to these complex and largely verbal events in a way that means that he was paying attention to the course of this confusing public dispute and that he had some, although probably very limited, understanding of the situation. He laughed at a sarcastic remark one of Phocion’s opponents made, apparently aware that the Macedonians now favored the anti-Phocion faction.39 Plutarch reports that Polyperchon publicly expressed concern that the king not believe the charges leveled at him by Hegemon, one of Phocion’s friends. It is certainly plausible that Polyperchon would have worried that Arrhidaeus would take literally the hostile statements of Polyperchon’s enemies. In fact, in contrast to the concern Polyperchon articulated, Philip Arrhidaeus, still quite loyal to Polyperchon and sensitive at least to the tone and manner of Hegemon’s remarks which he apparently took to be insulting,40 tried to run the man through with a spear and had to be restrained by Polyperchon.

This intriguing episode confirms that Arrhidaeus’ mental limitations were not severe enough to prevent him from having some if limited comprehension of political issues. He knew whose side he favored but felt no need to restrain an extreme physical demonstration of his preference, whereas Polyperchon limited himself to verbal indications of the same preference (Phoc. 33.6-7). Indeed, the episode suggests that Arrhidaeus’ marginal competency presented more difficulties than more severe mental problems would have. Had Arrhidaeus simply continued to sit under the canopy and failed to react at all, Polyperchon would have had no trouble. As it was, the regent had to worry about the king’s opinion and, at the same time, try to control the king’s actions. Philip Arrhidaeus’ reaction to Hegemon’s tone, however, seems much odder in our world than it would have in his own; we need to place it in its appropriate context.

After all, his father Philip II tried to kill Alexander during one banquet when his son irritated him (Plut. Alex. 9.5) and, during another, Alexander, irked by the tone of remarks made by Cleitus, grabbed a spear and, though his Companions tried to restrain him, did kill Cleitus on the spot (Plut. Alex. 50 — 52.4; Arr. 4.8.1-9.9; Curt. 8.1.19-2.13; Just. 12.6.1-18). Cleitus had previously saved Alexander’s life (Arr. 1.15.8; Curt. 8.1.20; Diod. 17.20.7; Plut. Alex. 16.5). Arrhidaeus could have been present for both earlier incidents which may have made a lasting impression; a young man of limited mental ability might well have concluded such murderous behavior was appropriate when a king was angered. It is an important distinction that on the occasions referred to, Philip and Alexander were drunk, whereas Philip Arrhidaeus was, so far as we know, sober (a distinction Arrhidaeus, in any event, was not necessarily capable of making). On the other hand, the Macedonian court was often the scene of violence and what passed for acceptable behavior in the Macedonian elite did not necessarily meet Athenian standards of decorum. Literary tradition often represents Philip II as acting in an extreme, arbitrary or irresponsible fashion, even when sober (Plut. Mor. 178f-179a, d; Athen. 435b-d).41 Arrhidaeus, a man of limited understanding, reacted to a perceived insult in a way that was an exaggeration of the royal norm. He was not normal, but his behavior was not terribly far from that of other Argead rulers. Had he succeeded in killing Hegemon, one doubts that Hegemon’s kin would have found the distinction between an arbitrary act by a mentally limited king and one by a drunken king a meaningful one. Arrhidaeus’ limited mental ability produced the same lack of inhibition and judgment that heavy drinking had in his close male kin.

Fairly soon after this incident, Philip Arrhidaeus and Adea Eurydice somehow escaped the control of Polyperchon. After the royal pair had returned to Macedonia,42 Cassander, son of Antipater, was substituted for Polyperchon as regent. Justin (14.5.1-4) says that Adea Eurydice, exploiting her husband’s condition, whose duties she was beginning to claim title to, wrote to Polyperchon (and also to Antigonus) in the name of the king, and told him to give the army to Cassander, to whom the king now transferred the administration of the kingdom. Diodorus (19.11.1) says that Adea Eurydice, taking charge of the kingdom, and hearing that Olympias was going to return, asked Cassander to give aid. Polyperchon’s loss of physical control of the royal duo and his subsequent dismissal as regent precipitated a confrontation between the military forces of Polyperchon and Olympias and those of Adea Eurydice and Philip Arrhidaeus. Polyperchon, Olympias, and Aeacides, her royal Molossian kinsman, led a mixed force of Macedonian and Epirote troops against Philip Arrhidaeus and Adea Eurydice in command of a Macedonian army. (Cassander was out of the country.) Both Arrhidaeus and his wife were present with the army, but she probably led it.43 When the home army saw Olympias, mother of Alexander and wife of Philip, they abandoned the king and his wife and went over to Olympias without a fight. Olympias captured Philip Arrhidaeus and his court somewhat before she was able to seize Adea Eurydice and her secretary (Diod. 19.11.3); she maltreated them briefly (probably hoping to compel Philip Arrhidaeus to abdicate) and then, in somewhat different fashions, had both killed (Diod. 19.4.7; Just. 14.5.10; Ael. VH 13.36). Within months Cassander returned, defeated the forces of Olympias, had her killed, imprisoned and ultimately murdered her young grandson, Alexander IV, and gave Philip Arrhidaeus and Adea Eurydice a royal burial at Aegae (Diod. 1.52.5).44

 

Indirect and Direct Evidence of the Sources on Arrhidaeus’ Functionality

Let us consider first what the ancient sources tell us about Arrhidaeus’ physical and mental functionality indirectly (by describing his actions and the reactions of those around him) and then directly.45 Arrhidaeus regularly took part in public and religious ceremony (Curt. 10.7.2, 9.11-19; Plut. Phoc. 33.5-7). No source suggests that his physical appearance was abnormal.46 Since it is possible that those performing ritual could not display obvious physical disabilities,47 his participation in ritual may confirm that he was physically unblemished. It is unlikely that he suffered from epilepsy.48 That the army ritual was accomplished on horseback and that he had gotten to Babylon from Macedonia implies that he had something like the ordinary physical skills of a man of his class and culture. The Macedonian elite was famously skilled on horseback and Arrhidaeus was, apparently, at least competent in this activity. Just as he was apparently trained to ride, Arrhidaeus must, judging by the Hegemon incident, have been trained to use weapons. He may have gone into actual battle, although no source clearly says that he did.49 Perhaps, although not of sufficient mental competence to command, he was physically capable of combat but his various regents feared risking him in battle.

However normal his physical appearance and skills, it seems clear that Philip Arrhidaeus’ mental abilities were not normal. Let us evaluate the limits of his mental capacity. Since Arrhidaeus was capable of performing ritual accurately, he must have been able to follow complicated directions and may well have had some ability to memorize detail. Curtius believed that he was capable of speaking in public, as we have seen, but two passages in Plutarch (Mor. 337e, 791e; see below for discussion) seem to deny that he could. If he did speak in public, it must have been rare. Based on the evidence of both Curtius and Plutarch, he was able to follow fairly complicated verbal exchanges, although in such simplistic terms that his reaction to exchanges could be exaggerated or inappropriate. Usually but not always he was passive and dutiful, letting the generals and/or his wife act and speak for him. Judging by the incident relating to Hegemon and the behavior Curtius describes, he had some simple (perhaps highly personalized) short term grasp of the political and military struggles of his day; he knew whose side or at least what person he was currently supposed to favor. Those who managed him had to worry that he might easily be led to change sides and needed to act to prevent their enemies from manipulating him as easily as they themselves did. He seems to have been sensitive to the royal image and to perceived slights to it,50 perhaps because he was able to appreciate little more than the external forms of kingship.

No source suggests that Arrhidaeus’ problems ever varied after they were first noted or were anything other than chronic.51 He seems always to have had a guardian or manager. Justin (13.2.11) says explicitly that Perdiccas had rejected him as a possible king because he would never be able to have more than the name of king and that someone else would hold the real power; the Heidelberg Epitome (FGrH 155 F 1.2) makes a similar connection between Arrhidaeus’ limited mental ability and the need for some kind of regent. The reported permanent nature of his problems differs from Herodotus’ description of the deteriorating mental condition of both Cambyses and Cleomenes,52 rulers whose capacities have been compared to those of Arrhidaeus (see below).53

Two passages in Plutarch’s Moralia (337d-e, 791e) appear to contradict the general picture of Arrhidaeus’ mental capacities created by the narratives of our other sources, including Plutarch’s own Phocion (33.5-7). The Moralia passages describe a much more severely disabled monarch than the only moderately limited ruler who was so irritated by Hegemon (Phoc. 33.5-7). Both passages apply the term kophos (mute) to Philip Arrhidaeus, in each case in the context of a non-speaking stage character.54 These passages, therefore, specifically contradict (if one takes them literally) Curtius’ report that Philip Arrhidaeus spoke to the army (10.8.16-19) and, more generally, they picture a man who understood nothing of real rule as opposed to the ruler described in Phocion, whose understanding was very limited, but who did have some simple grasp of factional politics.

How are we to resolve this discrepancy? Plutarch is not always a dependable source. He is capable of telling the same story, with the same moral, but reversing the roles of major participants in the same anecdote.55 The discrepancy in the portrayal of the relative skills of Philip Arrhidaeus in the three passages may derive from Plutarch’s varying rhetorical needs.56 Both passages in the Moralia compare Arrhidaeus unfavorably to another more able ruler. The first description of Arrhidaeus’ abilities (337d-e) occurs in the context of a discussion meant to demonstrate that Alexander, rather than being dependent on good fortune, triumphed because he made use of it and Arrhidaeus is mentioned to prove that good fortune alone cannot make a man great (so also Plut. Mor. 336d). Philip Arrhidaeus is explicitly and implicitly contrasted to his brother and it is that contrast, I believe, that leads to the more extreme picture of Arrhidaeus’ limitations. Similarly, in the second passage, the contrast is between Arrhidaeus and Antigonus and Plutarch’s intent is to demonstrate that ability rather than age should be the criterion for public service.57

There is good reason to put more trust in the picture of Arrhidaeus painted by Plutarch in his Phocion. For one thing, as I have noted, descriptions of Arrhidaeus’ actions should generally be considered more dependable than general descriptions of his condition. There is particularly good reason to trust the image of Arrhidaeus in the Phocion passage. Since Plutarch clearly intends to have his readers admire Phocion and his allies, Plutarch’s rhetoric would, if anything, have led him to inflate the relative violence of Arrhidaeus’ reaction. Indeed, one wonders if he did exaggerate the king’s displeasure, possibly with the model of Alexander’s treatment of Cleitus in mind. His account of the incident is not only unflattering to Arrhidaeus but to the Macedonian court in general: his narrative clearly constructs a contrast between the Macedonian court with its luxury, idle courtiers, easy brutality and risible ruler and the dignified and heroic Phocion and his supporters. Although it would be dangerous to take any of the three Plutarch passages literally, none seems to warrant concluding that Arrhidaeus was severely mentally limited although all of them confirm the conclusion that his mental capacities were less than normal.

With the exception of Curtius, all other ancient sources specify or at least imply that Philip Arrhidaeus had a mental disability. We can hardly ignore the diction the sources employ about Arrhidaeus’ abilities. Instead, we must examine it to decide whether any of it constitutes useful evidence. Unfortunately, the terminology the sources apply to Arrhidaeus makes it difficult to determine whether he was mentally ill or retarded. This is hardly surprising. For one thing, Greek writers comparatively rarely refer to disabilities of any kind58 and then only in general terms.59 When reference is made to disability, euphemism is common. Arrian (3.6.6), for example, says of Alexander’s notorious treasurer Harpalus that his body was unfit for warlike tasks, but he avoids mention of any specific disability. I know of no Greek term that clearly refers to the condition we term retardation, although there are a number of Greek terms relating to madness or insanity.60

More significantly, Greeks may not have distinguished in any generic way between mental illness and mental retardation; 61 modern medicine did not until 1845;62 in popular speech and understanding, this failure to distinguish sometimes persists.63 On the other hand, though the sources do not clearly indicate any recognition that Arrhidaeus suffered from a different category of mental illness than the other mentally troubled rulers, examination of diction applied to Arrhidaeus in comparison to that applied to the others does demonstrate a difference in emphasis. Whereas Herodotus’ account of two kings who became mentally ill (the Persian Cambyses and the Spartan Cleomenes) often employs wording indicating that they had difficulty in reasoning, diction similar to that applied to Philip Arrhidaeus,64 Herodotus also uses terms about Cambyses and Cleomenes referring to violent madness,65 expressions never applied to Philip Arrhidaeus by any author. Clearly, the mentally ill and the mentally retarded share a limited ability to make rational decisions and our sources reflect that perception. Even if the Greeks did understand all those who lacked phren (mind, sense), as so many of our sources say Arrhidaeus did, to be insane,66 we need not imitate their failure to make a distinction that we consider meaningful. Moreover, significantly, the sources do not generally say that Philip Arrhidaeus completely lacked the ability to reason, but term him slow and say that he was limited in this area (Diod. 18.2.2; Plut. Alex. 77.5; FGrH 155 F 1.2).67 Our sources, therefore, offer little reason to conclude that Arrhidaeus was mentally ill.68

 

Arrhidaeus and Current Definitions of Mental Retardation 

In fact, the available evidence about Arrhidaeus better matches the traits of a person suffering from mental retardation than one with mental illness. This is the most recent (1992) definition of mental retardation offered by the American Association on Mental Retardation:

Mental retardation refers to substantial limitation in present functioning. It is characterized by significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, existing concurrently with related limitations in two or more of the following applicable adaptive skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social skills, community use, self- direction, health and safety, functional academics, leisure and work. Mental retardation manifests before age 18.69

Thus the current definition emphasizes functionality70 and requires that all three aspects of the definition be present before an individual can be considered retarded. Despite the fact that all previous AAMR definitions classified those with mental retardation according to a level of severity determined primarily by IQ scores, the current standard abolishes the old method of classification in favor of one based on the level of support needed to function as completely as possible.71 Nonetheless, the old classification system has not entirely disappeared from scholarship published after 1992,72 partly because it is employed in federal legislation about mental retardation,73 partly because it is difficult to make use of earlier research without referring to its terminology,74 and partly, I suspect, because it is more abstract than the new system and thus easier to use when one is generalizing rather attempting to determine treatment of individuals.

It seems clear, despite the poor nature of our sources, that Arrhidaeus would today be judged to have mental retardation. Currently, ‘significantly subaverage intellectual functioning’ is determined by an IQ score of no more than 75 or, when such information is not available, the conclusion that an individual’s intellectual capabilities are below the standard of the vast majority (approximately 97 percent) of persons of comparable background.75 Although, of course, no such specific evidence is available for Arrhidaeus, as we have seen, all the sources but Curtius say that there was something wrong with Arrhidaeus’ mental capacity and imply that it was far below that of the rest of the elite.76 Arrhidaeus demonstrated limitations in more than the two ‘adaptive skills’ required by the definition: our examination of his career suggests limited ability in communication, social skills, self-direction, and work.77 Although no source provides a specific age by which Arrhidaeus displayed these limitations, Plutarch (Alex. 77.5) implies that these limitations were observable no later than early adolescence and all sources demonstrate that he had significant limitations by the time he was an adult. According to the old AAMR classification system, Arrhidaeus would probably have been classified as ‘mildly’ retarded;78 according to the new system, he might be characterized as a person who needs intermittent support in the areas of communication, social skills, self-direction and work.79

In addition to the fact that Arrhidaeus seems to meet the general criterion for mental retardation, other specific aspects of mental retardation seem to suit what we know about Arrhidaeus. Most retarded people have a normal physical appearance and suffer from no obvious physical disability, as did Arrhidaeus. Today, many retarded people are not recognized as such until their school years.80 Whatever the absolute truth of Plutarch’s story about Olympias’ poisoning of Arrhidaeus as a child (Plut. Alex. 77.5), it may well signify that Arrhidaeus’ retardation was not obvious until late in his childhood. A delay in recognition seems particularly likely in societies where physical activity and oral culture mattered more than written. Plutarch’s story could, on the other hand, signify that Arrhidaeus’ retardation was not pre- or perinatal,81 but the consequence of some disease (e.g. a form of meningitis82 or malaria83) or trauma that caused brain damage.84

Arrhidaeus’ behavior and reactions clearly resemble those of many retarded people. Their analysis of problems is often less than subtle because of difficulty in foreseeing the consequences of an action and because of limited focus and attention.85 The Phocion incident shows Arrhidaeus reasoning but simplistically and without apparent thought to the consequences of his action. This same episode demonstrates another circumstance common among those with retardation. Because retarded people may not fully understand what is expected of them in social circumstances, they may misinterpret a situation and therefore respond inappropriately.86 Arrhidaeus was usually the compliant tool of those in authority over him. Passivity in finding solutions, a tendency to withdraw or depend on those in authority is typical of many retarded people.87 Faced with repeated failures, their goal is often simply to avoid failure rather than to achieve success;88 Arrhidaeus’ dealings with Meleager and Perdiccas seem to conform to this general pattern. Because they are more vulnerable to environmental stress, retarded people often react to events in more extreme fashion,89 experience more anxiety,90 and greater stress.91 On at least one occasion, Arrhidaeus’ actions were extreme. Coping with the complexities of events after his brother’s death made him anxious and somewhat unpredictable in behavior.92

General prejudice and uncomfortableness about the retarded persists. Scholarly references to Philip Arrhidaeus’ disability are anything but politically correctþ‘half-witted’, ‘feeble-minded’, ‘imbecile’ and ‘moron’ — are all terms that have been applied to him.93 Much of this diction, however, derives from the great difference between Philip Arrhidaeus’ abilities and his status as king and from the gap between his own skills and that of the famous brother he succeeded. These contrasts tend to generate exaggeration. For instance, as we have seen, Plutarch’s allusion (Mor. 337d) to him as being like a baby swaddled in purple — obviously contradicted by Plutarch’s own testimony elsewhere (Phoc. 33.5-7) — probably has a similar origin.94 Such strong language would probably not have been applied to a retarded carpenter or foot-soldier or even to the retarded successor of one of the more obscure Argead kings like Amyntas II.95 In addition, propaganda and character assassination were commonplace in the period of the Successors. Insulting references to the status of Philip Arrhidaeus’ mother doubtless derive from political caricaturing of the day.96 Similarly, the severity of Arrhidaeus’ mental disability may well have been exaggerated by his enemies and that exaggeration then preserved in our sources.97 It is difficult, however, to deny that Arrhidaeus had some sort of mental disability.98

We must avoid concluding that a person with limited skills has none at all. Generalizations, however valid, are not enough. On the evidence, Philip Arrhidaeus was not a piece of royal luggage toted around by various members of the Macedonian elite, but an individual sensitive to slights to his status and sometimes tricky to handle. He had to be handled; he had to be persuaded and led. The story about Phocion’s supporters makes that obvious, but a number of other moments in his career imply the same thing. Suppose, for instance, that Polyperchon had not persuaded the king not to kill Hegemon or suppose that Arrhidaeus had not been maneuvered into accepting the elimination of Meleager.

 

The Implications of Arrhidaeus’ Career for Macedonian Kingship

Let us consider how these findings might relate to the nature of Macedonian monarchy. Macedonian monarchy was the defining institution of the society. Kingship belonged to the royal clan. Over the centuries, the Macedonians had experienced little order and stability; kings were frequently assassinated99 but only Argeads were kings. Choosing a king from the Argead house was about the only consistent element in the chaotic political history of Macedonia.100 Political events were understood in terms of their relationship to the king. Even during the reigns of Philip Arrhidaeus and Alexander IV, the opposing groups were defined by their support or opposition to the kings.101 Only under Alexander III, and then not always, did the kings begin to employ a title; until then, it was enough to give a patronymic, demonstrating that one was the son of an Argead.102 Macedonian kingship, until there were no Argeads left, was personal and the personal possession of the Argead family.103

I have referred to the king’s ‘regents’ only for purposes of convenience. In fact, our sources use a variety of terms that may or may not reflect original Macedonian usage, to describe those responsible for the two kings.104 In the past, before the death of Alexander, there had been no need for any formal or elaborate substitute kingship; Macedonia was a country too unstable to survive a long period in which the monarch could not rule personally. Typically, a close male relative of a minor held some sort of trusteeship very briefly; then usually the minor conveniently died and the person with the real power was king.105 Kingship was not understood as an office held by an individual, but rather as the possession of the royal clan, one member of which currently was king. The king had no clear job description — he did as much as he was able to get away with — and, obviously, substitute kings certainly lacked such descriptions.106

The dual kingship only made matters muddier. As we have seen, Arrhidaeus, unlike minor kings in other historical periods, regularly signed papers and decrees and seems to have been able to hire and fire substitute kings.107 On the other hand, some historians believe that Arrhidaeus was only a placeholder who would retain his title as king only until Alexander IV came of age.108 The latter was very likely the preference of Perdiccas and the rest of the elite, whatever was said publicly. Indeed, subsequent events suggest that the Macedonian elite considered even Alexander IV only a convenient temporary solution to the succession crisis; one doubts that any of them really thought he would live to rule as an adult.109

Mass and elite in Macedonia, however, had very different understandings of the nature of monarchy and the importance of the Argead dynasty. Historians have, without real reflection, replicated the view of the elite and discounted that of the general Macedonian population. As events after Alexander’s death demonstrate, the members of the Macedonian elite looked at kingship in pragmatic terms and were concerned about the capacities of individual monarchs. They may well have treated Arrhidaeus with contempt, at least in private.110 Their preference for a possible son of the Asian Roxane, granted the prejudice of even members of the Macedonian elite against Asians and Asianizing,111 speaks volumes about their low opinion of Arrhidaeus’ capacities. Often enough, over many reigns, members of the elite assassinated kings they did not care for or aided in the replacement of one Argead by another. Even when Alexander was only a few days dead, the more distinguished of his generals may already have looked to the day when they themselves might take a royal title.

The mass of the Macedonian population, however, was more sentimental about the monarchy and the Argead dynasty, possibly because their understanding of it was more religious in nature,112 and because the populace seemed more inclined to see the monarchy in general and dynasty in particular as a source of social order. Ordinary Macedonian soldiers focused on the royal family and were comparatively indifferent to the various aristocratic king-substitutes and quite loyal to the royal family, as Arrhidaeus’ accession and other incidents demonstrate.113 Whether or not the army at Babylon was already aware of Arrhidaeus’ mental limitations at the time of Alexander’s death,114 the generals would certainly have made them so, yet the army continued to prefer him over the choice of the aristocrats. After Alexander’s death (and to some degree during his preceding absence from Macedonia) the women of the royal clan benefited from this phenomenon because they, as part of the family, had axioma (reputation, authority) and the generals did not. To ordinary Macedonians, therefore, Philip Arrhidaeus really was their king, to them the last living son of Philip was no token and his physical presence was vital.115

 

Reassessment of Arrhidaeus’ Role in Events 323-316

Let me consider the some of the implications of what we have concluded about Arrhidaeus in terms of the events in the years after Alexander’s death. One might wonder why, if ordinary Macedonians took Philip Arrhidaeus’ Argead kingship as seriously as I have suggested, the Macedonian army in 317/16 deserted him and his wife, an Argead by birth, and went over to Olympias, not even a Macedonian, let alone an Argead. Olympias, of course, was the champion of her grandson, Alexander IV, a half Persian boy of six. In the past, Macedonians had been anything but tolerant of Persian blood. Six years earlier another Macedonian army had preferred Arrhidaeus to Olympias’ grandson, or at least, to the possibility of such a grandson. Yet the army’s choice in 317 led directly to the execution of the royal pair, a fairly predictable development, given the nature of past Macedonian history and one the army must have expected.

Diodorus (19.11.2) says that the army changed sides because of the axioma of Olympias and because they recalled the benefactions of Alexander. Justin (4.5.10) attributes the reversal in allegiance to Macedonian memory of her husband Philip, the greatness of Alexander, to the sense that the attempt of Philip Arrhidaeus and his wife to stop Olympias from entering Macedonia was a humiliation (presumably to the memory of her husband and son). Olympias had not been seen in Macedonia in many years; doubtless the reappearance of this tough old woman did stir memories of her son and husband, but this alone would not have been enough.

Several additional factors may help to explain the disappearance of allegiance to Arrhidaeus. For one thing, it is unlikely that the army that preferred Olympias to him contained significant elements of the Macedonian forces present in Babylon in 323. Part of the answer to the change in allegiance from the strong preference for Philip Arrhidaeus in 323 and the abandonment of him to his fate in 317 must lie in what had happened in the intervening years and, perhaps, what had not happened. After six years the army would have been well acquainted with Philip Arrhidaeus’ mental limitations, but then they may have been so all along, as I have suggested. What certainly had changed in six years was this: Alexander IV was no longer a foetus of unknown gender still in his mother’s womb but a boy of six, past the most dangerous period for children and infants, whereas Philip Arrhidaeus was no more mentally competent than before and he and Adea Eurydice, after six years of marriage had, so far as we know, no children. Doubtless many factors precipitated this particular peripeteia, but surely one of them was that the army opted for an existing Argead heir over a king who, quite apart from his mental limitations, had produced no sons. Curiously enough, old Olympias stood for the future of the dynasty and that, I think, is what the army chose. After all, Macedonians had been choosing between different Argeads, with generally fatal consequences for the losing candidate, for centuries.116

We live in a world in which power is virtually never hereditary and rarely life-long. Because of that we have failed to see the obvious. Philip Arrhidaeus really was king and no matter how many aristocratic minders he had, if he chose to decide something or to take some action, it is hard to see how his caretakers could prevent him.117 Mostly, he was willing to let others decide, but we have seen that was not always so and he sometimes had to be cajoled.

The realization that Philip Arrhidaeus was king and therefore hard to stop if he chose really to be king may explain some puzzling developments. I will mention two.118 The various generals who were currently ‘regent’ consistently kept both kings close to them, yet Arrhidaeus and his wife somehow got out from under Polyperchon’s thumb and used the opportunity to fire him. One wonders how Polyperchon let this happen;119 the answer could be that he could prevent neither the departure of the royal pair nor his own subsequent dismissal. If the king chose to go elsewhere, short of a public use of force that would have compromised Polyperchon’s authority by suggesting that he did not rule for the king, what could Polyperchon do? Apparently, he was willing to use force against Philip Arrhidaeus and Adea Eurydice only after he had been dismissed and after Olympias was physically at his side. Arrhidaeus may also be the explanation for the timing of the confrontation of Philip Arrhidaeus and Adea Eurydice with Olympias. Why would Arrhidaeus and his wife face Olympias’ forces when their latest ‘regent’ was out of the country? Arrhidaeus may have chosen the moment and Cassander proved powerless to prevent it. Even if it was not he but his wife who chose these particular moments, the fact that Arrhidaeus was actually king made it possible.

Once one recognizes that Arrhidaeus was a man of normal appearance and manner with dangerous partial competence in public matters, it is obvious that he could have been a factor in events and decisions. In our world a man with a skill level comparable to Arrhidaeus’ would tend to be allotted menial tasks, but in fourth century Macedonia, despite the probable contempt of the elite, this man and his infant nephew were kings. None of the generals dared to take the title of king until the last male Argead was safely and long dead because none of them could be king until even the least of the Argeads was gone.

 

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Footnotes

1     His original name was Arrhidaeus; when he was made king, he took his father Philip’s name. He is sometimes referred to as Philip III, more often as Philip Arrhidaeus, and sometimes simply Arrhidaeus. Greenwalt 1984: 69-77 is the only discussion of his life of any length.

2     As, for instance, Sharples 1995: 58 suggests. Although I do not find his argument particularly convincing, one can hardly exclude the possibility.

3     See discussion in Greenwalt 1984: 72-3. The only certainty is that his father judged him of marriageable age in 337.

4     See Carney 1992: 169-79 for discussion and references.

5     Ellis 1981: 135-6 and Hatzopoulos 1982: 59-66 argue unconvincingly that the historicity of the Pixodarus incident should be rejected. For convincing arguments against this view, see Develin 1981: 95; Bosworth 1988: 22. See also Carney 1992: 179.

6     See Carney 1992: 180 for the possibility that Philip meant Alexander to understand the marriage alliance with Pixodarus as a kind of slap on his wrist, not a serious threat to his succession.

7     In this same time period, he himself married his seventh wife, Cleopatra (Plut. Alex. 9.4-5; Satyr. ap. Athen. 13.557d; Just. 9.5.9; Arr. 3.6.5); his daughter by Olympias married Olympias’ brother, the king of Molossia (Just. 9.6.1; Diod. 16.91.4þ93.2); and, in all probability, his daughter Cynnane married Philip’s nephew Amyntas about this time (see discussions in Greenwalt 1988: 94-5 and Carney 1991: 18 n. 4).

8     Carney 1992: 180 suggests that Olympias’ and his friends’ interpretation of the Pixodarus alliance may not have been, as Plutarch implies, malicious.

9     Badian 1963: 245-6, apparently followed by Hamilton 1969: 26.

10     Ruzicka 1992: 131 points out that the marriage would have eliminated the need for further military operations in southwestern Anatolia and put the Carian fleet and whatever army Pixodarus controlled at Philip’s disposal. A number of Philip’s own marriages were to women whose family status was not particularly high, but whose short-term political worth made a marriage alliance important; one might say the same of Alexander’s marriage to Roxane. Granted that Philip himself had contracted such marriages, Alexander must have wondered why his brother rather than he was selected for this one. Ruzicka 1992: 131, while not down-playing the importance of the alliance, suggests that Philip was holding out for a possible Persian marriage for his presumed heir, but that, of course, seems to assume that the very polygamous Philip was for some reason not planning that his son continue his marriage policy.

11     Neither Pixodarus nor Philip would have been indifferent to the possibility of heirs. If it is true that his contemporaries did not believe Arrhidaeus’ problems were hereditary (see below), neither party would have had reason to doubt that he might father normal offspring. Indeed Ruzicka 1992: 130-2 suggests that Pixodarus, lacking any sons, intended the projected bridegroom to succeed him in rule and that Pixodarus was, in effect, offering Caria to Philip.

12     Granted Philip’s anger at the collapse of the marriage negotiations, one must doubt that he had considered Pixodarus so insignificant and needy that he could pass off to him a son who was somehow considered a joke; Philip could not afford the risk that Pixodarus would consider the offer of Arrhidaeus insulting.

13     So Badian 1964: 264; Errington 1970: 51. In the immediate aftermath of Philip’s murder and Alexander’s accession, Alexander had his cousin Amyntas, two of the Lyncestian brothers, and Attalus, guardian of Philip’s last wife, Cleopatra, killed. Cleopatra and her baby by Philip were also killed, perhaps by Olympias alone, perhaps by Alexander and Olympias. On these events, see Bosworth 1988: 25-35. Alexander had considered Arrhidaeus a threat to the succession at the time of the Pixodarus incident (Plut. Alex. 10.1) only because he believed that Philip had made him so; with his father gone, Alexander apparently saw no grounds for concern, so long as he kept his brother away from those who might try to use Arrhidaeus as Philip had.

14     So Greenwalt 1988: 77; Bosworth 1992: 78. Bosworth suggests that Alexander brought him to Asia only when he wanted, as Bosworth believes, to make him king of Babylon (see below) and when Alexander’s dealings with Antipater had grown tense enough to make the king distrust him.

15     Bosworth 1992: 77-8 hypothesizes that Alexander made him king of Babylon and that the ritual was Babylonian, arguing against the more usual assumption that the ritual was Macedonian (so Berve 1926: 386; Hammond 1980: 475; Greenwalt 1984: 77).

16     See Green 1990: 1-9 for a recent discussion of these events. Bosworth 1993: 420-7 argues, primarily on the basis of a newly published addition to IG II2 402, that Alexander IV was not proclaimed king immediately after his birth (October of 323 at the latest) and that Philip Arrhidaeus remained sole king until about a year later, in late summer or early fall of 322. Bosworth considers the proclamation of Alexander IV as king at this particular point a consequence of Perdiccas’ consolidation of power after his military success in Cappadocia.

17     See Atkinson 1997: 3451-6; Baynham 1998: 200-19; McKechnie 1999: 49-52 on the date and identity of Curtius. McKechnie 1999: 51 rightly observes that the wide range of dates suggested by scholars suggests that there is nothing conclusive in the famous excursus.

18     Though Curtius could have offered such a description in the large section of book ten that we now lack, the extant narrative paints a picture of Arrhidaeus that, while unflattering (see below), does not include anything that blatantly implies mental disorder or retardation.

19     Sharples 1995: 53 goes considerably too far when he claims that Curtius pictures Arrhidaeus as ‘an able negotiator. ’ See below for negative aspects of Curtius’ depiction of Arrhidaeus.

20     On Meleager, see Berve 1926: 249-50; Heckel 1992: 165-70.

21     Martin 1983: 166-7 assumes that Arrhidaeus’ mental impairment would have prevented him from putting on the royal robes on his own, yet this is one of the more plausible aspects of Curtius’ narrative: a mentally limited young man would be likely to understand being king in terms of externals like the royal robes. Arrhidaeus could have put on the robes at Meleager’s bidding, but Curtius does not say he did. Arrhidaeus had been frightened by Perdiccas and the rest and may well have felt safer putting on his brother’s robes.

22     In the first case, Arrhidaeus admits that he had tried to have Perdiccas arrested at Meleager’s urging but adds that this decision had not, in fact, cost Perdiccas his life, and in the second, when Perdiccas arranges the trampling of Meleager’s main supporters, Curtius comments that Arrhidaeus neither prevented the action nor authorized it and then observes that it was obvious that Arrhidaeus claimed an action as his own only when events made it acceptable.

23     Nothing in Curtius’ account of Arrhidaeus’ actions, other than the specific rhetoric of the speech attributed to him, would be impossible for a retarded individual to have accomplished.

24     Bödefeld 1982 (see Carney 1985: 277 for a review critical of this point of view); Martin 1983: 161-90. Contra Martin, though there is some similarity in circumstance: there are no striking similarities between Josephus’ narrative of the accession of Claudius (BJ2.204-17) and that of Curtius. Josephus’ Claudius is a thoughtful and decisive figure who takes charge of the attempt to put him on the throne. The critical figure of Agrippa has no parallel in Curtius.

25     Martin 1983: 161-90 unconvincingly attacked the accuracy of Curtius’ account. For instance, he asserts (164 n. 7) that Curtius (10.7.15) inaccurately implied that Arrhidaeus was ‘born to rule’ (genitum ut regnaret), demonstrating Curtius’ willingness to embellish. Since Arrhidaeus was born the son (possibly the first son) of Philip II and (see below) may not have displayed recognizable signs of mental problems until later in childhood, the statement is not inaccurate. Similarly, it is likely enough (and not necessarily embellishment) that Meleager mentioned that Arrhidaeus was an Argead and that those opposed him were not.

26     See McKechnie 1999: 44-60 for references and a brief history of this scholarly dispute, but not for his conclusions. For a comparatively positive reading on Curtius as an historian, see Atkinson 1997: 3468-70 and Baynham 1998: passim; see especially 1-114, 201-19. See also Errington 1970: 72; Bosworth 1983: 150-61.

27     McKechnie 1999: 49.

28     In some cases, his points seem plausible, but insignificant. For instance, McKechnie 1999: 53 doubts that Meleager was murdered in a temple, something only Curtius (10. 9. 21) reports. Even if it was an invention (although there is nothing unbelievable about it), is it worth rejecting Curtius’ general testimony?

29     As McKechnie 1999: 45-6 notes.

30     For instance, he discusses (53-55) Curtius’ attribution to Ptolemy (10.6.13-14) of the view that the Macedonians should not be ruled by the sons of Asian women, noting that it resembles views Justin (13.2.9) attributed to Meleager and suggests that Curtius changed the attribution to Ptolemy because this better fit the base for his Roman-Macedonian comparison and the debate on the three constitutions that McKechnie believes so distorted Curtius’ account (see below). Nothing about McKechnie’s discussion demonstrates that Ptolemy did not have such views: even McKechnie concedes that a number of Macedonians may have held such views; Justin’s attribution of these views to Meleager hardly constitutes proof that Curtius is wrong, whether or not Trogus wrote before Curtius (both men may have held these views; both authors may be arbitrarily attributing views held by many to well-known personalities; few scholars would generically prefer the testimony of Justin/Trogus to that of Curtius); Ptolemy’s acceptance of Alexander IV as king in 311 (see McKechnie 1999: 53 n. 49 for references) is not even good evidence for his genuine views in 311, let alone those years before in the days after Alexander’s death. In addition, McKechnie 1999: 53 mistakenly includes on his list of incidents uniquely described in Curtius the purging of the army though Arrian FGrH 156 F 1.4 also mentions it.

31     For instance, Justin (13.2.9), though attributing it to a different Macedonian, echoes statements in Curtius about how wrong it was to have Macedonians ruled by descendants of those whom they had conquered (the imperial race theme McKechnie detects in Curtius). Justin describes the reaction of the infantry to the news of the preference of the elite for Roxane’s unborn child in terms that go even further than Curtius does to imply that the Macedonians believed that they had a right to participate in the succession debate, pedites indignati nullas sibi consiliorum partes relictas ... (Just. 13.3.1).

32     Even moments of obviously rhetorical imagining based on parallel Roman experience can be useful. For instance, Curtius’ description (10.5.7-16) of the confusion, panic and fear felt by the court, army and inhabitants of Babylon the night after Alexander’s death, tells us much about what it was like to live through a period in which the man who ruled one’s world had died, civil war threatened, and uncertainty was everywhere.

33     McKechnie’ s argument (1999: 54-9) that Curtius generally modeled his succession debate on the debate on the three constitutions, first appearing in Herodotus (3.80-83), does not convince.

34     McKechnie 1999: 60 exaggerates the degree of difference between Curtius’ description of the king and that of other authors. For instance, Justin’s narrative attributes to Meleager a description of Arrhidaeus (Just. 13.2.8) that is, if anything, a more flattering description of Arrhidaeus than anything in Curtius. Meleager refers to Arrhidaeus as comem et cunctis non suo tantum, verum et patris Philippi nomine acceptissimum.

35     See discussion and references in Badian 1964: 264; Errington 1970: 63; Hammond 1988: 123. Karl Lehmann, on the basis of his reconstruction of an inscription, suggested that sometime before his brother’s death and probably before he left Macedonia, Arrhidaeus made an offering of a building at the shrine of the Great Gods at Samothrace, a sanctuary on the borders of Macedonia much patronized by Macedonian royalty, starting with Philip II. His reconstruction is not generally accepted. See discussion and references in Cole 1984: 16-20. At Luxor (see Stewart 1993: 174) and at Samothrace (see McCredie 1968: 222-30) buildings were dedicated in his name or that of both kings. Cole 1984: 16-20 interprets both Samothrace dedications to a continuing Argead policy to emphasize a northern religious shrine in order to increase Macedonian prestige. Obviously, we cannot know whether Philip Arrhidaeus made this policy or simply did as those directing him suggested. Cole 1984: 19-20 seems to take him seriously as a policy maker, rejecting Olympias as a possible sponsor of the earlier building project and considering him more plausible.

36     See Heckel 1983-84: 193-200 and Carney 1988: 392-4 for general discussions of her career.

37     On Adea’s career, see Carney 1987: 496-502 and 1994: 357- 80.

38     See discussion and references in Tritle 1988: 18-30 on the dependability of the anecdotes included in Plutarch’s life of Phocion. See below for two seemingly contradictory Plutarch passages.

39     Plutarch (Phoc. 33.6) reports that Arrhidaeus ‘γλασεν’ (laughed or was amused) and that the foreign and Macedonian members of his court, being at leisure, were eager to listen to the competing ambassadors. One could deduce from this that Arrhidaeus’ entourage was more seriously interested in the dispute than the king himself (although Plutarch’s diction actually implies that they were looking for a way to entertain themselves), but it is not clear that Plutarch intended to make such a distinction.

40     Philip Stadter was kind enough to discuss (in correspondence) this and other passages in Plutarch relevant to an understanding of Arrhidaeus. I am grateful for his comments and have included them at appropriate points in the discussion, although I have not always agreed with his conclusions. Philip Stadter suggested that Arrhidaeus may have been reacting to the angry voices of Phocion and Hegemon, much as a child or an animal might, not necessarily to the words themselves. Since two other elements in Plutarch’s narrative of the same incident confirm the idea that Arrhidaeus did have some verbal comprehension of the argument (his laughter or amusement at Hagnonides’ sarcastic remark and Polyperchon’s fear that the king would believe the accusation of Hegemon), I am more inclined to conclude that Arrhidaeus’ understanding of events derived from a limited understanding of the argument as well as from a reaction to the anger in the voices of Polyperchon’s enemies.

41     Greek literary tradition is hostile to Macedonians in general and to the family of Philip in particular. One can hardly ignore this prejudice in stories about Philip’s and Alexander’s drunkenness and occasional irresponsibility, but it seems clear that Macedonians did not draw the hard line between public and private, between symposium and public hearing that southern Greeks did or claimed to draw. Borza has argued persuasively that the symposium had a quasi- constitutional function at the Macedonian court and that it was the venue for important decision-making and power plays, no matter how drunk the participants (Borza 1983: 45-55, 1990: 241-2). The style of the Argead court was rough and ready, an odd combination of sophistication and provincialism. Arrhidaeus’ behavior, although not normal, needs to be interpreted in that context.

42     Neither of our extant sources on this incident specifically state that Adea Eurydice and her husband were in Macedonia at the time and that Polyperchon was not, but they do imply it: Justin (14.5.1-5) says that Adea Eurydice, having learned that Polyperchon was returning from Greece to Macedonia, wrote to him firing him and hiring Cassander. Cassander seems briefly present with the king’s wife and king and then is said to return to Greece. Diodorus (19.11.1) seems to suggest that Adea Eurydice and Philip Arrhidaeus had been in Macedonia for some time prior to their battle with Olympias, Polyperchon and the rest; certainly he clearly states that Adea Eurydice took over the administration of the monarchy there in Macedonia.

43     Justin 14.5.9 says that both were in charge of the army, but Diodorus 19.11.2 clearly pictures Adea Eurydice being in sole command. Duris (ap. Athen. 13.560f) describes the confrontation as the first war between two women and thus also assumes that Adea Eurydice was in charge. On Adea Eurydice’s military background and orientation, see Carney 2000: 132-7.

44     Whether Tomb II at Vergina contained the bones of Philip II and a wife or those of his son Philip Arrhidaeus and Adea Eurydice remains disputed: see Carney 1991: 17-26 for discussion and references.

45     In general, information about his actions is better evidence for determining his ability to function than the few extant attempts by ancient sources to describe his general mental condition (although these attempts will also be examined). Most such descriptions prove, as we shall see, too vague to do more than indicate that he had some sort of mental problem. Certainly these descriptions hardly provide enough information for a diagnosis, particularly since they are founded on a medical understanding very different from our own.

46     Justin twice (13.2.11 and 14.5.2) refers to Arrhidaeus’ ‘valetudo’, his ill-health, but the context of these two passages seems to suggest mental ill-health since his health keeps him from the decision-making tasks rather than physical activity. Plutarch (Alex. 77.5) speaks of a disease of the body but explicitly connects the disease to limited reasoning power. Simon 1978: 215 points out that in the Hippocratic corpus, it is assumed that all diseases of the mind are or come from diseases of the body; similarly, Herodotus 3.33.1 makes a connection between a disease of Cambyses’ body and one of his mind.

47     Garland 1995: 64. Parker 1996: 219 argues that though Greeks often stoned or spat at the sight of madmen or epileptics, they did not consider them religiously polluted. He points out that none of the discovered sacred laws included those suffering from these diseases among polluted people banned from entering a temple. Physical oddity or deformity, however, is a different matter.

48     It is true that the Heidelberg Epitome (FGrH F 1.2) calls him epileptikos (the only source to do so). Fredricksmeyer 1981: 334 n.27 denies that this passage constitutes evidence (as Lehmann 1980: 529 had assumed it did) that Arrhidaeus was epileptic (possibly because the term can also, according to LSJ, generally refer to the disabled), but does not explain his reasoning. Greenwalt 1984: 75 n.37 says that Arrhidaeus’ symptoms were similar to those of Cambyses whom Herodotus (3.33.1) said suffered from the ‘sacred disease’, but is not certain that either man had epilepsy. Arrhidaeus’ and Cambyses’ symptoms are, however (see below) not very similar. Had Arrhidaeus suffered from epilepsy, it seems unlikely that he would have taken part in public ritual so frequently since, as I have noted, Greek tradition said that epileptics should avoid company when they felt an attack coming (Hippocr. Morb. Sacr. 15; see Temkin 1971: 8). Garland 1995: 65 points out that an epileptic attack could have interrupted a religious observance. No source mentions that he suffered anything that sounds like a seizure.

49     For instance, Diodorus (18.16.1) reports that when Perdiccas was regent, he took with him King Philip and the royal army and campaigned against Ariarathes, ruler of Cappadocia. In the rest of the section on this campaign (18.16.1-3), Perdiccas is clearly understood to be in command and Philip Arrhidaeus is not mentioned again. Referring to that same campaign, Diodorus (18.22.1) says that Perdiccas and King Philip had defeated Ariarathes. Diodorus then proceeds to recount the details of attacks on two cities in Pisidia. He uses the plural (continuing to refer to Perdiccas and Philip Arrhidaeus) to talk about these two attacks in a general way, but when he refers to specific actions he mentions Perdiccas (Diod. 18.22.6) or those around Perdiccas (18.22.5). Obviously Perdiccas commanded the army and obviously Arrhidaeus was present with the army, but one cannot really tell if the king went into battle.

50     Two incidents already discussed suggest this: his donning of his brother’s royal robes and his reaction to Hegemon’s tone. Several passages stress that he was able to manage the mere appearance of rule rather than the reality. Curtius (10.8.8) notes that the pristina quidem regiae species manebat, with all the outward forms of court ceremony and procedure continuing. Plutarch (Mor. 337d-e) describes him, accurately or not, as a mere reciter of lines or actor, a mute figure with a diadem who paraded across the world as across a stage and elsewhere (Mor. 791e) likens him to mute actor playing a spear-bearer, who was capable only of the name and appearance (perhaps ‘stage character’) of king. See below for further discussion.

51     Plutarch (Alex. 77.5) claimed that Arrhidaeus was intelligent and not ignoble as a boy, but that his ability to reason was destroyed when Olympias poisoned him. Whatever the accuracy of the report, his mental limitations were understood to have appeared suddenly. Plutarch Mor. 791e clearly treats Arrhidaeus’ condition as permanent, twice using roots of adunameo (to be incapable) to refer to him, in contrast to Antigonus’ capable old age. The passage assumes that Arrhidaeus’ condition is as incapable of reversal as Antigonus’ age.

52     Herodotus reports that both kings were originally hupomargos (half mad), but then got worse (3.29.1, 30.1; 6.75.1). See Padel 1995: 21-2. Like roots of mania, this term refers to violent, frenzied madness.

53     Greenwalt 1984: 75-6 does so (see further below).

54     Philip Stadter points out that image of the mute spear-carrier also appears in Alex. 77. 5, where Perdiccas is said to have towed Arrhidaeus along as a spear-carrier of basileia (monarchy or royal power) and that the image was meant to contrast the appearance of power with the reality of it.

55     For instance, four times (Mor. 67f, 179b, 334d, 634c-d) Plutarch tells a story in which a harpist reproaches Philip II for claiming expertise in technical musicianship when it fitting for a king only to appreciate music, but in Per. 1.5, it is Alexander who has inappropriate musical expertise and it is Philip who knows better and is reproachful.

56     Philip Stadter, in terms of these apparently conflicting passages, concluded that ‘different purposes and contexts led Plutarch to express himself differently. ’

57     Philip Stadter notes that a little later in this same passage, Plutarch mentions Phocion (Mor. 791e), who commanded troops at the age of eighty, as another example of vital and energetic old age, and suggests that Plutarch, in the Phocion passage already discussed (33.5-7), may have had in mind a contrast between the aged but able Athenian leader and the youthful but disabled Macedonian king.

58     See Garland 1995: vii-viii, who refers to the Greeks’ tendency of offer ‘an image of physiological perfection’ and who notes that they always preferred the generic and idealized to the specific.

59     For instance, the face of Philip II must have been terribly disfigured by the wound that cost him an eye, but sources report only the injury and offer no details on disfigurement Even Demosthenes (18.67), in the course of listing Philip’s various wounds, says only that his eye had been destroyed or knocked out; he does not comment on how Philip looked. Similarly, Aelian (V.H. 12.43) simply observes that Antigonus had only one eye and was therefore called Cyclops; Plutarch (Sert. 1.8) remarks that the most warlike generals (including Philip, Antigonus, Hannibal and Sertorius) have been one-eyed. Only Pliny (NH 35.90) hints that the loss of an eye (in this case, he refers to Antigonus) may have been disfiguring: he explains that Apelles did a portrait of the king in three-quarters view, avoiding the depiction of the part of the face with the missing eye. See Prag 1990: 244, fig. 3, for a reconstruction of the face of Philip II. I do not mean, by this reference, to indicate that I accept the identification of the bones in Tomb II at Vergina as those of Philip II, but, since Prag used literary descriptions of Philip’s wound, I do believe that his reconstruction gives a good sense for how disfiguring Philip’s wound (even in Prag’s second version) might have been.

60     There are words that could easily be applied to the retarded (Heidelberg Epitome FGrH 155 F 1.2 calls him nothros (slow, sluggish) and Plutarch Mor. 337d-e calls him kophos (mute or possibly dull)), but they might also be applied to those with normal intelligence. Padel 1995: 13-39 has a useful discussion of terminology related to insanity found in tragedy.

61     Two passages in Herodotus make a distinction, though it may be one of degree rather than kind: at 3.25.2 Cambyses is said to be raving/mad and not of sound mind εμμανης τε εων και ου φρενηρης and at 3.30.1 Herodotus says that Cambyses was mad, having been earlier being not of sound mind εμανη, εων ουδε προτερον φρενηρης.

62     Grossman and Tarjan 1987: 1. Garland 1995: 137-9 has a brief discussion of both mental retardation and mental illness, but most of it deals with mental illness and his very short discussion of retardation is basically an argument from probability. He refers to no specific incidence of mental retardation in a Greek source and simply assumes that there must have been retarded people.

63     It is interesting that Fontana (1960: 128) begins his discussion of Arrhidaeus’ actual mental state by asking whether he was as ‘mentecatto’ as the sources claim. In modern Italian, ‘mentecatto’ is a word which can be used to refer to both the mentally retarded and the mentally ill.

64     Greenwalt 1984: 75-6 considers these similarities persuasive evidence that Arrhidaeus, like the other two rulers, suffered from some sort of mental illness. Generally the texts use a negative in terms of some root of phren (mind or reason). Plutarch (Alex. 10.2, 77.5) describes Arrhidaeus as a man who was not of sound mind ου φρενηρης and who reasoned imperfectly or incompletely ατελη δε το φρονειν. Appian (Syr. 52) says that he was not considered rational ουκ εμφρονα νομιζομενον. Similarly, Herodotus (3.25.2, 30.1) says Cambyses was not of sound mind ou frenhrhj and states (3.33.1) that his reasoning powers were unhealthy μηδε τας φρενας υγιαινειν.

65     Herodotus uses roots of mania (madness) about Cambyses (3.25.2, 3.30.1; 3.33.1; 3.34.1; 3.35.4) and Cleomenes (6.75.1; 6.84.1). See further Padel 1995: 20-1, 23-9. On his usage of hupomargos, see above. These passages include descriptions of violent, unprovoked acts, whereas Arrhidaeus was generally a much more passive and reactive figure; on the only occasion in which he is known to have threatened violence, his behavior was indeed provoked, an over-reaction to the perceived hostility of Hegemon (see above).

66     As Padel 1995: 27-8 seems to do, but at 128 n. 62, she translates ‘silly, stupid’ for similar diction.

67     Philip Stadter believes that a story told in the Moralia (564c) about another Arrhidaeus may help to explain Plutarch’s understanding of the nature of the Macedonian ruler’s mental problems. In the story, a certain Arrhidaeus who had lived foolishly, returned to life as Thespius, complete with his intelligence, having left his body with the rest of the soul behind as a kind of anchor. Stadter suggests that Plutarch may have used the name ‘Arrhidaeus’ because he understood the condition of the two men to be parallel, that the king had a body and part of a soul but not the thinking part μοιρα ... φρονουντι.

68     Contra Greenwalt 1984: 75, who finds the terms deriving from phren convincing evidence of madness. Adams 1997: 229 n. 1, aside from reading the passages describing Arrhidaeus already discussed to refer more directly to mental illness than I do, also seems to take the incident involving Hegemon as a sign of mental instability.

69     Luckasson et al. 1992: 1. In the U.S., the American Association on Mental Retardation (hereafter AAMR) has long dominated the understanding and classification of mental retardation. It began producing manuals with definitions in 1921; the 1992 edition is the ninth published by the organization.

70     Earlier AAMR definitions stressed intellectual capacity alone and focused on IQ scores, but the fifth edition of its manual (published in 1959) introduced adaptive behavior as a criterion (Luckasson et al. 1992: ix) and subsequent scholarship increasingly stressed functionality and insisted on an understanding of retardation as a combination of limited intellectual ability and limited adaptive skills. (Zigler and Hodapp 1986: 5-6, 45; Wrestling 1986: 21). The current definition reflects this change. Since many researchers argued that retardation is culturally relative rather than absolute (see references in Zigler and Hodapp 1986: 13), the current definition also emphasizes social and communal context.

71     See Luckasson et al. 1992: ix-xi and Jones 1996: 37-43 for discussions of the changing AAMR definition and classification of mental retardation.

72     Jones 1996 employs the old classification even in its subtitle; Thomas and Patton 1994 also use the old classification system in their title and even Luckasson et al. 1992: 70.

73     So Jones 1996: 42, specifically referring to P. L. 94-142, first passed in 1975.

74     This appears to be the reason why Luckasson et al. 1992: 70 use the old system.

75     Luckasson et al. 1992: 14-15.

76     Plutarch (Alex. 77.5) says that his dianoia (intelligence, understanding) was destroyed. Justin (13.2.11) and the Heidelberg Epitome (FGrH 155 F 1.2) both connect the need for someone to rule in his place to his disability, demonstrating that the rest of the elite found his abilities substandard.

77     See Luckasson et al. 1992: 40-1 for explication of the various adaptive skills detailed in the AAMR definition. Communication: only Curtius reports that Arrhidaeus ever spoke in public at any length and the Phocion incident suggests limited verbal comprehension. Jones 1996: 74 reports that 90 percent of the mildly retarded display speech and language disorders. Social skills: Arrhidaeus’ attempted attack on Hegemon demonstrates an inability to control impulses and to understand standards of conduct. His evasive conduct in terms of both Perdiccas and Meleager implies problems coping with the demands of others. Self-direction: the same circumstance relates to problems with being assertive, making choices, and dealing with unfamiliar problems. Work: the assignment of a regent obviously means he had fundamental difficulty in performing the tasks required of a ruler, as does the incident with Phocion and Hegemon.

78     For one thing, according to the old standards for mild retardation (IQ range of 50-70 or 75), 75% of the retarded population belonged in this category (Zigler and Hodapp 1986: 9; Wrestling 1986: 24). Moreover, Arrhidaeus’ ability to follow arguments and participate in a modest way in disputes suggests an intellectual capacity comparatively close to the average.

79     See Luckasson et al. 1992: 26-34 for a description of and explanation of classification on the basis of the intensity of the need for support, noting that one must also refer specifically to adaptive skill limitations when making the classification. Determination of classification by this system is necessarily somewhat subjective because there is no internationally recognized score or age equivalent index to assess adaptive skill limitations as there is for assessment of intellectual capacity (Luckasson et al. 1992: 42). In terms of Arrhidaeus, one might argue that his need for support, rather than being ‘intermittent’, a support that is supposedly episodic in nature, his need was ‘limited’, that is to say, consistent over time. Certainly, he always had a regent, but he seems to have done a number of tasks, ritual, formal occasions, without obvious help.

80     Wrestling 1986: 37; Jones 1996: 65. This happens because the discrepancy between the retarded and the average gradually becomes more apparent as academic standards grow more demanding and behavioral problems appear. Those once categorized as mildly retarded (i.e. seventy five percent of all retarded people) can reach skill levels up to fourth or fifth grade levels (Grossman and Tarjan 1987: 8)

81     Garland 1995: 20 points out that in antiquity only a few infants suffering from any obvious congenital deformity would have survived the first few weeks of life, but that the incidence of people suffering from postnatally acquired disabilities would have been higher.

82     Luckasson et al. 1992: 70 note that perhaps 50% of retardation has more than one possible cause and that etiology may be cumulative or interactive, involving both biological and social/environmental factors. Grossman and Tarjan 1987: 138- 41 refer to permanent neurological damage stemming from various forms of meningitis, seizures during the course of acute infections, lead poisoning and head trauma. Menkes 1985: 328, n. 100 cites studies that show a significant number (29%) of those who survived hermophilis meningitis had significant handicaps and that a much larger number functioned at a significantly lower level than that of their peers.

83     Jones 1996: 51 mentions malaria. On the prevalence of malaria in ancient Macedonia, see Borza 1979: 102-24.

84     Wrestling 1986: 87 points to a variety of events that may leave people functioning at the level of retardation because of brain damage (often caused by deprivation of oxygen), among them: child abuse, cerebral palsy; stroke; heart disease; asphyxia, heat stroke.

85     Jones 1996: 67.

86     Jones 1996: 77 notes that difficulty with reading social situations and the frequent consequent inappropriate behavior, rather than limited intellectual capacity, is often what gets retarded people identified.

87     Jones 1996: 80.

88     Bennett- Gates and Kreitler 1999: 130.

89     Wrestling 1986: 140.

90     Wrestling 1986: 142.

91     Stress caused by failure to meet average standards often means that the mildly retarded display aggressive, withdrawn, or negative behavior: Grossman and Tarjan 1987: 19.

92     Nonetheless, personality traits may impede or increase the success of retarded people in coping with their environment, just as they do the success of people of average intelligence (Zigler and Hodapp 1986: 10).

93     Errington 1970: 51, ‘mentally defective’, and 1990: 116, ‘feeble-minded’; Green 1991: 28, ‘half- witted’; Stewart 1993: 214, ‘mentally defective’; Badian 1964: ‘feeble-mindedness’; Bosworth 1992: 79, ‘idiot.’ Most of these descriptions were once employed as terms in classification systems for mental retardation (see Jones 1996: 40 for a short overview). Feelings about the mentally retarded are so strong that such terms, at first used in hostile fashion about the retarded alone, tend to become generally pejorative in use and so lose their technical significance. It is interesting that Luckasson et al. 1992: xi note that many individuals with this disability urged the AAMR to drop the term ‘mental retardation’ because it too has acquired a stigma.

94     Philip Stadter suggests that the description, which he believes was certainly not meant literally, is taken from an earlier account of Charillus, who really was in swaddling clothes when proclaimed king.

95     For instance, Curtius 10.8.8-9 speaks about how the appearance of royal normality continued, but adds that for those present at Babylon, a comparison of their new king to their former one inevitably excited longing for the one they had lost.

96     Just. 13. 2. 11 calls her a Larissan whore and Plut. Alex. 77. 5 calls her obscure and common. Although some scholars have taken these judgements literally, see Greenwalt 1984: 69-72 for convincing arguments contra. As Greenwalt argues, the period of the struggle between Olympias and her grandson and Adea Eurydice and Philip Arrhidaeus generated a propaganda war of which this is probably a remnant.

97     See Griffiths 1988: 51-78 for the possibility that the portraits of the mad kings Cambyses and Cleomenes in Herodotus, were fiction or folk-tale and possibly propaganda too.

98     Badian 1964: 263-4 rightly criticizes this idea, which he takes to be that of Fontana 1960: 128-33. As we have seen, only Curtius could possibly be taken to support this view and only in the sense that Curtius does not explicitly say that Arrhidaeus had mental limitations. Fontana, however, does not so much deny that Arrhidaeus had any problem at all as to raise the possibility that the degree of difficulty was exaggerated by our sources (Fontana 1960: 128). Fontana argues that Hieronymus was the source of much of our tradition and that he, favoring Eumenes and Olympias, had an interest in emphasizing the infirmity of the king. Badian’s criticism ignores this part of Fontana’s view of Arrhidaeus. Fontana’s suggestion (1960: 131) that Arrhidaeus was merely weak or sick (‘debole o malato’) is indeed unconvincing.

99     Carney 1983: 260-72; Greenwalt 1989: 19-43; Borza 1990: 240.

100     Borza 1990: 240.

101     Hammond 1988: 138. For instance, see Diod. 18.55.2.

102     See discussion and references in Carney 1995: 370-1, especially nn. 9 and 10.

103     The collapse of the Argead dynasty was a disaster from which it took Macedonia about two generations to recover, particularly because the Antipatrid dynasty that initially replaced it died out so quickly. Ancient sources blamed the demise of the Antipatrid dynasty on its destruction (through the murders of Cassander) of the Argead house (Paus. 9.7.2-4; Just. 16.1.15- 17; 16.2.5; Plut. Demetr. 37.2)

104     Carney 1995: 372-4.

105     See Carney 1995: 374 n. 19.

106     See Carney 1995: 368-76.

107     Adams 1997: 238 believes that the ability to transfer guardianship or regency from Polyperchon to Cassander was ‘fully within his legal rights. ’

108     See Errington 1970: 58, n. 71 for discussion and references. Heidelberg Epitome FGrH 155 F 1 and App. Syr. 52 specifically say that Arrhidaeus would be king only until Alexander IV’s majority. The Romance (3. 32) has Alexander’s will make Arrhidaeus king only until Roxane’s child is born. At that point, according to the & #145;will’, if the baby proves male, he will be king (and Arrhidaeus presumably unemployed) but if the baby is female, the choice is left to the Macedonians as to whether to retain Arrhidaeus as king or choose another man. Other sources do not refer to Arrhidaeus’ kingship as temporary. If one accepts Bosworth’s suggestion that Arrhidaeus was actually sole king for about a year before Alexander IV was proclaimed (Bosworth 1993: 420-26), one could further surmise that Arrhidaeus’ kingship was qualified, made temporary, at this point. It seems, however, unlikely that the army would have accepted such an agreement in 323, if publicly proclaimed, and not much more likely in 322. Hammond 1988: 106 implausibly supposes that Arrhidaeus was Alexander IV’s guardian and was elected king for that reason.

109     See Carney 1994: 376-7 for the point that Diodorus narrative, presumably based on the knowledgeable Hieronymus of Cardia, consistently portrays all the Successors as eager for basileia, even soon after Alexander’s death.

110     Plutarch (Mor. 791e) mentions that Arrhidaeus was insulted by those who really ruled.

111     Of those for whom Alexander arranged Persian marriages at Susa, only the marriage of Seleucus to Apame is known to have lasted. See further Eddy 1961: 63-4.

112     See Hammond 1989: 21-3 on the religious aspects of Macedonian kingship.

113     Outraged by the murder of Philip’s daughter Cynnane, the troops forced Perdiccas to arrange the marriage she had died trying to accomplish. Her daughter nearly won the army’s loyalty away from Antipater. The Macedonian army went over to Olympias because of who she was. Similarly, even the men who condemned Olympias to death hesitated to execute her because of who she was. Olympias’ daughter Cleopatra, Alexander’s full sister, also had some clout with the troops. In each case, the sources describe the people in terms of their blood relationship to Alexander and Philip.

114     Even if Arrhidaeus had only comparatively recently joined the expedition (see above), it is hard to believe that the Macedonians were unaware of his problems.

115     Hammond 1989: 22 cites the following passage as proof of the importance of the royal presence. Justin 7.2.8-12 tells recounts this tale: in the sixth century, the Illyrians, disdainful of the Macedonians because they had only an infant king, at first defeated the Macedonians in battle, but when the baby king was brought to the battlefield in his cradle, the Macedonians believing that their earlier defeat was the result of the absence of the king’s authority (and also inspired by pity for the child), routed the Illyrians. What they had lacked, says Justin, was not their courage but their king. Hammond also points to the importance of the presence of the body of Alexander during the assemblies after his death. I would add that, for some years after Alexander’s death, various of his personal relics (e.g. his tent or his throne) were manipulated by various of the Successors to gain authority with the Macedonian troops (see references and discussion in Errington 1975: 138-45.

116     On these events and their motivation, see also Carney 1987: 500- 2 and 1994: 357-80.

117     A suggestive historical parallel: Henry VI of England, although still a minor, sometimes considered retarded and later unable to rule because of mental illness, began to sign documents and take other personal initiatives in July of 1436, exercising his royal role more than a year before he was formally emancipated. Since he himself formally announced his intention to rule in person to the Great Council in November of 1437, it appears that he emancipated himself, first informally and then formally. (See Griffiths 1981: 231, 275- 76.) English monarchy, by the fifteenth century, was certainly less personal and more complex than fourth century BC Macedonian monarchy, as the existence of the Great Council (Macedonia lacked a formal council) indicates, but it was still hard to stop a king from being a king if he chose to be one.

118     There are other possibilities. For instance, Stewart 1993: 301-2, in a discussion of the Alexander Sarcophagus, suggests that one scene on the sarcophagus may depict Philip Arrhidaeus as a participant in the murder of Perdiccas. (His identification is based on the fact that the figure in question wore a purple chiton and had a cutting for a now lost diadem.) Stewart assumes that the king may have been persuaded to join the plot in order to lend it respectability. It is even possible that he needed no persuading, perhaps resenting Perdiccas.

119     See Carney 1994: 364 who suggests two other possibilities: Adea Eurydice managed their escape or Polyperchon was actually persuaded.