Chapter 2
(The dual reality)
2.1) Starting from the individuality.
Why "starting from the individuality and not rather from the "totality"?
For the simple reason that a philosophy which
intends to found it on the reality must base
itself on what is the "first" perceivable
and certain reality "for us" (that
are the subjects who look into), and it is
that of "I", or if one prefers
of the "himself". The totality
refers to an abstract and unreal entity,
appointable only how sum of all the real
beings, and in as such a pure "flatus
vocis" (a universal one) (42) to repeat
the famous Roscellin expression. (43)
I will enter the subject from the outside,
with a historical mention about the most
significant modern thinker who placed the
individuality and its rights to base of all his thought.
This thinker, who was calling Max Stirner
(44), more than a hundred and fifty years
ago, was placing the problem of the singularity
as human as "absolute uniqueness",
combining this, in terms of "individual
power", with the possession and the
complete enslaving of every object both real
(the things) and virtual (the thought), by
which had to cease every physical or psychological
dependence. Therefore Stirner is a subversive
philosopher, which brand as "spirit"
all what is placed outside of the individuality
and prevent it from fully fulfilling. So
his philosophy is one of the most radical
materialistic world and existence vision.
For Stirner what is "spirit" is
shown like a set of "ghosts", among
which are principally placed the religions
and the humanisms (Christians or Marxists are they), but among
which unexpectedly appears also the freedom,
in as it, in its classical form, would be
incompetent to express adequately the deep
demand which is to the base of "uniqueness",
which is not a " to free himself from"
but a "to take possession of ".
Coherently with this assumption in fact Stirner
says that every freedom, more than to be
realized, must owned and likewise the thought
not exercised, but, just, "owned".
To the base of the widespread possession
that is realized for means of the "individual
power" is an egoistic radical behaviour,
absolute and unconditional, without which
the individual would live "estranged
by himself". (45)
Began this my speech about the individuality
mentioning Stirner because I think I will
not find better historian hook to introduce
the theme I intend to develop. Already in
the former centuries the ancient philosophers
had placed the problem of the essence of
the individuality (in secular sense)(46), until the Christian
Scholastic thinkers who seal the uniqueness
(or singularity) in the soul, immortal element
without which the human individual should
being only a living body among other ones.
The interesting aspect in Stirner is to have
turned over this perspective, attributing
to the corporeal "willing" uniqueness
the "unique" and absolute value
which refer to, purely reserving to the soul
a phantasmic existence.
The disconcerting and provocative way with
which Stirner places the problem of the realization
of the individuality certainly hides also the intention of place
himself in antithesis to the romantic conformism
which was attributing the "divinity"
to the creator "genius" one. For
Stirner the essence of the individuality
is instead represented by the individual
will to not depend than from himself, and
to "only" draw from himself the
reasons of self-being. However this last
and original target of uniqueness make it
very next to that blind "life will"
placed by Schopenauer to base of everything
of the "living" world (47), moved
and stressed at individual level. But the
important to notice is that, in any case,
this corporeal Stirnerian uniqueness cannot
escape from the laws of the necessity, to which is submitted the living matter in its generality and therefore it is absolutely
different from the concept of individuality how is asserted in the RD.
I used the German thinker to put in clear
terms the topic of a "strong" individuality,
as by him conceived, to then notice the paradox
inside his thesis and to oppose the our one,
that centre itself in the core of idema, as uniqueness not just at the level of
"necessitated" materiality but
in that one of the extra-material tendency
to made self free of the physic laws. On
the other hand the idema is not any material "being" that
live the instant of present (as in Stirnerian
individuality) but is the potential "place"
where happen the elaboration and formation
process of something that is "irreducible"
to the matter.
The theme of individuality, that I have introduced starting from the
Stirner thought and on which have dwelt is
one of the bases on which it has built the
RD and it is starting from it that we will
be able to gather the big differences with
other immanentistic philosophies (from that
of Buddha to that of Spinoza). In fact these
ones hypostatize a Nothing or a Whole in
which the individuality must melt to get the peace (the nirvana) or the realization of himself in the totality
of the God-Nature. The individuality is actually represented above all by that
"desire" of identity that the Buddhist
wants completely to cancel, as primary source
of the suffering. Desire of identity which stimulates and
worries, that torments and exalts, but that
pushes us to hypothesize a natural horizon
of that desire, that according to the RD
is an ambit in which are cancelled the "appearing"
(or better "functional") qualities
of the forms of aggregation of the matter (actually always reducible to the quantity)(48) and where emerge those authentic ones,
escaping to such quantitative reduction.
On this point a synthetic specification on
which we will get back however becomes opportune.
When we declare "apparent" the
qualities of the matter do not intend to affirm that it is not possible
to attribute some "qualities" to
the material entities, but simply that they
are not-substantial to the object which them
shows and therefore (the pun is to forgive)
are "not qualitative" qualities.
In fact the qualities inherent the matter are actually "functions" and they
have never "in themselves" the
aesthetic or affective prerogatives what
we can they attribute .
However the RD in its opposition to Buddhism
an other ascetic philosophies, which pursue
the fusion of individual in the totality
for the target of remove the suffering, does not lead for anything the man to a
situation of constant "tension",
which in such case would be the exact opposite
of what which proposes. In fact it places
its "solution" not in the nullification
of the individuality, but in "engaging" of it as starting
base of positive evolution of the person
and his realization. In other words, while
the spiritualist monistic philosophies assert
the "dissolution" of the individuality in the "totality", the RD instead
wants its "consolidation" and qualitative
formation into idema targeting "difference" and not
"homologation".
Then we repeat again the initial question:
why starting from the individuality? Because not only this one is the unique,
certain and inalienable real for each of
us, but because it represents also the real
"frontier" of the matter. It is only in the individuality that a material entity loses the intrinsic
character of the quantity, to access a quality that from the matter exceed, entering so in contact with that
ambit which "is" the quality itself. Therefore this consideration diametrically
removes us from a totalizing materialism where the individuality in the end is only
the noblest appearance of the matter. And it is in base of this that we can say
to indomitable materialists that since the
sound which is to the base of the Beethoven
music or the colour which animates the Michelangelo
frescos are pure quantities (the acoustic or optic frequencies) looking
in the individuality of the artist for what which turns such
quantity into the music or painting quality becomes
indispensable.
But it is there of more: the individuality is not only what makes us to think and to
love (or to hate) in a "certain way",
but it is also what makes us speak in a certain
way, say a yes or a not in a certain way,
smile in a certain way, look in a certain
way, walk in a certain way, etc. Then it
becomes the true "emergent" element
of the matter. Of other part we can ask the spiritualists
what sense could be in humiliating the individuality, which is true quality, to make it converged in a general spirit
in which it would reach a "widespread
and abstract perfection". This appears
a clear contradiction in itself, because
what which is distinguished from the generality,
as particular quality, must be considered a value and not a disvalue,
and that, to me seems, can be worth in general.
Unless please say that the only virtue is
in the obedience or in the homage to an abstract
principle (the Whole or the Nothing) and
in the nullification of himself.
However someone could advance the suspicion
that we have thrown out the concept of soul
from the door to make it re-enter through
the window by means of idema. This suspicion vanishes if one considers
that the idema is material and springs from the matter, while the soul would be a divine element
lowered in the body. While the first is the
result of an evolutionary process of the
living matter (attributable so, even if in
forms probably more elementary, also to other
forms of the biosphere) the second would
be an extraneous spiritual entity on the
body, which would only be lodged from.
Of other part it must saying that the "soul"
concept, not as entity of divine origin but
as material principle of "animation"
(i.e. of life) is as ancient as the man and
that theologies have simply assumed it, changing
the characteristics. The same eschatological
petition of the soul survival the death of
the body has been yes theorized by the institutionalized
religions, but it pre-exist to them as primitive
anthropological expression of the real and
not equivocal separation between the essence
of "living" and that of "feeling"
one. That suggests a kind of original anthropological
paradigm (and not necessarily religious)
that could be express with: "the body
lives, the mind thinks it and the soul feel",
where this sensitive feel about the soul
is not other than the essence of the individuality.
If this elementary ascertainment, what has
done by the ancient man of a hundred thousand
years ago as we do it and as with all probability
the men of the XXII century will do we confuse
with theology, that ratifies it to rear,
to covering it of "divinity" and
transcendence, we perform a historical and
perspective mistake, with which we fall down
in the stiffened schemes of the dullest materialism. And the overcoming of old mental schemes
is actually possible only recovering the
grain from the bran, that is distinguish
what is authentic from what is only ideological
dross.
The belief of the survival of the individuality to the death of the body is ancient as much
as the man and the religions if anything,
in their ethical and metaphysical setting
work of what which was anthropologically
guessed, have not done other but rearrange
"feeling" in a "belief",
stiffening it in the dogma. The man is wrapped
from always in the mystery of what which
his reason cannot analyse and understand;
by way of compensation the intuition could
feel the not-rationalizable one, as who,
completely being in a room dark, can intuit
the immobile presence of someone that he
neither hears nor sees. This is really the
point which definitely distinguishes a philosophy
from a religion: this one fix that "presence"
as sure for doctrine, while that one reasonably
advances it as rationally conceivable but
uncertain proposal, therefore it forces us
to search verifications and confirmations
(any way and always). Proposal that everybody
can refuse, and in this case going back to
the harsh alternative materialism/theism, or instead take it heuristically into consideration
and keep on putting and putting back it in
trial. For as it concerns us, this means
that it is not necessary, in every case,
to accept "a pig in a poke " what
our philosophy of the dual reality proposes, as it would do himself with a
religion, but simply to enter "in the
field" of the placed thesis and to evaluate
his validity.
NOTES 2.1
(42) I refer to the so-called "Controversy
about Universals", which opposed (between
the XI and the XIV century) the so-called
"realists", who were asserting
the reality of the general concepts applied
to the individuals (as classes or species),
and the "nominalists", who were
denying such reality, claiming that only
the single individuals are real and every
generalization is only a name, a "flatus
vocis" (voice emission).
(43) French philosopher and theologian of
the Middle Ages (end of XI Century) considered
founder of the nominalism who was thinking the Trinity without reality
over (as pure name) and divine only the three
divine Persons separately considered.
(44) Max Stirner (Kaspar Schmidt's pseudonym)
(1806-1856) is considered the most important
theoretician of the individualist anarchism. His masterpiece, to which we refer, is
The ego and his own (1845).
(45) Concept tight derived by that of alienation. Initially given by Hegel as objectivation
of the absolute spirit, is then taken again by Marx to show the
process on the basis of which what which
belongs "really" to the man becomes
extraneous to him, because of the perverse
social situation determined by the capitalism.
(46) It goes yet kept present the interesting
religious phenomenon of the Orphism. It was
a mystery-spiritualistic ideology, born in
VI century b.C. in Greece that considered
the life as a preparation of a more high
existence, in which the terrestrial element
resulted overcome and "purified"
in the union with that divines one. In the
Orphism, even if not at all explicit, is
present a dualism body/soul that will have
notable influence in the contemporary and
posterior philosophical thought, above all
in that of Pythagoras and of Plato one.
(47) Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1869) in his
The world as will and representation (1818) has theorized the "life will"
as blind and irrational principle that governs
all the living creatures.
(48) The RD, as we will see later, correlates
from a side quantity and necessity and at the other side quality and liberty.
(49) We here are referring for example to
"seductive" colours and forms of
vegetables and animals, which are actually
"material" functions only to service
of reproduction.
(50) The formation, as we assert, corresponds to big lines
to the German bildung concepted as Goethe thought it. That is
as formative process of the individual sensitivity
in which, in some sense (as it happen for
the forms of the nature) it happens the meeting
between necessity and liberty.
2.2) A thesis seeking verifications.
The RD start from the thesis which the reality
is not only one but plural and that inside
the plurality for human species we can reasonably
only place a second real "irreducible"
to the that us constitutes and founds; therefore
we can, anthropically, argue only in terms
of duality. Leaving from the general hypothesis we
therefore have a thesis where two reality
ambits coexist and uniformly spread themselves,
but whose natures, being substantially different,
separate makes them, even if coextensive
in space and compresent in time. To give
a concrete idea of this coexistence in the
diversity let us think to any foam (whipped
cream, foam rubber, etc) where the liquid
or solid substance shares the space with
the air which wrap it up, without having
any physical-chemical relation with it.
But in what this mysterious second component
of the universe could consist? Try to take
the things from far off: In my room there
are the walls, the furniture, objects of
the most various natures, air, light, noise
and at last, in representation of the biosphere, I and a myriad of tiny insects, down and
down until billions of bacteria and to billions
of billions of electrons, neutrinos, quarks,
etc. All that constitutes the material reality
of which my room is a tiny fragment. Then,
is this the whole that fills the universe
and defines it? Under a point of view strictly
rational nothing opposed to this hypothesis,
but our general "sense of the world"
and the set of our approach faculties to
the reality reveals us that the things don'
t seem really to be in this way. We clearly
intuit that the matter, also in evolved form of our "cerebral
grey matter", can' t constitute "the
whole" of the reality, because if so would be it some main aspects
of ours being men they would become absolutely
unreal and illusory, considered that it does
not present such characteristics to be thought
over neither cause nor origin of them.
What' s in fact a state of mind and how it
would be possible define it as compound of
elementary matter particles in activity (even
if in neuronal and of synapses aggregation)?
What processes of assembly and transformation
can to arouse a feeling, when it would be
under the point of view of the elementary
constituting exactly identical to a piece
of skin, but also to a piece of stone? Then,
it become legitimate supposing that in the
same space of the room, in which I am reading
and writing, my mind state can belong to
an "other" reality. This reality
"other" could not be then founded
by a more or less great number of immaterial
entities which exist in completely independent
way from the material ones and which I can
only perceive some effects and so can only
think them in terms of "emotional effectuality"?
Or perhaps of them I can even some intuition?
Maybe. But if this intuition, that everybody
of us had tested at least ounce in front
of a sunset on the sea or before a snowed
mountain top, or in front of a beautiful
painting or before the face of a dear person,
really could be a sensible signal of that
unknown reality which yet us escapes?
This was in fact the hypothesis and the starting
point of the RD; but one must consider that
all this, maybe unusual, is not completely
new, since an important precedent exists.
In a certain way even already the "res
extensa" (matter) and the "res
cogitans" ("spirit") of Descartes
were alluding to something of this kind,
even if at the end both were subject to the
only "divine substance", and therefore
this dualism is only apparent, because sentenced
to fall again (even if by the "outside
lines" of the Creation) in a monism
one. But there is another great difference
which divides the Cartesian dualism from
the RD: this one in fact considers the intellect and the reason not in the res "cogitans" or "spirit"(as
it thought Descartes) but in that "extensa"
(the matter).
But a true dualistic theory of the world
had already appeared about twenty-six centuries
ago, in the context of the Indian thought.
It were cultivated and developed until to
receive systematic formulation in the XIV
century, but after decayed, obscured by the
triumphing Buddhist monism and by the polytheism
of the dominant Hinduism, which was based
on the dharma (51) , justifying the caste social set.
I am speaking of the Samkhya (52), which is one of the six ancient philosophical
systems historically identified of India.
Of it I learned after to tormented myself
for many years about the hypothesis of the
existing together of two different reality
ambits. Hypothesis of which I had not found
track nowhere and that was to me appearing
as something of so queer that I not dared
turn it into a thesis. From my dubious reflections
was coming a mass of ideas quite confused,
from which was emerging this charming dualistic
hypothesis, which was making justification
of the reality of our emotions and in the
same time of our impossibility to have any
notion of feasible cause one. My very vague
hypothesis was to me appearing attractive
but also quite problematic and as well in
disagreement with my reason itself. I was
also pushed towards to some dualistic sketch
but was lacking the intellectual courage
to assumes it seriously and give it a defined
form. To me needed a ray of light that lit
up the dark profile of it. To me needed a
precedent, known and recognized that legitimated
the appearance of that absurd idea and drove
me to abandon my insecurity about the rational
legitimacy of that hypothesis. That precedent
I should have found by chance and luckily
in that ancient philosophical system, of
which I had found track in a comparative
history book.
I am obliged to point out the fact that never
was been interested in eastern philosophy,
totally feeling that cultural context stranger
to me and to which I was looking with deep
suspicion. However, when among the folds
of that world unknown to me appeared, in
way random and unexpected, the Samkhya, I received suddenly that light and that
courage blow which were helping me every
delay break to. Slowly all pieces of my disconnected
puzzle were finding their place, and little
by little I was proceeding the horizon was
opened beyond which appeared something of
extraordinary, scandalous, denied and emarginated
from always. Everything were appearing finally
clear and what which had been only a hypothesis
now was shape, until to keep the contours
of a genuine and real vision of the world,
which were reconciling me what I was feeling
a long time from.
But at last, after all this, I repeat once
the rhetorical question: why should must
exist a second reality of which we don' t
have any perception? This one in facts was
the remaining problem, but I later became
aware that was its premise to be wrong. The
perception is a knowledge act due to the
senses and "instead" those experiences,
which I had always considered as fruit of
an "other" reality differing from
matter (the feelings, the aesthetic emotions,
the ethical aspirations, etc.), they could
yes come through the senses, but from them
they weren't depending at all. Then these
experiences must depend from "something"
else having place in brain (as they are bonded
in some way to thinking matter) but this
elusive "something" must had a
nature much more complex of what producing
thought or psychic states, i.e. the electro-chemical
processes related to neurons, synapses, etc.
Because, placing this "elusive"
one beyond the conventional emotionality
to define it was no possible with a think
of linguistic type, nor rationalizing it
in formulable and verbalizing inductions
or deductions, but it was relating to an
extraintellectual "feeling" that
was escaping to every solid determination.
With the time the answer arrived. It was
simple, just too simple, but to the end it
impose itself with a logical strength quite
elementary that immediately convinced me:
we can perceive and know only what is directly
or indirectly "reducible" to matter which us constitutes, from the feet to the
head, brain included. I once realize that
answer was not at all original (53); but
why he had delayed so to arrive? And however,
if the feelings are born in an extraneous
center to the thought, how is it possible
to think of "think them"? Without
some notion, if no rational at least rationalizing,
on all that it was only possible to let a
silence mantle lower, leaving to my personal
imagination free field, but then closing
all that in my head and throwing the key
away. After, with the reflection, the suspicion
came that this vice of mine always to want
to take everything in front of the court
of the reason could paradoxically lead to
a kind of hyper-rationalistic "anti-realism".
So was it that, little by little, I started
finding most plausible my hypothesis and
even reasonable. To that followed also some
backgrounds of possibility in which the hypothesis
was buying more reality. And the reality
of it came setting up in what I would then
have afterwards called argumentation of the irreducibility. Not long this remained alone, after another
one came on which seemed me to throw a certain
light on it, turning out a completion on
the moral plan. In the end went the third
argumentation, ascribing to a previous reflection
about different perception of material reality
and aitherial reality of any object or fact.
To these three argumentations I gave then the names of "logic",
"ethic" and "observational-perceptive".
NOTES 2.2
(51) The dharma in the Hinduism is the cosmic law that governs
the world, which create the harmony to which
every individual must concur, respecting
the rôle that has been assigned to him by
the birth, on the basis of the caste of membership
of his parents. A strict religious collection
of precepts prescribes for each caste the
behaviour rules to respect. The accomplishment
of such duty is one of the foundations of
the Hinduist religiousness in general. Therefore
the dharma owns this prerogative of absolute "ethical
duty".
(52) I will provide a short picture of the
essential aspects of the Samkhya system. For it the reality is dual, constituted by the prakriti (the matter) and infinites purusa (souls or individual spirits). The prakriti is the early element and origin and cause
of all the existing things: chaotic, active,
irresponsible, infinite and eternal. Instead
the purusa represents the spiritual monad of the individuality, which (identifiable also with the "himself")
is also it eternal. But unlike the prakriti, the purusa is immaterial, without form, inactive, immutable
and insensitive. Of other part his existence
is perceived as conscience of the individuality. It is furthermore pure intellection, light
of the knowledge and cosmic stability. Unlike
the immutability of it the prakriti is unconscious engine of "evolution",
which determines the destiny of the creatures
through the law of the karman (the dead is reincarnated in forms corresponding
to the quality of the actions according to
the kept behaviour with respect to the dharma)
in an eternal cycle of revivals, the samsara.
To reaching of the "evolved one"
(the purusa of himself) one opposes the illusory and
fallacious "empiric subjectiveness "
(ahamkara) which is false and diverting image of the
purusa. This ignorance of the truth is cause of
that pain which soaks the human existence.
From this depraved circle exit is possible
when the thinking substance (the buddhi), also it material, comes to the true knowledge.
In this process the purusa acts towards the individual prakriti as a magnet, which without directly acting,
attract it towards itself up to the reaching
of the truth. At this point, exceeded the
reflecting in empiric ego, the self its authentic
being reaches, in a superior, eternal and
absolute, isolation state.
(53) Already Empedocles was asserting, "the
equal knows the equal".
2.3) Logical argumentation. (The irreducibility).
This first argumentation can also be exemplified
leaving from classical metaphysics, (all
today to base of the Christianity), in which,
placed two not homogeneous substances between
them, like the matter and the spirit, which ontologically is cause of the other
(God) can know the lower one created by him
(the world) and not vice versa. But a time got God out of the way, the
hypostasis of hierarchic relation between
that two substance come to fall, they aren't
connected between them any more and also
the theoretical impossibility of any reciprocal
knowledge emerges. Therefore, if my thesis
of a double anthropic reality is plausible,
the intellective and rational faculties of
our brain (matter made) no possibility of accessing the "irreducible"
knowledge of what which doesn't have origin
in the matter (but in any other) they'll
never have.
Let's go to develop better the theme. There
are moments of our life during which we get
some experiences whose mental effects will
be referable, in hypothetical terms, to mysterious
cerebral processes which escape to every
scientific investigation. Their nature, just
under a scientific point of view, is so ephemeral
and insubstantial that, past the circumstances
in which they happened, those effects seem
to disappear in the nothing, only leaving
of themselves a mnemonic more or less marked
track.
They are as suspensions or accelerations
of the vital flow, that alter for an instant
of the existence the normal modality to exist
and to feel himself existing, to then disappear,
returning a metaphoric material light that
makes recognizable the daily reality, the
laws of cause and effect, the certainty of the facts and of the bodies,
the sure perception of "I think",
the awareness of our body and of the rest
of the world that surround us. But, while
we know exactly that constitutes the reality
of the matter, that in every his details are able define
and calculate, what do we know of the dark
motive of the emotion that take us during
the listening of a certain music? Absolutely
nothing other the verifiable effects on our
nervous system. But we are rather silly if
limit us to identify it simply with that
acceleration of the heartbeat that accompanies
even every other more banal emotion. And
yet, this mysterious "cause" we
cannot besides think it few "real",
but neither casual, since within certain
limits it is repeatable. Not only, but it
may straight be common to other persons with
them we are in company. Of other part, a
music is made of sounds, but are not the
sounds to organize themselves in the music.
So as a painting is made of colors, but with
colors one does not painting. And likewise,
the poetry is composed by words, but the
words doesn't be enough to do the poetry.
Generally we may say that every feeling has
yes even a material cause, that however is
not at all able to explain it. Returning
to the music I want take an example: in an
air for voice of Mozart material are the
sounds which constitute the background, as
are material the tools that give out them,
as is material the voice that sing, yet the
result of all this possesses an "added
value" without which that air "would
not exist" . But from the moment that
not there is its creator (Mozart) to re-create
here and now, this mean that it has an immaterial
and potential reality that is actualized
by that set of material instruments that
the creator has imagined and tied to the
aitherial product, which can be repeated
in thousands of technological products. The
aitherial product of starting is only one,
but it may actualize itself, in the time
and in the space, in a practically endless
number of executions, in which a further
"additional value" can be given
from every single performer that has the
sensibility to go beyond the materiality
of the musical text and of the given out
sound.
In consideration of the fact that however
that musical effect happens in our brain,
of which are known structures and functions,
you legitimately think that it is a secondary
phenomenon of the cerebral matter, as the
fruit of a particular state excitational
of it, what some positivists philosophers
have called epiphenomenon. I even had thought so for many years, without
never derive authentic conviction, but with
a certain thin torment of intellectual dissatisfaction
that flowed in a definite refusal in the
depths of my conscience. To enter still better
in the theme I'll make a digression of historical-personal
character, that will illustrate the antecedent
and the genesis of this argumentation, that
I have defined a little pompously: logical.
For a lot of years, in my radical materialism,
that seemed to me the only vision of the
world " rationally possible", I
felt this epiphenomenal explanation as logically
unexceptionable, but at the same time as
intuitively unacceptable: a kind of "
absurd ". And yet I did not able to
imagine anything that were not, somehow and
however, reducible to the elementary particles
of the matter: position not void of schizophrenic elements.
This conviction, inexorably come out throughout
many of reflection years(and more wanted
than heartfelt ) drove me in a deep state
of frustration. It denied every reality to
aesthetical emotions, to the affections,
to the ethical feelings and to cognitive
enthusiasms that I experimented and I felt
as absolutely " real ".
In the adolescence and in early youth I thought
that all that of beautiful and noble they
had given me to was a sign of the divinity.
Generally all the answers to my existential
problems seemed me simple, immediate and
convincing. All was clear, to the light of
a faith that explained and guaranteed every
thing or aspect of world. Now, as materialist,
all seemed me to fall in a well of absurd
nihilism devoid of sense. In the more serious
period of my fifty-year-old man crisis, with
phases of authentic desperation, I had tried
even to revisit my fallen beliefs, in the
attempt to recover them, even to cost to
humiliate my reason. A great deal of time
was gone, but not much to forget the bases
of the faith in which I grew, that I had
accepted and practised till eighteen years.
Then I have re-examined the run that me had
led to the materialism, ready and prepared
for throw back it in favor of a return to
a transcendentalistic belief that gave me
psychic well-being. But to the end the conclusion
not has been distinct from that acquired
over the years: the idea of a God "creator,
legislator, orderer and provident" seemed
me more destitute of sense of when I never
have thought, and that all in favor of the
conception of a blind " necessity "
of the matter.
Anyway that investigation allowed me to recover
a concept become then fundamental in the
elaboration of the DR: that of soul , replaced
only later with that of idema. It, after the abandonment of the religion,
was remained in me as that vague concept
of common speech that attributes to it feelings
and behaviours of high-minded character.
Suddenly it appeared me instead as that tool
situated in the brain, which, as an aerial,
were able to receive the signals of the "irreducible"
to the matter (54). Signals not translatable
in speech just because of different nature
from that material of our mind. For this
reason came the complete absence of perception
of the "irreducible", but only
its intuition in peculiar mental states,
those in which idema is active. That this intuition can not be
a pure hallucinatory state seemed me of all
evidence: anyone is able to experiment, even
if with different causes and circumstances,
in normal health of conditions, to any race
belongs, under any latitude and probably
from the mist of time.
I have think over to long on the name to
give to the "irreducible" and to
the end, as already said, I have choose that
of aiteria. But must repeat to avoid any misunderstanding:
the aiteria not transcend us, but is immanent to us,
even if unknowable: this differentiates from
the traditional conceptions of the spirit
of the abrahmitic monotheisms. It is "
here ", around us, "to the margin"
of matter, with which it go along, more or less as
in a foam where a gas (the air) is present
within the liquid without yet do part.
But where is to the end the logic of this
argumentation? I would say in the deletion
of any irrational hypostasis of the spirit
and in the ascribing the so-called spiritual
experiences to the essence of our individuality
(the idema), that too being body exceeds
material corporeity and that therefore (in
its oneness) is subtracted to the "necessary"
processes of matter. And it is just for this
ability to get out to the laws of the matter
(that too constitutes it) that the idema
has then the possibility to enter to a relationship
with that to that is "irreducible".
The aiteria then is a unknowable reality, that is offered
only to the intuitive sensitivity, always
supposed from the man from the mist of time
and which concept has illegally phagocytized
and manipulated from the religions in transcendental
sense.
Notes 2.3
46) Only later I realized the inopportunity
of using a term by now so abused and equivocal,
substituting it with idema.
2.4) Ethical argumentation (Sense of the justice and of the pity: the
absurdity and the contradiction ).
In the daily life, apart from the satisfaction
or dissatisfaction for as "go the things"
we are continually struck from the inequity
that pervades our world. Inequity that is
not only produced from the so-called "wickedness"
of the man, but that is internal and structural
to the life and to the evolution of the biosphere. This is a site of ferocity and cruelty
on the dry land, in the sea and in the sky,
because the animals get out of nutriment
the energy for life and that request and
determines the terribleness in the food chain.
Neither the perspective changes if we think
about the natural happenings, in their effects,
sometimes perverse, just on the existence
of the most weak and defenceless.
Looking closer up what we are, is easy realize
that our genetic patrimony has determined
talents and handicaps, are they physical
or mental, that are a great deal more conclusive,
for the success or the defeat, of all the
good intentions or of the praiseworthy efforts
to reach a legitimate and desirable end.
If the rectitude sometimes is winning it
is often in uncertain and relative sense.
Too often the arrogance, the astuteness and
the fraud (among the beasts as among the
men) produce positive and lasting effects
on the existence of an individual or of a
group, in accordance with logics that our
conscience and our instinct of justice refuse.
Generally the misfortunes or the fortunes
strike the humanity at random, in a way that
seem very "immoral". This has done
say by someone that if God there is, he governs
the world not in accordance with love and
justice, but instead with perverse sadism.
That especially for the fact that, with few
exceptions, the evil and the good are feeding themselves as a contagion, off
the good will or the honesty of the intentions
of anyone runs away them or looks for them.
The evil, with its happening, favors and provokes
other evil, while the good " benefits ", " blesses "
and produces other good.
The moral rebellion that rush in us in face
of an iniquitous distribution of prizes and
punish is not casual or sporadic, but general,
motivated and deep. This demands an answer
(and not merely consolatory) that delineates
believably a conceptual scenery of global
character and not depending on the case's
caprices or of a God considered kindly disposed
and not malicious. This demand real, constant
and universal is.
In front of this scene resolutely pessimistic
we oppose that optimistic coming by evolution
of civilization, which besides legal culture
and organization of action means even promote
the ethics of pity and solidarity, joined
with a democratic social structure efficient
and functional, in which is recognized the
human of rights and duties equality, joined
to the care of unlucky persons, to whom a
modern civilization has to recognize the
further right to be helped and protected.
But all that the civil man can do to correct
the cruel laws of biosphere not changes the structure of the living
world, that is biologically "perfect"
and at the same time (from the ethical point
of view) quite "perverse".
But there is of more; the reality that we
experiment is not only unjust in ethical
terms, but it is even strongly contradicting
in cognitive terms. In the sense that just
goes out from the hard laws of the physics
and of the biology, that us concerns as men,
all the happenings that interest the human
race, to level of the individual as of the
crowds, show themselves much often casual,
incoherent and incomprehensible. And has
to ask why never the man would have to be
equipped with a so distorted mental capacities
to do appear illusively negative that one
would not exist in the reality: the contradiction
and the absurdity of the world under the
ethical point of view.
Then, if the contradiction exists, and if
human feelings as the pity becomes in their turn absurd in comparison
with the logic of the living, of the selection and of the predominance of the more adapt,
must ask from where originates the ethical
appeal that does be born those our attitudes
based on affection or solidarity so different
from collaborative logics of all the other
social animals and from the common parental
cares common to all living world. It is evident
not be any biological nor rational logic
to keep alive an elderly and only sick person
to receive still her affection and to lavish
the our. The human affections, in themselves,
cannot have origin in the living matter,
that goes on entirely different roads and
that to positively evolve has, on the contrary,
to ignore such human "degeneration".
The flock of elephants abandons the ill old
one, the more strong eaglet kills that more
weak because his parents would not are able
get both the food, the little cuckoo throws
down from the nest his little friends that
are the legitimate inhabitants, and we can
do hundreds of other example of "immorality"
in the nature (55). Likes us or not this
is the "true" nature, that nature
that some irrealistic and naïve jusnaturalistic
(56) man of wild "goodness" (tardy
follower of Rousseau) still today imagines
as a biblical terrestrial heaven that the
man would have twisted and of which instead
the man has to rationally accept and understand
the merciless, hard and ineluctable biological
logic.
Therefore becomes necessary to think that
what is absurd for the living matter and
infringes her laws must somehow turn virtually
"off" the biological reason (57) that it governs. So this ethical argumentation
send back and may find confirmation in the
connotations of that reality "other"
that what the DR has set to side (to the
margin) of the matter. A reality that somehow itself reveals and
us involves, in which ambit have to be absent
that aspects of the world that reveal themselves
incompatible with our human "ethical
sense" of the justice, that the living
matter in its remain and evolve doesn't resolve,
but, on the contrary, dramatically stress.
Then we are able to take an other footstep
forwards and arrive to form the hypothesis
that our individual sensibility contains
an element "of contrast" with the
laws of the matter and that it would be theoretically able
to not be liable to the laws of the living, or, at least, tend to free of them. If
this hypothesis is legitimate "something"
of it would be able then perhaps even get
out to the death of the body that supports
it, in an enough reasonable extramaterial
"permanence" more or less long.
Yet, if that would be acceptable, this is
not surely not it is some for a naïve and
trivial principle of compensatory indemnity,
as propose the religion, but because the
finitude of the material body perhaps cannot
implicate the annulment even of that with
all evidence pursues logics very different
from that of the living matter.
The contradictoriness of the past and recent
history of the human society seems therefore
confirm the existence of something that "
pollutes " the mechanisms of the perfect
world of the matter, regulated from the physics
and from the biological reason of living matter in evolution. This "something"
is then to suppose to be an unknown constituent
of the general reality, even if heartfelt
and intuited, but completely incompatible
with the evolutionary and conservative reasons
of the biosphere, which put aside entirely from the our "moral"
motives.
On the contrary, our moral motives are often
opposing and straight injurious of the laws
of that biological reason that govern the
life and its maintenance to the best. What
do we think of that glorifies champion of
the feline evolution that is the male lion
if after killed the rival not will kill even
all his children? If he would be taken from
the pity what is becoming to his offspring
and of the laws of the selection? And what
say of the lionesses if not will come at
once in heat to make children for the new
head, but instead she will loiter to cry
the killed ones? How to is seen, already
only taking in consideration the ethical
feeling of the pity, we realize that this
is itself a serious insult to the laws of
the living matter.
So far all answers to the inequity and to
contradictoriness of our world is substantially
referable in three categories, which, for
simplicity and conciseness, will define "rational",
"elusive" and "transcendental".
The first, native in the antiquity, but imposed
itself in the eight hundred with the evolutionistic positivism, denies all kind of extramaterial reality
that can us concern and postulates, with
the death, the zero resetting of all living
being in its individuality, in favor of the
" life " in its totality. It sees
therefore the justification of all that happens
in the general mechanism of the macrocosm
and in the evolutionary logic of the living
species, which are maintained and are improved
through the fitness, the competition and
the struggle for survival. The development
and the amelioration of a species happen
just because it is able to react positively,
adapting to the happenings, changes and evolutions
of the context where it is integrated. While
the decadence and the extinction is the result
of the weakness, is it sexual, psychologically
disturbed or somatic of an individual, of
a species or of a genus. Finally, the biological
"good" is ascribing to the unstoppable
affirmation of the more strong or of the
more adapt and the "evil" to what
damage this eugenic principle.
We can find the second answer in the great
oriental spiritualistic philosophies ( Buddhism,
Taoism, etc.) which postulate, approximately,
a formation and elevation process of the
individual soul toward the soul of the "Whole",
with the abandonment of the individuality, as slave of the desire and of the pain,
toward a condition of " fusion "
in the Global Spirit (of the Whole), as stable,
final and permanent reality. I have defined
"elusive" such solution, because
to seem me that attribute the pain in the
world to purely psychic or intellectual causes
(attachment and ignorance) and think that
it is enough to "discover" the
"truth" to do disappear it, means
elude the terms of the reality itself.
The third answer is that expressed (even
here a little generalizing) from the three
"abrahmitic"(58) and monotheistic
religions (Judaism, Christianity and Islam),
and more specifically from the second, which
affirm that the misfortunes and the sufferings
(the effects of the Evil in general) are
by God allowed or sent to put the men to
the test of their faith and that through
their behaviour (fidelity, devotion or submission)
shows the respect for the divinity (or its
sinful contrary). This is an answer of great
effectiveness, because it guarantees an indemnity
of the suffering, even if deferred, for anyone
has faith and lives it in accordance with
the doctrine, dictated divine revelation
in terms of commandments and precepts. Besides
it is a "perfect system" of prizes
and punishes post mortem, closely connected to the good or to the
evil that the men produce with their profession
(or negation) of faith and with the their
voluntary actions.
Evidently the first answer seems too cruelly
inhuman and nearly revolting for the greatest
part of us. The second, a little too elusive
in its escape from the suffering, with the
negation of the reality of a perceivable
and managing individuality, to advantage
of a vague and abstract " totality ".
The third one, in its marvellous arbitrariness,
is " divinely " and " providentially
" consolatory, heralding with hope in
a future when God will pay justice, but clash
against the more elementary relative scientific
knowledge about our universe, in imaging
"out" of it a prize and a punishment
places on absolutely material connotations.
Therefore the first insults the feeling,
the second insults our men identity and the
third one insults our reason.
In face on this incompatible opposition the
DR offers an answer that confirms the first
(with regard to the material ambit) and,
in a certain sense, makes nearly true the
third, provided that it come ascribed to
a, perhaps possible, immaterial future yes,
but however immanent to the universe and
not transcendent or fantastically located
" out of " of the reality of it.
And here I neglect that contradictory and
absurd " resurrection of the body ",
for which our body would come to coexist
with the divine "Spirit", which,
a time of more, to underlines the evident
"materiality" that pervades the
abrahmitic doctrines, where the hypostasis
of the Spirit grafts on concepts exclusively
referable to the matter.
The ethical argumentation therefore is useful to put adequately the
idema in the physical and extraphyisical context
of the existence and of the eschatology.
The idema, as we seen better later on, has to have
probably the function to percept, receive
the aither and elaborate it, producing that kind of
" individual spirit " (or idioaitherion) that, perhaps, would be able, coherently
with the premises, subsist even after the
death of the body, entering then in an eschatological
future that in a all new way would replace
the mystifying "life to come" of
the religions and of the parapsychology.
But the idioaitherion doesn't be able obviously and in any case
to have consequent and functional characteristic
to the idema that is its origin and then get out totally
to every spiritualistic relationship not
only with the "soul" of the western
monotheism, as well with the âtman (59) of the oriental philosophy.
The idema, that extracognitive "function"
of our mind, in its working to receive aither and transforming it, "build" itself
for concretion and evolution (51) . That
hypothetical future then would be able to
ensure survival of something of us that has
become "irreducible" to matter
and that is no more subject to inflexible
laws of necessity. Becomes then even legitimate
and consequent add that in us, as of now,
can be building an extramaterial entity that
would be able to go, perhaps, toward an eschatological
future. If so were, we can be protagonists
even of an autoevolution process toward an
aitherial entity, for which (and in a certain
sense) would be able affirm that we perhaps
"will be that we are now becoming ",
every day, till the moment when our marvellous
bodily machine will return to the nature
from which originates.
In any case the future of the essence of
our individuality is not imaginable as a
heaven, in the sense that all that concerns
the aither cannot arbitrarily be expressed
in human categories and then material ones,
type pleasure like or beatitude. Since a
thing is of the all obvious: the suffering
and pleasure categories, tightly connected
to our material structure, are of the all
destitute of sense if report to an extramaterial
entity as the aither.
NOTES 2.4
55) That is one of the reasons for which
the RD think that the "poetization"
of the nature is a specific human phenomenon,
relative to idemal perception of the aither that wrap the matter.
56) The doctrine of jusnaturalism is that doctrine philosophical-juridical
that affirm the existence of rules of natural
and rational laws to which the human ones
have to conform. Elaborate in the XVII century
it had as initiator Huig de Groot, followed
by Locke and Hobbes. Jean Jacques Rousseau
intervened on the theme hypothesizing a primitive
and perfect natural state (of "good
savage") that the human culture would
have perverted, favoring the inequity and
the embezzlement.
57) I introduce here the concept of biological reason, as complex of necessary laws to assure
the biological progress and the life continuity
in general. It favor the species of the individuals
biologically more efficient in assuring,
starting to stated conditions, the best vital
performances in general to conserve and improve
the reached evolutionary level.
58) In the sense that they recognize to Abraham
the paternity of the "opening"
of the direct relationship between the man
and God.
59) In the Hinduism and in the Buddhism,
with few differences, the âtman is considered the spiritual essence and
first/latest cause of all universe. In such
sense it is even identified with the brahman, the vital power that produced and holds
in life all beings of universe. The idema results instead conceptually neighbour to
the purusa of the Samkhya, which is spirit or individual conscience,
but that means even simply "person"
or "man".
60) I advance here that the aither would be able possess basic elements (like
the elementary particles of the matter) as minimal unity bearing the characters
of the aither. To these hypothetical unity I have given
the name of pneumas. They could be the aitherial "first
matter" which the idema perceives, introjects and elaborates, forming
and growing the idioaitherion. The pneumas would be besides considered (for the idema) even of the analogous of the fundamental
sources of energy for the subsistence of
the body: like the food, the sun and the
oxygen.
2.5) Observational-perceptive argumentation.
This third argumentation was added after over six months from the
end of the layout of this first part of Necessity and Liberty. I have qualified it with a double attribute
because did not still decide if in the phenomenon
that intend underline prevails the pure perception
or the intention (or the attitude) of the
observer-receiver. In other words: it is
the perception "guiding" the observation
or is this that "decides" what
has to be perceived? The odd fact is that
such argumentation appears after the other two, while the awareness
of it has preceded for a very long time every
other consideration on foundation of RD,
going back really to the years of my distant
adolescence. In that time I used ask me if
it were possible with the painting testify
of a possible hidden reality of an object,
beyond of what revealed from its physical
appearance, that already the photo stood
out quite perfectly (even if bidimensional
simplification). This my ancient reflection
seem me today that, even roughly and naively,
was recalling approximately the very learned
husserlian phenomenology, which, in that
moment, was to me completely unknown and
that even after interested me not much (61).
Perhaps because it was deeply presupposed
before the birth of the RD, this observational-perceptive
theme was so taken for granted and so not
emerging as argumentation? Probably!
To get to the point: every aspect of the
reality (is it natural phenomenon or object) is
unobservable and imperceptible jointly and
contemporarily from a physical-structural
point of view and from an affective-aesthetical
one. This is the thesis that I intend sustain.
All of us had been able to do this enough
banal verification in more occasions and
with the more varied elements of categories
of the reality. If we observe a flower from the point of
view of the botanist not are able to do it
contemporarily from that of the painter.
This not means that the painter is not able
be a botany researcher and that the botanist
not is able to be a painter, but simply that
the approach of the observer to the observed
is "here and now" either scientific
or aesthetical and that is unable to be in
both way in the same time.
But I foresee a possible objection to this
my assumption so expressible: it is not a
problem of alternative catching, but of attention;
our mind is in fact functionally structured
to selectively perceive the reality, otherwise
would come submit to a super-work improper
and unproductive! From here the necessity
of the intention-attention that leads the
mental system to consider the elements of
the reality one at a time, to be able focuses
them opportunely, with an appropriate and
concentrated psycho-cognitive investment.
The objection is correct and motivated, but
it not goes against the presented thesis,
indeed it completes it, in the sense that
the DR duality coincides with the monothematic
focusing of the attention, phylogenetically
made to the target to avoid not-working of
our brain. In other words, the theme of the
attentional selection to the perceivable
things of the reality, biologically accompanies that observational-perceptive
one, which sets on the philosophical ground
what here we are developing.
Yet our operation, that look at divide still
a time the reality in two ambits even on perceptional plan, is legitimate
and objective or aprioristic and instrumental?
If we analyse with calm the subject, have
to ascertain that to be conscious of the
ecosystem that contains a flower, or of the
structure of the carbon, which is the base
of the organic matter that it constitutes,
or the electromagnetic phenomena that determines
its color, are actually all elements concurring
with the reasons of the forms of petals,
anthers and pistil in view of the reproduction,
while the aesthetical elements remain entirely
extraneous and even diverting. And viceversa,
if a flower is seen for its beauty (or for
the memories that recall) all the considerations
of physical or biological kind not only are
extraneous but even diverting the mood that
is tried. With that we intend to say that
exist two blocks that give us information,
the first (physical, chemical and biological)
concurring to the cognitive approach (intellective-rational)
and a second one, emotional-abmotional (about
beauty/ugliness, appeal/repulsion, etc).
This one leads to conscience states of feelingly
(idemal) character and therefore the two
blocks are (under the observational and perceptive
point of view) between them incompatible
and alternative.
The further problem, but that pertain to
the cognitive sciences and not the philosophy, it is if the various
information sent from observed to observant
are separated in starting or if is our perceptive
systems to do head to different nervous structures
that creates and elaborate the mental image.
But, as we already observed to the paragraph
1.1 about the transformation of the animal
structures in consequence of the information
taken from the environment, we are inclined
to give greater credit to the cognitive theories
on "ecological" base in comparison
with that "analogical" ones (62),
even if they concern a field of investigation
that lies outside from our purposes and whose
developments we will limit to follow with
attention, but from a distance.
The "duality" of approach to the
reality is regarding every aspect of the visible
world, as of that audible, as of that exclusively
thinkable or imaginable. As we consider the
water of the sea, or the solar rays to the
sunset, the earth under our feet or the bugs
which live into, the sky by day or at night,
always we behaviour either as potentially
"aesthetical-affective" observers
or "scientific-pragmatic" ones.
In our consideration of the other human subjects
this matter can present itself in a way decidedly
more complex, since it is hard to judge when
the liking for an other person is assignable
more to estimation or more to sex appeal,
or the antipathy to the fear to receive damages
or to physical repulsion, but certainly we
are always able to individualize, in the
complexity, two perception spheres that separately
pertain to the physical-structural elements
of the observed person or that aesthetical-affective
ones. A doctor, accustomed to judge the health
of his patients from the state of the skin
or from the colour of the ocular conjunctiva,
whereas gathers negative aspects on the face
of his mother he will only in the following
instant to the "clinic" remark
notation transfer on the plan of the feelings
what he has perceived and surely not contemporarily
to the scientific remark. Or exactly the
contrary will happen, and the initial perception
of the state of pain of a dear person (and
the impulse to remedy) will push him to the
clinical observation to decide what to do
to solve the problem.
The fact that a spiders researcher or of
worms arrive to love so his objects of investigation
from to judge they beautiful and love passionately
such animals he study, contrarily or what
thinks the profane, not invalidates our observation
but it is only a corollary. In fact the beauty
or the ugliness, so as love or deprecation,
they are not objective phenomena but entirely
relating to the subjectivity of the judging
one. It is instead important notice that
when the scientist considers analytically
his object of study left aside the sympathetic
attitude that made him an entomologist rather
than a botanist, while in an other moment
he is able to think about his little animals
with apprehension or liking without activate
for nothing his usual professional criterions
of investigation, that will reserve to other
moments.
But one other consideration is still to do
for completion of this argumentation. Any
is the reason for which an aspect of the
reality offers itself to the unintentional perception
or to the voluntary observation they are
always two consideration blocks that meets
in the general judgment about them, which
stay originally separated. The considerations
about the utility and the usability are always
separated from those of pleasure or repulsion
in front of the reality. The admiration of
a underwater fisherman for the elegance with
which move a shark in the water not has any
possibility to coincide with the terror that
tries when gathers the threat; that even
if the two feelings are able be together
in producing the resultant to the base of
his behaviour. So as the temptation of a
meteorologist to stop in place while the
hurricane approaches, to gather completely
the appalling beauty, it is extraneous in
the instinct of self-preservation that would
push it to run away. In other words, both
the underwater fisherman and the meteorologist,
are on the razor's edge of the material experience
and of the aitherial one and just the superimposition
of the two submits them to a terrible stress
because that opposition. This kind of dissociative
experience there is probably not in the greatest
part of the other animal species, where the
idema is much primitive or irrelevant for the
behaviour.
The material/aitherial stress of some dissociative
situations, certainly appeared in clean way
in a certain phase of the hominization (63) , has probably had also an important
effect on the evolutionary plan, even if
I think to be a lot of difficulty to judge
(I suppose even for the specialists) if such
stress has been able to lead modifications
in the genome of the homo sapiens (64) or more simply was fundamental is ground
state for the cultural evolution, with regard
to the emotional dispositions in situations
of appeal/fear, of interest/repulsion ones
or of authentic pulsions of love/self-destruction.
The access of the homo (in some phase of its evolution) to the
idemal perception of the aither has brought with it a complex of emotional
and intellective states unthinkable before
that moment. If the actual structure of the
idema would appeared suddenly it probably would
have devastating effects on the maintenance
of our species, for which it is to think
that in a gradual (even if rapid in terms
of cosmic time) formation of the idema as we have now, such to allow the adjustment
of the other mental organizations to such
disruptive emergency. Remain to ask us because
of the plurality that we hypothesized only one other (the
aither) besides the matter (the substance that flow within us and about
us) and not "others" became accessible.
Probably that happened because we not would
be able "to bear" the information
bombardment and solicitations that from them
would come. But we cannot exclude that future
mutations of the homo sapiens, heralding of a new speciation, or the appearance
of new species derived from other biological
lines, are able go toward horizons of such
kind. But if that had to happen (or even
were already happened in some place) we never
know it.
NOTES 2.5
(61) Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) with his
phenomenology wished an approach to the reality of an
object leaving aside the practical-empirical
connotations of it. For Husserl the "true"
reality of an object (the essence) is offered
only in a contemplative type of cognitive
attitude, with a suspension (epoché) of the
common and current judgment. It seems to
me rather evident the platonic foundation
of such conception, which has had a notable
influence on the philosophy of the XX century
(Heidegger, Scheler, Sartre, etc.). In any
case even in the husserlian phenomenology
we meet a vision "hierarchical"
of the reality. The physical-phenomenal data are believed
in a certain sense only "appearances"
of the thing and contrasting with "essence"
of it. Still a time we meet not the "pluralist
diversification" of the reality, but its "monistic dissociation"
, what leads to the subordination of "evidence"
of it to what would be the "essence".
(62) Without to go into the complex debate
on this point, that cross from some time
the world of the experts of the cognitive sciences, are enough say that the approach that have
here defined "analogical" founds
on the principle that analyses the operation
of the human brain as a special structure,
which would create mental images (informations)
on the external world apart from the intrinsic
reality taking in consideration ( in such
sense "analogous" to the reality),
while for that "ecological" one
the information is already present in the
stimuli that the reality (the environment)
produces on the observant-thinking function,
which not does that record and entering in
resonance with it. This in accordance with
point of view placed by James J.Gibson after
the 1970, which contested the approach tightly
cognitivist grounded on the HIP (Human Information Processing), which founds its searches on the analogy
among the operation of the human brain and
that of computers. From the 1976 (with Knowledge and reality) even Ulric Neisser, one of the founders
of the cognitive sciences, accepted the thesis
of Gibson, even if with some variations.
(63) It is so defined in anthropology the
complex of evolutionary processes that from
the early hominid leaded to the homo sapiens.
(64) About this theme is interesting the
point of view of Konrad Lorenz; explained
in The other face of the mirror (Adelphi 1974 pag. 302): << When we
find that conclusive motor schemes and fixed
norms of the behaviour are able to be called
"generally human", that is when
their presence is verifiable in the same
identical form with the men of all the cultures,
then we are able suppose with probability
near to the certainty that they are planned
phylogenetically and that are set by hereditary
way.