CHAPTER 3

(Specifications and developments)

3.1) But, what is (for us) the reality?

   As we arrived to this stage of the explanation it becomes necessary deal with a fundamental matter for the further developments of the subject, premising at once the obvious consideration that speaking of reality we have to report tightly to that universe part that    is “somehow” to us accessible, while of a global reality, outside our knowledge actual horizon, we are able to affirm anything, if not it imagine in its boundless and plural  possibility to exist. Remaining however in the “minimal” field of anthropic reality and at a time advanced its duality in two entirely different and separate ambits, is set yet the problem to define what pools them. Then, if the matter and the aither are forms of the human reality, they have to possess a common denominator, that just of being “real”. But real with regard comparison to whom, what, and in accordance with what criterions?

    Before facing the subject I think not be out place a short historical sign on the reality concept through the centuries, obviously simplifying very much. Pruning the multitude of the definitions I think that we can limit ourselves to take the two extreme answers to such question into consideration. The first one says that the reality is made up by what is real “in itself”, independently from the fact to be perceived and thought or not by the man, the second says which we must consider real all what can be thought by the man, since the "thinking" is a divine gift that cannot deceive us. An intermediate and “effectual” variant of this point of view is what considers as real what produces effects on the man, whether under the physical aspect or under the psychic one. But that with the consciousness than the reality which surrounds us can be enormously richer and complex than accessing us.

    The two mentioned and opposite attitudes have characterized since the antiquity the disputation between who considers the reality starting from the "things" that exist and who considers it starting from the "man" that perceives and thinks them. Kant was affirming that the things "in himself" are unknowable as subtracted our senses and then only thinkable (noumena), and that of them we can only say something for "as they us appear", that is as phenomena. To this theme is linked that one puts in light the difference between “to appear” and “to be”, therefore the phenomenon, beyond his "give itself", does not tell me anything of more about the substance of being or beings that produce it. This reality splitting, of Platonic origin, besides a gnoseologic meaning (to fix the limits of the knowledge) however hides also an ontological meaning, since the "thing in himself" (noumenon) is placed in a superior sphere, in which has seat the divine intellect that can know, as creator of it, the secret nature of the things. From that will draw the conclusions the German idealists of ‘800, which denying the separation noumenon/phenomenon will do of it different moments of the process of realization of the “spirit” in the matter.

    While we refuse to consider the man's mind as term of measure of the reality, instead we advance an analogical concept with respect to the couple phenomenon/”thing in itself”, but in a completely different meaning. From a tight anthropic point of view all that is existing, or better what is object of experience, a complex entity is (and dual in the substance), that for an angle offers his denotations to the knowledge (as phenomenon) and for an other conceals them to the margin of himself, only offering them to the intuition. In the DR however a hierarchy of values does not exist between what which "is hidden" and "what which is made clear" to the senses or to the intellect, as it was willing Platon and as it was implying Kant.

    It is actually clear that it does not treat of a "hide itself" of the thing, but only of an incapability of the man to gather it accomplishedly. The case of the sounds can clarify the explained concept: the ultra-sounds and the infra-sound are real and the man can measure them in fact (gather them with the intellect) but he cannot hear them, for against other beasts, like the bat or the dog, have such possibility. That means that our perception is not completely reliable, and this means that what which escapes to our senses is not said that it is unreal and neither that it has a reality status different from what we usually perceive. This specification goes done preliminarily, just because, consistently with our thesis, we have to soon add that between what which is not perceived of an object they could there be immaterial qualities offering themselves only to the intuitive sensitivity. Of what of which it is not possible sensitive experience (by the senses) can there however be intuition by other mental functions (intellect and idema), without are lacking the essential qualifications coming so that the experience we do can be defined absolutely real.

    Moreover it would be wrong to consider the man's mind as term of measure of the reality; that is: are able to decide about the existence or the inexistence of something. If the existence, that is the reality, would regard not objects or materially perceivable facts but instead the objects of the thought (could be God but also every immaterial entity in general), which would therefore become "reality judge", the conclusions on their existence and reality would become pure tautology without foundation. In the field of the not perceivable by senses and not instrumentally measurable realities (it is our case) placing a few fixed criterions therefore becomes necessary (could also call them "reality rules") and they must turn out always respected so that an object or an happening could be considered "real". The risk is in fact that some experiences of single people, in particular circumstances (e.g. the subject that gets experience suffers of troubles of psyche or he is under the effect of drugs) can be considered real in their singularity without having to answer to universal criterions.  It is understood that they can stay real for the individual (because its effects are real on him), but they cannot be taken into consideration at the purposes of a research that concerns the man in general and the realities perceived or intuited by it. In importance order the RD therefore places four indispensable qualifications as criterions of experience of the reality: a) (the universality, b) the repeatability, c) the constancy and d) the normality.

   Let see them in the detail. Universality means that the experience must be possible and gatherable relatively to individuals of any race or condition and in any part of the globe. The repeatability  of the experience must be possible in any place and circumstance able to produce the elements establishing the experience itself. The constancy is claiming with certainty that already also in the past people who lived such experience and that everything lets foresee that in the future it will continue to happen; moreover have to exist a sufficient documentation it concerning. The normality at last, requires that the experience happens in ambient conditions without exceptionality characters and presence of more people that can it testify .

  Evidently the here placed criteria purely conventional are, but the restrictions that they impose have the purpose to leave out from our considerations any perceived objects or facts that can be attributed to fantasy, illusion or suggestion.

              3.2) With regard to philosophy, or rather to extraphysics.

    Secular and learned disquisitions have developed by philosophers about a classification of the branches of the philosophy from which we will keep away. For what concerns the RD I think that we can simplify defining physics the reflection about all what is matter and extraphysics about what "matter is not". However we have to say that our extraphysics  picks up also some aspects of the classical metaphysics (in the literal sense of "beyond of the physics") and that it takes again some fundamental answers as " what are we"? "where we come from"? and "where are we going"? Anyway we take here the opportunity to confirm that the RD not at all does run out the extraphysical investigation, because it is concerning only a simplified and elementary form of pluralism of the reality, that of the two aspects of it " accessible to the man". Actually the pluralism, at least for the moment, is a pure phantaphylosofic hypothesis, but no one forbids us to think that our cat tries reality to us blocked, that in a distant galaxy are life forms of all different forms from earthly ones, or that here, on the Earth, among some year’s millions, will appear an animal much more evolved than the homo sapiens and then able to intuit reality kinds “even more hidden“, which to we are irremediably precluded.

    I am aware that turning to the common man, busy with hundred problems of living and surviving, in a world of contingencies sometimes unfavourable, to attract attention about such extraphysical questions it is very difficult. Therefore I am ready to admit that extraphysics, in a virtual classification of the "useless" activities to daily live (as it regards world and life conceptions, if also with the presumptuousness to help better understand the "to live job "), would certainly place itself to the top, while in another concerning the "useful" ones it would occupy the tail position. In this second classification obviously to the first place the eating would be, followed by sleeping, to the third the love, to the fourth to amuse oneself, to the fifth pray God and descending away, until such idle and sometimes dangerous "amateurish" timewaster about which are we talking here.

    And yet in every epoch there is always some madman that runs behind the questions that our extraphysics is placing, while it is enough own what is enough of a religious faith for to have already beautiful and ready all the useful answers. I then know as much good than no unemployed of the African bidonvilles or of the favelas of the South America, but also any Eskimo hunter of the Arctic or a lonely shepherd of the Sahel their time and energies could lose with the extraphysics. On the other hand so had been for hundreds of thousands of years for the men of the West Europe, till the subsistence and survival problem has occupied our far ancestors' minds, perhaps more able of ours but busy by  the contingencies, under the yoke of which they did not have some the time to devote to the idle philosophical reflections that I propose. In other words, the philosophy, of any type, is done for who has at least the full belly.

    On the other hand among us, well-fed Occidentals, the things to which think or do are so pressing (accomplice the consumerist offer) that are we a minority that can lose time with the extraphysics in which I believe (as reformed metaphysics); that has to give me the advantage to have a few of competitors. The army of the professors in fact is in all other subjects so busy, dealing more "specialistically" with hermeneutics, epistemology, formal logic and at the most "history" of the philosophy, as if by now of the classical metaphysical questions that have us tormented for centuries we can now do only the archaeology. Then, for the already mentioned questions of the type "who are we"? "where we come from"?, "where we go"? together other idle and connected amenities, it seems no one to have time to interest in them.  Maybe because the supermarket of the religions already sold from millennia excellent answers, with which putting in competition does not suit. And yet also they, it would seem, saw lately some contraction of their market, suffering of a moving forward indifference wave, at least in the industrialized world.

   Goes moreover recognized that some of them, like the Christianity, have been able to face all crises produced by the scientific progress, with an ideological transformation capacity which has done of the theologians the best sophists (in current sense) of all times. To be silent of the Islam, which has simply solved the problem ignoring the science and electing the Koran to totalizing law, that everything devours with "its" truth, which it is due blind obedience to. But for who should have different tastes the offers in every case do not fail and some very modern syncretisms promise a miraculous internal peace together with an excellent physical state. To up end, in this super-technological world that very much gives us, but something also takes away us, the ideological consumerism seems to have two prevailing addresses where two types of goods are offered: or the "from always guaranteed" and omni-resolving monotheism or the extreme scientism that promises, in some year, to explain us what is the soul and how he works.  Can, between who wants to feel in safety and who all bets on the relentless scientific progress, which should open all the secret doors of the existence, as third reliable street seems not remain other than the east direction jump and (tearing the Maya veil) abandon the low matter and pursue the nirvana on the eightfold path [65], the tao choosing consequently the wu-wei [66] or other ascetic “ways”.

    This odd booklet would instead to turn also to the few or many ones, gone under all bridges of the incredulity, still there to gave the usual ancient questions the old metaphysics was placing, penetrating for twisted and dark meanders where a thoughtful exercise is apparently useless is very expensive without guaranteeing not at all. Exercise which does not make use of any revelation, no prophecy, no table of the law, no ark of the coalition and no last dinner, which are sealing the divine gift of the rules of good live and of the better die, to crown the existential journey with the participation to the divine beatitude. Nothing of all this in the extraphysics, but perhaps, metaphorically, the desert without end, between clouds of sand, perpendicular sun and icy nights, waiting some oasis appearing to the horizon.

    Is the extraphysics incompatible with the materialism and in contradiction with the atheism? Many people could tell you yes, but they would affirm so on the basis of old schemes that I hope will be soon abandoned. What I cannot elude to reaffirm that, almost tautologically, the RD is "materialist" and "aitherialist" in the same time and just for this "atheist"; because only bringing to light that hidden object of our intuition (the aither) finally to bury the fetishes that replaced it for millennia it is possible. And that becomes possible in the moment that we decide to abandon all kinds of traditional dogmatic monism that rages from always and wants the dimensions of the reality to have a only origin and a only cause, for that one of two produces the other or vice versa. For the theists and the idealists the matter comes from the “spirit”, while for the materialists is still always the matter that produces the “spirit” (or what the first ones define so). In the RD the idema is that "function" of the material mind (nearby to psyche, intellect and reason), which, like an aerial dipped in that dimension "other", picks up and elaborates a substance that is separated from always by the matter. This substance, which we test in the feelings, in the aesthetic emotions, in the cognitive enthusiasms and in other forms of experiences of the "irreducible" to the matter, is a reality that the man intuit "from always", but that he has in the past attributed to supernatural or divine hypostases that have it phagocyted, mystified or cancelled.

    We already said that the RD presents itself as a rough philosophy with some pragmatic-existential aspects quite parallel to those of a religion. This could induce someone to exchange it for something of similar to a syncretism [67]between beliefs in immaterial entities and philosophical assumptions of pure materialistic matrix. This is predictable and for nothing surprising. Relatively to its "roughness" I hope that it hit the target, since what here is presented "must" be anti-intellectualistic, and therefore philosophically a little rough, to be virtually understood by anybody. On the other hand the RD wants to be also a pragmatic thought, that is "practical"; it must therefore be useful "for the life" (as the religions are) and not only "for the culture", how unfortunately the philosophies too much often are. In as to the possible sincretism charge I think sufficient to ponder on the way that led to the formulation of the RD and the terms in which it places itself to make it insubstantial, but I well know that somebody will not trouble to do reflection on that and therefore, superficially, will have not scruples to advance it.

    The theme of the extraphysics offers me also the opportunity to express my point of view on what I consider "existential" philosophy, since I think that a philosophy "existentially usable" cannot be what that fills the libraries and the university halls, producing learned disquisitions and dialectic refinements, but rather what provides some information as look at the universe and manage a little better the life, in the short-term and in the long-term, in this "tears valley" where the ignorance and suffering us torment. Therefore, according to my modest opinion, to take up a true philosophy of the existence is always that event for which "one bets his life ".

                                     3.3) Finality and casualness.

    All finalistic theories imagine always a kind of processes at the end of which a stable and definite target is reached. That clarifies why all the religions and many systematic philosophies have finalistic (or teleological = tending to a purpose) character, in the sense that they suppose a "purpose" (or “final cause”) predetermined, to which, in the various reference fields, are subjected all the processes and all the mechanisms of cause/effect; where therefore the various classes of phenomena are linked, connected and disposed towards a "necessary" conclusion [68]. A virtual "casualism" [69](a philosophical position with this name does not exist) is opposed to such attitude, which instead ascribes to the case the beginning of every true transformation phenomenon. Finalism and casualism are therefore respectively analogous (but with various shades of origin and meaning) to determinism and indeterminism, with which moreover to confusing a mistake would be. The RD, that denies any type of aim in every field of evolutionary processes and the impossibility to predict the course and the result of them can be therefore considered as a form of casualism and in the same time of indeterminism.

    Under the existential aspect are the monotheist religions to present marked finalistic characters, in as God is the original cause and the last purpose to which aims all that exists, but finalistic characters are present also in the eastern religions (Hinduism, Buddhism and Taoism). The “salvation” from the sin like the nirvana, the perfection like the absolute spirit, is the "not-renounceable purpose" to which to aim. To this aspect an axiological meaning of the purpose, that is overcoming and abandon of imperfect or lower conditions, is often connected.

    Historically the finalism, inalienable prerogative of the rigid and dogmatic thought systems (definable also ideologies), almost always involves both the aim to reach and the way. The aim and the way also imply what is often defined the "sense" in an ideology. For this reason we often hear someone to say that “has sense” only what has a defined purpose or that to is aiming.

    Such finalistic setting makes sure that always becomes necessary search for some strict cause/effect relationships, to fix antecedences and consequences, to find a justification for all what occurs and a defined origin for all that exist or happens. I think possible to say that this principle, that I would also call "of the aim at all costs", is a a-priori that has raged too much in the history of the humanity, often determining some dogmatisms that lead to ideological fanaticism, with devastating consequences on the civil plan, on the cognitive and on the existential one. For this the "indetermination", and especially the case, have been expelled from the transcendentalist religions and from many philosophies based on closed thought systems. On the contrary, the case, as "resultant" of disconnected causes [70], it is, according to RD, the "anomalous" (multiform) and indefinable cause of very important moments of all macro-reality.

    However the casualistic/indeterministic attitude does not necessarily lead to a radical relativism and to an absence of values. Is the charge that is often thrown on atheism in general, as it would deprive the life of every sense, giving rise and run to a chaotic and untidy substantially “aim” towards the evil. This mentality that despises the indetermination [71] is certainly due to the structure of our psyche, which, besides strongly conservative, is able to remain at a low and healthy level of tension when can to count on the image of an ordered and finalized world. But not minor weigh has in that the cultural factor, in as the institutions in general and the dominant powers in particular have always supported the foundation of some weltanschauungen (conceptions of the world) that in explicit or implicit way involves positive aims both of social and individual character. All that has made sure that “order” and “aims” have become as consequences of a cultural stiffening a “finalistic” demand of which is difficult to get rid. In other words; the "finalistic demand" in psychic terms remains very high and that ghettoizes every casualistic and indeterministic philosophy.

    Has however to marked that also having coupled, under the point of view of the meanings, finalism and determinism, and also having highlighted, at the purposes of our speech, the finalistic character of the religious ideologies and the idealistic philosophies, nevertheless, when one talks commonly of Determinism one refers to an opposite thought current to them and specifically materialistic one. According to this conception (which can be made go back to the ancient Greek atomists), but accomplishedly theorized only in the XIX century [72], all natural phenomena are subjected to the principle of cause, therefore every phenomenon is "determined" by necessary and universal laws. In this conception of the world it is understood that the reality is only phenomenal and that it happens in a process where every happening is the effect of a previous phenomenon and cause of a next one. So, contrary to the RD that admits the case as effect of "disconnected" causes (and potential modifier of structures and laws) in the Determinism the causes are always "connected" and suitable to an "absolute" and inviolable necessity, based on fixed laws and not subject to any alteration.

    But then, relatively to the "sense", how is the RD placed? We soon say that the perspective for which the core of the individuality (the idema), made of matter, can be the agent of the formative process of an aither element, perhaps destined to survive to the death of the body, does not mean in any way than the idioaitherion is a "aim" with respect to the material individuality which comes from. We have to abandon the "deterministic" prejudice and enter in a way of thinking of “possibility”, therefore a not only but multiple reality, can theoretically admit the existence, besides of more universes, also of several reality forms inside of a same universe. Connecting the reality word to consistency, solidity or permanence is an old materialistic prejudice that must be deserted, otherwise we shut up the knowledge in a dark box without doors neither windows. In this perspective the RD, without exit from boundaries of the intuition, admits such possibilities, which become credible in the moment in which we go out from that metaphorical “blind” box and access to a heuristic attitude, which the research favours with respect to the definition.

                                              3.4)  The laws and the case.

    When, about the end of '600, Newton was publishing his Principia, the heavenly watchmaker look like having revealed to the pious Isaac the secret mechanisms of his creation and shown a universe regulated by inflexible physical laws, which seemed to draw, once and for all, the definitive image of the cosmos. Image where the parts were coordinated with the whole and in which every thing was in its place and of this place and of the behaviours of the thing all the mysteries were seeming revealed by then. A cosmos perfectly ordered, a cosmos-engine, that satisfied everybody, rationalists and irrationalists, scientist, philosophers, theologians, and that had to remain substantially valid until all the XIX century.

    To break such idyllic and reassuring image would have had contributed before Einstein with the theory of relativity, which was making the mass corresponding to the energy and that binding his theory to disconcerting light speed, and little after the developments of the quantum mechanics and of the “new biology”. But to what already was known about the sky complexity were meantime adding new knowledge on what that is "out" of our tiny solar system, where are stars that collapse to white dwarves or to stars of neutrons, where the supernovae explode, where there are couples of stars in which one cannibalize the other and finally galaxies that go away in a universe that “swells” (expanding itself). If then we refer to the birth of the life on our planet, due with good probability to a random event, and to the randomness of the position of an electron "looked", we finally realize that the unitary rigidity of the laws of the nature had been one beautiful and consoling invention of our psyche, without references to the reality.

    The case is a factor of the reality that to the scientists and the philosophers in general never too much was liked, because if we it place in the game became blowing all clear definitions referable to immutable principles. Or rather, it just escapes to every definition of itself that is not approximate or relativistic. And however the numerous philosophers who have a special liking for the cause principle, keystone of all systems, have never been able completely to get rid of it, in spite of their probable secret wish not to have to speak "definitively" any more of it. But the case, in the end, as an Arab phoenix always it reappears to worry the sleeps of those super-rationalists who would want all rigorously rationalize.

    I take from the dictionary of the Abbagnano [73] three principals interpretative lines of this "black beast" of the philosophy: 1) the unpredictability and the indetermination of the case depend on ignorance or confusion in understanding the causes, 2) it is an event where the causes mix and intersect themselves, 3) it occurs when the probabilities are insufficient to foresee an happening. The 1) and the 3) have subjectivistic character and only the 2) attributes a certain objectivity to the case and it is what we will assume, rather in the variant that consider it as consequence of "plurality and interlacing of the causes" [74]. We will allow a further little change, defining the case as the resultant of "disconnected" causes, that is, independently from the number and the complexity of the causes into play, the problem is not so in the interlacing-intersecting of them, but in the fact that they connect or not themselves towards a predictable and repeatable issue. Where then abound the intersections and the interlacing is when the case is reported to the necessity and the liberty, but here must say that the case can be placed about both of them, without being able to affirm if it really concerns or supports them, since it really refer itself to them .…"at random".

   Obviously not need point out too much that it is, besides the black beast of the philosophy, also "the intolerable one" of all the religions and above all of monotheistic ones, for which taking it into consideration in real terms is equivalent to a blasphemy. On such disconcerting and uncomfortable entity we could talk for long, but I do not want to dwell any more than the necessary on it to the essential purposes that I have intended. I would so conclude the speech saying that perhaps we can define the case as that disconcerting and joker elf that amuse itself taking us for a ride, putting together all those causes which "should" deterministically or providentially stay apart and that instead overlap themselves. For that also those materialists that have banished the providence adhering to the "religion" of the deterministic and finalistic reason would like to see it vanish in the nothing. That nothing from which it comes and of which the uniformity has broken, making sure that from some part "there was something". Good reason, at least, to define it as the remote "origin" of all causes.

    The case furthermore represents a very interesting reference element for the psycho-sociological study of the man, as object of a "phobia" that has joined and joins very wide layers of the human fauna, from the very learned grey eminences of the culture to the ingenuous primitives with the ring to the nose. The refusal of the randomness shows itself in that deep and perverse manìa that is the superstition, in all its forms: in fact it is not other than the exorcization of the damned and intolerable case. That leads to think (or unconsciously to want) that the happenings can never be due to the blind and neutral case, but that (instead) what that happens (to me or to everybody) is always of someone or of something fault or will; that coincide with the "personalization" of the cause, and that is probably to the base of all very funny forms in that the superstition shows itself. Then the case a little becomes the paradigmatic entity of the independence of the subject from the “animistic” [75]psychoses, which have their root into the night of the times and into the depth of psyche. Independence that is the inalienable corresponding of a authentic human freedom with towards the fetishes and the ghosts from created psyche, which are still today the unhappy producers of the "sleep of the reason".

                                           3.5) Why atheism?

    After have declared my atheism and let myself going to some statement about the inexistence of every divinity in general, without providing any reason for such attitude, I am obliged to dwell on this theme and fill that gap. As you will have understood the atheism is not only implicit in the RD, but is for many aspects "foundation" of it, and is therefore assumed in every its development. Would have not any sense to place aither if all what shows itself as immaterial was attributable, also only in hypothetical way, to some single divinity (inside of a polytheism) or to a single God that would be a sum of all the forms and attributes of the "divinity" in general. But it would not neither have in the case of a globalizing pantheism, where every single aspect of the reality is ascribed to a "general divinity", which everything permeates and includes.

    By leaving apart the polytheism, as remote form of the divinity, but for some aspects almost nearer to the reality (as we here understand it) with his "attributive pluralism", we will dwell briefly on abrahmitic monotheism and on the pantheism (substantially identical in its several forms). As we know exists also a form of attenuated or incomplete atheism, which is included in the so called agnosticism, with which one abstains from the meaning on the God existence or inexistence, in as one and the other are not scientifically verifying. Under the point of view of the RD we think that such attitude (in general) is fruit, more than of true and real cognitive scruples, than the plus or minus aware will of definitively ”not exclude" the God existence, so avoiding a total orphanhood of a possible and known "divine father". But this is obviously a biased judgement and we must moreover recognize that this position is completely legitimate and respectable.

    The debate on the God inexistence is very complex has and in his modern form lasts for at least three centuries, therefore is not this the place of diffusely to occupy us with it. I will therefore limit myself to a few synthetic considerations of tightly personal character, without pretending so to interpret the reasons for the atheism in general, and so only in the indispensable terms not to leave a heavy gap in the speech that we go developing.

    We begin with the monotheism: because "not" to a person-God, only, omniscient, almighty, creator, ordinator and so on? Because that supposes that a single will determines the universe and such will, although in his inscrutableness, reflects itself in our imperfect intellect, which of that derived and imperfect copy is, but with it consistent. If the will is unique it acts without contrasts and then its creative project and his act on the universe must be necessarily supposed characterized by the perfection that the omniscience imposes. Now, turns out frankly difficult to image a engineer-God that creating a universe and giving it some laws for its working make all this in so approximate and chaotic way, so to allow so many abortive operations and so waste of elementary and vital energies. All this then to make work a huge circus where the stars would be there (with all their explosions and collapses) and the biosphere would work (with all the savagery and the complexity of the selection and the alimentary chain) only for a whim or to make background  for an animal on two legs “made in his likeness".

    But still less believable seem us a second aspect of that same “creation” that is to base of monotheism, because the biosphere develops primarily in casual way, with a enormous waste of life, doing so think more that to an almighty and omniscient god to an uncertain amateur that attempt and reattempt thousands of times a certain genetic mutation till hits that good one. With reference then to the so-called “theodicy” and to the “best of possible worlds” placed by Leibniz [76], I believe that only having a blind faith and in meantime abdicating to the exercise of the reason, which would be “divinely” received and then  “humanly” refused, can possible to think them believable and acceptable.

    An argumentation against the pantheism is more difficult, since in it all is reduced to the running and to the supposed “divine” perfection of the universe, then the contrary argumentation can only aim in the fact that a supposed “unitary”, “ordered” and “necessary” running clashes with the chaotic reality that the universe shows of itself. With regard then to the instability of the universe (that is continuously expanding) we not see because the divine “order” (that can not be other that synonymous of “stability") should must show of itself (perversely or just diabolically) a imagine of “disorder" and "instability". This “perverse reality” should appear specially made to do squeeze a little more the brains of those poor theologians that have to be able somehow to explain to their dangerously doubtful believers that what appears as messy and casual is only a degraded or contingent (because of sin) form of the perfect divine order, which (in spite of that) to the true pure souls and “without sin” reveals itself in all its perfect magnificence.

NOTES