TEMPO Magazine, May 07 - 13, 2002
Bloody Ambon
Ambon is writhing again after a new spate of bloody violence. But the real fighting may
be going on behind the scenes, among the local and national elites.
The electricity suddenly goes off. It is 4am Ambon time. Suddenly explosions echo
across the battered city and fires appear all over the place. The sounds of gunfire mix
with screams and crying from women and children. Soya, a village 5 kilometers to the
southeast of Ambon city, generally a calm and peaceful place, has erupted in tumult.
Soya is located on the slopes of Mount Sirimau, so the fires can be seen a long way
away. Twelve people die, two of them children. Another 12 are injured and more than
30 buildings burnt, one of them the old Church of Soya, built in 1896.
"The attackers wore military (TNI) fatigues and covered their faces," said one
eyewitness.
But there was something strange about this attack. Soya is located on a hillside, and
can only be reached by footpath. The village of 4,000 is surrounded by other Christian
settlements. It would be difficult for strangers to enter it, even by night. So the
attackers were clearly organized and trained. It is hardly surprising if many people
have suggested it was the TNI.
"It is soldiers who are stirring things up in Maluku, but we who are always becoming
the scapegoats," said Mosses Tuanakotta, secretary-general of the Maluku
Sovereignty Front (FKM).
The FKM is widely regarded in Ambon as a reincarnation of the separatist Republic of
South Maluku (RMS), although the FKM leaders themselves deny this.
The commander of the Ambon-based Pattimura military command, Brig. Gen.
Mustopo, denies that soldiers could have carried out the attack on Soya.
"That is a lie. Military fatigues are on sale freely everywhere," he said.
The morning attack on Soya was the peak of the violence that broke out before and
after the commemoration of the RMS anniversary of April 25. That was the day in
1950 that the RMS leaders proclaimed their 'independent' state. Although long
defeated, its name remains anathema to the ruling elite in Jakarta.
The RMS flag, a mixture of red, white, blue and green, was flown from balloons over
Ambon. This stirred up the anger of their arch-enemies, the Muslim militia Laskar
Jihad. Its leader Ja'far Umar Thalib held a big religious meeting on April 26. Ja'far
threatened the FKM. Then the FKM got angry. And suddenly on Sunday, Soya was
attacked. So far, the security forces say they do not know who was behind the
attack.
Suddenly on Saturday evening, Ja'far was arrested by a team from police
headquarters at Juanda airport in Surabaya.
According to the director of general crimes at police headquarters, Brigadier General
Aryanto Sutadi, in the meeting, Ja'far had insulted the government and the president
and urged the people to reject the Malino II peace accord.
"He also called on the people to carry out violence," he said.
The arrest of Ja'far may open two possibilities. The Ambon conflict may quickly
subside. Or the opposite, Laskar Jihad may be angry and may heat things up again.
"If you want to be wise, in truth arrests are not the solution, but the creation of
peaceful zones," said Imam Prasodjo, a sociologist from the University of Indonesia.
This all shows how hard it is to settle the three-year-old Maluku conflict. Successive
governments have made a whole series of efforts, which all failed. Then came a ray of
hope.
In February, Jusuf Kalla, coordinating minister for people's welfare, led talks between
the parties at dispute. The venue was Malino, South Sulawesi, where the government
had earlier brokered a peace accord for Poso in Central Sulawesi. Most of the people
fighting in Ambon signed what was later dubbed the 'Malino II' agreement. Only two
major groups rejected it, the FKM and Laskar Jihad. Unfortunately, the Civil
Emergency Authority in Maluku was not successful in quickly disarming all groups.
According to a Moluccan sociologist at the University of Indonesia, Tamrin Amal
Tomagola, Ambon post Malino II is not an easy thing to solve because the people who
are fighting are no longer at the grass roots level.
Daily life for ordinary Ambonese has been pretty normal since the agreement was
signed on February 12, Tamrin said. The 'peaceful zone' has expanded. There is the
Baku Bae market in Ambon, named after the reconciliation process that helped lead
to the accord. In that market the Muslim and Christian traders mix freely together. The
same is true of the buyers.
"Young kids take nostalgic trips back to the places where they used to go," said
Tamrin.
For most of the conflict, Christians areas of Ambon have been pretty much off-limits to
Muslims and vice versa.
Des Alwi, a top community leader in Maluku, says much the same thing. Even the
bomb explosion in Jalan Yan Pays, which killed six people, was not followed by
Christian attacks directly on Muslim areas. The 'reprisal', such as it was, was on the
governor's office, which admittedly was burnt down.
Nor was there any 'revenge' for the attack on Soya.
"If that happened before Malino II, the Christian population certainly would quickly
counterattack," said Tamrin.
All that, said Des, shows that the ordinary people are bored with fighting. According to
Tamrin, the people already know how to defend themselves and can analyse events to
the point that they do not react spontaneously to any violence.
Unfortunately, Tamrin added, the 'elite level' conflict is heating up. One of the triggers
was the Malino II accord itself, thought up and implemented by Kalla, who-note well-is
a civilian. Kalla, of the Golkar Party, is in fact a businessman with strong contacts all
over eastern Indonesia. The TNI did not really feel comfortable with this civilian-led
initiative. They did not want to be controlled by the civilian authorities, which they
would if the state of civil emergency imposed in 2000 were lifted.
This was quite clear on the ground. When Governor Saleh Latuconsina ordered the
Maluku police to arrest Laskar Jihad chief Ja'far for allegedly provoking the masses,
the police and the TNI did not carry through with it. Pak Ja'far was instead arrested in
Surabaya last weekend.
Governor Saleh and the chief of staff of the army General Endriartono Sutarto both
admit this problem. But Endriartono denied his men had disobeyed orders.
"They did not carry it out because the time was judged not to be right," he said.
The authorities were also slow to deal with other issues. Tamrin gave the example of
the 'RMS' movement. He says Saleh, as head of the Civil Emergency Authority, knew
well in advance that the flag would be flown.
"Handling the RMS is not difficult. They do not have a task force like in Papua or the
GAM forces in Aceh. Their number is at most only 200 or so," said Tamrin.
More difficult still, said Tamrin, several events on the ground show that the TNI is
involved-outside the line of command of the civil emergency structure in Maluku. In
other words, they are not all following their superiors' orders. Not long ago, around 60
military personnel were found at the Hotel Wijaya who were thought to have become
'shadow forces'. In other words, they had joined in the fighting. When the supporters of
the FKM demonstrated at the police decision to arrest their leader, Alex Manuputty,
two people were found carrying grenades among the demonstrators.
"When asked, they said that they were 'Intel'. The police later handed them over to the
Pattimura military police," said Tamrin.
With the weak regional government effectively in tatters, it is clearly difficult for Saleh
to implement the Malino II agreeement. Two commissions formed to follow through on
Malino II never even got off the ground, Tamrin said.
"The meetings never even took place," Tamrin said.
Tamrin surmises there has been a push by the TNI to turn the civil emergency into a
military emergency. If that were to happen, total control of the province would be in
military hands. And at the moment there are some developments which give the TNI
strong motives to seek to change the status.
First the governor's term ends on May 10. The governor is the supreme head of the
Civil Emergency Authority, although he works in conjunction with the provincial police
and military chiefs. There is a strong chance Saleh will be replaced by a caretaker
governor as he is widely considered not up to the task. And this interim administrator
will have to carry out an election for a new governor within three months. Many people
are eyeing up the interim post. The person appointed may be able to determine who
will follow him. The word is that two generals are eyeing up Saleh's position. There are
also some civilians who want the job. One of them is the speaker of the Maluku
legislature, Z. Sahuburua.
Tamrin's views are not a million miles away from those of Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono, coordinating minister for political and security affairs. Susilo says that he
will be very disappointed if the election triggers more violence. According to Tamrin,
the election is urgent because various factors have unsettled things further. Not least,
he says, is that not long ago in Seram an oil deposit was found which is bigger than
the one in Sorong, Papua.
"Kuwait Petroleum has already issued initial investment of US$500 million," he said.
So the future administrator of Maluku may have a very rich region to play with.
The central government should push for the implementation of all the points of the
Malino II agreement, including disarmament, Tamrin said. That was supposed to
begin-again-last week, with the homes of the Maluku officials themselves. The
government must also quickly set up a national investigation team to look into serious
cases from the violence. If these two things are done, there is no justification for
implementing a military emergency.
"What is important is that the government is consistent with Malino II and actively
pushes so that the points are quickly implemented," said Tamrin.
Meanwhile, the Civil Emergency Authority has to anticipate which events could stir
things up in Ambon. On May 10, there clearly will be the potential for trouble. With the
TNI issues hard to resolve in the short term, the election of a caretaker governor will
not be an easy matter.
Then there is the anniversary of the Pattimura military command on May 15. The
command was only re-created in 1999, after the first wave of Ambon violence.
"Based on past experience, usually something strange happens," Tamrin noted.
If the central government and the Maluku regional government can do their homework,
the violence in Ambon should logically be easier to halt. But once again whether the
Ambon problem gets better or worse is in the military's hands.
M. Taufiqurohman, Levi Silalahi, Fritz Kerlely (Ambon), Yusnita Tiakoly(Ambon)
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After Malino II, What?
February
12 February 2002:
Malino II agreement is signed. Two groups, Laskar Jihad and the Maluku Sovereignty
Front, do not sign it.
13 February 2002:
Bomb explosion on the border of Mardika and Batu Merah. No victims.
17 February 2002:
Bus belonging to the regional government is shot at. Five people injured.
March
23 March 2002:
Parade to publicize Malino II is marred by violence: two people die, eight motorbikes
are burnt and four cars are burnt by a mob in front of the Al-Fatah mosque in Ambon.
April
3 April 2002:
A bomb explodes in Jalan Yan Pays. Six people die and 58 people are injured.
Maluku governor's office is burnt down.
24-27 April 2002:
Flying of the flag of the Republic of South Maluku (RMS).
25 April 2002:
A mortar explodes in Karang Panjang. Two people are seriously injured. The Silo
church which is under renovation is burnt.
26 April 2002:
Laskar Jihad carries out a big meeting. A vehicle is burnt by a mob in Kapaha. Two
people die.
28 April 2002:
Soya village, Sirimau, Ambon, is attacked: 12 die, 12 are seriously injured and 30
buildings are burnt down, including one old church.
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