[Transliteration of Greek words was done by The Web of Practical Theology. Errors of transliteration should not be attributed to the original author. We apologize if any errors are present and would appreciate a note of correction if discoveries are made.]
Beginning at the last part of the chapter on “Word-Study Fallacies” on p. 36 under “Semantic Obsolescence,” Carson is making the point that words change in meaning over time and kephale [head] is a case in point. Apparently the word never meant “source” or “origin” (as the feminists and egalitarians maintain) in Hellenistic or biblical Greek. The following is an unedited excerpt from Carson’s book:
In short, words change their meaning over time. Most of us are aware by now that the force of diminutive suffixes had largely dissipated by the time the New Testament was written: it is difficult to distinguish ho pais from to paidion by age or size. We are also aware that many perfective prefixes had lost some or all of their force.
It follows, then, that we should be a trifle suspicious when any piece of exegesis tries to establish the meaning of a word by appealing first of all to its usage in classical Greek rather than its usage in Hellenistic Greek. In an article in Christianity Today, for instance, Berkeley and Alvera Mickelsen argue that “head” in 1 Corinthians 11:2-16 means “source” or “origin”;24 but their appeal is to the standard classical lexicon (LSJ-which does of course move forward to cover Hellenistic sources), not the standard New Testament and Hellenistic Greek lexicon (Bauer). The latter lists no meaning of “source” or “origin” for kephale (head) for the New Testament period.
We may usefully continue with the previous example. Not only do the Mickelsens appeal to LSJ, but also they fail to note the constraints that even LSJ imposes on the evidence. The Mickelsens make much of the idea head of a river as the river’s “source”; but in all such cases cited by LSJ, the word is plural, kephalei. When the singular form kephale is applied to a river, it refers to a river’s mouth.
24. Berkeley and Alvera Mickelsen, “The ‘Head’ of the Epistles,” CT 25/4 (Feb. 20, 1981): 20-23.
The only example listed by LSJ where kephale (sing.) means “source” or “origin” is the document the Fragmenta Orphicorum, from the fifth century B.C. or earlier, which is both textually uncertain and patient of more than one translation.” Although some of the New Testament metaphorical uses of kephale could be taken to mean “source,” all other factors being equal, in no case is that the required meaning; and in every instance the notion of “headship” implying authority fits equally well or better. The relevant lexica are full of examples, all culled from the ancient texts, in which kephale connotes “authority.” The Mickelsens’ argument, and that of many others who have joined the same refrain, probably depends on an article by S. Bedale;26 but the fact remains that whatever the dependencies, the Mickelsens are attempting to appeal to an unknown or unlikely meaning. Certainly there are sound exegetical reasons why such a meaning will not fit the context of 1 Corinthians 11:2 -16.27
There are many examples of this fourth fallacy. Some spring from poor research, perhaps dependence on others without checking the primary sources; others spring from the desire to make a certain interpretation work out, and the interpreter forsakes evenhandedness. In some instances an intrinsically unlikely or ill-attested meaning receives detailed defense and may even become entrenched in the church. [emphasis added] For instance, although no less a Pauline scholar than C. E. B. Cranfield has argued that nomos [transliterated] sometimes means not Mosaic law or the Mosaic law covenant, but legalism (e.g., Rom. 3:21),28 the fact remains that the primary defense of that position is not rigorous linguistic evidence but the adoption of a certain structure of relationships between the Old Testament and the New.”
25. This information was brought to my attention by my colleague, Wayne A. Grudem, in a review in Trinity Journal 3 (1982): 230.
26. S. Bedale, “The Meaning of kephale in the Pauline Epistles,” JTS 5 (1954): 211-15.
27. See especially James B. Hurley, Man and Woman in Biblical Perspective (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1981), 163-68.
28. C. E. B. Cranfield, “St. Paul and the Law,” JTS 17 (1964): 43 - 68.
Again, Walter C. Kaiser, Jr., has argued more than once that nomos in 1 Corinthians 14:34 - 35 refers not to Mosaic law but to rabbinic interpretation, rabbinic rules that Paul has come to reject .30 Women are not allowed to speak, but must be in submission, as the nomos says. The Old Testament does not say this, Kaiser argues, so Paul must be referring to rabbinic rules. Then in verse 36, Paul fires his own comeback: Did the word of God originate with you, or are you men (monous, not monas) the only ones it reached? Paul, in other words, gives the gist of the opponents’ argument, as he does elsewhere in this epistle (e.g., 6:12; 7:1-2), and then gives his own correction. The result is that the passage on the submission of women is a summary of the erroneous views Paul seeks to refute.
This interpretation has its attractions, but it will not stand up to close scrutiny.
Elsewhere in this epistle when Paul rebuts or modifies certain erroneous positions, he never does so with a mere rhetorical question: he argues his case and sketches in an alternative framework of understanding. This observation calls in question the suggestion that all of 14:34 -35 can be dismissed by the question of 14:36. The recurring pattern does not prove that 14:34 - 35 could not be introducing a different structure, but since there is no other clear example of this alternative, the observation cannot be lightly dismissed or ignored.
The masculine monous in 14:36 does not prove that Paul is addressing only the men of the congregation and asking
29. Refer to Douglas J. Moo, “’Law,’ ‘Works of the Law’ and Legalism in Paul,” WTJ 45 (1983): 73-100. For discussion of many of the related issues, see D. A. Carson, ed., From Sabbath to Lord’s Day: A Biblical, Historical and Theological Investigation (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1982).
30. Walter C. Kaiser, Jr., “Paul, Women, and the Church,” Worldwide Challenge 3 (1976): 9-12; Toward an Exegetical Theology: Biblical Exegesis for Preaching and Teaching (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1981), 76-77, 118-19.
if they think they are the only ones the word of God has reached -- they alone, and not the women. Rather, it refers to both the men and the women who constitute the church: the Greek regularly uses plural masculine forms when people (without distinction as to sex) are being referred to or addressed. This means that Paul by his rhetorical question is rebuking the entire church for its laxness on the issue at hand; he is rebuking the highhandedness its members display on all kinds of issues, a highhandedness that prompts them to break with the practice of other churches and even question Paul’s authority. This interpretation of monous is confirmed by three things. First, it makes sense of 14:33b, “as in all the congregations of the saints” (NIV): that is, Paul is refuting a practice that sets the Corinthian church off from other churches. (It is syntactically unlikely that 14:33b should be read with 14:33a; rather, it begins the pericope under debate.) Second, this interpretation also suits 14:37-38: apparently the Corinthian believers are so arrogant, so puffed up with an awareness of the spiritual gifts distributed among them, that they are in danger of ignoring apostolic authority. Are they the only ones who think they have prophetic gifts? Real spiritual giftedness will recognize that what Paul writes is the Lord’s command. The contrast in verse 36, carried on in verses 37 -38, is thus not between Corinthian men believers and Corinthian women believers, but between Corinthian believers, men and women, who set themselves over against other churches (14:33b) and even over against apostolic authority (14:37-38). The Corinthians must learn that they are not the only people (monous) the word of God has reached. And third, this interpretation is confirmed by other passages in this epistle where the same sort of argument is constructed (see especially 7:40b; 11:16).
If verse 36 is not a dismissal of rabbinic tradition, then nomos (“as the Law says,” v. 34, NW, italics added) cannot refer to that tradition. Now we come to the heart of the fallacy under consideration. Insofar as nomos can be a rough Greek equivalent for “Torah,” and “Torah” can in rabbinic
usage encompass both written Scripture and the oral tradition, a plausible a priori case can be made for understanding nomos in verse 34 in this way. But the fact remains that Paul never uses nomos in this way anywhere else, even though the word is common in his writings; and therefore to that extent Kaiser’s interpretation of this passage, in addition to its other weaknesses, falls under this fourth fallacy. It is an appeal to a meaning unlikely for Paul, if we are to judge by his own usage. The only time such a highly unlikely appeal is justified occurs when other interpretations of the passage are so exegetically unlikely that we are forced to offer some fresh hypothesis. But when this takes place, we need to admit how tentative and linguistically uncertain the theory really is.
In this case, however, there is no need for such a procedure of last resort. The passage can be and has been adequately explained in its context. There are ample parallels to this way of looking to the Old Testament for a principle, not a quotation (and the principle in question is doubtless Gen. 2:20b -24, referred to by Paul both in 1 Cor. 11:8 - 9 and in 1 Tim. 2:13); and the demand for silence on the part of women does not bring on irreconcilable conflict with 1 Corinthians 11:2 -16, where under certain conditions women are permitted to pray and prophesy, because the silence of 14:33b-36 is limited by context: women are to keep silent in connection with the evaluation of prophecies, to which the context refers, for otherwise they would be assuming a role of doctrinal authority in the congregation (contra 1 Tim. 2:11-15).31
All of this is to show nothing more than that this fourth fallacy may be obscured by considerable exegetical ingenuity; but it remains a fallacy just the same.
31. See especially Hurley, Man and Woman in Biblical Perspective, 185-94. Also consult Wayne A. Grudem, The Gift of Prophecy in 1 Corinthians (Washington, D. C.: University Press of America, 1982), 239-55; review in Trinity Journal 3 (1982):226-32.
A fine example of this fallacy – the fallacy that argues that because X and y are alike in certain respects they are alike in all respects – occurs in a recent article by David C. Steinmetz:
Women may be forbidden to preach, teach, and celebrate the eucharist only if it can be demonstrated from Scripture that in Christ there is indeed male and female (contra Paul) and that in the last days sons shall prophesy while daughters demurely keep silent (contra Peter). Women already belong to a royal priesthood. Otherwise they are not even members of the church.12
Steinmetz is an excellent historian and a telling writer; but as catchy as these lines are, they do not prove what he thinks they do. Of course the Bible teaches that in Christ there is no male and female (Gal. 3:28); but does the Bible mean that male and female are alike in every respect? Who is going to bear the babies? Or do I now get my turn? The context of Galatians 3:28 shows the concern in that passage is with justification. In their standing before God, male and female are as one: neither enjoys any special advantage, each is acquitted by grace through faith. But Paul wrote other passages (1 Cor. 14:33b-36; 1 Tim. 2:11-15) which, on the face of it, seem to impose some sort of distinctions between the roles of men and women in the church. [emphasis added] Even
12. David C. Steinmetz, “The Protestant Minister and the Teaching Office of the Church,” Theological Education 19 (1983): 45-64, especially 57.
if someone ultimately decides that those passages do not mean what they seem to mean, it is methodologically illicit to decide in advance that because male and female are alike in certain respects they are therefore alike in all respects.
The same is true, of course, of the other passages referred to by Steinmetz. According to Luke, Peter cites Joel to the effect that both male and female shall prophesy (Acts 2:17); and certainly in the New Testament women do in fact prophesy (Acts 21:9; 1 Cor. 11:2 -16). But Peter also says that the wwoman is the weaker vessel (1 Peter 3:7). Whether this is taken with respect to physical strength or something else, it entails some sort of distinction; and a very good case can be made from New Testament evidence that a distinction was drawn between the gift of prophecy, which men and women could equally enjoy, and the church-recognized teaching authority over men, which only men could discharge.13 [emphasis added] Similar things could be said regarding Steinmetz’s treatment of “royal priesthood.” However one comes out on what the Bible as a whole actually says regarding the role relationships of men and women, the argument presented by Steinmetz is an example of a frequently repeated fallacy.
From another perspective, the example from Steinmetz’s writings can be seen not only as a failure to recognize distinctions, but also as an instance where there has been so selective a use of evidence that other evidence has been illegitimately excluded. We noted this problem in connection with word studies (chap.1, entry 10), but of course it has much broader application. As a general rule, the more complex and/or emotional the issue, the greater the ten
13. See especially James B. Hurley, Man and Woman in Biblical Perspective (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1981); Stephen B. Clark, Man and Woman in Christ: An Examination of the Roles of Men and Women in Light of Scripture and the Social Sciences (Ann Arbor: Servant, 1980); Wayne A. Grudem, The Gift of Prophecy in 1 Corinthians (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1982).
dency to select only part of the evidence, prematurely construct a grid, and so filter the rest of the evidence through the grid that it is robbed of any substance. What is needed is evenhandedness, along with a greater desire for fidelity than for originality in the interpretation of the Scriptures. I dare say that many of the fundamental disputes dividing Christians, such as the manner in which to integrate God’s sovereignty and man’s responsibility, could be substantially and happily ameliorated if Christian leaders were to improve in this area. (I am presupposing, of course, that we want to improve; and sometimes that is only wishful, not to say wistful, thinking.)
An easy example is the appeal made by some very conservative Christians to 1 Corinthians 14:33 -36 to argue that women should always keep silence in the church. They should not pray out loud, offer testimonies, or speak under any condition. Admittedly those verses by themselves could be taken that way; but such an interpretation brings us into unavoidable conflict with what Paul says three chapters earlier, where he permits women under certain conditions to pray and prophesy in the church (1 Cor. 11:2 -15). The appeal to 1 Corinthians 14:33 -36 to maintain absolute silence therefore reduces to an argument based on selective handling of the evidence. [emphasis added]
I could introduce many scores of examples at this point, all of which betray some fundamental error in argumentation. The fallacy lies in thinking that certain arguments are good, when a moment’s reflection exposes them as worthless.
Trinity Journal recently published an exchange centering on the interpretation of 1 Timothy 2:11-15.14 When Doug
14. Douglas J. Moo, “1 Timothy 2:11-15: Meaning and Significance,” Trinity Journal 1 (1980): 62-83; Philip B. Payne, “Libertarian Women in Ephesus: A Response to Douglas J. Moo’s article, ‘1 Timothy 2:11-15: Meaning and Significance,’“ Trinity Journal 1 (1981): 169-97; Douglas J. Moo, “The Interpretation of 1 Timothy 2:11-15: A Rejoinder,” Trinity Journal 2 (1981): 198-222.
las J. Moo responded to Philip B. Payne’s criticism, he clarified some of the division between them by showing in syllogistic fashion that some of the arguments of his opponent were invalid. For example, Payne seeks to show at one point that no teacher in the New Testament possesses inherent authority; and he does this by adducing examples of various types of false teachers in the New Testament. Moo correctly analyzes Payne’s argument as follows:
No false teaching possesses “inherent” authority for the church.
Some teaching is false teaching.
Therefore no teaching possesses “inherent” authority for the church. 15
The problem with this argument is that the minor term is distributed in the conclusion, but not in the premises. “In other words, to show that some (e.g., false) teaching does not possess inherent authority is very far from proving that all teaching is without such authority.” 16
Again, Payne argues that because 1 Timothy 3:11 refers to female deacons, and two of the men chosen as deacons in Acts 6:1- 6 speak publicly and baptize converts, therefore women deacons may do the same. Syllogistically, the argument is as follows:
The seven men appointed in Acts 6:1- 6 were deacons (the unstated premise).
Some of the men mentioned in Acts 6:1-6 spoke publicly and baptized.
Therefore deacons (including women) can [“presumably”] speak publicly and baptize.”
15. Moo, “Interpretation,” 200.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., 210.
Even if we grant the exegetically debatable points (e.g., that the seven men in Acts 6:1-6 were deacons), and whatever we conclude about the right or otherwise of women to speak publicly, this argument is inadequate, for it illegitimately presupposes that in the minor premise the two men from the group of seven in Acts 6:1-6 speak publicly by virtue of their role as deacons.
In another syllogism, Moo draws attention to a different type. Payne argues that 1 Timothy 2:11-15 is directed toward a local abuse, and therefore that its teaching should not be universally applied. The reasoning may be analyzed thus:
Teaching occasioned by a local situation is not universally applicable.
The teaching in question [in 1 Tim. 2:11-15] is occasioned by a local situation.
Therefore the teaching in question is not universally applicable.) 18
In this instance, the form of the argument is valid, but the first premise is too generalized to be believable. In one sense, all the New Testament documents are “occasional”;19 so unless one enunciates more clearly just what features are no longer binding (e.g., should we still greet each other with a holy kiss?) we shall be left with the uncomfortable conclusion that nothing in the New Testament is binding on the consciences of modern believers -- which of course neither Moo nor Payne would want to say. . . .
18. Ibid., 219.
19. See Richard N. Longenecker, “The ‘Faith of Abraham’ Theme in Paul, James and Hebrews: A Study in the Circumstantial Nature of New Testament Teaching,” JETS 20 (1977): 203-12; D. A. Carson, “Unity and Diversity in the New Testament: The Possibility of Systematic Theology,” in Scripture and Truth, ed. D. A. Carson and John D. Woodbridge (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1983), 65-96.
There is nothing intrinsically wrong with emotion, of course. Indeed, it is scarcely proper to preach and teach about heaven and hell, justification and condemnation, and the forgiveness and retention of sins without expressing any emotion whatsoever. But emotive appeals sometimes mask issues or hide the defectiveness of the underlying rational argument. An emotional appeal based on truth reflects sincerity and conviction; an emotional appeal used as a substitute for truth is worthless (although unfortunately often successful in winning the gullible). The fallacy lies in thinking that emotion can substitute for reason, of that it has logical force. [emphasis added]
Sadly, the more disputed the issue, the more frequent will be the illegitimate emotional appeals; and sometimes these will be laced with sarcasm. “Calling and not sex is the test of authentic ministry,” writes Steinmetz; “the church has been called to prove the spirits, not determine the gender.”32 The statement is cute, emotive, slightly sardonic –- and worthless as a rational argument, unless the author has already shown that “proving the spirits” (1 John 4) has to do with determining general competence for ministry (it does not) and is set over against “determining the gender” (for otherwise the two might be complementary, not antithetical). But emotions are so high on this issue that the worthlessness of the argument will not be spotted by most readers until long after it has had significant psychological effect. [emphasis added]
Appeal to emotional arguments can extend to the ways in which data are presented. Consider, for instance, the chart of the “Husband’s Role in Headship Models” prepared by Lawrence 0. Richards (see fig. 6). Even the hastiest reading shows how the material is skewed to drive the reader in the direction Richards wants; and the result is a
32. David C. Steinmetz, “The Protestant Minister and the Teaching Office of the Church,” ATS Theological Education 19 (1983): 57.
biblical interpretation of the relevant passages that comes out (surprise! surprise!) just where Richards’s “servant” model might expect it. But it would be just as fair to prepare a parody of Richards’s chart (fig. 7), in order to drive readers in a somewhat different direction. My parody, as ridiculous as it is, is no less valid as an argument than the chart prepared by Richards. In fact, not to put too fine point on it, most of Richards’s exegesis in this connection is without real value, and much of it is wrong, because he constantly falls into fallacies of question framing, of worldview confusion, and of purely emotional and emotive appeals.
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