The International Crisis Group (ICG) Asia Report No. 43, 11 December 2002
Indonesia Backgrounder: How The Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist
Network Operates in Poso and Maluku
[Only part of Jihad in Poso, Maluku and the Conclusion]
[Click here for the full report in a PDF file]
VIII. JIHAD IN POSO AND MALUKU
If they differed on other issues, JI and the MMI moderates were in total agreement on
means and ends in Maluku and Poso. The Laskar Mujahidin, the armed forces of the
Ngruki network, totalled at its height in late 1999 and early 2000 some 500 men -
much smaller but better-trained than the Laskar Jihad troops, with whom they did not
cooperate and sometimes clashed. (A particularly virulent enmity existed between
Fikiruddin alias Abu Jibril of Laskar Mujahdin and and Ja'far Umar Thalib of Laskar
Jihad, and the two nearly came to blows three times, once in the Middle East, once in
Afghanistan, and once in Ambon, according to an ICG source.) The commander of
Laskar Mujahidin forces through October 2000 when he was killed in Saparua, was
Haris Fadillah alias Abu Dzar, a former Darul Islam figure from Bogor, West Java, but
perhaps better known now as Omar al-Faruq's father-in-law.
He was succeeded after a leadership void of a few months by Aryanto Aris (also seen
as Haris), a man from Magelang, East Java. By November 2001, Aryanto Aris was
back in Java, taking part in the bombing of a church in North Jakarta. It is clear that
Ambon served as a military training ground for JI recruits from across the region,
much as Afghanistan and the Southern Philippines had for an earlier generation.
A. LASKAR MUJAHIDIN IN MALUKU
In an effort to understand how the Laskar Mujahidin worked, ICG interviewed an
Ambon veteran whose brother and nephew had also been fighters there. He said an
initial contingent of 50 recruits arrived in Ambon in February 1999, about a month after
the first wave of violence. Almost all were from Makassar or were Ambonese who had
studied there, and many leaders were "alumni Moro", that is, had previous experience
in the southern Philippines. They called themselves Laskar Jundullah, not Laskar
Mujahidin, although their arrival seems to have preceded establishment of the Laskar
Jundullah that Agus Dwikarna headed.
In the beginning, the ICG source said, they had no modern weapons, but focused on
setting up posts of five to ten people, mostly along the north coast, beginning in Hitu
and spreading to Mamala, Morela and several other villages. Within a month, they had
received automatic weapons and were making daily attacks on Christian villages in
the area, usually together with a local force called Laskar Hitu.
By July 1999, the ranks of the mujahidin forces had reached 500 in central Maluku
(that is, Ambon, Ceram, Saparua and Haruku) but they never exceeded that total.
Recruits served between six months to a year. The mujahidin headquarters was in Air
Kuning, a hilly and forested area where the alumni Moro could instruct recruits in
guerrilla tactics. One main difference with Laskar Jihad, indeed, was Laskar
Mujahidin's preference for guerrilla warfare, with formations of about a dozen men
carrying out hit-and-run attacks. The aim was frequently to destroy churches or target
priests, Christian business people, or other Christian leaders, more than to secure
ground as Laskar Jihad was trying to do. The source remembered a hit list of 50
people, 47 of whom were priests.
After July 1999, Laskar Mujahidin had access to serious arms, such as mortars,
grenades, AK-47s, Stiger 5s, and anti-personnel mines. Almost none were obtained in
Maluku but rather were packed in paralon (a kind of plastic casing) and frequently
brought in by ship from Surabaya. As the vessel approached Ambon harbor, the
paralons would be dropped overboard, then picked up by waiting fishing boats.
The Ambon veteran said that a reason Laskar Mujahidin posts were set up on Buru
and Seram (rice-growing areas) was to have a cover for import of fertiliser used in
bomb making.
Laskar Mujahidin, like Laskar Jihad, had links to the army in Maluku but they were
mostly through soldiers from the Kulur ethnic group in Saparua. Members of this
ethnic group, the source said, were particularly prominent in battalions 731, 732 and
733 of the Indonesian army. Many soldiers were willing to rent out their guns for a
daily fee of Rp.2.5 million. (about U.S.$250). Laskar Mujahidin also had a strong
presence in North Maluku but the ICG source did not know how many people were
involved.
B. LASKAR JUNDULLAH IN POSO
In the other major conflict area, Poso, the mujahidin forces were known as Laskar
Jundullah, but it becomes confusing because many Islamic groups operating out of
Central Java, Maluku, and Sulawesi called themselves by the same name, which
means "army of Allah." Groups that identified themselves as Laskar Jundullah, for
example, appeared in Poso in July and August 2000, after the massacre of some 200
Muslims at the Wali Songo Pesantren in Poso on 3 June 2000.
The best-known of the Laskar Jundullahs was created in September 2000 as the
military wing of KPPSI, the Preparatory Committee for Upholding Islamic Law, under
the command of Agus Dwikarna, now detained in the Philippines as a JI member. It
was originally conceived of as a religious police that would enforce Islamic law among
KPPSI members. In setting up Laskar Jundullah, Dwikarna worked closely with
Syawal, the JI member with close ties to the southern Philippines, and with Tamsil
Linrung, the man later arrested with Dwikarna in the Philippines in March 2002.
Laskar Jundullah, while officially based in Makassar, set up its military headquarters
in Pendolo, Pamona Selatan, Poso. Its commander there was reportedly Amno Dai, a
native of the area who had been a follower of Kahar Muzakkar. He began to recruit
former members of Kahar Muzakkar's Darul Islam rebellion, and those men joined with
Laskar Mujahidin forces recruited by Pondok Ngruki.
The Laskar Jundullah forces reportedly drew on three networks for their recruits. The
first was Darul Islam, and in particular, the followers of Sanusi Daris, Kahar
Muzakkar's Defense Minister, who died in Sabah in 1988. The recruits associated
with Darul Islam would reportedly often go to the Hidayatullah pesantren in Balikpapan
before proceeding on to Poso, and many teachers and students from that pesantren
reportedly joined Laskar Jundullah themselves.
The second network was that of the hardline faction of the Indonesian Muslim
Students organization (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam or HMI), known as HMI-MPO.
Tamsil Linrung and Agus Dwikarna both had HMI-MPO backgrounds, and many other
HMI-MPO members from South Sulawesi joined the jihad in Poso.
The third network consisted of local Muslims from the Poso area. Among others,
these included men from the Komite Perjuangan Muslim Poso (Committee for the
Islamic Struggle in Poso) under the command of Adnan Arsal, based in Poso city.
Arsal is one of the signers of the December 2001 peace pact for Poso, known as the
Malino Accord.
The Laskar Mujahidin and Laskar Jundullah forces had both guerrilla training and the
capacity for rapid reaction. In Poso, they may have outnumbered Laskar Jihad forces,
with which their relations were poor. Laskar Jihad only arrived in Poso in August 2001,
long after mujahidin forces were well-established.
ICG has received conflicting reports as to the continued presence of Laskar Mujahidin
in Maluku and Poso. Laskar Jihad sources in Yogyakarta claim that even before the
dissolution of their organisation in early October 2002, Laskar Mujahidin had already
left, chased out by Laskar Jihad, which was numerically much stronger. MMI sources
in Solo, however, report that the mujahidin are still in place, if not particularly active.
C. RECRUITMENT
According to one young man close to those who took part in the training camp in
Pandeglang, run by Bali bombing suspect Imam Samudra, in Banten in 2001,
recruitment for Poso and Ambon took place as follows. A member of Samudra's group
would strike up a conversation with students from a local state-run Islamic high school
(madrasah aliyah negeri). These high schools can be located within a pesantren or
religious boarding school, or they can be separate structures. The students would be
invited to come to a meeting where the discussion leader showed video CDs about the
war in Ambon and Poso, made by KOMPAK, the mujahidin-affiliated organisation. The
videos inevitably produced outrage from the viewers at the brutality and inhumanity of
the Christian side.
The viewers were then invited back for religious study sessions, where a small number
of people sat around in a circle (halaqah) and studied the main precepts of Sungkar's
teaching - faith, hijrah, and jihad - with a strong Wahabi orientation. Students who
went through the training learned formulaic definitions, such as that what Muslims had
to fear most was a government enslaved to infidels. The situation in the world today, it
was repeatedly stressed, was like the darkness and ignorance (jahiliyah) prevailing in
Mecca before Islam was generally accepted and when Muslims were being
persecuted. The group leaders stressed the need to rid the faith of syirik or idolatrous
practices. But the most important emphasis was on jihad.
After about four months in the study group, the students would be told that jihad was
not just a concept but something that had to be put into practice, and they were
invited to join the struggle. One of those who accepted said he was surprised when
the instructor then introduced a friend from Malaysia and produced firearms for the
training. At this stage, the proportion of religious training fell to about 30 per cent,
while 70 per cent was devoted to military training. The trainees had to start from
scratch, learning how to hold a rifle, aim and fire. They were also instructed in
self-defence and how to use knives and machetes.
The instructors rented a house far from the main road for the training. In thiscase, it
was in Cimalati, Pasir Eurih, Saketi, a heavily wooded area in Pandeglang, Banten
but there was anotherr in Malimping, Banten, and at least one in West Java, in
Ciseeng, Bogor. The road leading to the house in Saketi was rarely used by cars or
motorcycles-for-hire, and the houses in the area were relatively far apart. The front of
the house was turned into a kind of a repair shop, both for camouflage purposes, so
no one passing would suspect that there was military training going on in the back,
amidst a hectare of palm trees and banana plantation.
The workshop also served as a place where the trainees learned to make bombs.
When they were considered ready, they were sent to Poso or Ambon as members of
Laskar Mujahidin or related groups. There was never any overlap with Laskar Jihad.
Halaqah study groups, without the military training, were started in at least five other
areas around Banten alone: Menes, Ciruas, Kasemen, Benggala, and Kramatwatu.
Almost all drew on young men from Islamic high schools. Such schools within
pesantrens run by Muslim leaders (kyai) with a history of Darul Islam involvement
were a particularly rich recruiting ground.
E. MALUKU'S IMPORTANCE TO THE JI NETWORK
Just as experience in Afghanistan served to bind an older generation of the JI network
together, time in Maluku served the same purpose for a younger generation.
Information from some of those convicted in earlier JI bombings provides insight into
how this worked.
Taufik Abdul Halim alias Dani, 26, is a Malaysian convicted for his role in the August
2001 Atrium Mall bombing in Jakarta, another JI operation. Taufik was born in Muar
Johor, Malaysia. According to his court testimony, he studied in religious schools
around Pakistan - in Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar and Islamabad - from 1993 to 1996,
the same years that Fatur Rahman al-Ghozi was in Lahore. It is not known if they
met. Taufik was imprisoned briefly under the Internal Security Act after he returned to
Malaysia. The Malaysian government later said that Taufik, whom they accused of
being a member of Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia, an organisation alleged to be an
affiliate of JI, was in Afghanistan in 1994-1995. Taufik's brother, Zulkifli bin Abdul Hir,
is in detention as a JI member in Malaysia and is accused of killing a Christian
member of parliament, Dr. Joe Fernandez.
In June 2000, according to his interrogation testimony, Taufik met nine other
Malaysian recruits at the Kuala Lumpur airport. These included three men from
Trengganu, two from Selangor, two from Kuala Lumpur, one from Pahang, and one
from northern Malaysia. Taufik, with an architecture degree, was the only one with an
advanced education. The group crossed to Sabah (Malaysian Borneo), travelled
overland to Tawao, a seedy port on the southern tip of the state, crossed by boat to
Nunukan, East Kalimantan (Indonesian Borneo) - without passports - then continued
to Menado, North Sulawesi by boat. They then flew to Ternate in northern Maluku.
After some three months in Ternate, which to their disappointment was quiet, they
went on to Ambon. In court, Taufik would say only that he and his colleagues helped
defend villages there; it would be interesting to know whether his contingent was
involved in the battle in Siri-Sori when Abu Dzar was killed. In April 2001, six of the
original group returned to Malaysia and the others took a boat to Surabaya, then
travelled to Jakarta by bus.
A young man who was to take part in the Atrium bombing with Taufik met him at the
bus station, then took him to stay with another Maluku veteran, Eddy or Dedi Setiono
alias Abbas alias Usman. Abbas was from Bogor originally, had lived for many years
in Malaysia, and made his living selling mineral water in Jakarta. Dedi had been with
Hambali in Afghanistan in 1987 and met him again in South Jakarta in October 2000
to plan the Christmas Eve bombings. After his "success" as field commander for
Jakarta of the latter operation, Abbas worked with Imam Samudra to coordinate the
Atrium Mall bombing in early August 2001. Taufik was an expendable foot soldier.
The rationale for the Atrium bombing was retaliation for the attacks on Muslims in
Ambon, since a congregation that was reputed to be funding the Christian side met for
services on the second floor of the mall. The bomb went off prematurely, and Taufik
lost part of his leg.
After both he and Taufik were caught, Abbas told his interrogators of the training camp
in Pandeglang, Banten, described above, where recruits for Ambon were being
trained. Police raided the camp in September 2001 and captured thirteen people,
mostly young men from the Banten area. They also recovered six revolvers, seven FN
pistols, and 400 rounds of ammunition. One camp leader who escaped was a
38-year-old man named Ibrahim from Trengganu, Malaysia, who had served two years
in Afghanistan.
IX. CONCLUSION
The investigation into the Bali bombings is beginning to uncover some of the ways in
which Jemaah Islamiyah leaders were able to use a range of networks and
associations in Indonesia to wage jihad in accordance with Abdullah Sungkar's
teachings. The investigation is far from over but one can see a mix of family ties, old
school ties (to Pondok Ngruki or its Malaysian counterpart, Pesantren Luqmanul
Hakiem), and Darul Islam linkages at play. The reach of JI through these networks
may be more extensive than previously thought, even though the number of senior JI
leaders appears to be very small.
When the results of the Bali bombings are considered, together with an examination
of previous JI operations such as the Christmas Eve bombings, several policy
imperatives arise.
- Investigations into all previous JI operations need to be reopened, with the highly
effective combination of international investigators working alongside their Indonesian
counterparts, under Indonesian direction.
If the Christmas Eve bombing investigations are any indication, investigations at the
time were poor. Police often used torture to extract confessions that were highly
unreliable as a result but were then used to convict other suspects.
Little, if any, coordination took place among the investigations into the bombings of
different cities across the countries, so that common threads could be exposed and
examined. Important leads were not pursued.
There is some indication that the investigations are being reopened, but if this
amounts to re-interviewing convicted prisoners, as seems to be the case in Medan,
the results will be inconclusive, since none of those convicted was a major player, and
two were probably not involved at all.
- Intelligence resources need to be strengthened but the resources need to go to the
police, not to the National Intelligence Agency (BIN) and not to army intelligence.
There is no question that BIN has done some important legwork on the investigations
that significantly helped break open the Bali case, and it is using the Bali bombingsto
try to significantly increase its resources. According to one press report, a draft
presidential instruction is being prepared to create new intelligence structures, one at
the national level and one at the provincial and district level.
The first would coordinate intelligence agencies belonging to the Attorney General's
Office, police, customs, immigration, relevant units from each branch of the armed
forces, and BIN. The second would do the same but at a sub-national level. All would
be coordinated by the head of BIN, A.M. Hendropriyono.
Coordination is important, and there is no question that it is not now taking place. But
creating a new structure would put the cart before the horse. Major issues need to be
resolved first, such as the exact division of responsibility between the police and the
army on internal security matters. No amount of coordination on paper is going to
force an army officer to turn over information to the police, or vice versa, when each
force sees the other as determined to undermine its authority. One provincial army
intelligence officer told ICG, "We're sitting on all this information, and no one's asking
for it". He suggested that unless and until the post-Soeharto tendency to leave
investigations to the police was reversed, the information would stay unused.
At the same time, the professional pride of the police is at an all-time high with the
Bali successes. This may be the first time that police are taking pride across the
country as a force getting results as a result of dogged pursuit of leads, rather than
money or coercion. If ever there were a moment for strengthening civilian law
enforcement agencies, it is now, but it has to be done with strong civilian oversight
mechanisms.
One intelligence officer in eastern Indonesia told ICG he had no money to pay
informants, and even though he strongly suspected a military training camp was in
operation not far from his office, he had no funds to pay anyone to try and find out
what was going on. Lack of resources for intelligence gathering is a serious issue,
particularly in remote areas, but without adequate controls, extra resources are going
to be consumed by corruption.
- The government needs to get far more serious than it has about controlling leakage
of weapons, ammunition, and explosives from Indonesian military depots. Much of the
weaponry and explosives used by JI was purchased abroad but not all of it, and trial
documents, not only from the Christmas Eve bombings but also from other bombings
such as that of the Jakarta Stock Exchange, show how the arms trade is flourishing
in Bandung and Batam. The Indonesian government might want to consider setting up
a commission with advice or input from some of the international investigators working
on the Bali case about how this trade can best be curbed.
- A major unanswered question remains what happens after Maluku and Poso? It
would be a valuable contribution to the conflict resolution efforts in both areas to
understand exactly what role groups like the Laskar Mujahidin have played and what
havoc they can continue to wreak.
Jakarta/Brussels, 11 December 2002
[Its only shows part of Jihads in Poso and Maluku.]
For full and complete report as a PDF file in A4 format (Adobe Acrobat Reader) go to:
http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/asia/indonesia/reports/A400845_11122002.pdf
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