The Sydney Morning Herald, January 22 2003
A conspiracy of silence
A hundred days after the Bali bombings police have gathered a huge amount of
evidence but cannot identify the culprits. Philip Cornford reports from Bali.
After arresting 17 Islamic fundamentalists, including five accused major plotters who
face the death penalty, police have yet to resolve the central criminal act of the Bali
bombings: who detonated the bomb outside the Sari Club, the bomb which did most
of the killing?
So far, police say, three terrorists - Amrozi, 39, his brother Ali Imron, 30, and the
operational commander Imam Samudra, 35, a veteran terrorist who had spent two
years in Afghanistan - have confessed to roles in the bomb attacks on October 12,
but all have denied they exploded the Sari bomb. Although they are otherwise boastful
about what they did, none is claiming this poisoned chalice. Ali Imron and Samudra
were in action that night. They were the men in command. Are they protecting
themselves?
The Sari bomb was the biggest and most destructive of three detonated, 1000
kilograms of explosives packed into a filing cabinet which was put into a van which
was driven to Jalan Legian, the tourist strip at Kuta, and parked outside the packed
nightclub around 11.30pm. It was a Saturday night, and across the narrow street,
jammed with tourists, motorbikes and cars, Paddy's Bar was also doing a roaring
business. The bomb had four triggers, three of them backups to the first-choice
device, a mobile telephone. Whichever trigger was used, the result was a catastrophe
which replaced Australian complacency with fear and suspicion. The blast and the
resulting conflagrations destroyed the Sari Club and Paddy's, killing almost 200
people were killed that night, almost all tourists, including 88 Australians.
The next morning, according to police, Samudra, Ali Imron and another plotter, Idris,
35, drove to the smouldering ruins and observed with satisfaction their handiwork.
Police said Ali Imron told them he "felt happy" that so many had died. Yet when it
comes to naming the man who detonated the bomb, he is not helpful, although there
can be little doubt that he knows the culprit.
So far, police have one suspect, Dulmatin, a 32-year-old Javanese electronics wizard
who is allegedly a bomb maker for Jemaah Islamiah (JI), the regional terrorist group
which is blamed for ordering the attack. Dulmatin was named as the triggerman by
Amrozi, the first suspect arrested, on November 5, who gave police the names of
most of the key conspirators and their roles. But Amrozi was not in Bali on October
12, having returned to East Java several days earlier after performing his mission -
buying the van and the explosives and delivering them to Bali. Amrozi was at home in
Tenggulun, a village 200 kilometres from Surabaya, watching boxing on television
when the bombs were detonated.
Amrozi told police Dulmatin made the mobile-phone triggers for all three bombs. It
was a complex task, especially for the Sari bomb. The backup triggers, according to
more recent testimony by Ali Imron, were a device which would be activated by a
radio signal, another activated by a battery and the last, a protective device which
would be activated by pressure if anyone tried to disarm the bomb.
Another expert, Wayan, 35, who had previous experience assembling bombs for JI,
helped Dulmatin. Amrozi claimed Dulmatin punched in the three SMS messages
which individually activated the three mobiles, sending electrical charges to the
detonators, exploding the bombs.
Dulmatin, Wayan and Idris, key players, have yet to be captured and their versions
still to be told. But when police tested Amrozi's testimony against that of his brother
and Samudra, they found inconsistencies which strongly indicate the plotters are
telling the truth only when it suits them.
From the alleged confessions of Samudra and Ali Imron, police have scenarios for two
of the bombs. Both say Dulmatin assembled the triggers and helped make all three
bombs. But unlike Amrozi, neither Samudra nor Ali Imron said Dulmatin detonated the
Sari bomb.
Ali Imron's testimony is the most recent, given to police on Thursday night after he
was flown to Bali from East Borneo, where he was arrested on Monday. He took
police to a boarding house in Denpasar which was the headquarters for the bomb plot.
Police knew it existed, but not its location. Ali Imron still had the key to the front door.
He told police that he and Samudra had paid a year's rent in advance, posing as
cargo agents and telling the landlord they were from Sumatra.
It was to this house that Amrozi delivered the van and explosives. Ali Imron's story is
that he and Idris helped Dulmatin make the bombs, promoting Idris, who hitherto had
been described by police as a quartermaster who arranged accommodation and
supplied the mobile phones. They combined potassium chloride, TNT and an
unidentified black powder and tested a small bomb in the garage. Alarmed neighbours
where told an electrical implement had exploded. They believed the explanation, but
the plotters had taken an alarming risk which would have horrified better disciplined
terrorists.
When it comes to events on the night of the attack, important elements of Ali Imron's
testimony are hard to believe.
Police say Ali Imron told them that Samudra, the overall commander, remained in the
safe house in Denpasar. Ali Imron described himself as the "field commander". He
said he and another plotter drove the van with the bomb to Jalan Legian. Who was the
other man? Ali Imron wasn't sure. He thought his name was Jimmy, which might be
an alias for Iqbal. This is farce. Police have never heard of Jimmy before. Ali Imron
was the "field commander" of a conspiracy about to commit mass murder, he was
transporting the bomb - and he didn't know the identity of the man sitting next to him.
"He's lying," police said.
Police said Ali Imron claims he stopped the van 800 metres from the Sari Club, got
out and was picked up by Idris, who had been following on a motorbike. The van drove
on, Ali Imron and Idris returned to Denpasar to the al-Ghorobah mosque near the safe
house. Their roles ended, they prayed for success and were in the mosque when the
bomb exploded. They expressed their joy.
Three days later, Ali Imron changed his story, claiming that Idris detonated the Sari
bomb. By then however his testimony had little credence, containing too many
inconsistencies. Police believe he is lying to minimise his role. By escalating the role
of Idris from quartermaster to master bomber, it is possible that Ali Imron is sacrificing
a more expendable Idris to protect someone else, possibly himself.
Ali Imron says Iqbal or Jimmy parked the van outside the Sari Club and went into
Paddy's. This links neatly with what already has been established by DNA on body
parts recovered from Paddy's and which were identified as belonging to Iqbal. He took
a backpack bomb into the bar and was killed when it exploded. How this happened is
a matter of intense speculation.
Samudra, when caught on November 21, boasted that Iqbal was a suicide bomber,
which Indonesian police never tire of denying, justifiably afraid of allowing the
conspirators to claim a martyr as a role model for their "Jihad".
Police claim Ali Imron's account supports their version of an accidental early
detonation. This is that Samudra used a mobile phone to detonate the third bomb
near the American consulate in Denpasar. The signal prematurely detonated the Sari
and Paddy's bombs, catching Iqbal unawares.
But there is no evidence to back this theory, and even the police have no idea how
one mobile could activate three mobiles simultaneously with a single message.
Another version is that the mobile message to activate the consulate bomb somehow
"crossed over" into the two other mobiles, although police once again are unable to
explain how this could happen. These attempts at explanation lack credibility,
especially since Amrozi is insistent that the three mobiles had to be activated
individually.
The consulate bomb harmed no one. It was clearly a symbolic attack on the United
States. "Destroy America," Samudra shouted when he was arrested. But Samudra
has made no reference to this bomb.
So is Ali Imron telling only part of the truth to conceal a greater guilt by his mentor?
Why give only this pathetic gesture to Samudra? He was their inspirational leader, the
toughest and most experienced terrorist among them, a religious zealot who had
fought in Afghanistan, and who, police say, has confessed to participating in a series
of bomb attacks in Indonesia in December 2000.
Why give Samudra only one bomb, and the least important? Why not all three,
especially the Sari bomb, which was what the plot was all about? He was the fittest,
the most deserving to deliver such a devastating message to their enemies. He was
also in command, the man most willing and able.
More light needs to be shone into this world of shadows, to establish what are truth,
deception and lies. In only three months, the Indonesian police have done a
remarkable job, and there is every reason to accept their confidence that they will
arrest the suspects still at large, especially those they want most: Idris, Dulmatin,
Wayan and another bomb expert, Dr Azhari, a Malaysian.
They have struck a significant blow against JI in Indonesia. One of their prisoners is
Mukhlas, another brother of Amrozi, and he is their most important captive so far.
Mukhlas, 42, a religious teacher and veteran terrorist who spent more than 10 years in
Malaysia, is said to be JI's operations commander for South-East Asia, the No. 3 man
in the hierarchy. Like Samudra, another big loss for JI, Mukhlas went to Afghanistan
and is accused of initiating the plan for the bomb attacks and ordering its execution.
Another prisoner is Mubarok, who was captured with Ali Imron. Mubarok played no
direct role in the bombings but on Mukhlas's orders financed the operation, using part
of the $90,000 which a separate cell got by robbing a jewellery store in Serang, East
Java, two months before the bombing.
The arrests give an alarming insight into JI's capabilities. The group was able to
provide a cadre of committed, experienced terrorists with sophisticated technical
skills, along with the resources to finance and plan the operation. But they exposed a
fatal weakness: a reliance on passionate amateurs to be the ground troops, in
recruiting Islamic fundamentalists from religious schools.
Mukhlas recruited two blood brothers, Amrozi - whose carelessness in buying the van
in his own name gave police their initial breakthrough - and Ali Imron, plus two
stepbrothers.
A difficult task for JI will be replacing the veterans Mukhlas and Samudra. But there is
no shortage of eager volunteers among the fundamentalist Islamic religious schools of
Indonesia and Malaysia.
Copyright © 2002. The Sydney Morning Herald.
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