"Pointblank" - the combined allied strategic air offensive over europe
On january, 14th, 1943 Roosevelt and Churchill met in Casablance and talked about
how establishing the "second front" against Hitler and how to do the strategic air war.
The results were the invasions on the coasts of Sicily, Salerno, Anzio and the Normandy, the british RAF bomber commandīs terror attacks on german civilians at night - and the USAAF bombing campaign against continental europeīs industry. At this time, the USAAF had proved that it was able to execute strategic bombing strikes at daylight, and the british had proved that they were able to FIND at least the target AREA without daylight.
Well, what had the USAAF in their inventory at this time (bomber with strategical range and fighters)?
(Iīve placed the answer here, because I suggest that most readers know it.)
(I decided to make a list for the most important, because most of you know the reality.)
Strategical targets in range of tactical bombers were mostly under attack by tactical bombers.
USAAF and RAF used low and medium altitude level-bombing tactics against such targets.
Strategical targets far away from allied bases were usually under attack by level-bombers
at medium altitude (except for example the oil refinery at Ploiesti, Romania, south-east europe,
which was atacked by B-24 from africa out of very low altitude).
The problem was that from 20,000 feet, 2/3 of American bombs fell 1/5 of a mile or more from their targets -
even with the best and most expensive bombsight of that time, the Norden bombsight.
A list of all U.S. free-falling bomb types during WW2.
Guided weapons were introduced in late 1942 (a passive-acoustic homing airborne anti-submarine torpedo),
guided airborne weapons for ship attack (almost the same like ground target attack in this case) were
introduced by the germans in 1943 (Henschel Hs293A radio-controlled combination of a rocket and
a 500kg high-explosive bomb and the SD1400 X-1 "Fritz X" radio-controlled armour-piercing 1400kg bomb).
The USAAF did not use guided weapons until 1944 (AZON, RAZON and Aphrodite projects).
There were several guided weapons in development for the USAF and the USN (especially the futuristic radar-guided
anti-ship missile "Bat" for the Navy), but they didnīt seem to recognize their potential. History is sometimes forgiving;
sometimes not (1940, France).
The Azon bomb had with a 12-15% direct hit rate on railway bridges a 2900% better precision than usual free-falling
bombs in combination with the Norden bombsight. Hs293A (30% on small ships, 60% in training on barrack-size target),
RAZON and Fritz-X were even better!
Photographic reconnaissance was granted by RAF and USAAF de Havilland Mosquito PR versions, although its speed became insufficient to escape the best german interceptors by mid ī44.
Hereīs the THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY for the european war, written in 1945
Targets:
Energy economy (power plants, coal dehydration, oil storages, oil refineries, dams ...),
shortage production (optics, accumulator & ball bearing production, ...),
railway bridges (over wide rivers)
Aircraft:
Tactic with P-51/B-28/Razon:
Here I present a typical fictional raid (against ten, not just one target, at once!):
(all I need are 1,000 P-51 and 200 B-28, and I assume squadrons of each 20 planes)
1,000 P-51D and 200 B-28 take off in Norfolk,
200 P-51 without droptanks escort until the netherland-germany border and then fly back for refueling,
now the other P-51īs escort the B-28īs in a 4:1 ratio until approx.100km close to the target(s),
theyīre splitting into smaller goups (like 20 B-28+80 P-51) to attack around ten different targets,
(more than 15% hit ratio multiplied with 4 RAZONīs per B-28 allows over 12 x 1,000lbs direct hits with 20 B-28)
now they can return (the B-28 are too fast to allow much of the Bf109 and Fw190 to refuel in time for a 2nd interception),
they should try to form once again a big swarm or to fly in 2-5 smaller groups,
200 P-51D take off for a second time this day without droptanks for a rendez-vouz with the bombers,
as soon as these fresh P-51D`s arrive, the old escort flies independent from the bombers home if they want to
The problem is that with an extreme high hit chance, the number of necessary bombers decreases a lot (and also the number
of bombers which can release their bombs at once, because of radio frequency shortages and possibly only four different flare colours).
A single squadron cannot survive the onslaught of a complete fighter wing without a lot of escort fighters, thatīs why I chose to let them fly
most of the way united with massed escorts and why high (cruising) speed is essential.
Another problem are ECM (Electronic Counter Measures) which can reduce the worth of guided bombs with wrong steering radio signals.
Thatīs why I prefer directional radio like the german engineers developed it for later Hs293 versions.
Then would be the only major problem that the defender could deploy hundreds of decoy flares on the ground near the target
(a Fritz-X bomber once lost visual contact to its missile because 37 or 40mm HE tracer ammunition was to thick around the target).
P.S.: The Luftwaffe had similar designs like the B-28 with the Ju288 and Fw191, but didnīt use them because
raw material shortages prevented the production of the necessary Jumo222 four-row radial engines in !!!1942!!!.
They had also their first guided bomb operational in !!!1943!!!.
But they only hadnīt enough raw material, crews, aviation gas and no escort fighter with 2500km range.
Further, most war production was too far away (USA, inner USSR) for a useful german strategic air war against them.
A useful german strategic air war would have meant to attack not the production, but the transport of supplies;
in the Battle of the Atlantic against allied convoys, but this was neither Luftwaffe doctrine nor were adequate bombers
available (but could have been around 1942 with He177B and Ju288 and later with Me264 and Ta400).
email me: Sven.Ortmann@stud.uni-hannover.de
