The Jakarta Post, December 30, 2003
Opinion
Contemplating the possibility of a military coup d'etat
Historian Andrew Janos wrote in 1964 that a military coup in the United States "would
be too fantastic to contemplate, not only because few would actually entertain the
idea, but also because the bulk of the people are strongly attached to the prevailing
(democratic) political system" (The Seizure of Power: A Study of Force and Popular
Consent, Research Monograph No. 16, Center for International Studies, Princeton
University, 1964, p. 39).
According to Janos, a coup against an elected democratic government could only
occur if political apathy prevailed as the dominant feature in society.
Three decades later, Charles J. Dunlap Jr., then a lieutenant colonel and Deputy Staff
Judge Advocate, U.S. Central Command, at MacDill AFB, Florida, envisaged an
American military coup in 2012. (The Origins of the American Military Coup 2012,
Parameter, Winter 1992-1993: pp. 2-20). The main ingredient behind the coup,
according to Dunlap, was widespread exasperation with democracy.
Such contrasting views deserve special attention. Janos was a civilian, who believed
in participatory politics. On the other hand, Dunlap was a military officer concerned
more with effective government. To him, a military coup was possible if people
became disillusioned at the apparent inability of elected government to solve the
nation's dilemmas.
Arguably, the post-2004 election will lead to such an environment. Indonesia's societal
malaise was readily apparent in 2003.
According to a poll earlier this year, 78 percent of Indonesians believed the country
was on the "wrong track." One researcher declared that social indicators were at their
lowest level in 20 years. The country suffered from a "deep pessimism about
politicians and government after years of broken promises."
Meanwhile, TNI's political faction in the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR)
abstained from two votes leading up to the special legislative session in 2001.
Generals refused to uphold President Abdurrahman "Gus Dur" Wahid's emergency
decree, designed to keep him in power. Still, in Maluku and Aceh military operations
succeeded in reducing the brutality that often characterizes territorial military action.
With such "political neutrality and professional" conduct, Janos' and Dunlap's theses
appeared to be mutually reinforcing.
People began to dream of a return of the Soeharto legacy. As people are looking for
someone or something that could produce workable answers to the nation's crises,
the military appears to have been successful in restoring a considerable degree of
public confidence. Of course, political oxygen as such may be insufficient for a
military coup.
Nonetheless, another oxygen prevails, i.e. a praetorian guard mentality in the military.
Both the ouster of Gus Dur (2001) and discussion on Article 19 of the draft of the
Armed Forces bill (2003) indicate some important points. Disobeying Gus Dur,
constitutionally the supreme commander of the military, was not, according to the
military, an act of insubordination. With a strong belief that "loyalty to the government
must be in line with that to the people," the move against him was justified because
the president was engaging in a political struggle with his legislature, also political
institutions.
While the fall of Gus Dur showed that the military can continue to influence events,
debate on Article 19 of the draft of the Armed Forces bill may illuminate another
military fixation.
Indeed, the article, under which the Armed Forces chief is required only to inform the
president 24 hours after deploying troops when he determines the well-being of the
state is at risk, was not an indication that army conservatives were preparing a
contingency measure in anticipation of anything going wrong in the 2004 election.
In fact, argument used in the discussions related to more practical issues, for
instance intercepting intruding foreign aircraft into Indonesian's territory or
uncontrollable communal conflict in remote areas. Changes of personnel in the
drafting committee of the bill were not necessarily predestined to the return of Army
conservatives, though some of them brought orthodoxires. what is meant here -- "their
own agendas"?
Nonetheless, the article did not fall from the sky. The whole discussion about the
military has regressed to the patterns that existed before Soeharto's fall from power.
Since mid-2001 senior officers have been genuinely concerned about the civilian
political leadership, about the involvement of party leaders in money politics and
especially, about their perception that politicians show more concern for rebel
casualties in places like Aceh than the casualties of their own army.
Military coups have been seen somewhat less frequently since the mid-1980s. The
failure of military regimes in Latin America to resolve the economic and political
problems appeared to have made the military much more reluctant to intervene in
politics. In contrast to past crises, the armed forces sat on the sidelines through
economic crises such as the Asian crisis in Thailand in 1998 or the Argentinean crisis
of 2002.
Failed transition to democracy, either in the form of ineffective government, the
shortsighted interest of civilian elites or mounting corruption, could invite military
intervention, although this should not necessarily end up with a military regime.
In Pakistan (1999), Pervez Musharraf moved in with the promise of fighting corruption.
In Cote d'Ivoire and the Central American Republic (2002) the military serves as an
arbiter between civilian leaders.
Democracy is a fragile institution that must be continuously nurtured and scrupulously
protected. The old credo that the military is the guardian of the state is taking on
special meaning for the Indonesian Armed Forces, amidst a prevailing strong
ideological fixation and an ingrained, self-defined, quasi-religious mission of protecting
the state.
At present, few generals envisage such a coup. The political role of the military will
not end in 2004. I was somewhat nervous when an active general told me, "despite
being no longer in the legislature, the military will use the authority with which it is
vested to take part in safeguarding and controlling the reform movement." I was even
shocked when a young, Western-educated colonel grimed what is meant here? "a
soldier fails to live up to his oath to serve the country if he does not speak out when
he sees his civilian or military superiors executing policies he feels to be wrong."
By definition, a military coup is simply the use of the threat of military force to remove
a particularly unpopular leader; the military may not directly assume power. This
occurred twice in the Philippines in 2003. Let us hope that the 2004 elections do not
fail to establish an effective government, and thereby further deepen political apathy. --
Kusnanto Anggoro
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