ASEAN at the Threshold of the 21st Century:  Cultivating a Trisectoral Partnership?[1]

Good morning, Colleagues and Friends.  First, I thank the Organizers of the Assembly for undertaking this initiative.  Second, I thank our Indonesian friends for their graciousness and hospitality.  Third, I am honored to be able to share with you some thoughts on ASEAN Vision 2020.

INTRODUCTION

As the last presentor in this Panel, I do you service by not repeating the ideas and views that already have been presented to you by the four previous speakers.  I will concentrate, instead, on three thoughts that I have taken from the discussions yesterday afternoon and evening which, to my mind, are germane to the assessment of ASEAN Vision 2020.

These thoughts are as follows.  First, the formulation of ASEAN Vision 2020, in hindsight, seems to be only a second best starting point.  Second, ASEAN Vision 2020, by itself, may be only a second best message or content.  Third, the emergence of trisectoral approaches and mechanisms seems to point to the need for a review, if not a redefinition, of the principle of non-interference in ASEAN.

Now let me explain briefly each of these ideas.

ASEAN VISION 2020:  SECOND BEST STARTING POINT

First, the formulation of ASEAN Vision 2020, in hindsight, seems to be only a second best starting point.  ASEAN Vision 2020 offers us the substantive elements and programs in industry, finance and banking, trade and investments, technology, social and environment as well as macroeconomy, among other sectors, that aim to transform progressively the community of Southeast Asian nations into a nucleus of geopolitical and socio-economic cooperation and partnership.

Perhaps, the first best starting point should have been the development and establishment of mechanisms for engaging the ASEAN community—its member-nations’ respective governments, civil societies and business sectors—in partnership.  After all, ASEAN’s battle cry has been “ASEAN in concert” or “ASEAN in unity”.  The ways and means that have been applied since 33 years ago, certainly and at the least, need to be assessed as to their effectiveness and responsiveness.  We always need to check against inertia.  We always need to know and feel the pulse of our peoples and of our times.  Moving forward is far from stretching what we simply and comfortably have.

I see it as a step forward, than backward, for ASEAN to talk about improving its structures, mechanisms and approaches than, or in addition to, the areas of cooperation that the member-nations have constantly deliberated on.  I will leave it to the subsequent Panels and presentors to tackle the role and promise of trisectoral approaches and mechanisms for ASEAN.

ASEAN VISION 2020:  SECOND BEST MESSAGE

Second, ASEAN Vision 2020, by itself, may only be a second best message or content.  Is it an “ASEAN Vision 2020” that we need?  Or a “20-20 Vision for ASEAN”?  We all know that having a 20-20 vision means having “perfect eyesight”.  I hope that twenty years from now, ASEAN will be proud, less for having its ASEAN Vision 2020 now, but more for preserving a “20-20 vision” for both what and how it had wanted to become.

By linking idea number one and idea number two, I reckon that trisectoral approaches and mechanisms will enable ASEAN to preserve its “20-20 vision”, or, if a bit late already, to deter the further erosion of its “already less than 20-20 vision” or its “already dimming eyesight”.  With the failing eyesights of the traditional players, such as national governments, other players, such as local government, civil society and the business sector, can lend their own eyesights for greater synergy with the governments’.

Allow me to dwell a trifle longer on the economic and financial areas, as these are my areas of professional interest and work.  ASEAN Vision 2020 could have become even more meaningful and potent after the financial crisis hit the region in the middle of 1997.  Some Southeast Asian economies[2] tripped from a high of 5.5 percent to 8.6 percent gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate in 1996 to a low of –0.5 percent to –13.7 percent in 1998 (United Nations Survey, 2000).

 The effects of the Asian financial crisis only bore on ASEAN member-nations the realization that regional cooperation needs to be planned for, managed well and monitored regularly.  The regional financial disorder that was unsheathed by the Asian financial crisis provided an opportunity for almost everyone in the development field to cooperate and work together—knowingly or not.

 Monetary innovations that will bring more people and actors together in implementation are being considered for the establishment of a regional system of currency swaps, the adoption of an Asian currency similar to the Euro, the setting up of an Asian Monetary Fund and the recent implementation of the ASEAN surveillance system for monitoring critical economic and financial indices as part of the region’s early warning mechanism to avert future financial crises.  These initiatives spell out opportunities for greater collaboration among the financial entities in government and civil society to engage in nontraditional areas of development work.

RECONCILING NON-INTERFERENCE AND TRISECTORAL APPROACHES AND MECHANISMS

Third, some pressure seems to be at work on the ASEAN principle of non-interference, particularly during these times when trisectoral approaches and mechanisms are evolving and exhibiting concrete promise for success.  Personally, I find the clash of the ideas of non-interference and participation stark.

ASEAN is now experiencing economic and corporate uncertainties, simultaneous political leadership maelstroms and social and anthropological imbalances because of transnational or transborder dynamics.

While ASEAN has always distanced itself from issues it deems as “internal” to member-nations, its members may already find it difficult to separate what is “internal” from “external”, what is “domestic” from “regional and international”, because of transnational and transborder spillover effects or externalities.  As I have mentioned under idea two, financial movements, for example, are no longer held as purely a domestic concern but as a regional issue to monitor through the ASEAN surveillance process.

The following issues strike at the heart of ASEAN security if the latter is to be more forward-looking in problem-solving, than being slowed down by the diplomatic tradition of “non-interference”:

·        Human ecology issues:  haze issues and toxic wastes; food insecurity; AIDS surge and regional tourism and migration; digital divide; women’s and children’s rights and welfare; land and water uses.

·        Economic issues:  currency dives; oil price hikes; labor absorption and migration; poverty; transportation and communications.

Before I close, I would like to say something about an area where I do not have expertise on, but directly thrives on transborder concerns and trisectoral approaches.  This is the area of security.

THE CHANGING FACE OF SECURITY

In this “Age of Globalization”, security is no longer confined to defending the territorial integrity of the state and maintaining internal peace and order.  Security now encompasses human, or individual, well-being, ensuring that pervasive threats to people’s rights, safety, property and lives are addressed. 

Notwithstanding the movement towards economic cooperation in the region, one could not escape from the unevenness in the levels of development within the region.  Disparities in income and opportunities are not only pronounced domestically, but also among the nations in ASEAN, which would remain as a vulnerable point against human, and even state, security. 

The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP)-Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) conflict in Southern Philippines, for example, presents a case wherein violence was fueled by the claim that Mindanaoans were greatly disadvantaged in and marginalized from the development process.

The Philippine government is now vigorously working for stable and sustainable peace in the South, anchored on inclusive and culturally-sensitive development.  A Mindanao Development Framework and Investment Plan is being prepared for relief, rehabilitation, stabilization and development efforts.  Peace and development are not mutually exclusive.  Without development, there is no peace.  Without peace, there is no development.

Ethnicity, inclusion and development characterize the complex challenges confronting the region today.  The challenges on differences among peoples are not unique to the Philippines, although my country has received a fairer share of global concern over the media-exposed flashpoints in Southern Philippines.

With the wealth of diversity in Southeast Asia, the challenge is to nourish mechanisms of inclusion, participation and empowerment.  Where kinship and tradition shape cultural identity that feeds into the consciousness of distinguishing “us” from “them”, what could blur cultural gulfs are common aspirations and ideals rooted in equitable and broad-based development.  Where inequity persists, peoples’ differences deepen.

If we were to learn our lessons from recent history not only in ASEAN, but also from other culturally-plural societies of the world, the greatest threat confronting us in the 21st century seems to be not war between, but internal strife and violence within, sovereign nations.  In the 1990s, the UN reported in its 1999 Human Development Report the rising number and growing extent of damage to life and property of internal violence within nations.

The flourishing of trisectoral arrangements and institutions could spell the scope of influence and effectiveness of governance at the national and regional levels.

In the economic area, for example, the creation of an ASEAN Business Advisory Council (ABAC) indicates ASEAN’s move to accommodate the pragmatic experience and resources of the business sector in supporting trade liberalization and financial reforms.  ASEAN initiatives such as e-ASEAN, AFTA, ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) and ASEAN Industrial Cooperation (AICO), among others, would not be successful if these were pursued without the support of the private sector.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This leaves us with the role of civil society.  Certainly, we do not want a “Seattle” in ASEAN; we do not need a “Prague” in ASEAN.  We need civil society to democratize, not disrupt, regional and global governance.  We need civil society as partners, not adversaries.  We respect their advocacies and not marginalize their concerns.  We “include” them.  This will strengthen shared ideals and unleash creative cooperation.  Where issues potentially take us to divergent views, we build confidence, discuss and move on.

There is, at present, still a vast area for involvement of civil society in ASEAN.  Lest ASEAN falls short of its vision for a “caring community” in the year 2020, there is a need to involve the creativity, potentials, experience and resources of civil society, especially in areas where its members perform best, i.e., poverty alleviation efforts, advocacy and empowerment.

Thank you and good day.

 erbi/philippines/24.11.00


[1]  Delivered by Mr. Eugenio Raymundo B. Inocentes III, Director, Management Staff, National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), Philippines during the ASEAN People’s Assembly (APA) 2000, held on 24-26 November 2000 at Batam, Indonesia.

[2]   Includes Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines.  


Copyright 2000
Legislative Executive Development Advisory Council
Ground Floor NEDA Bldg. Amber Ave. Pasig City MMA Philippines
Tel. Nos. (632) 631-37-33 (632) 631-37-37 (632) 631-09-45 up to 46 Loc 110

Back To Previous Page