Franklin Freeman
copyright © the author 2002, 2003, 2005
You may download the article for your own use,
and reproduce it, as a whole or in part (but include the
full copyright notice), on non-commercial websites
Contents:-
The Historical Background
The Current Situation
The Middle East
Caspian Oil
Venezuela (and Latin America)
Other Countries
In the early 1970s America and the rest of the West were rocked by price hikes and cutbacks in production of oil by OPEC, the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries. Arab-dominated OPEC initially intended this as a weapon against the West during the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, but soon realized its economic advantages. Western economies, on the contrary, were plunged into recession, as their governments and peoples were brought to realize their heavy dependence on this commodity and therefore on its producers.
No serious energy alternatives to oil could be devised at short notice, and in fact none have been developed to this day. Oil prices plunged back to their pre-war levels (in inflation-corrected terms) in 1986, but Western economies are now more dependent on oil than ever. They are thus at least as vulnerable to external political conditions as before.
In the mid 1970s the US government devised a contingency plan to occupy oil fields. In the Middle East such a seizure was regarded as impracticable (in spite of then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's public blustering), because of the likelihood of Soviet counter-intervention. Only Venezuela was considered a practical option at this time. But nothing came of these plans at the time. ('The Oil Wars: and the ones that almost happened')
With the end of the Cold War the Soviet world threat evaporated, and with it the potential restraints on the actions of the remaining superpower, America. Under the Democratic presidency of Clinton, such action was less unrestrained, however. Military intervention against Yugoslavia, for example, took place under the idealistic mantle of humanitarian liberation from tyranny.
...
The US oil cabal's efforts are in proportion to the size of the target land's oil resources, and more particularly the importance of their contribution to the USA. (The USA itself supplies a declining proportion of its own oil requirements, 46% in 2001.) Saudi Arabia is usually the US's top external supplier of crude oil (at 1.61 million barrels per day in 2001). Jostling with it in the top category are Venezuela, Canada and Mexico (1.28m, 1.32m and 1.38m bl/day respectively in 2001; Venezuela and Canada are also significant suppliers of processed oil products to the USA). Below this, in 2001, fell Nigeria and Iraq (0.81 and 0.78m bl/day of crude). In a third category were Norway, Angola and the United Kingdom (0.27, 0.31 and 0.23m bl/day). ('[US] Oil Imports', Michigan Public Service Commission; table of US crude oil imports, 1984-2000, The Public i.) (Though areas which could be important oil suppliers may also receive special attention [see 'Caspian Oil' below].)
The staged attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, and the list of "19 hijackers" quickly produced by the administration's new FBI chief, Robert Mueller, provided the pretext for an immediate attack on Afghanistan, on the eastern edge of the projected oil empire. Fifteen of the alleged hijackers were stated to be Saudi Arabian, but the cabal evidently decided it was inexpedient to play this card at this time. Instead, it concentrated on the militarily easy — and politically relatively easy — Afghan target. Together with Pakistan, which has been subsequently worked on, this would secure the eastern flank of the oil empire.
Under the banner of fighting al-Qaeda, the US subsequently moved military forces into countries all around the prospective empire, forming the basis of an "iron corset" — which can be used as a base to mount subversion and attacks into the target oil countries themselves. Uzbekistan and Tadzhikistan to the north-east (but it is currently withdrawing from the former), Georgia to the north-west, Yemen, Djibouti and Somalia to the south, as well as Afghanistan to the east. (And American special forces are also present in Pakistan, "fighting al-Qaeda".) The cabal's junior ally Israel offered to allow US forces passage to attack Iraq from the west; Israeli PM Sharon wants the USA to attack Iran after Iraq.
Iraq stands at a strategic point in this region, bordering on Saudi Arabia and Iran, and itself having the world's third-largest reserves. Saddam Hussein's regime was a dictatorship modelled on the Soviet regime, and had in the past produced chemical and biological weapons (and used the former on both Iraqi Kurds and invading Iranians). Scott Ritter, one of the UN weapons-inspectors who worked there in the 1990s, disbelieved the Bush administration's claims that Iraq had resumed production of such weapons. The claims, as those against al-Qaeda, were allegedly of intelligence whose sources cannot be revealed without endangering those "sources" — a facade which became decidedly overworked over the course of 2002-3. (But the cabal has since not been ashamed to adapt it for use on Iran.)
The US-led coterie conquered Iraq in March-April 2003. No WMD were ever substantiated, and the US and UK officially acknowledged by 2004 that there were none. Under a plan drawn up before the invasion, the oil fields were to be placed under US administration, with the British "being given to understand that a portion of the oil revenue will be allotted to defray their military expenses and the costs of maintaining an army in [the extreme south-east of] Iraq". ('Promised: Autonomy for British Command, Post-War Assets in Iraq', DEBKAfile, 12 March 2003) This seems to indicate the pecking order within the emerging Anglo-Saxon world empire.
On 7 May 2003 the Pentagon admitted that the contract granted to Halliburton (via its subsidiary), hitherto said to be for quelling oil fires and repairing oil facilities in Iraq, included a section for the distribution of Iraqi oil. The agreement was said to be "temporary, for two years", and other — American — companies were, from August 2003, to be allowed to compete for such contracts. This went some way to confirming the real purpose of the Iraq invasion. (Cf. 'Halliburton's role in rebuilding Iraq grows despite flak', Mercury News, 8 May 2003.) Now, in 2005, with the help of US-UK government pressure, Western oil companies are seeking to establish "production sharing agreements" (PSAs) with the Iraqi government (in advance of the December 2005 parliamentary elections) which would ensure the companies between 42 and 162 per cent returns on their investments during the next 25 to 40 years, "far in excess of typical 12 per cent rates" (Philip Thornton, "Iraq's oil: The spoils of war", The Independent (UK), 22 November 05. The article is based on a report, Crude Designs, produced by various American and British "pressure groups" such as including War On Want and the New Economics Foundation (NEF).)
The US junta has since turned its attention to Iran. It is working up the issue of high-grade uranium production in the country, which it says could be used for atomic bombs; the Iranian regime denies any such intent. Also, President Bush became vocal in his support for anti-regime demonstrations by students in Tehran, calling them a cry for freedom. (Such "freedom" has already been demonstrated by the increasing bloodshed in Iraq.)
Iran's currently-available oil deposits are contained wholly within the south-western corner of the country. It would only be necessary for US forces to "pinch off" this territory, while reducing the rest of the country to a rump state. Such a policy is already evident in Iraq, where the quick seizure and careful treatment of oil facilities is in complete contrast with the lack of administration of the rest of the country. (And a similar possible "solution" has been suggested for Saudi Arabia, which could be divided into an eastern oil zone-of-control and a western rump state containing the Islamic shrines of Mecca and Medina. See Eric Margolis, "America's New Mideast Empire", ForeignCorrespondent.com, 9 Dec. 2002) Iran is already sandwiched between two US-occupied countries, Iraq and Afghanistan, putting it in a disadvantaged position for defending itself.
In August 2002 the extreme right of the US political establishment began agitation against Saudi Arabia itself, but nothing dramatic has yet come of it. It was a — rather clumsy — attempt to play the "15 Saudi 9/11 hijackers" card. The Pentagon's advisory Defense Policy Board (with the apparent sole dissension of Henry Kissinger) approved a description of Saudi Arabia as a "kernel of evil" and a promoter of "Islamic terrorism", and apparently suggested that its oil fields should be seized "as punishment" if it did not curb its "efforts" in this direction — a most unsubtle agenda. ('Briefing Depicted Saudis as Enemies', Washington Post, 6 Aug. 02, p.A01) In May 2003 came the bomb attacks in Riyadh which left over thirty US and other foreign workers dead, so the "Saudi terrorist card" does remain an active possible pretext for the conquest of that country.
In summary, the oil cabal continues to manoeuvre forward on a broad front, leaving us guessing "who's next". But its ultimate aim is evidently the conquest the entire region and the securing of all of its oil resources.
Security in Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and western Pakistan would be needed to ensure safety for a pipeline to convey Caspian oil to the Indian Ocean.
In fact, a pipeline is now being constructed along an alternative route through Azerbaijan, Georgia and eastern Turkey, for a shipping point in the eastern Mediterranean. These areas are not without their security problems either. But the overthrow of President Shevardnadze in Georgia by the liberal opposition may be a step towards securing this area for oil transportation. Interestingly, Shevardnadze claimed that the billionaire George Soros financed his toppling. We might also wonder if the presence of US special forces in the country provided a cover for subversive activities against the old government. ( Cf. "European papers assess Georgia 'revolution'", BBC News online, 24 Nov. 03)
As early as Dec. 2001, the US government was suspected of planning a coup against Chavez. ('U.S. cooking up a coup in Venezuela?', San Francisco Examiner, 28 Dec. 2001) But it was not until March 2002 that disaffected army officers staged a two-day coup, which then collapsed. Chavez averred that a American plane was involved in his temporary detention on an offshore island. Since the failed coup there has continued to be social conflict between Chavez's supporters and opponents.