What Does a Winner Look Like?

What Does a Winner Look Like?

Illustrations
I have often thought of this category but was inhibited by two considerations, to wit: first, a winner can look like any card in the deck, and secondly, recognizing winners is pretty much inherent in the analysis of any hand, particularly those from declarer's viewpoint. Why do declarers go down in cold contracts? Generalizing from the hundreds of hands I have here, I would say a primary reason is a lack of planning. Declarers, for instance, will take three rounds of trump on a 5-4 fit, as if the trump are inexhaustible, and find that they have one loser too many. I have any number of 5-4 fits which would have been a cakewalk on a 2-2 break that were butchered on the 3-1 when a little planning would have allowed a fulfilled contract. Another way common error is to wipe out entries for no good reason before asking themselves how they could make the contract.
Another common reason (which could be considered a sub-section of the first) is a failure to count. See Count Winners, Count Losers. And a not too distant third reason is a strong proclivity to avoid a risk early in the hand, thereby dooming themselves to the setting trick later. Counting losers in one suit in one hand, in another suit in the other hand isn't too rare. A failure to recognize winners doesn't loom high on the horizon here. Indeed, one must acknowledge that he can't read any declarer's mind and thus can't know whether it was an exceedingly careless declarer who failed to establish obvious winners or one who simply didn't recognize those cards as winners or likely winners. Nevertheless, every so often a hand pops up, such as the one given below, where I find myself saying, "How can I propound counting winners when declarer may not know what a winner looks like?" Declarer didn't seem to recognize winners in this very cold contract.
I would divide winners into four categories:
(1) First are top cards. Well, anybody who's played any card game comes to bridge knowing the hierarchy of the cards. That's not a problem, exactly. Indeed, I'd say the first mistake with top cards is recognizing their winning potential a little too hastily, by which I mean they cash them out too soon. For no good reason. An opposite mistake is not to cash them out at their last chance and find they don't have an entry to one. That is much rarer. Then there's a sub-section here, which is near top cards that can be developed into winners by knocking out a higher card or two. That does surface as a failing a lot more often.
(2) Secondly are long cards, those cards that outlast the length in either defender's hand and can thereby be winners, with qualifications made for access and the possibility of being ruffed. Except on a few freak hands, these aren't going to win as many tricks as high cards, but of course, are often the tipping factor that brings the contract home. Indifferent declarers rather commonly fail to take advangtage of an opportunity here.
(3) Thirdly are not-so-high cards that can be turned into winners by virtue of being protected by higher cards, allowing a finesse. They are, to be sure, iffier winners, but commonly winners nevertheless, and here OKBridge declarers commonly display a deplorable penchant for spurning that potential.
(4) And lastly, of course, is trump. Despite the popularly of no trump contracts, trump is really what makes bridge the game it is. Indeed, even no trump contracts play a backward obeisance to trump in that they say, "I think choosing a trump suit would do me more harm than good." I once mentally listed about four or five unique properties to trump, but here will cite only one, which is that it's the only suit allowing more winners than the length of the long hand. A 5-4 suit cannot bring in more than 5 winners as a side suit (and in no trump, every suit can be considered a side suit). But if named trump, there would be a theoretical possibility of 9 winners, which would be highly improbable, of course, but seven winners wouldn't be unlikely, and if not seven, six would be highly probable, I'd say. Deciding between exploiting the potential for more winners than the length of the long suit and risking allowing the defense to snatch a winner from a low trump is a situation that has bedevilled any number of declarers.
Then there is one sub-class that needs to be acknowledged, and that is cards that enable another card to be a winner. I first though of calling them substantial winners, then effective winners, but neither term seemed quite right since they're clearly not winners. Ah, then I thought of winner-enablers, which seemed valid enough, but oh so many syllables, and finally, I settled on the simpler term "enablers". Fr'instance:

K 5
6 2

The 5 of hearts can't be a winner, but it enables the king to be a winner if the ace of hearts is onsides. Particularly when this is in dummy, if you sluff the 5 because you can, you now have no chance of a winner in this suit, even if you've more or less guaranteed (in a trump contract) that you won't have two losers. I recently came across a hand where declarer did just that with a spare ace opposite a void. The kicker went on the ace, and the ace of the suit was onsides. Down one. Here is another case in my first example:
K Q 5
7 6

The 7 and 6 between them serve as enablers for one spade winner when you have no other entries to dummy. The declarer who sluffed the 6, now had no spade winners, since he had no entry for the second round of the suit, and eventually lost a club he could well have sluffed.
Anyway, here is the hand that finally tipped me over toward inserting a category for recognizing winners.

A K J 9 5
K Q 9 2
A K 8 6
------
10 8 6 5 3 2
J 5 10 6 4 3
9 7 Q J 4 3
A 8 7 5 4 J 3 2
Q 5
A 8 7
10 5 2 Contract: 6 no
K Q 10 9 6

Opening lead was a low club, declarer sluffing the 5 of spades, East going up with the J, won with the Q. Now there was a lead to the A of diamonds, back to the A of hearts, and the Q of spades was cashed. You see declarer virtually rushing to wipe out entries to the lovely clubs in the closed hand. He of course he was in that hand after cashing the Q of spades but if West takes the next round of clubs, declarer would have no access to the next two rounds, which he would sorely need.
It's a puzzling sequence of plays, starting, of course, with his sluff of the 5 of spades. You have a seven cards in each of the top three suits. Two suits are 4-3 with the top three honors, and the other is 5-2 with the top four honors. C'mon. You don't need to be an odds maven to see that the 5 of spades is far, far likelier to be a winner than the 9 of hearts. The odds against a 4-2 or 3-3 split are about 16%, meaning there's an 84% chance that the 9 of spades will be a winner. Since an uneven split might yield the 10 in the short hand making the 9 a winner, we'll have to tack a few percentage points onto that also. So you're more than twice as likely to make a winner of the 5th spade than of the fourth heart.
Of course, that wasn't what did declarer in. He could still make his contract with ease if he'd only exploited those clubs, but it didn't augur well, and indeed, more or less foreshadowed declarer's poor grasp of what looked like winners. It seems to me that East could have given declarer a bit more trouble by withholding the J and going in with his second best card, but he can't know that, and in any event, I am here interested in a declarer who didn't have a very firm grasp of what winners looked like.
Of course declarer should sluff a heart (or diamond) on the opening lead, win with the Q, knock out the ace with the K, sluffing a diamond (or a heart), knock out the 5th spade with the 10 upon regaining the lead and claim.
Declarer failed to recognize the long spade potential and the potential of the club high spot cards. Either could have settled this valuable contract for him.