The International Crisis Group (ICG), 09 January 2006
"Asking the Right Questions to Fight Terror"
Sidney Jones in The Jakarta Post
9 January 2006, The Jakarta Post
2005 brought a sobering reminder of the lethal power of terrorism:
* 6 Indonesians shot as they slept in Ceram, Maluku on May 16;
* 22 Indonesians killed by a bomb in a crowded Saturday morning market in Tentena,
Central Sulawesi on May 28;
* 14 Indonesians and 6 foreigners killed by suicide bombers in Bali on 1 October.
Other attacks on civilians in Maluku and Poso during the year pushed the death toll
higher, although many of these were locally inspired and harder to link to any concept
of global jihad.
The year also brought welcome indications of the increasing efficacy of the Indonesian
police to track down suspects and break up terrorist networks. The Nov. 9 killing of
"master bomber" Dr Azhari Husin and the arrest of other members of the suicide
brigade that he and Noordin Mohamad Top helped create were the most spectacular
examples of this, but there were many others.
In the aftermath of the Ceram attack, for example, police were not only able to arrest
three of the perpetrators in very short order. They also were able to piece together the
elements of a mujahidin-preman alliance that has been responsible acts of lethal
violence going back to 2001.
But 2005 was not just about action and reaction. It was also about the evolution of
terrorist organizations and shifts in public perceptions.
It became increasingly clear during the year that Jamaah Islamiyah, the largest of
Indonesia's jihadist organizations but by no means the only one, was divided. A small
faction, inspired by but not directed by al-Qaeda, seeks to continue to wage a jihad
against the U.S. and its allies -- especially Australia -- on Indonesian soil.
The ideological justification for that jihad might be summarized as follows:
* The U.S. and its allies are leading a Christian-Zionist conspiracy to destroy Islam
* Non-Muslims are kafir (infidels) and therefore by definition enemies of Islam; a
defensive jihad entails attacks on kafirs either to pre-empt attacks by them or to take
revenge for losses already incurred.
* Muslim rulers who ally with the U.S. and its allies are thought, by definition acting
against Islam and therefore for all practical purposes kafir. (This would be the
ideological basis for attacks on Indonesian officials and institutions, which have thus
far been rare.)
* All Americans and civilians of countries allied with the U.S. are enemies because
they pay taxes that finance the war machine against Muslims or elect representatives
and officials who are spearheading that effort. The division between civilians and
military is irrelevant.
* Kafir deaths are justified as an appropriate response to the millions of Muslims
killed, injured, or rendered homeless by the U.S. and its lackeys in Afghanistan,
Palestine, Iraq, Chechnya, Bosnia, the Sudan, and elsewhere.
* The killing of innocent Muslims in order to attain victory over kafirs is acceptable
collateral damage.
This view was associated most closely with the Indonesians associated with the
Lukman al-Hakiem pesantren in Malaysia, like Hambali, Muchlas, Dulmatin, Abu
Dujana and Imam Samudra, as well as Noordin and Azhari. It never had strong
support within the rest of JI, and it appears to be losing ground.
The other faction of JI is more committed to dakwah as a means of building a mass
base and working toward the establishment an Islamic state, more along the lines of
the original Darul Islam movement from which JI emerged. It opposes the bombers not
only because it regards their interpretation of jihad as wrong, but also because it
believes they have engaged in activities that squandered resources and weakened the
organization. This faction may be more "benign" in the short term, but its members
are still committed to acquiring the military capacity to take on enemies -- defined as
including those who actively try to prevent the gradual expansion of their influence.
Once young recruits develop skills in bomb-making and precision shooting, even if for
different aims than Noordin and company, they are going to be a problem.
But that's just JI. One of the things 2005 taught us was how complex mujahidin
networks are. The year saw the trials of Rois and others involved in the Kuningan
bombing. They weren't JI, they were from a splinter of Darul Islam known as Ring
Banten -- but they had trained with JI in Poso and worked with Noordin and Azhari on
the embassy attack.
The attack in Ceram involved three men from Poso linked to Mujahidin Kayamanya; a
Darul Islam member from Riau; a KOMPAK-affiliated man from Tasikmalaya; and a
few local thugs. None was JI. But the men from Poso had trained in Ambon, and the
Darul Islam and KOMPAK men had fought in Poso.
More than ever before, we began to understand how important those conflict areas
were in producing new recruits, new linkages, and a new generation of jihadist leaders
with real combat experience. After all, the Afghan alumni are now aging; the first
Indonesians began training on the Afghan border in 1985, and the skills of many are
rusty. The Maluku-Poso generation is fresher, battle-hardened, and probably more
militant. We are not talking about large numbers of men, but neither are they just a
handful of hardliners concentrated in Solo. Their network, as the Ceram attack shows,
is nationwide.
The year also brought home the realization to many here that suicide bombing has
taken root here as a standard terrorist technique. In Bali II, for the first time ever, we
had three young men used in a single attack. It's not enough to disseminate
teachings showing that suicide is forbidden under Islamic law, because those who
promote the practice do not consider it suicide. More important is understanding who
they are, what their backgrounds are, how they get recruited, what arguments are
used, and what criteria the recruiters are looking for. We now have ten men who have
killed themselves while engaged in terrorist attacks, or in one case in an accident
while planning one (two in Bali I, one in the Makassar bombs of December 2002; one
in the Marriott, one in Kuningan, one accidentally in Poso, and three in Bali II; and
one who blew himself up rather than be captured by police at the time that Azhari was
killed). We also have detainees, such as Wiwid, arrested in November, who reportedly
was being trained as a suicide bomber, men in prison known to have helped recruit
candidate bombers. This is a substantial data set that needs an in-depth analysis so
programs to prevent new recruitment can be developed.
If 2005 brought change and mutation within terrorist networks, it also brought a real
shift in public perceptions -- especially after Bali II. It was the videotape found of the
suicide bombers that seems to have turned the tide, led Vice President Jusuf Kalla to
take the important step of inviting ulama to his home to watch and discuss it and led
the ulama themselves to decide to take action. Why only now? It was not the first
time that jihadist videotapes had been found, but it was the first time that such
compelling evidence had been so quickly shown on national television. It was also the
first time anyone had seen very young Indonesians talk about martyrdom, knowing
that by the time they were watching, the men were already dead.
Since May 2000 when the first JI bombing attack took place in Medan until late 2005,
all counter-terror efforts had focused on intelligence and law enforcement. With Bali II,
it looked as though the Indonesian government was going to put more effort in
understanding why this phenomenon was happening, not just react to the violence.
The international climate during 2005 made counter-terror efforts in Indonesia more
difficult. Daily images of suicide attacks in Iraq, revelations about the use of white
phosphorous in Falluja, atrocities in Abu Ghraib and other U.S.-controlled detention
centers, "ghost" prisons, and other horrors unquestionably helped the jihadist cause.
But with few exceptions, anger over international events alone does not produce
terrorists. If it did, then Indonesia really would be a hotbed. Local factors are always
more important, and if in 1999-2000, Ambon and Poso were the driving forces, we
need to understand what took their place in 2005.
Likewise, poverty is not the root cause. Yes, two of the three suicide bombers came
from very poor families, and neither Iqbal in Bali I, nor Heri Golun, in the Kuningan
attack, were well-off. But people who join mujahidin networks come from across the
socioeconomic spectrum. If poverty drives young men into terrorism, how do we
explain why Heri Golun, and not his friends allowed himself to become a "bridegroom"
as suicide bombers are called? And why have we seen so few terrorists emerge from
the underclass of Jakarta?
2005 did not bring answers. But by year's end, more and more people were beginning
to ask the right questions.
The writer is Director of the Southeast Asia Project of International Crisis Group,
Jakarta. |
