The Jakarta Post, January 27, 2006
Violence linked to jihadist groups 'serious crimes'
The International Crisis Group's Southeast Asia project is analyzing recent
developments of terrorism in Indonesia, which most recently saw a bomb explosion
kill seven people in Central Sulawesi on New Year's Eve. The project's director Sidney
Jones outlined conflicts in the area, and offered suggestions for resolving the crisis
with The Jakarta Post's Duncan Wilson and Tiarma Siboro.
Question: Why do terrorists seem to target Central Sulawesi?
Answer: Because Poso (the conflict-ridden town in Central Sulawesi), like Ambon,
was seen as an area where the conflict produced new recruits for their movement.
They think these regions could be developed into a qoidah aminah (secure area)
where residents can live by Islamic principles and Islamic law.
But I think also maybe because there are still many unresolved issues about the
conflict regarding corruption of funds, distribution of land, and also perhaps, the
perpetrators believe they can get away with it.
Do you believe that terror training camps are ! still active in Sulawesi?
I believe they exist. There may not be formal camps, say with obstacle courses or
particular structures, but I'm sure there's still backroom training in somebody's
bengkel (garage) or backyard because all you need is space for five people to plan
how to make bombs.
Do you agree with accusations of political or military involvement in acts of terror?
Certain local NGOs (non-government organizations) sometimes assert that corrupt
politicians may be involved, such as their assertion over the Tentena bombing. But
there is no evidence linking acts of violence to corruption, and nor have I seen any
hard evidence that links individual members of the military to acts of violence in Poso
and Tentena. There are assumptions but there is no evidence.
These assumptions are based on past experiences. For instance, in Ambon in
mid-2001 a small group of soldiers from TNI (Indonesian Military) provided basic
military training to Laskar Jihad, a Java-based fundamentalist militia, and supplied
them with modern weapons. And when Poso erupted in 1998 the initial outbreak of
violence involved political interests.
So for some locals, earlier corruption-related violence feeds into these theories of
military or political responsibility for acts of terrorism. But these assertions are often
unable to be followed logically, and have not yet been backed by any hard evidence.
There have been concerns over the questionable acquittals and inadequate sentences
dispensed by the judicial system. Has this improved?
! There was a kind of culture of impunity in Poso and Maluku from 1999 to 2003, in
which perpetrators of violence went unpunished or received only light sentences. Just
as the government has assigned a special police team to Poso they should also
install a team of prosecutors to put together decent cases that carry relevant
evidence. For instance, in the current trial regarding the 2004 killing of the prosecutor,
the judge was presented with three `witnesses' who had nothing to do with the case.
What does that say about the ability of the prosecution?
You can also get sympathetic sentences from judges that think the terrorist law and
the American led `war on terror' has been politically motivated. If they were sentenced
under (regular) criminal charges they would get heavier sentences.
So what is ! the way forward to peace in Indonesia and success against terror
groups?
If politicians are serious in understanding terrorism and why it occurs, they will find
there is no silver bullet. We need better coordination between intelligence agencies to
prevent attacks and serious punishments for serious crimes.
We need to treat acts of violence linked to jihadist groups as serious crimes, to be
treated as such: by putting top level officers and prosecutors into it and ensuring that
you have a good, impartial judicial system. Understanding the local differences and
motivations in terrorism is also critical.
And while I believe that people should get sentences proportional to the severity of
their acts of violence, once they have served their time there should be rehabilitative
and social programs that ensure! these ex-combatants and imprisoned mujahidin do
not rejoin former networks.
While I've spoken of Indonesia's `new breed' of terrorist as fresh, battle-hardened and
well-connected, I think that many of the local mujahiddin, who fought in Poso for
example, suffered losses to themselves or their families from the conflict. They're not
ideologues in the sense that others are ideologues. There is more of a likelihood that
they can be integrated back into the community. It could also help to address broader
justice issues. Perhaps such a range of approaches could begin a way forward, to
peace for Indonesia.
All contents copyright © of The Jakarta Post.
|
