Thirty years of failure in `development' in Africa have led to major reassessments, in the 1990s in particular. Dissatisfaction among donors is matched by frustration and resentment in recipient countries over increasing dependency on aid, the failure of aid to develop local and relevant technical skills, the erosion of local initiative and the tendency of aid to reinforce undemocratic power structures. Moreover, the structural adjustment programmes of the international financial institutions (IFIs) have failed to stem Africa's economic crisis. This economic crisis was mirrored by the seeming failure of the much hoped-for `second wave of democratization/liberation' that occurred from the early 1990s. After the Cold War, in an upsurge of popular movements for democracy in much of Africa, single-party or military regimes conceded multiparty elections and greater space for civil society and autonomous associations. But by the end of the decade the process in many countries appeared to have stalled, and in some countries, for example Zimbabwe, to have been reversed.

There has been a lively debate among African scholars as to whether the struggle for democratization narrowed popular aspirations into formal multipartyism or whether the small gains made were useful building blocks for the future. Equally important is an unresolved debate on whether democracy is meaningful for African peoples only in the context of development (the `candyman approach') or whether it is `a good thing in itself', divorced from any relationship to economic advancement.1 It would seem obvious, however, that if democratic structures cannot deliver development, Africans' (or anyone else's) commitment to them is likely to be limited.

African scholars are reassessing several aspects of development in Africa. One area of analysis is the internal dynamic - Africa's democratic culture; its commitment to human rights including gender equality; identity and the manipulation of ethnicity; decentralization; human security; and conflict management. The state's role is being examined with a view to increasing public sector accountability to prevent conflict and create human security.2 Another area of analysis is the external dynamic, which looks at Africa in the light of the international economy. This addresses economic reform, trade policy, globalization, development cooperation (including new `political conditionality' agendas), debt issues and poverty-reducing measures.

For some, particularly analysts of the real as opposed to the rhetorical process of globalization, the new post Cold War dynamic has been that of the `metropolitan states' (i.e. the North/West, particularly the United States) characterizing post-colonial/Third World states as either `failed' or `tiger' states.3

This conveniently locates the fault or praise as lying purely within `peculiar internal characteristics' such as `east Asian work ethic, African atavism, Islamic fundamentalism' rather than with international factors, with the corollary being that Northern/Western engagement/intervention is necessary in the interests of international stability and security.4

The initial focus of development in post-colonial African countries was the state, rather than the individual or the market.5 Post-colonial leaders saw this as necessary to overcome the problems of colonialism and imperialism. Others contended that the civil and political rights of individuals must be sacrificed in the interests of social and economic advancement (the `full belly thesis'). Although this ideology of `developmentalism' purported to concentrate national energies on overcoming economic backwardness and the inheritance of settler colonialism and racism, it also provided justification for neglect of human rights, civil liberties and pluralism. Often `development' became merely the state's right to receive more international aid.

The Cold War further removed individuals from the focus as both western and eastern sponsors, in the pursuit of strategic military and economic interests, turned a blind eye to human rights violations committed by their client states. Both categories of human rights - economic, social and cultural and civil and political - suffered as a consequence. At the time, African scholars asserted that the protection of civil and political rights should await the implementation of economic and social rights, simultaneously proclaiming that African states were too poor to realise the latter.

Finally, the marked growth in the past several years of indigenous African organizations focusing on civil and political rights contrasts with the paucity of groups dealing with economic and social rights. Despite all the talk over the past 30 years about sacrificing votes for food, in Africa economic and social rights remain the poor relation of civil and political rights. The `second wave of liberation' made it critical to reconsider the issues, because many of the struggles for democracy have been underpinned by a demand for economic improvement.

The promotion of a human rights culture, and indeed of development, requires not only a vibrant civil society, but also a strong state capable of implementing policy, listening to grassroots voices and withstanding competing pressures. By comparison, Africa's states have inherited colonially-inspired `non-rational' borders which bear little resemblance to pre-colonial power and kinship structures. Such states have attempted to compensate for underdevelopment, reliance on primary commodities and lack of nationhood or legitimacy by overcentralizing political power. Many leaders have used political power to gain economic advantage and deny any spoils to their opponents. This makes the incidence of violent conflict very high and the likelihood of the acceptance of diversity and human rights standards very low. A `winner takes all' approach and reliance on a group one can trust or relate to characterizes the attitudes of elites and rebel groups alike.

African states suffer from a lack of territorial and governmental legitimacy. In some cases this can be traced to pre-colonial reliance on kinship groups, which was used rather than instituted by the colonial state. Problems arose when the initial mobilization for the nationalist project faltered. Legitimacy had to be purchased from key constituencies, kinship networks had to be assuaged and the acquiescence of other groups assured by force. The resources of the state became a means to maintain a hold on power through patrimonialism and clientelism.

Given the lack of internal legitimacy, external sources of patronage such as aid and cheap loans became vital. Most US funding in Africa went to authoritarian governments with little popular support, such as Somalia, Sudan and Zaire.

It is often assumed that this post-colonial history of the state and the further twin processes of structural adjustment and globalization have disabled the African state, but in fact both states and peoples appear to adapt to globalization in a variety of survivalist ways, rather than necessarily succumbing to it. More important, it would seem - certainly in Africa - that these ways of adaption are unlikely to be developmental (in the sense of the ability to devise and provide programmes that bring significant benefits to most of the population).

People's response to this situation has been the `flight from the state' into clientelism, clannism or `tribalism'. State agents also took part in this process. In what Jean FranĜois Bayart called the `rhizome' state these agents, along with others, engage in smuggling, tax evasion, drug trafficking, personal control of state resources and other activities that undermine the legitimacy and authority of the state. President Daniel Arap Moi's fomenting of ethnic conflict in Kenya and President Robert Mugabe's chaotic land resettlement have much the same effect of maintaining power by degrading the state. They have produced a precarious balance between repression and disintegration, seen at its most extreme in Mobutuism.

Although African civil society was important in the unsteady movement towards democratization, it is a complex phenomenon incorporating both democratic and anti-democratic forces.6 Civil society and the state often have an ambiguous relationship, at times complementary (with the state attempting to use civil society to organize its projects), at times antagonistic.7 It may be that the relationship is necessarily contradictory. The upshot is that civil society, which needs a form of social contract with the state, cannot strengthen itself when the state is illegitimate. Illegitimate states do not tolerate strong civil societies.8

Instead, the gap in security and social provision is filled either by external forces, or by private security companies (mercenaries) or warlords. Even in societies where the state has collapsed, such as Sierra Leone, Liberia or Somalia, markets and trade can continue, and indeed flourish and be profitable, in a situation without state controls or taxation. For example, Charles Taylor in Liberia provided much of France's tropical hardwood and UNITA exported diamonds from Angola throughout the mid- and late 1990s.

This situation is not necessarily unattractive to African elites or to Northern companies and states. Although Northern/metropolitan governments are reluctant to see their citizens killed in Southern peacekeeping operations, mercenaries can act as their economic and strategic proxies at minimal risk. But there can be no long-term development for the majority when instability combines with resource depletion and privileges granted to foreign companies. For African elites, who are unlikely to benefit formally from globalization and whose votes count for little at the United Nations and other global fora, the opportunities now lie less with formal aid or loans than with `under the counter' deals with Northern companies and relationships with informal national and international actors. Elites the world over also use structural adjustment programmes for their own ends, selling off state assets to friends, relations and allies in the name of privatization.

None of this is helpful to the mass of the people. They see the chance of a progressive, human rights-oriented developmental state, one which would enable them to improve their economic situation, receding. It all seems to indicate that the democratization movement in Africa was shallower and shorter-lived than expected.9 Often the same elites have remained in power under the same socioeconomic arrangements.10 Civil society may exist, but is not necessarily democratic. Structural adjustment, even where it may have improved economic growth (a view always under challenge, even in `success stories' such as Mozambique) shows little positive results in other areas. For example, in Mozambique economic growth leading to gains for a limited few is linked to a mafiosi class that is seemingly out of governmental control. Liberalization of agricultural prices may boost incentives to farmers, but is of little use if they can no longer afford farm inputs. The World Bank may prescribe `safety nets' for the poor, but they do not necessarily receive them. Nor is the kind of state that the World Bank has in mind for post-conflict reconstruction, the `framework state' with its supposed commitment to helping the poor and creating the right market conditions, likely to emerge (whether or not it would be appropriate).

In terms of understanding how the African state fits into the new agendas of globalization, Mark Duffield and others offer interesting perspectives. Rather than seeing globalization as a process that undermines and `shells out' states in the interests of outsider interests, he sees `privatization and marketization [as] synonymous with new discursive practices and technologies of power through which metropolitan states are learning to govern anew.... by projecting authority through non-state actors and the non-territorial networks of international assistance'.11 One could in this context critically examine such phenomena as the `Fair Trade' movement where liberal democracy is promoted via private corporations with human rights issues and working standards being pushed by companies with the power to employ.

The process began in the late 1970s through economic reforms propelled by the IMF and World Bank, expanded in the 1980s with the growth in NGO activity into development and social welfare, and speeded up with the emerging UN system-wide humanitarian interventions. The latter brought security and `good' governance concerns relating to marginal areas/`borderlands' within this new non-state alliance. Castells points out that the marginal areas are contained within globalization, not by the massive increases in financial, productive and technological transfers characteristic of the Northern/metropolitan countries, but by the expansion of international aid networks - geographically and in the number of links and sectors involved.12

The changing nature of security (for the metropolitan countries) becomes increasingly seen through the prism of development (historically always concerned with reconciling rapid industrial change to the maintenance of social order). From being a state-based method of maintaining the balance of power, security since the 1970s has become a response to the inability of marginalized states to bring development, halt conflict or prevent regional and international crises. This was exacerbated by the ability of guerilla movements to undermine the conventional security system of state-state alliances and their superiority of weaponry in places like Vietnam and Afghanistan. Development and its privatization in order to contain the dangers from the borderlands are now inextricably linked since `changing the behaviour of borderland populations, although vital for international security . . . is beyond the capacity, remit or legitimacy of metropolitan states'.13

Something of the flavour of this can be seen in the recent British government consultation paper14 on conflict in Africa, which promotes poverty reduction, peace and stability. Looking at the performance of post-colonial African states in terms of vaunting the role of the state in development, but in practice only building those institutions that helped in the `exploitation and management of resources' it sees the heart of the problem as `an African leadership system, based on centralisation of power and patronage networks that allowed little popular involvement in government at national or local level'.15 This predatory form of state combined with the effects of the Cold War arms aid (responsibility for this situation remains vague in the document) leads to the collapse of state institutions.

Such a state operating through `coercion, corruption and personality politics' and poor economic management (structural adjustment is not mentioned in this context) `finds itself unable to provide basic services or security to its people and loses its legitimacy.... the combination of breakdown of institutions and physical infrastructure coupled with the use of ethnic violence creates the conditions in which violence becomes self-sustaining and factional warfare develops'.16

The paper does note that there are two regional exceptions to the picture of a reasonably untroubled path to the independence of African states - Southern Africa and the Horn - in which Cold War rivalry and the arming of strategic client states meant actual and potential conflict arising, as well as `a corrupt leadership [being] sustained while the institutional basis of the state continued to atrophy'.17

Once external state-state assistance on this basis began to collapse (state to state arms transfers dropped from US$4 billion in 1988 to US$270 million in 1995, but the market for arms rapidly became privatized), Africa was left with the inheritance of strong centralized states with little democratic input and being used to large armies but without the backing or `restraint' of their backers. Internal conflict increased dramatically throughout the 1990s in the continent and took on both a more localized and more regional nature with increased numbers of civilians caught up in conflict and fleeing from it and neighbouring countries ready to invade collapsing states under the justification of self-protection (but often, as in the Democratic the Congo, in order to grab natural resources such as minerals). The nature of warfare has changed with ethnicity, small arms, proxy armies and factional fighting being major characteristics. The effects are death, displacement, destruction of infrastructure, underdevelopment through disruption of production, extreme violence, often against civilian populations, intended as intimidation, massive increases in criminality, environmental degradation, added vulnerability to `natural' disasters, and insecurity for investment.

Background to Somalia

The history of Somalia is impossible to understand without some knowledge of the interweaving of an uncentralized egalitarian (for men) political system based on pastoralist people with the outside strategic interest in the Horn/Red Sea area, with the effects of British, French and Italian formal colonization and conflict (and their relations with Ethiopia) and the attempt to create a post-colonial modernist nation state.18 State formation falls into three distinct periods. 1827-1960 saw the Horn of Africa colonized and Somalis divided between five different political entities that had no respect for clan boundaries: the British Somaliland Protectorate, Italian Somalia, French Somaliland (now Djibouti), the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and Kenya's Northern Frontier District. 1960-69 saw civilian government under the Somali Republic. The final period before the collapse of the state in 1991 was the military dictatorship of General Mohamed Siad Barre. None of these eras was marked by peace, with periodic conflict between the British and the Italians, between the British and the religious nationalist Dervishes up till the 1920s, and the post-independence attempt to create a greater Somalia leading to conflict within the region with Kenya and Ethiopia.

At independence the Somalis, one of the largest ethnic groups in Africa, were thought to have a better chance of creating a modern nation state than many others, with a single ethnic group defined by a common language, a pastoral economy, a commitment to Sunni Islam and a clan-based political system. Thirty years later the collapse of this seemingly homogenous society seemed, outwardly at least, puzzling. Much emphasis has been placed on the internal kinship dynamics, and lately, to a lesser extent on the non-nomadic minorities (seemingly unnoticed at independence), but Bradbury argues that it is `the interaction of the specific nature of Somali society with the impact of the political and economic intrusions of colonialism and state policies' that has to be examined.19

As colonization occurred the Somalis comprised a dominant pastoral group inland, some agriculturalists, and a coastal city culture (which included Arabs of Yemeni descent), but with no unitary political structures or state. Political affiliation was based on kin identity, with six major clan families - Dir, Issaq, Darod, Hawiye, Digil and Rahanweyne.20 Kinship sub units of these clans - the diya-paying group (`blood compensation' group) - are the structures through which the links between economy and culture, rights and economic security are politically mediated. The well-being and livelihood of pastoralists is linked to quality of pasture and water and access to both in a transhumance system. Kinship-based social structures determine entitlement to resources, divisions of labour and authority, but also contracts (xeer) between and among clans.

Decision-making is through consensus amongst males and order is thereby maintained with even warfare (largely over grazing resources) having historically been subject to certain norms and marked by negotiation as much as conflict. The colonial imposition of artificial boundaries,Western judicial systems, and centralized government disrupted traditional grazing patterns as well as the authority structures and thereby the equilibrium of clans and management of resources. Despite the British formal adherence to indirect rule through the diyapaying group heads, final administrative control was with the district commissioners (a similar structure pertained under Italian control) which distorted pastoral institutions. These were further undermined by new forms of accumulated wealth within the state so that `political leadership altered from regulating kin relations and entitlements to pastoral resources, to regulating access to the political and economic benefits of the state', leading to disunity and conflict and (in a dangerous precedent for the Siad Barre years) for increased expenditure on state security.21

Transformation also occurred within both the rural and urban economy linked to the commercialization of the pastoral economy through the growth of the livestock export market, initially to the British garrison at Aden, but increasingly from the 1950s to the expanding oil-based economy of Saudi Arabia. Sales of stock acted to undermine coping strategies and the availability of animals for traditional loans and marriage contracts. Increased trade also made some merchants wealthy and altered the balance of power between merchants, state and pastoralists, in that the state's major revenue, taxation of livestock, has meant that from supporting the producers, the production of livestock shifted to supporting the state and the merchant class. Not only poverty but inequality ensued along with vulnerability to droughts and (as mentioned later) any bans on or other disruptions to the livestock trade. Colonial development of commerce, education and bureaucracy was also urban-based which further marginalized the rural population and meant that the nationalist leadership was largely drawn from the urban areas.

All of this had implications for the immediate post-colonial period. Aside from the rapidly emerging hostility between the north and south of Somalia, the rapid expansion of state bureaucracies, centralized development and the growth in foreign aid (but with little real development) meant that the state and its resources (including aid) became the battleground for increased attempts by clans to control the state for themselves. The third period of state formation with the emergence of `socialism' was supposedly aimed at overcoming the problems of clannism, backwardness, through the integration of clan structures into the party, the centralization of political power and the nationalization of land. The upshot was the increasing `securitization' of the state as opposition grew, rather than development of the economy, with the army being the strongest institution and engaging in military adventures ending in defeat in the Ogaden in 1978.

Increasingly autocratic and based on Siad Barre's clan, the regime moved from abuses of individuals' human rights to the repression of entire clans and economic communities. The insurgent opposition movements that emerged in the wake of defeat by Ethiopia and began the civil war, including the Somali National Movement (SNM) based on the Issaq clan from the north-west (Somaliland), were the response to the regime's record of lack of power-sharing, corruption, abuses of human rights and autocracy. This struggle against the oppressive state and for self-determination had its most dramatic symbol in the declaration of Somaliland independence in 1991.

Somalia was a strategic pawn in Cold War politics with alternate Soviet and US sponsored periods of dictatorship. In the ten years since the Somali state collapsed in civil war in 1991 as the dictatorial Siad Barre regime crumbled, the south of the country has been divided between different armed clan factions under rival warlords. In theory a unitary republic known as the Somali Democratic Republic, Somalia has only two relatively legitimate and functional administrations - in the north-west (Somaliland) and north-east (Puntland).22

Everywhere else (and indeed Somaliland in 1994/96) has seen human rights abuses, inter and intra-clan fighting, banditry, clashes between clan militias and Islamic groupings, and piracy on the seas.23 The civil war destroyed much of the capital Mogadishu and other cities, including Hargeisa (capital of Somaliland), and led to food shortages and widespread famine which claimed the lives of over 250,000 Somalis and led to an estimated one to two million Somalis becoming either internally displaced or refugees.

The crisis precipitated a UN peace enforcement operation (UNOSOM) in 1993-95 which, despite some modest success in ending the famine and sporadic return of refugees and displaced persons, became entangled in armed conflict with the Somali National Alliance (SNA) and failed to bring either reconciliation or reconstruction. Since 1995 conflict has been more within the clans, meaning fewer major armed clashes, but the likelihood of increased if smaller, and more unpredictable armed localized hostilities. Somalia remains one of the poorest countries in the world with the lowest Human Development Index anywhere. Average life expectancy is 41-43 years; the mortality rate for children under five exceeds 25 per cent and adult literacy rates are alleged to be (although not accepted by all) 14-17per cent.24

Hopes for Peace at Arta

Since 1991 there have been 11 sets of failed negotiations to form a government for Somalia. Finally in Arta, Djibouti in August 2000, the twelfth attempt seemed to have succeeded. The conference was organized on the basis of clan (even if not all clans were present), but also included a cross-clan delegation of 100 women. Abdulkassim Salat Hassan (58) was sworn in as the new Somalia25 President; the new Prime Minister Ali Khalif Galayadh (a former Minister of Industry under Siad Barre) named a new government, the Transitional National Government (TNG). As of April 2001 however, the administration had yet to function as any real kind of government.

Mass celebrations by Somali people in response to the formation of the TNG took place in Mogadishu, previous capital of the Somali Democratic Republic, and in the Somali diaspora in Nairobi. Even the Islamic courts which have their own agenda in imposing sharia law, particularly in the parts of south Somalia that their militias control, formally supported the new administration. However the performance thus far of the new government has not lived up to these expectations and warlords grouped in the Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council (SRRC) opposed to the TNG met in Ethiopia in March 2001 to set up an opposition to this government. Nor was the stitching together of a new government marked by similar joy in other parts of the country. The one area that has enjoyed reasonably stable and peaceful government for a five year period - North West Somalia/Somaliland - rejected the Arta peace process that created the new Somali TNG primarily because the latter asserted sovereignty over its area.26 Somalilanders say that the independent status of Somaliland is non-negotiable, and that Somalia must first put its own house in order before any form of negotiations can begin on the future relationship between Mogadishu and Hargeisa. Sources close to the latter also expressed concerns about the human rights records of members of the TNG.

Somaliland Objects

Somaliland Protectorate was keen at independence from the British in 1960 to unite with the previously Italian-controlled south, but its subsequent experience of southern domination, human rights abuses (with Siad Barre laying waste to the north), inequitable distribution of development and resources, soured the nationalist dream of Greater Somalia. A court judgement (by a British judge) in Mogadishu in 1962 after the two former colonies united, laid doubt on the complete legality in international law of the union of Somalia and Somaliland.27

In May 1991 Somaliland, under the leadership of the Somali National Movement28 and based on the territory of the old British protectorate, declared itself independent. Led by President Mohammed Ibrahim Egal who was re-elected in 1997, Somaliland still awaits any diplomatic recognition.

A mix of clan system and autocracy the government's authority is weak and dependent on its management of clan relations and the patronage of Somaliland's big businessmen. Unrecognised internationally, this government although not democratic is participatory in that structures for consultation and consensus exist (see later in this section). It has signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, overseen a restored peace, the demobilization of former combatants, partial social and economic rehabilitation and the drafting of a constitution based on universal suffrage, decentralization and multipartyism. The next elections are due in 2002. These will be the first elections where women will have an equal right to stand for nomination and to vote. Hargeisa is, though, deeply troubled by the implications of the Arta agreement for its own continuing independence and new-found freedom from the chaos that characterizes the south.29

Somaliland covers 137,600 square kilometres with an estimated 1.5 million to 2 million people.30 It lies on the tip of the Horn of Africa, bordering Djibouti to the north, Ethiopia to the west and is just over the Red Sea/Gulf of Aden from Yemen. The population is overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim and was largely nomadic pastoralist.31 Camels were the traditional and prestigious form of wealth, with sheep, goats and cattle being produced in considerable numbers for daily subsistence and export to the Arabian peninsula, the main economic resource (apart from remittances from Somaliland diaspora).

The Hargeisa government under President Egal has overseen a spirited if limited recovery from the devastation and oppression of the Siad Barre years, the civil war of the late 1980s32 and early 1990s and a clan war from 1994 to 1996. There is a parliament, one of whose houses, the Guurti or House of Elders, comprises representatives of the major clans ensuring a balance of power and stability in a clan-based system. Government authority is weak, extending only as far as people (tribal and clan leaders) are prepared to allow it. The government has not effectively enforced a taxation system and is unable to deliver adequate services to its people, relying heavily on the private sector33 and to a lesser extent, international aid. However, Somaliland appears to be on trajectories towards building more accountable and participatory forms of governance through greater democratization and some form of social contract with civil society. It remains to be seen how successfully these intentions can be implemented against a backdrop of vested business interests and (some) religious fundamentalism.

In Somaliland (and Somalia) the gap between male and female literacy is still huge. In the Somali context the situation has been made worse by the years of war. With the collapse of the state came the collapse of a legislative system which had over the years begun to structurally address the subordinate position of women in traditional Somali society. Added to this is the confrontation between emerging gender issues and the rising importance of political Islam, formerly contained under Siad Barre. There is a tension between progressive gender-orientated policy-makers and conservative political Islamists. Lack of gender equality in terms of political opportunities partially mirrors the educational opportunities available to girls and women. Equal participation in politics, though, remains a distant possibility for women as long as the dominant patriarchal social frameworks under which they live continue to work to maintain the status quo.

Whatever constitutional or other legal rights women may be accorded, (and they have been in all the countries of the region to a greater or lesser extent), in practice the majority of women in the country, as in the region, are poor and uneducated and continue to live lives where gender-based human rights violations are a part of their daily lives in the home, in the workplace, in the community.

Girls and women's low social status, limited bargaining power and economic disadvantage, polygamy and inheritance of the wife of a deceased brother makes them vulnerable to HIV/AIDS in a way that most men are not. Gender-based violence as a weapon of war was a feature of the civil war in Somalia in the early 1990s (particularly against women of the coastal region and minorities) and gender-based domestic and sexual violence is a growing problem in Somaliland.

Particularly in Somali societies female genital mutilation continues to be practised as a girl's first rite of passage. Government and civil society efforts to eradicate the most severe form of the practice have begun to show some success in urban areas of Somaliland. The few highly educated women in Somaliland/Somalia left the country during the civil war to move to Europe and North America, though there is a trend for such women returning home to assist in the empowerment of other women who remained.

There have, though, been significant social, political and economic gains for women since, and because of the conflict, as many women asserted at the Amnesty International/CIIR workshop34 in Hargeisa in 1998; many women are now household breadwinners which, despite disadvantages, contributes to economic independence and a more equal balance in decision-making in the home. The main concern of many Somali women today is how to consolidate their gains and not slip backwards. Civil society outside of clan structures is, though, beginning to assert itself, not least through women's groups which attempt to use their outsider status precisely as mediators in conflict.35 There is a war crimes commission looking into the human rights abuses of the Siad Barre years. There is a reasonably high level of personal security for citizens although this is less a reflection of a strong police and judiciary and more a reflection of strong civil and traditional practices and the spending of much of the tax revenues on `security forces' in order to demobilize and control the potentially problematic young armed militiamen.

In May 1999 the Hargeisa government approved a plan to move from the current clan-based system to a multiparty political system provided the proposed parties were not based on tribal or religious lines and drew support from all five regions. There were to be votes for women, although no women were consulted in drawing up the draft. One should note that one indicator of the marginalization of women is that although they take the clan of their father, their husbands and therefore children can be from different clans, leading to perceptions of potential divided loyalty and therefore a weak voice in clan affairs.

New parties were supposedly to be allowed to participate in forthcoming civic elections and eventually in presidential elections, although neither have yet happened.36 The new draft constitution received a 97 per cent Yes vote in the referendum on 31 May 2001. This referendum drew condemnation from Puntland which warned Somaliland about holding such a referendum in Sool, Sanag and Bohoodle District in Togdheer Region.37

Despite these awaited constitutional reforms, a reasonably free society, including a free press, some attempts to combat corruption,38 and a vibrant informal economy and trade, there are many social and economic problems. Somalia had little social service provision and formal employment to combat unemployment and poverty. Somaliland gets little outside aid - not necessarily to its detriment since it has nurtured a culture of self-reliance.39

Trade has recently been badly hit by a renewed ban imposed in September 2000 by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States (lifted in 2001 in the latter) on the export from Somaliland, the Horn of Africa and East Africa of livestock to those countries and Yemen due to outbreaks of Rift Valley Fever (RVF) in the Arabian peninsula. The last ban in 1998 was not lifted for a year. A recent World Food Programme report concluded that the new ban will do much greater damage to affected states due to the lack of alternative markets, the general poor condition of livestock and the fact that the ban came into effect before the peak period of Ramadan livestock sales. How Somaliland will cope with that major loss of earnings (half of Hargeisa's US$3040 million budget is accounted for by taxes on livestock exports) is impossible to gauge, but there are already reports of greatly reduced incomes for those involved in the production of and trading in livestock. This is deeply worrying given that an estimated 60 per cent of the population is involved in some way in the trade.41 There are reportedly seams of coal and possibly oil under the desert, although no reports of any likely investment, and suggestions that gemstone mining could prove profitable for the future.42

Problems in (Southern) Somalia

The Abdulkassim TNG in Somalia has been bequeathed a situation of profound political and economic instability in which asserting its authority will be made even more difficult because of the number of clan leaders, warlords and selfgoverning entities opposed to rule from the new administration. These range from Somaliland government and leaders of the Puntland administration to five of the largest clan militias in the Mogadishu area plus a number of other clans. The warlords accuse Abdulkassim Hassan of being both a relic of the previous dictator Siad Barre (he was his one-time Minister of Interior) and in hock to Islamic `fundamentalists'. Hassan has to convince the outside world, but more importantly all other Somalis, that he can bring peace and stability. To do this he has to live up to promises made in his inaugural speech to negotiate with the warlords (he has to do this by buying them off, persuading the elders to withdraw support or co-opting the warlords into the government),43 and with the breakaway regions/countries of Puntland and Somaliland (who resent outsiders seeing their territories as controlled by warlords rather than as functioning administrations).44

There will be major problems of funding,45 militias will have to be disbanded or demobilized in order to create a national police force.46 There has not been a viable economy from which to generate tax revenues and one will have to be created from minimal financial resources to replace the current system of buying off the militias. Somalis have only ever effectively taxed themselves through customs duties at major ports, and occasionally at road tolls. Taxes on imports and exports need to be kept low, given the number of natural ports in the south (where smuggling would not be difficult) and the competition that the ports of Berbera (Somaliland) and Bosaso (Puntland) pose to the north. The TNG's first step at gaining financial revenue - importing large quantities of Somali shillings printed abroad - led to street protests in Mogadishu over the consequent hyperinflation and is unlikely to be repeated.

Given the depressed economy and little likelihood of outside external assistance, the revenue base for the administration is extremely low. The recent ban on livestock exacerbates the economic crisis depriving the TNG of its chief source of hard currency as it takes over.47 Throughout the entire country, purchasing power will drop, followed by declining demand for consumer imports. Without a commercial outlet for surplus livestock, herders may well build up their herds anticipating the reopening of the Gulf markets, leading to increased overgrazing and hence environmental risk.

It seems as though the administration will only be able to handle essential government tasks. This will conflict with high public expectations of a windfall of jobs, contracts, and social services emanating from the public sector. The administration's current popular support could lead quickly to public disillusionment if jobs and services are not forthcoming. The reaction of the administration has been to search for foreign aid - in particular Gulf and Arab states and Islamic donors. This runs the danger of alienating Addis Ababa, which has powerful security interests in minimizing Arab and Islamic influence in the Horn of Africa - a dilemma of solving the financial crisis but provoking a political crisis with Ethiopia which is the hegemon in the region. What way forward for `the Somalias'?

Somaliland

Somalilanders pointed out to me on a recent visit there that Somaliland model of development has had its successes. It could, indeed, be seen as a first indigenous modern African form of government. This entails a fusion of traditional forms of organization (with `a reaffirmation of lineage identity and territoriality' 48) within a democratizing framework containing an emphasis on self-reliance, as a legitimate post-colonial option for Africa. Somaliland `nation-building' process was more bottom-up and does actually function as a state unlike the paper Hassan one. It is the one place in Somalia where peace with security has been established, unlike the south of the country, and it could be the basis of state-building. In essence Somaliland has escaped from a `failed union', rather than being a `failed state'.

In 1991 Somalilanders had to overcome not just the massive physical devastation brought about by war49 and the preceding brutal dictatorship, but the destruction of social bonds and coping mechanisms. Somalilanders, however, charge that they have been abandoned by the outside community, in particular by their previous rulers the British, despite Hargeisa running a stable and reasonably democratic state. It is unlikely that Somaliland will gain international recognition50 (unlike the Eritreans they have not had the support of interested parties in order to overrule the normal Organization of African Unity's dictum on the inviolability of colonial borders), particularly when the major international and regional powers51 are waiting to see how the Hassan administration settles down. Somaliland has few natural regional allies52 and despite seeming Ethiopian support (including recent talks on bilateral cooperation on trade and road transport), there is no doubt that Addis Ababa prefers a weakened and divided Somalia that it can dominate.

Recent Ethiopian armed incursions over the borders into Somalia and Somaliland to assert Addis' hegemony are certainly worrying for regional and international leaders as well as for Hargeisa and Mogadishu. This continues a long tradition of Ethiopian interference in Somali affairs. Despite being involved in the (ultimately successful) war with Eritrea,53 in 1999 Addis allegedly had up to 15,000 troops in five of Somali's regions, with suspicions that at very least it seeks a security buffer zone along the common border. Regional commentators allege that with the loss of its ports to independent Eritrea in 1997 Ethiopia seeks to capture a Somali port. Given that this would create an international outcry (especially now that `peace' has been established in Somalia) a more likely scenario is continued backing for Somali militias with whom it is allied - in general those opposed to Hussein Aideed who until recently backed the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) fighting for increased autonomy54 for the 25 million Oromo people from Addis. Certainly the Addis government continues to use the port of Berbera in Somaliland, notably in 2000 when 100,000 tonnes of food aid transitted en route to Ethiopia came through the port.

However, those sympathetic to Somaliland case might advise against too hostile a stance in relation to Arta and the new regime in Somalia. It seems unhelpful for Egal, the government and the parliament to consider as traitors anyone who supports the TNA/TNG and to threaten to outlaw anyone who attended the Arta conference. In this uncertain situation, the Egal regime might be better advised to concentrate on gaining de facto acceptance as a government, i.e. showing pragmatically that it runs a functioning administration. It could do this whilst acknowledging that it still has incomplete control of its own territory55 and has considerable problems. Additionally it could moderate its own inflexibility over Arta by saying that it would be willing to negotiate without pre-conditions, but cannot accept Arta as a fait accompli. Local NGOs stress that existing crossborder links involving trading, non-governmental exchanges of information and the like should be the building blocks of future cooperation rather than a shotgun marriage with little popular support in the North. They further point out that Somalia will have enough internal problems to overcome.56 The outside community should help the new Hassan administration with those problems57 rather than encouraging them to assert rights (which would be resisted) over Somaliland which has no desire to be dragged back into a new version of the old failed union.

And for The Somalia Government?

No-one in the region or the international community appears to be too optimistic about the chances of survival of the TNG. Some useful possible scenarios for its future have been put forward by Ken Menkhaus.58

- The government in exile. Menkhaus sees tthis as one of the more likely outcomes. In this scenario, the Abdulkassim administration will run into trouble forming a cabinet to everyone's liking, and the first defections by clan or faction will occur (this has already taken place with the RRA leader Hassan `Shatigadud'). Overwhelmed by the prospects of establishing a government from scratch in a destroyed city with few funds, blocked by a veto coalition of warlords, and confronted by very high expectations on the part of the population, Abdulkassim Hassan and his top aides will understandably gravitate to the international fundraising circuit, where pressures are less and respect is accorded. There they will remain in orbit until the administration's legitimacy dwindles.

- Ineffective (but remaining) government iin Mogadishu. This is also highly possible if the business community and foreign donors which provide them with initial backing eventually decide not to throw good money after bad, and the administration is left with virtually no funds.

- Armed conflict. `Armed clashes between tthe administration and a militia could conceivably degenerate into widespread inter-clan conflict in Mogadishu, leaving the city worse off than before the Djibouti process'59 says Menkhaus.

- Proxy war. If the TNG in wooing Arab monney does not reassure Ethiopia as to its good intentions, `it is almost inevitable that Ethiopia will come to view the Mogadishu-based administration as a threat, and will actively support Somali groups opposed to it',60 as in the period from 1995 to 1999.

- Marshall Aid. This is the option Abdulkaassim Hassan is following, `correctly surmis[ing] that Arab and Islamic states are, for a variety of reasons, the most likely sources', but only `a necessary but not sufficient condition for a successful administration'61 given the likelihood of corruption.

- The Islamist. Menkhaus feels this is unllikely, partly because of the strength of pragmatic Somali culture (and clannism) which tolerates Islamic courts but which would vigorously oppose the imposition of strict Islamic law. Also it would have the effect of bringing anti-Islamic Ethiopia directly into internal Somali politics. Islamist groups in Somalia are not united and seem to prefer to work under the cover of secular administrations rather than challenging them outright.

- The minimalist state. Menkhaus asks whetther a minimalist central authority could survive, `sustained only by modest customs revenues and modest levels of foreign assistance'.62 The government would only perform a few essential tasks - `diplomatic relations, passports, basic security, and convening of parliament - leaving all other functions either to local (municipal or regional) governments, or outsourcing tasks to the private sector or international agencies'.63 Similar to the Somaliland `organic' system, this loose confederal system would reflect the fact that the only polities that have really worked effectively in Somalia in the 1990s are municipalities, this scenario would be roughly akin to a league of commercial city-states (not in fact disimilar to Somaliland). As Menkhaus points out, given Somalia's poor tax revenue, this is the only economically viable scenario, but highly contrary `to the political instincts and habits of the current political class in Somalia, whose formative years were spent in large civil services supported by foreign aid and expansive government mandates'.64

The transitional national administration faces considerable challenges. Its authority hardly extends beyond parts of Mogadishu, and even an optimist can only see it gradually being able to expand its control over Mogadishu (with the seaport and airport always being sites of potential conflict) and surrounding regions, let alone the South, Puntland and Somaliland. However, there does not appear any imminent threat of armed conflict, though some regions remain unstable. More immediate threats lie in the economic effects of the livestock ban, which will reduce the capacity of local communities to rebuild, cut tax revenues in Somaliland, Puntland and Mogadishu, undermine household food security, lead to increased degradation of overgrazed pastures and reduce local capacity to absorb returnees. All of these could lead to increased internal and external migration, exacerbating an already unstable region.

Marginalized in the global economy it is, however, typical of the globalizing process that in some ways the collapse of the Somali state has resulted in a more rapid globalization process than probably any other African country. The absence of central government resulted in deregulation by default. Somaliland by comparison has a more stratified business community (fewer and wealthier businesspeople), which has relations with government and is able to be more monopolistic than in Somalia /the South. In both places transit trade is very important - from and to the Gulf states, India, Yemen, Ethiopia, and Kenya.

Examples of the impact of deregulation are the highly efficient remittance/money transfer system which can transfer money from any place in the world to any part of Somalia/Somaliland within 24-48 hours; the flourishing commercial economy based around imports; the ubiquity of Northern soft drinks; the extent of telecommunications technology; the ease of air travel through private airlines.

Negative impacts include dumping of toxic waste on Somali shores; the depletion of the forests through unregulated charcoal production for export to the Gulf; illegal fishing of Somali waters; and the ease with which global criminal activities can be carried out in Somalia by international traders dealing in illicit commercial activities such as arms and drugs.

Conclusion

This article began with the failure of development and the need to reassess the actual processes that have taken place in Africa especially in the fields of development, democratization and the growth of civil society, including the instituting of a human rights culture. The corollary to those concerns has been the undermining of the African state and the emergence of increased post-Cold War regional and local conflicts. Somalia and Somaliland are not case studies of these but are an attempt at analysis in the context of these developments.

One can see the declaration of Somaliland independence within the `second wave' of democratization in the early 1990s; arguably it had more success in legitimating the state in the eyes of its citizens at least because it was based on cultural notions that neither colonialism nor `scientific socialism' were able to eradicate - `where the notion of a "social contract" has more to do with regulating political and economic relationships between pastoral kinship groups than with delegating responsibility to a central polity'.65 In this sense Somaliland was not a failed state, but nor did it embrace multiparty democracy in the usually accepted (Western) use of the term. Equally, although marked throughout by Islam, there is little fundamentalism as understood (misunderstood?) in the North e.g. in any move to theocracy.

If the notion of the failed state means anything in the Somali context it has to be understood in the conditions of the colonial inheritance of a supposedly united polity being succeeded by respectively a venal civilian and then a centralizing `socialist' state. Both attempted to fix the loyalty of `their' citizens through a modernization project, in the case of the latter through military adventures to `reunite' all the parts of the Somali `nation'. The very nature of this military adventurism with its alienating and centralizingly brutal nature led to the breakup even of those parts of Somalia that had joined together at the time of independence from the British and Italians.

The `rhizome' state has some relevance to both Somalia and Somaliland in terms of the grassroots search for both survival and security when the state collapses and only pre-state forms are available. The emergence of particular forms of social relations in either territory bears some relationship to this, but also has to be seen as an adaptation of sovereignty in response to outside pressures such as changes in the economic and strategic balance in the region in the post- Cold War period. Somalia (rather more than Somaliland despite the strong and increasing importance of the private sector there) has been opened up by globalization and privatization in what might appear its more extreme form - i.e. no state control or taxation, but in fact subject to forms of social control deriving from clan cultural practices. There has been a polarity in both territories between the `anarchy' of clan warfare (however much this was precipitated by the oppression and corruption of the Siad Barre regime) and a peculiarly Somali form of interaction between individual (particularly the wealthy merchant class), state and market characterized by great emphasis on the social contract (xeer) and clan notions of legimitate activity.

One element not mentioned before that is of significance in both Somalia and Somaliland is the prevalence and influence of agencies of transnational civil society such as Concern, CARE, Oxfam, Islamic Relief, AMREF, CIIR. Much greater access and influence is possible at community level than in the past when Somalia had a central government which exerted strict authority over international agencies. With no issue of state sovereignty to contend with, such agencies can come and go as they like and could undertake more or less whatever interventions, in whatever sectors they chose if they had the money. The only check on them has tended to be the gun. Often unaccountable except to themselves and their donors, the power of transnational civil society agencies to intervene and influence to the extent of even taking on the role of government, has been a growing response to the changing state in sub-Saharan Africa since the mid 1990s.

The Arta peace agreement illustrates some of the problems of attempting to reintegrate warring factions in the context of rebuilding states and their necessary institutions. Matters of managing ethnic or clan diversity through inclusive government, dealing with the need for reconciliation and finding out the truth, promoting growth (possibly through regional integration) and finding regional and African peacekeeping and longer term solutions are the main concerns of metropolitan/Northern governments, as well as such matters as controlling the small arms trade, dealing with `blood diamonds' and other resources used to fight wars, and encouraging local peace and reconciliation initiatives. Much of this remains to be done in both Somaliland and Somalia. Even with the presence of international agencies outlined above, it is doubtful whether the new interlocking privatized security regime that Duffield points to will be sufficient to deal with continuing local, national and regional insecurity. However, the emergence of more locally (traditionally?) based forms of governance, particularly in Somaliland do provide possible building blocks towards a form of state which also shares some of the concerns for peace and finding the truth that Northern governments see as necessary. Possibly more importantly the state also has legitimacy at least for its own population - which may be the best deal in terms of democratization and development that is possible at the moment.

NOTES

1 For a bibliography on this see Olukushi, Adebayo `The Democracy Debate in Africa' in Kayizzi- Mugerwa, Olukoshi and Wohlgemuth (1998) Towards a New Partnership with Africa (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1998).
2 This might include taking forward the debate on whether an economy undergoing structural adjustment can simultaneously handle a real democratic transition, or whether SAPs - externally imposed and externally accountable - necessarily have authoritarian consequences, including the repression of popular opinion.
3 Now apparently retitled `states of concern' with `rogue states' as a military alternative.
4 Centre for Global Political Economy, University of Sussex call for papers for (then) forthcoming conference on `The Global Consequences of `Failed States': the consequences of a new imperialism?' April 18-29 2001.
5 Andy Storey `Globalisation and the African State' in Trocaire Development Review 1999 (1999) p.41 makes the point that developmental states are not necessarily democratic.
6 Professor Reg Green has pointed out that the Interahamwe are part of civil society. `Civil society' is not necessarily progressive on such issues as gender and ethnicity.
7 This certainly appears to be the case in South Africa, where some see a split developing between the liberation forces that led the struggle and the social movements that were the base. The `exceptionalism' or `miracle' of the democratic transition may well be reverting to a more normal African pattern of increasingly statist politics and declining grassroots involvement. Much of this debate is covered in Development Update, produced regularly by the South African National NGO Coalition.
8 Mick Moore and James Putzel Thinking Strategically about Politics and Poverty (London CIIR, 2000) contains a good deal of information about the interaction between the poor and different types of state in formulating pro-poor policies.
9 `Africa was trying to forge ahead without attempting fundamental reforms to overcome habits of the past. . . . open democracies could not . . . be slapped on top of rickety authoritarian systems.' Human Rights Watch Report (2000), p. 7.
10 `Instead of building stability through economic growth and the construction of democratic institutions, some leaders counted on repression that smothered dissent, manipulated ethnic identities, tightened control on the press, employed dubious methods to crush the formation of independent opposition parties and scripted elections.' Ibid.
11 Mark Duffield `Governing the Borderlands: Decoding the Power of Aid'. Paper to the Seminar Politics and Humanitarian Aid: Debates, Dilemmas and Dissension. Commonwealth Institute, London 1 February 2001.
12 Manuel Castells ,The Rise of the Network Society Vol 1 of The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture. (Oxford: Blackwells, 1996).
13 Duffield, p. 5
14 Department for International Development, The Causes of Conflict in Africa. Consultation Document (London:HMSO, 2001). This was a joint consultation paper from the Department for International Development, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence. 15 Ibid p. 7
16 Ibid p. 13
17 Ibid p. 7
18 See Mark Bradbury Somaliland. CIIR Country Report (London: CIIR 1997).
19 Ibid pp. 19-20.
20 I.M. Lewis A Pastoral Democracy: A Study of Pastoralism and Politics among the Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 1961).
21 Bradbury 1997,p. 5
22 In parts of southern Somalia, some local administrations based on a combination of traditional, clan-based authority and Islamic courts, have emerged, but are weak and prone to collapse in the face of warlordism and clan conflict.
23 Despite this, public order, the rule of law and personal security have been largely maintained through a combination of traditional mechanisms and in the South, sharia courts under clan protection. For wider reading on this see Matt Bryden, New Hope for Somalia? The Building Block Approach. Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 26, No. 79, March 1999, pp. 134-40; Carolyn Logan, Overcoming the State-Society Disconnect in the Former Somalia: Putting Somali Political and Economic Resources at the Root of Reconstruction, Nairobi: USAID/REDSO, September 2000. Human rights in Somaliland: Awareness and Action. Report of a workshop held in Hargeisa by Amnesty International and International Cooperation for Development. (Amnesty International/CIIR 1999).
24 Roland Marchal and Ken Menkhaus, Somalia Human Development Report 1998, Nairobi: UNDP, October 1998, p. 12.
25 As with many conflicts, terminology bedevils seemingly straightforward descriptions. Somalia for many is the territory occupied by the Somali Democratic Republic and recognised as such internationally. This includes Somaliland and Puntland, the self-declared autonomous region in the north east, as well as other parts of the old Somali (Democratic) Republic. Somalilanders, however, insist that Somaliland is separate from Somalia with which it united to form the Somali Republic and with which since 1991 it no longer has any relationship.
26 In reaction to the proposals in 1999 for a Somalia peace initiative, Somaliland Parliament passed a law forbidding the Hargeisa government and private citizens to attend the Djibouti conference. It made attendance at Djibouti a treasonable offence. It was helped in this by the Arta process according a low level of representation to the ruling Isaaq clan, undercutting any opponents of the Egal administration. The latter has effectively planted deep suspicions about the economic motives of Djibouti in hosting the Arta conference, arguing that Djibouti was hoping to undermine a rival port in Somaliland.
27 See Government of Somaliland, Background to Somaliland's Quest for Recognition. (Hargeisa, 1994).
28 One of the major movements fighting against the Siad Barre regime and based on the Issaq clan. 29 After flatly denying any thoughts of reunification throughout the 1990s, the government of Somaliland did say in February 1999 that it would be willing to talk about reunification if peace and a viable government were established in the south (Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report (1999) Second quarter, p.37). Subsequent events around Arta seem to have sidelined this however.
30 Due to the wars and the major displacement they caused accurate population statistics are hard to come by. Hargeisa's population is estimated at 200,000. There are thousands of Somali refugees, with many (South) Somalis in Kenya.
31 Like many other colonially-defined states, the British Protectorate of Somaliland was defined more by political exigencies (in this case those involving the French, the Italians and the Ethiopians) than rational geographic, demographic or economic purposes. Access to the historic and fertile pastures to the south meant Somalilanders having to cross international boundaries. 32 An estimated 50,000 people were killed in Somaliland in the war of the late 1980s with 60,000 homes destroyed in Hargeisa alone.
33 To the extent that the funds for the newly-renovated Amoud University came from private donations. 34 See CIIR 1999.
35 Deborah Ossiya, Women Programme Officer at the Life and Peace Institute outlined at a recent women's conference in Mogadishu the role that women have played and are playing in conflict resolution in inter-clan clashes - often moving from one clan's area to another before passing matters to the clan elders, the traditional forum for peaceful resolution. See New People no. 99 June 1999 (Nairobi).
36 Without a census, it would be difficult to run free and fair elections, although they were still being promised for 2001 during the author's visit in September/October 2000.
37 Abdillahi Yusuf, the President of Puntland, warned Somaliland authorities that the holding of a constitutional referendum in Sool, Sanag and Bohoodle, areas to which they lay claim, would lead to confrontation. Hargeisa also came under condemnation on 1st May 2001 from the TNG which said the aim of the referendum was to legitimise the secession of the North from Somalia, and that the division of Somalia into small fiefdoms was "unacceptable".
38 In 1999 Egal sacked several ministers for corruption and incompetence. In March 2001 he set up an anti-corruption commission which has investigated ex-ministers.
39 Although Egal did criticise in 1999 a UN and EU $1.5 million project to improve Berbera's (the main port) institutional capacity, telling journalists `Nobody asks us what we need or how we want to be helped.., this .. project is very much appreciated, but we don't know anything about it'. Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Djibouti. 3rd quarter 1999.
40 `The Nation nobody knows' Economist 12 April 2001 stated that Somaliland government has lost duties worth US$15 million from a budget of US$25 million.
41 As PENHA (Pastoralist & Environmental Network in the Horn of Africa) and other local NGOs point out in their efforts to get the ban lifted, the ban causes `unmerited suffering to Somalis and Horn of Africa people' since `there is no tangible evidence to prove that Rift Valley Fever has been found in Somali territories and the Horn of Africa' - Lift the Ban - an appeal.
42 At present this is carried on in a small scale low-tech way with artisanal miners selling their crude stones to the highest bidder outside any government control.
43 The one clan leader who did go to Djibouti, Ali Mohamed Mahdi (sometimes Mohamed Ali Mahdi), stated "It is not the faction leaders who will decide what will happen... It's the people who have the right to decide for themselves". (International Herald Tribune 21 August 2000).
44 As with for instance the attempt to set up `Jubbaland' under the control of General Mohamed Siad Hersi `Morgan' which collapsed under attack from militias loyal to Hussein Aideed.
45 Although, however oddly it might be thought, Somalia could still receive EU funding under the Lom, agreement.
46 The attempt to create a police force in Mogadishu only lasted from December 1998 to April 1999 owing to lack of pay and a complete lack of success in re-creating law and order in the capital. There were similar problems in attempting to create a functioning administration for Mogadishu which collapsed under the strain of inter-clan rivalry and suspicion.
47 IRIN, Somalia: IRIN Focus on Saudi Livestock Ban, 22 September 2000 (IRIN) http://www.reliefweb.int/
48 Bradbury 1997, p.43.
49 Only 10% of structures in Hargeisa remained intact with many buildings having been dynamited as well as shelled, landmines scattered throughout the country, hospitals, schools, clinics and wells had all been destroyed, bridges and roads mined making communication impossible - Somaliland Centre for Peace and Development A Self-Portrait of Somaliland: Rebuilding from the Ruins. (Hargeisa 1999) Draft. pp 61-81.
50 The secretary of Somaliland Chamber of Commerce told the Financial Times in relation to lack of international recognition ` We cannot enter into formal trade agreements; we cannot even contact the outside through direct postal services, as we are not a member of the postal union' (3 June 1999).
51 Including the regionally-based Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) which also backed the Arta process.
52 Ethiopian Airlines recently announced flights to Hargeisa and Egal has apparently admitted that Hargeisa's currency reserves are in the State Bank of Ethiopia (Economist 12 April 2001).
53 To a limited extent, the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict was also played out on Somali territory through military assistance being supplied to rival militias and Ethiopian dissident groups.
54 Since 1998 a new more radical Islamic leadership in the OLF has called for the creation of an independent `Oromia' state through armed struggle. Addis in 2000 is said, however, to have persuaded Aideed to end support for the OLF in return for Ethiopia withdrawing some of its troops from areas recently controlled by Aideed - See Economist Intelligence Unit Somalia. EU Country Report. 1st quarter 2000, pp29-30.
55 The two eastern provinces of Sanaag and Sool which lay within the old British colonial boundaries have been the subject of dispute between Somaliland and Puntland. The clan controlling Sanaag decided to stay within Somaliland whereas the latter were keeping their options open. The dispute is a long-standing and occasionally violent clan-related one, although it may not be helped in the future by the recent interest shown by US oil companies in returning to Somaliland, including these two provinces.
56 Especially of course with the warlords as soon as any attempt to assert authority is made. 57 `Many Somalis say a government's surest road to success would be paved with money from rich countries. It would make the government popular and provide jobs for the warlords' gunmen - maybe even for the warlords themselves' (International Herald Tribune 20 August 2000).
58 Ken Menkhaus, Somalia: Situation Analysis written for the Centre for Documentation and Research, UNHCR. October 2000 pp. 19-21. These scenarios are, however, very much a personal view. 59 Ibid, p. 21
60 Ibid, p. 21
61 Ibid, p. 21
62 Ibid, p. 21
63 Ibid p. 1.
64 Ibid p. 21.
65 Bradbury 1997 p. 43.