This paper was presented by Farhiya Ali Ahmed, who lives in South Africa at a seminar organized by the "Africa Institute of South Africa" last May in Pretoria on Somaliland And Somalia:

Introduction

Over the past 13 years, Somalia has become known more for its problems of conflict and instability than anything else. 13 years of anarchy, with several feuding warlords in charge of what is left of the country, has resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of innocent people, the total absence of law and order, the destruction of the country's infrastructure and the general collapse of governing institutions as well as of the economy that was already on an external aid life-support system for years. The world witnessed Somalia descent into a morass of instability and a conflict that would continue a decade later.

States, organizations and institutions around the world have intervened in the Somali conflict since its implosion in 1991 in the hope of resolving it. There have been more than a dozen attempts by the international community to resuscitate a national Somali government since then. Millions of dollars have been spent on peace talks and conferences. Yet to date, Somalia remains without a recognized and functional central government _ it is currently the only country in the world without a central government _ and the killings still continue just as the peace talks continue. An obvious question that comes to mind is: why? Why hasn't a peaceful solution to the Somali crisis been reached yet? Despite good intentions, outside intervention has done little to help the situation, and has at times even made things worse. The failures of these initiatives to restore peace and a central government to Somalia, points to defects in such initiatives and begs the questions: where do such initiatives go wrong, and in what other alternative ways can peace and good governance be restored to Somalia?

In answering these questions, this paper offers a daring assertion and challenge: it proposes that a lack of understanding on the part of the international community of the true nature of the conflict, its various dimensions and dynamics, as well as of the actors in the region, has thus far made the task of conflict resolution an impossible mission to accomplish. The international community has been deluded into seeing the conflict for what it is not, and for this reason, resolving the conflict has thus far eluded them. In supporting this position, four factors are significant and need to be taken note of:

1) Because of certain cultural and traditional practices and beliefs, only Somalis can resolve the Somali conflict;

2) Contrary to popular perception, the Somali conflict is no longer ethnic based and solutions sought out under such perceptions can bear no fruit;

3) The conflict has become a profitable project for some influential and powerful actors, there is more to gain, materialistically, from the conflict and the ensuing peace processes than its resolution; and

4) Somali conflict resolution on foreign soil with only warlords and former military officers, who are not representative of the larger Somali populace, is not possible.

Based on this premise, and with these factors in mind, this paper offers a new and different view of the nature of the Somali conflict, and thus its resolution. The focus is on the unrecognizedSomaliland and the possible role an internationally recognized Somaliland could play in resolving the Somali conflict. In any consideration of the Somaliland experience, an analysis of its claims to statehood and the international community's reluctance to recognize it is important, and as such Somaliland's case for independence will also be presented here.

Somalia-Somaliland* Riddle

Somalia has been described as "the very definition of. a failed state." Ironically, the last time Somalia possessed anything resembling a `normal' government, was under dictator Siad Barre who was driven out of the country by a national rebellion in 1991. Since then political power fell into the hands of feuding warlords who each deploy their private armies to battle for power. Militias of rival warlords often clash in cities and kill civilians in large numbers. In Mogadishu alone, United Nations officials say the city of one million has about 60,000 militiamen.

After Barre's fall in 1991, the Capital City of Mogadishu was polarized along clan lines and was in a in bloodbath that resulted in the killings of 14 000 people and wounding three times that number in that year alone. Somalia collapsed into chaos and central governing institutions fell. Law enforcement, tax collection, banks, ministries and social services all collapsed.

By comparison, in the northwestern city of Hargeisa, a phenomenon that international observers and Somali studies experts labeled "a breakaway northern province with a functioning government" was in progress. After Barre's fall in January 1991, as the struggle for power in southern Somalia deteriorated into a civil war, the rebels of Somali National Movement (SNM), consisting of the clans of the north, abandoned hopes that an acceptable government could be established in Mogadishu. The SNM withdrew its forces from the south and convened a peace conference of the northern clans in the city of Burao in April. On 18 May 1991, the delegates at the conference made up of traditional and political leaders representative of all the northern clans, announced the restoration of Somaliland's sovereignty as an independent state and the dissolution of the 1960 union with southern Somalia.

Since 18 May 1991, the self-declared Somaliland has not only succeeded in maintaining a functional government but has also succeeded in maintaining a degree of peace, stability and democratic values unknown of in other parts Somalia. Despite this however, Somaliland remains unrecognized by the international community as a sovereign state.

Somaliland has neither exchanged ambassadors with any other government nor has been admitted to any major intergovernmental organization. Instead, the Transitional National Government (TNG), whose mandate expired in August 2003 and whose control only ever extended to a few blocks in Mogadishu even at the height of its popularity, holds the Somali seat at the United Nations, the Arab League, Organization of Islamic Conference and African Union.

International Relations experts, politicians, writers, academicians and the like are beginning to acknowledge the need for the international community to stop turning a blind eye to Somaliland and pretending that Somalia has a government that rules over the entire Somali territory.

With southern Somalia still in the hands of the feuding warlords, Somali studies experts and scholars note the necessity of Somaliland's recognition in resolving the Somali conflict. Professor I. Lewis guru of Somali studies, notes that "for the moment, despite the reluctance to recognize Somaliland officially, this might actually be for some time the only viable Somali state on offer. It might accordingly prove necessary to recognize that, in this as in so many other case, half a loaf is better than none." In the same tune, Kenyan scholar Professor Ali Mazrui holds that Somaliland should be allowed to go its way "for it has resources to sustain itself, [and because] the situation in Somalia is a culture of rules without rulers, a stateless society [whereas in Somaliland] there is order there, [and] they have the potential to survive." Mazrui regards allowing Somaliland its independence to be a worthwhile move that could eventually result in a pan-Somali reintegration.

Somaliland's Case for Independence

In their demands for international recognition as a sovereign entity, Somaliland governments have often chosen to argue their case on legal and political grounds. Somaliland president Dahir Rayale Kahin often emphasizes that "Somaliland's existence as an independent state is both a historical fact and today's reality." Like wise Somaliland's late president Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal often highlighted the country's success in establishing good governance, consolidating peace and stability and persevering in social and economic developments despite the country isolation from the world community and the absence of foreign aid.

Significant factors often raised, not only by Somaliland's governments and leaders but in academics circles as well, are the historical fact of Somaliland's existence as an independent state prior to unification with south Somalia, the legality of the 1960 union, the political atmosphere during Barre's regime, and Somaliland's political achievements after Barre's fall.

Somaliland's early existence as an independent state Somaliland was established as a British Protectorate in 1884 after the British government concluded a series of treaties with the other imperial powers. It's existence as a geopolitical entity was only temporarily disrupted twice between 1941 and 1948. First by an Italian conquest which resulted in Somaliland being briefly incorporation into the Italian East Africa Empire. Then came the British reconquest, and union of all the Somali territories except French Somaliland, a union in line with the British government's Bevin Plan aimed at uniting all Somali territories under a single flag. When the Bevin Plan failed, British Somaliland was restored to its prior status as a separate independent entity by November 1948, and it remained as such until independence in 1960.

Somaliland's history of colonization and decolonization cannot be looked at separately from that of the other Somali territories. Especially since the aspiration of most Somalis, at the time, was a unification of all five Somali territories under a single flag

Somalia and Somaliland: A historical background

Pre-independent Somalia was the only country in Africa that was divided into five regions each with a separate power ruling or colonizing it. The northern part of the country _ the part that is now Somaliland _ was a British protectorate. What is today known as Djibouti was under the French power while southern Somalia was an Italian colony. Somali NFD (Northern Frontier District) fell under Kenya, and the Ogaden region became part of Ethiopia.

The first of these territories to gain independence was British Somaliland. On the 26th of June 1960 Somaliland became fully independent from Great Britain. Five days later, on 1 July, Somalia followed suit, and the union of Somaliland and Somalia as the Somali Republic was declared on the same day. The intention was to pave the way for the unification of all the five Somali territories.

Dreams of `Greater Somalia' Fail

A vision of a "Greater Somalia" that would include all the Somali territories and unite them under a single flag was the driving force behind the Somaliland-Somalia union. This dream was not to be. The Northern Frontier District (NFD) was lost to Kenya in 1963 after Kenya obtained its independence from Britain. In 1977, the French territory voted in a referendum and opted not to join Somalia, and thus gained independence as Djibouti. Just a year later the final bow was dealt to the dream of a Greater Somalia. In 1978, Ethiopian and Cuban forces defeated the Somali army and Ethiopia acquired and retained control of the Ogaden region. With these developments, any hope of a Greater Somalia that would include the five Somali territories symbolized by the star (with 5 connected corners) on the new flag, were now crashed. The dream of a unifiedSomalia was now a marriage between Somaliland and Somalia only.

The Legality of the Somali Unity

The union of British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland had immediate and profound effects on the politics of the new country and laid the foundation for the future relations of the two territories. On 27 June 1960, the Somaliland legislature passed the Union of Somaliland and Somalia Law. The authorized representative of southern Somalia did not signed this treaty, it therefore remained without force in the south.

The Union of Somaliland and Somalia Law was repealed by the new National Assembly, but "since Mogadishu-based National Assembly did not yet have jurisdiction in the Somaliland, the act of repealing was not effective in both parts of the new Somali Republic." The view that the act of repealing was null and void was supported by the acquittal of a group of Somalilander officers tried for treason before the Mogadishu Supreme Court. It is stated that the British judge presiding over the case acquitted the officers of the charges "on the grounds that there was no Act of Union between the North and South, the alleged offence having taken place in the North."

Meanwhile, the legislature of Somalia approved its own document, the Atto di Unione (Act of Union) on July 1st. This time around, Somaliland failed to sign this document. Despite the fact that neither document was signed by both territories, the marriage between Somaliland and Somalia was declared and the new Somali Republic was thus pronounced _ without a valid Act of Union having been enacted. A proposed unitary Constitution met the same fate as the previous documents. It received a negative reception in the north.

Somaliland's political leaders campaigned against the constitution and called for its boycott. Results of the referendum on the Constitution reveal the extent to which the Constitution was rejected. Voter turnout was low and over half of those who voted rejected the unitary constitution. Of the "slightly more than 100,000 ballots cast in Somaliland, 53% voted "no"." In addition, irregularities in the poll in the southern region were also reported. Aside from the recognition by other states of the existence of the Somali Republic, argue the Somaliland government, "the de facto union between Somaliland and Somalia fell short of the legal requirements mandated by domestic and international law."

A Repressive Regime and A Rebellion

By 1981, dissatisfaction in the north with the Somali government was quite evident and widespread. "Although Barre's rule was becoming universally unpopular, discontent was felt most keenly among people of the former Somaliland, where [there was] economic neglect and deprivation (less than 7% of all development assistance was allocated to the region), stringent controls on trade, increasing centralization of administrative functions in Mogadishu, and the growing brutality of the Barre regime. As the wealthiest and most politically influential group in the north, the Isaq were singled out for especially unpleasant treatment."

This deprivation of political, commercial and basic human rights to Somalilanders gave way to rebellion under the banner of the Somali National Movement (SNM). The response of the Somali government to the resistance by the SNM was the documented by Africa Watch, the human rights organization:

The government exploited the emergence of the SNM to justify indiscriminate violence against individuals and groups that criticized government policies and leadership, or merely because of clan affiliation. [.] Both the urban population and nomads living in the country side have been subjected to summary killings, arbitrary arrest, detention in squalid conditions, torture, rape, crippling constraints on freedom of movement and _expression, and a pattern of psychological intimidation. [.] Whenever the SNM launched an attack [.] that area was subject to harsh reprisals, including summary execution, the burning of villages, the destruction of reservoirs, he indiscriminate planting of landmines and the killing and confiscation of livestock, the lifeline of the nomads.

By 1988, a full-scale civil war had erupted. The SNM had briefly taken control of Hargeisa and Burao, and the government responded by bombing and shelling major towns in the north. "This included flattening the Somaliland capital of Hargeisa, using a combination of artillery, South African mercenaries and bomber aircraft." The bombardment of civilian targets resulted in the killings of an estimated 50,000 - 60,000 people. "On the outskirts of the capital there are a number of UN-acknowledged mass graves as testimony to southern brutality." Though the SNM became victorious in February 1991, by then 100,000 people of the region have been estimated to have died and over 500,000 systematically driven from their homes.21

Second Declaration of Independence

The expulsion of Siad Barre from Mogadishu and the failure of the feuding factional leaders in the south to come to some kind of peaceful agreement on governing Somalia meant a new lease on life for the territory of Somaliland. Somalia's civil war became full-blown, a fight for power ensued and civilian casualty and anarchy became order of the day. Meanwhile in the north, the SNM rebels had withdrawn from their forces from the south and embarked on establishing a government in the north. A Peace Conference of the northern clans was convened in April 1991 at Burao. On 18 May 1991 the dissolution of the 1960 union, and the restoration of Somaliland as a sovereign state were declared.

This second declaration of independence was not welcomed by the international community that still chooses to ignore the existence of Somaliland, and clings to the illusion the unity of Somalia. International reluctance to acknowledge Somaliland as a sovereign entity can be attributed to the international system's prioritization of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states over the principle of self-determination. As such, maintaining a united Somalia that includes Somaliland is given preference to giving recognition to Somaliland.

Advocates of Somaliland's international recognition, argue that "recognizing Somaliland would be a strong signal to the rest of Africa that performance matters and that sovereignty granted in the 1960s will not be an excuse to fail forever." The Somaliland government is on the other hand also quick to point out that Somaliland's recognized statehood is not a defiance of the respect for the notions of sovereignty and territorial integrity since "Somaliland's declaration of independence is predicated upon the territory's prior existence as a recognized, independent state."

To Recognize or Not To Recognize

Jeffrey Herbst of Princeton University notes that order is supposed to be the defining characteristic of a state. If indeed this were the case, Somaliland's claims to sovereignty would not be contested at all. Since its second declaration of independence in 1991, Somaliland has gradually restored peace and order to its land, and steadily developed its own political, administrative and economic institutions and arrangements.

The Somaliland government's adoption of democratic value and practices is undeniable. The government carried out an in May 2001, an internationally observed referendum in which 97.9% of Somalilanders endorsed a new constitution and confirmed their wish to remain apart from the rest of Somalia. The world also witnessed Somaliland's internationally monitored municipal elections in 2002 and presidential elections in 2003.

While Somaliland's accomplishments are admirable, in determining its eligibility for international recognition, international law lays down certain requirements that a country needs to comply with before statehood is proclaimed. The basic requirements established in international law are:

- Permanent Population
- Defined Territory
- A stable government
- Capacity to enter into relations with oother states

Permanent Population

In fulfillment of the first requirement of a permanent population, Somaliland has a population of approximately three and a half million people, including the refugees that have been returning since the process of rebuilding the country began. These people comprise of the clans that have inhabited the territory prior to and during the time the territory was a British Protectorate, as well as during the Barre regime and after. Since 1991, Somaliland however can no longer be said to comprise or be dominated by a single ethnic group.

A Defined Territory

Geographically, Somaliland covers an area of 137,600 square kilometers and comprises of the territory of the former British Somaliland Protectorate. It shares a western border with Djibouti and its southern border with Ethiopia. Treaties establishing Somaliland's boundaries the Anglo-French Treaty of 1888, The Anglo-Italian Protocol of 1894, and The Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty of 1897. The border demarcations under these treaties are established in international law.

A Stable System of Government

Some factors worth mentioning in fulfillment of the third requirement of a stable system of government are: the adoption of a democratic constitution in 2001, successful local elections in 2002, credible presidential elections in 2003,, the two peaceful changes of government in 1993 and 1996, and finally the peaceful transfer of power to then Vice President Dahir Rayale upon the death of President Mohammed Egal in May 2002 within hours of confirmation of his death.

Capacity to enter into Relations with other State

Somaliland's capacity to enter into relations with other states is quite limited but nonetheless existent. Somaliland has signed agreements of co-operation with Ethiopia and Djibouti, and maintains representation in various foreign countries. The Ethiopian government has established a trade liaison office in Hargeisa and hosts a Somaliland liaison office in Addis Ababa. The two governments also co-operate on security matters.

Relations between Somaliland and other African states also seem promising. Senegal unexpectedly invited the Somaliland President and a delegation of ministers to Dakar in 2003. South Africa sent an observer team to monitor the 2001 Somaliland referendum, and in May 2003 Foreign Affairs Minister Nkosazana Zuma hosted the Somaliland Foreign Affairs Minister. How far these states will go in advancing Somaliland's case for independence still remains to be seen however. Additional requirements that Somaliland has been called upon to comply with in its quest for statehood are: conformity with the Charter of the African Union, public support for independence, and economic viability.

On the issue of conformity with the Charter of the African Union, an argument presented by the Somaliland government is that its declaration of independence is predicated upon its prior existence as a recognized state. Declaring independence, goes the argument, is consistent with Article 4.b of the Constitutive Act of the African Union which affirms the AU's "respect of borders existing on achievement of independence", and as such Somaliland's declaration of independence is in conformity with the Charter of the AU. Supporters of this argument also evoke the precedents set by the precursor to the African Union, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), in permitting states such as Egypt, Gambia, and Senegal to retrieve their sovereignty following an unsuccessful union.

Despite the international community's reservation, the extent of national public support for Somaliland's independence became evident after the referendum carried out by the Somaliland government on 31 May 2001. In a process described by international observers as "open.fair.honest.and largely in accordance with internationally recognized election procedures," of the 1.18 million ballots cast, 1.15 million (97.9%) approved the new Constitution, Article 1 of which affirms the 1991 decision to withdraw from the 1960 union with Somalia. For many, the referendum represented a vote on Somaliland's status, i.e. to unite or to stay apart from Somalia.

Lack of international recognition places restrictions and limitations on a country's economic development and advancement. Restrictions on trade places a strain on the economy and people's livelihoods, and the absence of banking and insurance services deprives the country of basic financial services and hinders both domestic and foreign investment. The Somaliland government is not blind to these facts and acknowledges that "with access to bilateral and multilateral aid, much more could have been achieved, much faster, and a sound policy for long-term economic and social development could be put in place." Despite these shortcomings, economic development has not been stagnant.

The Somaliland government often voices it pride at its self-reliance and its economic achievements in the absence of foreign aid. Its economy is predominantly pastoral, and livestock exports represent the country's single most important source of revenue with a value of approximately US$170 million each year. The fishing industry which is supported by a 850-kilometer coastline also represents a major export item. In addition, deposits of gemstones, minerals, natural gas and oil have been identified but are not currently under exploitation. And though there's still no reliable figures on it, remittances from the Somaliland diaspora which have been roughly estimated in the range of $150-200 million annually, account for a significant amount of foreign earnings.

In addition to these tangible features of statehood: a permanent population, a defined territory, a functioning stable government, relations with other states (limited) _Somaliland also possesses abstract features that one associates with a state such as a national flag, a national anthem, a coat of arms, a currency and vehicle license plate.

International Perspectives

What are the chances of the international community giving up hopes for a Somali unity in the near future, and recognizing Somaliland as a sovereign entity? What are the different position and perspectives that the world and global actors hold about Somaliland, Somalia and the Somali crisis in general and the prospects for its resolution? What are the motivating factors behind such perceptions?

Intergovernmental Organization

The United Nations, African Union, Arab League and Organization of Islamic Conference have shown through their decisions, actions and statements their prioritization of preserving a Somali unity over allowing self-determination to succeed.

Matt Bryden notes that successive resolutions by the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Arab League and the United Nations have reaffirmed he commitment of their members to the unity and territorial integrity of Somalia. In November 2000, the United Nations Department of Political Affairs actively promoted the establishment of the Transitional National Government (TNG) of Mogadishu, and was also instrumental in helping the TNG to claim Somalia's seat at the UN. The UN, AU, Arab League and OIC also implicitly endorsed the TNG's claims to jurisdiction over the entire Somali territory _ including Somaliland _ through their decision o extend membership to the TNG in Mogadishu. "Reports and resolutions issued by these intergovernmental organizations have been meticulous in either prohibiting the use of the term `Somaliland' or else situating it in quotation marks in order to ensure that no official reference to the territory could be misconstrued as a form of recognition."

The AU's commitment to respect for the territorial integrity of Somali is rooted in the 1963 OAU Charter which makes numerous references to the "sovereignty and territorial integrity" of member states". From this perspective, Somaliland's 1960 union with Somalia is characterized as irrevocable and Somaliland's claims to independence thus illegal. As such respect for Somalia's sovereignty and territorial integrity are to be upheld.

The Arab League makes no secret of the fact that it favors a Somali unity. The OIC's position on the Somaliland-Somalia issue was reaffirmed by the presence of the TNG at the last OIC Summit in August 2003. The AU's commitment to resuscitating a Somali government in Mogadishu has also been unwavering and still ongoing. Currently, the AU has devolved responsibility for handling the Somali crisis to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

Meeting in Nairobi, Kenya, the foreign ministers of the member states of IGAD _ Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Kenya and Sudan _ have started a new round of peace talks last week on 20 May, with Somali warlords and traditional leaders from south Somalia in the hope of ending the 13 years of anarchy and conflict in Somalia. Somaliland has been absent from these talks as well as all the previous ones because of its declaration that it will only enter into dialogue with Somalia as an equal (i.e. as a recognized sovereign entity).

Western Governments

Somaliland's early campaign for recognition was mostly directed towards Western governments, seeing that the West was not as fussy about the principle of territorial integrity as the Arab world and the AU members were.

Somalia's notorious resistance to the externally-led peacekeeping endeavors of the early 1990s, coupled with the country's loss of its former strategic significance rates it as low priority in the West. Western powers, in presented with the Somali situation therefore opted to defer it to the AU. Western government are also wary of getting involved in the Somali dilemma for fear of potential danger to their relations with other regional powers and states with whom they share more important strategic or economic interests. As a result, the Somaliland government has since 2001 shifted the focus of their efforts towards the AU instead.

African States

Excluding the East African states, notably countries that shown interest in the resolution of the Somali conflict and Somaliland's demands for recognition are South Africa and Senegal. Senegal invited the Somaliland president and a delegation on an official visit to Dakar in early last year. Senegal's experience of secessionist insurgency in the southern region of Casamance, and of dissolution of a voluntary union (the 1982-9 Senegambian Confederation), say Somaliland officials, places it in a unique position of understanding.

South Africa also recognizes the need to address Somaliland's claims, as well as the dire need to resolve the crisis in the south of Somalia. A South African delegation was sent on a fact-finding mission to Somaliland in January 2003. In May 2003, South African Foreign Affairs Minister Nkosazana Zuma hosted the Somaliland Foreign Affairs Minister for talks on advancing peace and stability in the region.

Fences Make Good Neighbors?

The task of resolving the Somali conflict has been delegated by the AU to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Therefore the relations that these regional member states have with the Somali territories are a significant consideration to be taken note, especially since it has become clear that member states' governments are deeply divided in their interests and approaches.

Djibouti, a neighbor to he self-declaredSomaliland, was the sponsor behind the 2000 Arta Conference that culminated in the formation of the TNG. Observers of the Arta process have stated that the President of Djibouti, not only interfered in the process itself but that the process had been hijacked and driven by his specific interests. Nowhere else in history, they point out, has a president enjoyed the right to nominate delegates to the parliament of a neighboring country. The nomination of the former Minister of internal Affairs in the Barre regime to the post of president of the TNG, as well as the selection of former military officers accused of being war criminals by Somalilanders to various ministerial positions infuriated many and created a rift between Djibouti and Somaliland.

The Djibouti government makes no secret of its opposition to Somaliland's independence and openly campaigns against Somaliland's recognition. Though the visit of Somaliland's President to Djibouti in 2002 simmered down the hostility, Djibouti's position on Somaliland's statehood hasn't changed.

Neither a neighbor nor an IGAD member, Egypt remains influential in the affairs of the Horn of Africa due to its geopolitical rivalry with Ethiopia. Egypt's uncompromising opposition to Somaliland's pursuit for international recognition is equaled by its support for a Mogadishu-based government. Egypt was instrumental in securing Arab recognition of the TNG and persuading Arab governments to give financial and military support to the TNG.

By comparison, Ethiopia, the dominant power in the Horn of Africa, is hostile to the TNG to the extent that the TNG has accused Ethiopia of seeking to divide and destabilize Somalia. Such allegations are further fuelled by Ethiopia's support for coalitions of southern factions opposed to the TNG.

On the other hand, Ethiopia has always maintained close relations with Somaliland. Even prior to the formation of Somaliland, Ethiopia was a supportive ally of the SNM during the 1980s. The Ethiopian government has established a trade office in Hargeisa and hosts a Somaliland liaison office in Addis Ababa. Ethiopia and Somaliland also cooperate closely on security matters.

Despite its overt support for Somaliland however, Ethiopia has not extended full diplomatic recognition to Somaliland for fear of damaging its relations with significant Arab and African states. The foreign policy of Ethiopia's strategic rival Eritrea towards Somalia is driven by a desire to counter Ethiopian influence. In line with this policy, Eritrea recognized the TNG in 2001.

Governments of member states assigned with restoring a central government to Somalia are deeply divided in their interests and approaches regarding the Somali crisis. The last peace process, which dragged for 18 months, collapsed amid criticism that rivalries were undermining the process. Observers recorded that "the peace process has been dogged by rifts between Ethiopia, the dominant power in the Horn of Africa, and Arab-backed African states who are wary of Ethiopia's sway over the talks and any future governments in Somalia."

Solving the Somali Conflict

Somalia still does not have a government, it is in absolute ruins, and strife and conflict still continue over a decade after one of the most expensive humanitarian interventions in history, and over a dozen peace talks later. Logic rules that, short of alleging a lack of commitment to the task at hand, the approaches thus far adopted in dealing with the Somali crisis are inadequate. A lack of understanding of the conflict's nature is to blame for this. This assertion, as pointed out earlier in the paper, arises from and is supported by certain factors which will be discussed in detail.

1. Strategic Culture

At the risk of coming across as stating the obvious, it is nonetheless significant to point out that in any situation, when one is called upon to intervene in the affairs of others, it is always important to understand the mentalities and ways of life of those people one is dealing with. A medical doctor, for example, question a patient on his or her lifestyle, activities, habits and daily routine before suggesting the ways and methods that the patient's sickness can be cured or brought under control. Ignoring these factors could have disastrous consequences.

Likewise, it is imperative that Somali people's ways of life and traditional approaches to certain situations be understood before any cures for their ills are suggested. More specifically, Somali people's own ways of dealing with crises needs to be taken into consideration in the quest for a peaceful resolution to the current Somali dilemma. This is not to suggest that all Somalis all uniform in their approaches or that every Somali individual will respond in the same manner if presented with the same situation. On contrary, individuals' responses will inevitably vary. But the fact of the matter is that the Somali community is a very conservative, patriarchal, and alike as a result of the society's religious homogeneity and strong respect for and reliance on the tribal system. Whatever clan one identifies themselves as _ and most Somalis do _ there is a hierarchy and system that is followed for every aspect and in every sphere of life, whether it is in resolving a conflict, paying compensation for injury or insult, pursuing a marriage, or simply seeking help in a matter. Such systems are complied with on a microscopic level in the family as well on the macro level in interactions between clans.

The way that a problem is solved among Somalis of different clans are also alike. A solution is first sought among those directly involved in the crisis and if no agreement is reached, only the immediate relations of the conflicting parties are involved. If no resolution is reached, the circle is expanded and distant relatives are called upon to help. As a last resort, the greater clan is involved and traditional rulers and leaders are asked to solve the problem. In the rare and often shameful event that those of the same clan fail to reach an agreement on a crisis (as is the case in Somalia now), elders of other clans reluctantly get involved.

In short, the mechanism of Somali conflict resolution, to use a non-academic phrase, is to keep it close to home. In other words, the process of solving a problem should not have to be done by an outsider but within the confines of one's people _ firstly within the household, then with the extended family, and if all else fails, with other clan member traditional elders. Therefore, because of their cultural and traditional practices and beliefs, only Somalis themselves can resolve the Somali conflict.

2. Somali Conflict Not an Ethnic Conflict

Since its implosion, the Somali conflict has been referred to as an ethnic conflict by the international community and the press. Granted, in its initial stages in the early1990s, wars in southern Somalia were between different clans fighting for power. But what the world is currently witnessing in Somalia points in the opposite direction.

Instead of the 1990s phenomenon of say, Hawiye fighting Daarood, what we see today in Somali is a case of those of the same clans in wars. Militias of feuding warlords of the same clan are at war, not members or groups of conflicting clans. Proving this argument is the fact that the previous three weeks have seen fierce fighting in the city of Mogadishu between militias of warlords Muse Sudi Yalahow and Mohammed Dheere _ both of the Hawiye clan. Clashes between rival warlords in the past years have also shown the same pattern.

Therefore, contrary to widespread beliefs and perceptions, the Somali conflict is no longer ethnic based, and solutions sought out under such perceptions can bear no fruit. The failures of previous peace processes can largely be attributed to this misconception about the nature of the conflict itself.

3. Profitable Project

The issue of the profits that have made off the Somali conflict is taboo in many circles and is thus often avoided in discussion and debates on Somalia. As controversial as it is though it needs to be addressed and dealt with in the quest for Somali peace and stability. The Somali conflict has become a profitable project for some very influential and powerful actors because there is more to gain, materialistically, from the continuing conflict and the ensuing peace processes than its resolution.

Firstly, profits from weapons and arms dealing are to be expected considering the affairs in the country. Reuters reports of the last conflict in Mogadishu that, "fighters.were using light artillery, truck-mounted anti-aircraft guns, heavy machineguns and rocket propelled grenades". Arms dealings have become a lucrative business in this city because of the demand that exists. Those that profit from this business thus fuel conflicts to ensure that demand for their goods does not decrease or vanish all together.

A second group of beneficiaries of the war in Somalia are those that gain from the peace processes themselves. Though no officially researched and documented proof has been published, allegations about the material gains of those often involved in peace processes are rife among Somali communities and other observers of the peace initiatives. An anonymous observer recently captured this scenario articulately on a popular Somali website and posted the message _ "warlords in Somalia fight in order to have peace talks about their fights because that's how they earn their living!"

4. What is in a name and the location?

All previous Somali peace talks and processes have been conducted away from Somalia and delegates to these processes have stayed the same. It would seem therefore that new faces and a radical change in venue is perhaps not simply a strategy used in marketing but could be useful in the Somali case as well.

Somali conflict resolution on foreign soil with only warlords and former military officers who are not representative of the larger Somali populace is not possible. Moving the peace talks to Somalia itself would not only decrease expenses and eliminate profits that unscrupulous characters gain from these processes, but would also raise Somali morale and support for the processes. There would be the home advantage factor at play.

Representation of the common folk at Somali peace processes would also increase chances of its success increase dramatically. One would assume that the task of restoring a central government to Somalia would be achieved more easily by respectable and knowledgeable individuals entrusted by the Somali people to represent them, as opposed to feared gun-trotting people accused of war crimes and alleged to profit from the killings of their people.

With the passage of time, chances for a negotiated and peaceful settlement to the Somali crisis decrease and the cost to human life and dignity increase. It seems reasonable then to say that since the international community's approaches have thus far failed, new mechanisms need to be adopted.

Somaliland's Sovereignty: Somalia's Salvation?

It has already been argued that the international community's lack of understanding of the nature and various dimensions of the Somali conflict has thus far rendered them incapable of resolving the Somali conflict. In conjunction with this point, it was also stated that because of certain cultural and traditional practices and beliefs, only Somalis can solve the Somali problem.

Somaliland's successful formation and maintenance of a functioning government, and restoration of peace and order to its people while the south of Somalia was literally disintegrating into statelessness, places it in a unique position of experience that the rest of Somalia can benefit from. In addition, their 31year co-existence as north and south of the same republic and the shared experiences under Siad Barre places Somaliland in a position to understand the woes and aspirations of south Somalia more than any other country ever could.

Somaliland insists on the world's recognition of its statehood before any dialogue with Somalia can take place. The international community on the other hand still clings on to the illusion of a Somali unity and turns a blind eye to Somaliland's demands for recognition. In this scenario it would seem, as a certain Mat Bryden eloquently put, "Somaliland's destiny.remains hostage to a state that has, by empirical standards, ceased to exist." On the other side of the coin, as the international community struggles to restore a central government to Somalia, Somaliland could be Somalia's only salvation and, ironically Somalia's fate might actually also be in Somaliland's hands.