Dr Ahmed Yusuf Farah

Paper Presented at the All-Africa Conference on African Principles of Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 8-12th November 1999

The former head of state, Mohamed Siad Barre, fled the city of Mogadishu in January 1991, leaving the capital and much of Somalia in the hands of competing armed military who rapidly established clan fiefdoms in areas dominated by their social groups. Strife and fragmentation have continued ever since. The dismemberment of Somalia has been most pronounced in Mogadishu itself, where hostile warlords divided the city in to two at the time of the study in 1993. Fragmentation of the city has increased since 1993 with the city now divided into more than three parts controlled by rival factions.

There have been, and continue to be, serious efforts by Somalis to bring about reconciliation in Mogadishu and other parts of the country. Peacemaking initiatives in the north, however, in the self-proclaimed 'Republic of Somaliland' have been relatively successful compared with the rest of Somalia. The severity of the government assault on this area before Barre's departure and the disruptive legacy of the 1977-78 war with Ethiopia, have thrown the clans of 'Somaliland' back on their cultural and institutional resources to tackle the disorder that prevailed after January 1991.1 A key to the visible progress in the north has been the spontaneous adoption by the general public of a 'bottom-up' approach to the restoration of peace and stability, involving representative authorities and institutional at all levels of society in 'Somaliland'.

Close ties with the elders, and experience of working with them and through them in reconstruction and rehabilitation in Erigavo district, led ACTIONAID to commission this study in the belief that it would give a fuller account of clan and lineage mechanisms in Somaliland as well as helping to identify those aspects of local peacemaking that deserve further support there and elsewhere in Somalia.

The Role of Traditional Leaders Under Siad Barre

Under Siad Barre, a system of divide and rule, formulated and implemented by the centralised state, undermined the ability of traditional leaders in Somalia to settle local disputes and keep the peace. Through a system of incentives, Barre drew many such leaders into the regime, just as colonialism has wooed them in the past. However this association with the regime diminished their standing among their own communities. The Barre government meanwhile, sought to impose homogenous modernity on the culture of clan and lineage. References to one's clan or common ancestor were strenuously discouraged. The regime officially outlawed one of the key traditional judicial instruments in Somalia: the collective compensation, known as dia, by lineage groups in case of misconduct by their members. By the mid 1970s the regime claimed that it has abolished the clan system throughout Somalia.

It is not clear to what extent the traditional elders are acting with equal responsibility in the south. A report of land tenure in the Juba and Shabelle regions of the South, for example, emphasises how some clan elders have enriched themselves by asserting title to land traditionally held by minority groups. Others hold documents issued by Barre's government which they claim proves their entitlement. This study suggests that, until the land issue is resolved at the local level, an equivalent peacemaking process can not begin satisfactorily.2

Evolution of Clan Structures

The findings of ACTIONAID's study in the north suggests that, during the civil war, the authority of clan elders was actually strengthened. The guerrillas who fought Barre's despotic regime were drawn from northern sub-clans and clan militias within the Somali National Movement. This returned traditional figures to prominence. Their influence was already apparent by the time ACTIONAID began working in the north.

This research confirms that, in a period of turmoil and uncertainty and in the absence of legitimate institutions, clans and sub-clans have had recourse to their own traditional structures. Particular emphasis has been given to the appointment of sultans - a special political office, sanctioned by religion. At the time of the study there were more twice the number of sultans in 'Somaliland' than at independence in 1960. This study also finds that lineage elders who led smaller units with the clans are live and well despite a period of eclipses under Barre's regime. The return to tried and tested systems of governance has enabled Somalis in the north to break the momentum of war and opportunistic plunder. This research has found that the mediating authority of Akils, or heads of dia-paying lineage groups - an office abolished in the early 1970s - is now firmly re-established and that its functions have expanded into the vacuum left by the collapse of the Barre centralised administration.

All clans in Somaliland and some of the larger sub-clans now have their own Supreme Council of Elders, known as guurti. These fulfil a dual role as legislative and executive, with responsibility for everyday questions arising within the clans and also for arbitration between different clans. In April 1992 for instance, the Gadabursi clan, whose celebrated dynasty of Sultans was disrupted during the 1950s, reinstated its paramount head, or Ugaas, and sent a peace delegation to reconcile inter-clan warring within the family of Isaq clans. The elders called for an assembly that would deliberate on the restoration of peace and on proposals for the future.

While north and south alike are plagued by freelance banditry, the goal so international recognition gives added impetus to a genuine and popular wish for peace. Somaliland moreover, is spared the existence of influential warlords locked in a desperation struggle of power this has been a major obstacle of peace in the south. It is also clear that the concentration of aid resources in one place (Mogadishu in the south) has been a potent stimulus to conflict.

Progress to Peace

The mechanisms for establishing peace depend on joint community committees formed at local level, empowered to implement agreements reached by Councils of Elders. Another local authority known as the 'committee which uproots unwanted weeds from the field is responsible for dealing with banditry and minor disturbances. This localised approach to peacemaking began with a series of inter-clan reconciliation conferences in 1991 and gradually advanced to district, regional and 'national' levels. The authorisation of agreements at peace conferences is given by clan elders, but other traditional leaders - politicians, military offices and particularly religious men and poets - have played a crucial role in the peace process.

Religious figures, such as sheikhs and wadaads, or Islamic scholars, take their duties as peacemakers seriously. Their authority is based on the esteem in which they are held as spiritual leaders, as distinct from Akils and sultans, whose status is more secular. Spiritual leaders are seen as ideal and neutral arbiters with allegiance to universal Islamic values that transcend clan loyalties. They do not settle disputes themselves or sit in judgement. This is the work of elders in council. Instead, their task is to encourage rivals to make peace. To this end, independent delegations of renowned holy men have taken part in all the major peace initiatives between previously hostile clans in Somaliland.

Poetry, which is the most celebrated and respected art form in Somalia, has been marshalled to the cause of peacemaking. Through metaphor and allusion, an oral poetry can tap the richest reserves of Somali discourse; it is widely understood and enjoyed and like the mass media in the west, it has the power to influence opinion. This study has found that in major clan reconciliation such as the meeting of the Eastern Habar Yonis and the Dhulbahante at Dararweyne in 1992, distinguished national poets recited poems advocating peace at the inaugural and closing ceremonies.

Role of Women

Women have also played a significant part in peacemaking. After marriage, a woman retains her kinship ties with her father's group and ' even though they are often denied ' the property rights that these entail. The dual kinship role conferred has often existed across two neighbouring but warring clans, with the result that women have suffered unduly in Somalia's upheaval. It has also meant that women have taken on a new and active function as ambassadors between rival groups the groups they married into and the group they were born into. This is a function of their traditional role in systems of exchange.

Often, at the height of the civil war, women provided the only means of communication between rival clans, since their status allowed them to cross clan boundaries. Twenty-four days after the Dhulbahante council of elders failed to appear at the agreed site for the first peace forum, the Habar Yonis, with whom they were supposed to meet, sent a delegation of kinsmen born of Dhulbahante women, who persuaded suspicious maternal relatives among the Habar Yonis to attend.

Traditionally, women were exchanged to seal a peace treaty between the parties. A daughter was offered as a sign of trust and honour to mark the pact between giver and receiver. Likewise, when blood has been shed, Somalis regard the gift of a marriageable partner as material and symbolic compensation for the loss of life. This study finds that such traditions have persisted in Somaliland and have strengthened some of the major peace agreements, including that of the Habar Yonis and the Isa Musa, each clan providing 50 eligible women for the other.

Modern technology has also been instrumental in the relative stability of Somaliland. In the past, radio communication was the monopoly of the government and international organisations. Recently, however, the elders of several bitterly embattled clans in 'Somaliland' have remained in constant radio contact during periods of tension, and radio links have provided vital channels for negotiation.

Declaration of Peace Conference between Eastern Habar Yonis and Warsangeli at Jideli, 5-9 November 1992

'In line with Jideli peace conference, Eastern Habar Yonis and Warsangeli clans call jointly for peaceful and harmonious co-existence between all the clans inhabiting Sanaag region. The present mutual agreement does not aim to create an alliance than can threaten the interests of other parties in the region. In contrast, it prohibits the formation of alliances of more than one clan against any party. This contract has been sealed by a binding oath, undertaken by 30 guurti from each clan.

How the Peace Conferences Have Worked

In November 1992, some 400 delegates representing the Eastern Habar Yonis and the Warsangeli met at Jideli. By the end of the conference they had agreed that each clan would be responsible for maintaining law and order in its own territory. A joint local committee of 30 members would be responsible for settling conflicts according to the terms laid down at conference. If more rain fell in the land of one clan, the guest community attracted by the pasture would be responsible for the protection of the lives and livestock of the host community.

Elders have also decreed that responsibility for paying damages for the actions of armed groups should be directly shouldered by the families of persistent offenders, rather than, as normal, being extended to the whole dia-paying group. If an armed robber is unable to pay compensation, the burden falls upon his father and brothers. There are many instances of crimes committed by younger men being dealt with by clan elders. In some cases their own kin has executed offenders.

The various inter-clan peace conferences in the north of Somalia culminated in the Boroma national conference at which a national ('Somaliland') peace charter was agreed and basic provisions for law and order were formulated. Following the collapse of the SNM regime, the elders appointed a new government. This was politically the most telling achievement to date of northern local level clan democracy. The Boroma conference received international support, but all of the other successful clan conferences in the north have been financed by community self-help, in marked contrast to the high profile UN forums in the south of the country and abroad, which have failed to produce a plausible settlement. Perhaps this accounts for the caution expressed by the Easter Alliance Elders in Garadag in 1992 against a unilateral UN military intervention in the north 'without the consent of the leaders of the local clans.'

Regulations agreed at a Special Conference between the Warsangeli and Eastern Habar Jelo at Shimbirale, 8-18 November 1992

With effect from 18 August any property stolen or looted should be returned immediately.

Anybody who suffers injury cannot take revenge on the clans of the criminal but will seek payment from the individual responsible or from his immediate sub-clan.

Those who suffer casualties should take no revenge measures themselves but inform the standing committee on peace. If they take steps by way of revenge, they will be treated as bandits.

The standing committee on peace will use the services of the peace forces when needed.

Anyone killed or injured while involved in acts of banditry will be treated as a dead donkey and should be denied any rights.

Any sub-clans engaged in acts of banditry which cause death or material loss should pay whatever damage they have caused. In addition, they will pay a bond of 100 female camels. This bond will be made over to the joint administration of the two sides, for common use.

Next steps

The efforts of clan leaders in northern Somalia over the past two years to bring about peace have raised popular hopes for positive change. The moral status and customary skills of the elders are a vital component in tackling the many problems that prevail in Somaliland. The participation of lineage leaders enables the representation of local groups in the administration to be balanced, ensures the equitable distribution of political and economic resource and allows more effective demobilisation of armed groups. This participation must not be allowed to be marginalised as modern state and professional infrastructure develops. The task of reconstructing basic services should start at the district level rather than from the top downwards. This approach is attuned by the decentralised system of governance, which is enshrined in the interim national charter for 'Somaliland' formulated by elders at the Boroma conference.

But the traditional structures on their own are not a complete panacea for the problems that are faced. Traditional peacemaking is sturdy, but it is also slow and cumbersome and will always benefit from logistical assistance. The initiatives in the north need to be supported. Such external support, however, needs to recognise the sensitivity of the recovery process. While much has been achieved in terms of restraining freelance banditry and inter-clan strife, the security situation remains delicate, which in turn suggests pitfalls for any hasty attempts at a programme of comprehensive reconstruction. For the time being, external assistance must supplement rather than overwhelm the kinds of local grassroots initiatives that already exist. To do so it will have to be timely and discerning and acknowledge the progress which an alliances of popular will and traditional leadership has already achieved in northern Somalia.

Conclusions

The traditional systems of governance examined in this study rely primarily on the moral authority of lineage and clan leaders. The power of such systems to prevent the occurrence of crime and violence remains limited. Northern elders describe their functions as upholders of law and order in such modest terms as dab demin, literally 'fire extinguishing'. The guarantees that these systems attempt to provide should not be under-estimated however. They are the basis of an emerging stability in the north. Their success depends on the support and trust of pastoral communities, which can only be won by anchoring the peace effort firmly within the existing social order.

It is now common for the herds of different clans to graze together in common border areas. This is remarkable progress, but it is largely unknown outside 'Somaliland'. Successes of this kind have come about despite, not because of, outside intervention in Somali. They provide ample evidence of the effectiveness of peace initiatives by and through institutions that have survived more than 20 years of harsh centralised government and a bitter civil war.

It is not the intention of this study to give tacit support to the ideal of a sovereign 'Somaliland' or to disparage peace efforts in the rest of Somalia. ACTIONAID simply believes that there are valuable lessons to be learned from the successes within 'Somaliland' and hopes to see support for traditional peacekeeping mechanisms in other parts of the country, beyond the notional 'Somaliland' border, where a state of harmony also prevails.

In the troubled south, meanwhile, the UN has facilitated peace moves outside Mogadishu (1992-1995) and also promoted the formation of local and district councils. But on the basis of this study in the north, ACTIONAID is bound to say that such initiatives can only win popular backing and work effectively if they take into account the dynamics and aspirations of people at all levels of the community, including minority groups in the south. Here the full representation and co-operation of traditional local leaders is crucial.

The Institutionalisation of the Guurti and their Controversial Role in the Resolving the Second Round of Fighting in Somaliland (1994-1996)

Somaliland adopted a system of governance that is anchored to the pervasive clan-based political culture of the predominantly nomadic northern Somali society. In this system 'national conferences' attended by representatives of local clan, shir beeleed, played a central role to political decision-making and in peacemaking. This inclusive and participatory approach to peace and governance allowed for the development of broad-based administrations in Somaliland.

In the prolonged transition (1991-1997), there evolved in Somaliland a culture of locally based reconciliation processes. The Somaliland guurti (supreme council of lineage leaders) have played a critical role in securing internal stability and in the development of institutions of governance. The first part of this summary discussed a series of peace conferences spontaneously organised by the Somaliland guurti over a period of two years, which successfully resolved the first round of fighting in Somaliland (1992-1993).

'Egaals' properly elected government was greeted with a brief period of stability that provided a window of opportunity for privately driven socio-economic reconstruction to flourish in the war-devastated administrative and commercial centres in 'Somaliland'. This brief lull was reversed by the eruption of a second round of fighting between government forces (a coalition of non-Gar'hajis clans) and disaffected Gar'hajis military over the control of Hargeysa airport in November 1994, the fighting spread to the second largest town, Burro, in March 1995.

The second cycle of fighting dragged on much longer than the first. It spontaneously died down without a formal agreement between the warring parties during the third shir beeleeed in Hargeysa between October 1996 and February 1997. The causes of the second round of fighting are as diffuse as those suggested for the first cycle of violence, ranging from unresolved issues of power-sharing among the Isaaq clans to competitions over Somaliland's resources (trade and currency), and historical animosities between Isaaq clans as well divisions within the SNM.

The institutionalisation of the guurti as the House of Elders in the two-chamber legislature in Egaal's successive administrations rewarded their good work in Somaliland during the troubled first SNM administration (1991-1993). But the new status of the guurti as salaried civil servants cost them their perceived neutrality and moral authority, central elements in the traditional method of reconciliation in Somali society. With a vested interest in the survival of the government, the guurti utterly failed to settle peacefully the second cycle of fighting between their paymasters (the government) and the Garhajis opposition. The politicisation of the guurti undermined an important local peacemaking instrument and allowed the fighting to drag on much longer than the first cycle of fighting.

The Peace Committee for Somaliland 3

The instability of the guurti to dispense their constitutionally mandated role of peacemaking and conflict resolution, as well as the polarisation of the warring parties, made inevitable the intervention of a third party. The externally based Peace Committee for Somaliland did raise suspicions in both camps of the warring parties, which hampered its effort to mediate between the government and the opposition and restore stability. Nevertheless, the grassroots work of the committee succeeded in placing the issue of peace back on the agenda and facilitated a successful inter-clan reconciliation in the Bura'ao region. A similar process of inter-clan reconciliation sponsored by the Peace Committee in the Hargeysa area failed to materialise due to government's predisposition to settle the dispute on its own terms.