Throughout the Cold War, secession was taboo in the state-centric international system. However, the breakup of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, the independence of Eritrea and East Timor as well as recent developments in Kosovo seemed to weaken the principle of inviolable state boundaries. From one point of view, these events may have far-reaching repercussions for Africa where borders are generally considered to be more arbitrary than elsewhere (Herbst 1989). And no other area in Africa is closer to secession than the northern region of Somalia - an area whose boundaries largely correspond to the former British Protectorate of Somaliland. (The British and Italian colonies of Somaliland became the Republic of Somalia in 1960.)

In 1991, the northern region of Somalia declared its independence from a state that was collapsing into chaos. Thus, a regional administration (retaining the name `Somaliland') has in the last decade overseen the creation of a modest state structure, a safe environment and a revitalised commercial economy. This contrasts sharply with the anarchy that characterises the south. However, Somaliland has failed to achieve international recognition as a separate state.

This paper examines as an independent entity by analysing three important factors influencing the prospects for its continuing existence and also attempts to define the success of its efforts for international recognition: first, economic viability; secondly, the viability of its political institutions; and thirdly, the international environment, including the prospects for reconstitution of political order in the southern part of Somalia.

Nation-Formation and the Declaration of Independence

The majority of the people of Somaliland have developed a sense of identity distinct from the rest of Somalis; a sense of identity mainly based on kinship and shared historical experiences. More specifically, four factors played a crucial role in the formation of this identity.

Firstly, a distinct clan dominates the region: all Somalis belong to one ethnic group, speak the same language, and are generally united by their devotion to Islam. They also attach great significance to their clan family system. Kinship is the bedrock of Somali nomad society, and clanship the determining factor in all social activity, politics included. Clanship, as the Somalis claim, is "bred in the bone and running in the blood" (Lewis 1994:233). There are six major clan families in Somalia - Darod, Digil, Dir, Hawiye, Rahanwein and Isaaq. These family groups are further split into smaller clan and lineages. The Isaaq clan dominates Somalia's northwest and more than 70 per cent of Somaliland's 2.5 million inhabitants are Isaaqs. Further, although the Isaaq clan family is made up of several sub-clans, in comparison to the other clan families of Somalia it is relatively homogeneous (Stratfor 1999).

Secondly, a distinct colonial experience: during the colonial period, the Protectorate of Somaliland was very lightly governed by the British. According to an analyst: "interested only in getting cheap meat to feed its Aden garrison and in keeping the French out, England treated its Somali colony with benign neglect" (Prunier 1998:225). As a result and in contrast to the authoritarian bureaucracy that the Italians imposed on southern Somalia, the native political institutions remained largely intact in the north. In turn, these traditional institutions played a crucial role in the success of local peace-making efforts in the 1990s (see below).

Thirdly, the northerners' feeling of marginalisation in independent Somalia (Omaar 1994:232-3): when British and Italian Somalilands united to form the Somali Republic there were frictions over the process of amalgamation of the two regions. The different economies, different judicial, administrative and educational systems, and different languages for conducting business, exacerbated by the fact that there was no previous planning for the unification, posed significant problems from the very beginning. While many northerners favoured a federal solution, independent Somalia finally emerged as a unitary state. The first serious frictions appeared in the referendum for the constitution in June 1961 when the north's Somali National League advocated a boycott. It was reported that an insignificant village not far from Mogadishu (Somalia's capital) had registered a yes vote higher than the total northern vote. Then, in December 1961, Sandhurst-trained lieutenants of the former British Somaliland, resenting their Italian-trained commanding officers imposed by Mogadishu, attempted the first military coup in sub-Saharan Africa. This abortive coup clearly had secessionist objectives (Adam 1994:25-6).1

In the years that followed, the north's educated cadres, leading businessmen and seasoned politicians gradually left the northern region for the southern capital. A new culture of co-existence started to develop at the elite level. The politicians of the north tried to manipulate the existing multiparty system by forming alliances with the political elite of the south. In 1967, the new President Abdirashid Ali Shermarke nominated Mohammed Egal as the first northern Prime Minister of the Republic. However, the semi-democratic parliamentary system began to teeter on the verge of collapse after the 1969 elections. In October of that year, the commander of Somalia's national army, Mohammed Siyad Barre, engineered a successful coup, and Somalia came under military rule which lasted for more than 20 years. The Siyad Barre regime concentrated its efforts on the development of the south, fuelling northern complaints of economic marginalisation. Gradually the southern clans - especially those linked to the president's family - dominated the government and its bureaucracy (Makinda 1992:26). The low-intensity northern demands for distributional benefits within the political system remained unsatisfied, gradually escalating into the current high-intensity demand for separate statehood.

Fourthly, events triggered by the Ogaden war crucially affected the formation of a distinct northern identity: after Somalia's defeat by Ethiopian forces in 1978, more than one million ethnic Somalis fled Ethiopia and entered Somalia. About half of them settled in the north (Ahmed 1999:241). The arrival of the refugees put pressure on limited natural resources and services. Isaaq resentment against the Mogadishu government in the south further intensified as a result of the preferential treatment of refugees in aid, services, jobs and the allocation of land. The Siad Barre regime organised armed militias among the newcomers in order to return and `liberate' Ogaden (the Somali-populated region in southern Ethiopia), but in fact the militias used their weapons to terrorise the local population. The Isaaqs started to fight the refugee militias and an organisation called the Somali National Movement (SNM) was created in London in 1981 with the declared aim of overthrowing the Siyad Barre regime. It was the beginning of a bloody decade.

In its struggle against the military regime in Mogadishu, the SNM accepted Ethiopian assistance, thus violating an imperative of Somali nationalism (Markakis 1994:233). However, in 1988, the Ethiopian government, desperate to move troops to stabilise its northern front where it confronted Eritrean rebels, made peace with Siyad Barre and agreed to expel the SNM fighters from their sanctuaries in Ethiopia (Clapham 1995:79-80). Forced back over the frontier, the SNM rebels attacked government forces in northern Somalia. Mogadishu responded by bombarding the northern cities - especially the capital, Hargeisa. Schools were razed, water and electricity were made inaccessible, and at least 40 000 people died and half a million fled into Ethiopia. Siyad Barre was finally ousted in a coup in 1991 and, while southern Somalia descended into years of anarchy, Somaliland declared its independence.

In sum, as happened in the case of medieval Europe (Tilly 1990; McNeill 1983; Van Creveld 1991), warfare had played a central and indeed essential role in the process of nation-formation in Somaliland. War shaped the `imagined community' that later proved essential in providing a government apparatus with the moral basis needed to ensure the willing participation and often self-sacrifice of its citizens. The international humanitarian intervention in Somalia in 1992, did not include Somaliland (Clarke 1993:44) since the latter - in contrast to the south - did not face a serious humanitarian crisis (Lyons and Samatar 1995; Clarke and Herbst 1997). A senior United Nations (UN) source argued later that the lack of attention to Somaliland during the international military intervention "contributed to [its] separatist philosophy" (UN 2001b).

The debate over secession was present in the SNM as early as 1981 and although the organisation's constitution clearly underlined the `need' for the preservation of Somalia's territorial integrity, the secessionist wing remained powerful (Bryden 1994; Gilkes 1994:6). In February 1991, the SNM called a congress of Isaaq and other elders in the northern town of Berbera. A second, larger, popular assembly was convened in the town of Burao in May and it was there that the self-determination decision was taken. Although the SNM leadership was against secession and favoured an alliance with southern warlord Aideed, the organisation's guerrilla commanders supported independence.2 It is particularly important to note that the decision for independence was supported not only by Isaaqs but also by representatives of the minority Dulbahante, Warsangeli and Gadabursi clans (Compagnon 1998:82). A provisional government emerged and ministers were selected according to the rules of clan balance and saw themselves as representatives of clans. Above all, in contrast to the south, peace was preserved.

Traditional conflict mediation was widely and successfully used in Somaliland. The role of clan elders (chosen by virtue and not by age) was probably reinforced by the lack of external intervention. In the rest of Somalia, the USA/UN forces entrenched warlords and militias and marginalised `peacelords' (elders and merchants) (Ahmed and Green 1999). In the north, by solving the disputes at the level of traditional social organisation without external mediation, the elders were able to deprive the politicians of the possibility of making war, and thus helped to create conditions of peace (Farah 1993; Bradbury 1993; Prunier 1997).

Local-level peace-making efforts reduced tensions between communities, restored trust and harmonious relations between clans, increased positive interactions among different groups, and reinforced the traditional means of resolving disputes (Farah and Lewis 1997). Women in particular played a key role in the mediation of disputes because of their dual kinship and they were often the most important means of communication between communities (Ahmed 1999). Traditional mediation was particularly successful when a conflict over the demobilisation and the integration of the various militias into a `national' army led to a full-fledged war between coalitions of Isaaq sub-clans, but in November 1992 elders brokered an agreement in Berbera that ended the fighting. The fact that many of the elders came from non-Isaaq clans, including the Dolbahante and Gadabursi, underlined the total disintegration of the SNM.3

A grassroots peace and reconciliation movement that started with local peace conferences throughout the north culminated in a `grand conference' in Borama (a non-Isaaq town) from late February to May 1993. The conference brought together elders from all clans and sub-clans, SNM leaders, professionals, young people, women and veteran politicians (including Omar Arteh, Mohammed Egal and Jama Mohamed Ghabib, who were originally opposed to the independence declaration). Omar Arteh ran for president but lost to Somalia's former prime minister Mohammed Egal, leading an analyst to note that "it is ... an irony of history that the person delegated to consummate union with ex-Italian Somalia is today charged with the task of guiding Somaliland out of the union" (Adam 1994:33).

Mohammed Egal's election was not without controversy. His first two years in office as President of Somaliland converted some of his adversaries into bitter rivals. In the second half of 1994, members of a clan (Garhajis) militia clashed with the government and its Habar Awal supporters. By the end of the year, the conflict had pushed large numbers of the capital's population to take refuge along the Ethiopian border. Nevertheless, what looked like an endless and senseless feud between rival clans was to a certain extent a more classical conflict of power. Politicians who were defeated in the 1993 Borama election distributed money among clan militias to foment opposition to the new president and helped to promote fighting in the towns of Burao and Hargeisa (Compagnon 1998:85).

Although the situation seemed to be leading to a civil war, the traditional peacemaking mechanisms worked once again. Rival clan members reached powersharing treaties and agreed to representation in government and the legislature (the 82-member senate and the 32-member parliament) along clan lines. Mohammed Egal's term as President of the Republic expired in 1995. However, he was able to use the state of national emergency to stay in power until 1997. Finally he called a new national meeting of the same style as the Borama one, where he was comfortably re-elected, receiving 223 of the 315 votes available. Interestingly, many local and outside observers disputed the legitimacy of the conference and questioned the way in which several candidates for the presidency were disqualified. Even today, and although Mohammed Egal has been Somaliland's President for more than eight years, many Somalilanders - including the leaders of some SNM factions - continue to distrust him, fearing that he might compromise on independence and find a way to reunite with the south (UN 2001h; Fisher 1999b). These nationalists believe that Egal's real ambitions lay with a powerful position in a reconstituted Somalia. However, other observers believe that the future of Somaliland as an autonomous entity will depend less on Mohammed Egal's personal ambitions and more on the area's economic viability.

Economic Prospects

More than half of Somaliland's population are nomads. Cattle exports (sheep, goats and camels) are the economy's most important sector and the government's most significant tax base. Saudi Arabia is Somaliland's livestock exporters' main market (more than 90 per cent of the total). In 1998, in response to a Rift Valley fever outbreak in Kenya and southern Somalia, Saudi Arabia imposed a livestock export ban on the Horn of Africa that particularly hit Somaliland's economy. The ban lasted for 14 months and the number of animals exported from Somaliland's port of Berbera fell sharply from 2.9 million in 1997 to just over one million in 1998. Although the effects of the ban on Somaliland were softened by increased smuggling of livestock into the Saudi market via Yemen, the government in Hargeisa lost significant custom duties. The ban was re-imposed in 2000, and this time not only by Saudi Arabia but also by five other Gulf states (including Yemen) - thus reducing the possibilities of smuggling (UN 2000, 2000a). According to the multi-agency Food Security Assessment United, "huge income losses have resulted from the Gulf livestock import ban" (UN 2001), while the government is reported to have lost duties worth $15 million from its $25 million budget (The Economist 2001). Somaliland's Minister of Finance has estimated that the ban will cost the country between US$150 and 200 million per annum in lost foreign exchange receipts (UN 2001g). Although the 2000 ban is not expected to be permanent, it underscored Somaliland's dependence on a single export, a single foreign market, and the need for diversification of exports.4

When Saudi Arabia imposed the livestock ban in 1998, many observers feared that the shortage of hard currency needed to finance imports would spell disaster for Somaliland. However, the ban failed to affect significantly the volume of imports because remittances succeeded in financing the country's entire import bill. Remittances originate mainly from migrant labour in the Gulf and from Isaaqs living in the West (Britain, the United States and Canada). The growth of telecommunications and private remittance agencies has greatly facilitated the transfer of money. The value of remittances is estimated at some US$500 million annually - around four times the value of livestock exports - benefiting about one-third of Somaliland's population (Ahmed 2000). Moreover, the Somaliland diaspora has also supplied much-needed assistance for schools, universities and hospitals (UN 2000b).

Another economic activity in Somaliland relates to qaat, a green leaf imported from Ethiopia that is rich in amphetamine. Its consequences are disastrous: qaat consumption "renders the economically active male population economically inactive by midday" (Green 1999a; Morris 2000). In the past, qaat consumption used to be linked to religious practices but has developed since the 1960s as an urban habit. In 1983 Siyad Barre, believing that its production and trade was used to finance the SNM, ordered the destruction of the qaat fields in Somaliland. However, Barre's efforts to limit its demand have failed. By the late 1980s, consumption was greater, and present even in the countryside. Today, in Somaliland's urban areas, more than 90 per cent or more of adult males chew qaat daily. The import of qaat from Ethiopia is considered by many observers as one of the main barriers for the economic recovery of Somaliland, while attempts by the government to impose a tax on trade have failed because of the qaat mafia (Zainab 1994).

The government of Somaliland employs about 26 000 people and around 70 per cent of its expenditure goes on salaries (UN 2001a). Moreover, more than 70 per cent of the national budget of about $20 million supports the maintenance of the security forces (army and police) composed of 20 000 men (Fisher 1999a). Indeed, the security forces play a crucial stabilising role in a country where the ownership of small arms is widespread. As a foreign journalist has observed, "carrying weapons in public is strictly illegal and rigidly enforced" (Harris 2000). However, from another point of view, the government is `buying peace' by paying salaries to former militia members. The reduction of the - undoubtedly - high number of policemen and soldiers could be severely destabilising for the country, since there are few opportunities for alternative employment. Although the government demobilised thousands of young fighters, with the support of international aid agencies, only half of them were able to find jobs (Mubarak 1997:2034). Somaliland's capacity to survive will depend less on its ability to defend itself militarily against other states or rebel movements than on its ability to extract the economic resources needed to maintain its differentiated administrative structures, and on the ability of those structures to deliver enough to the population that they control in order to retain its continuing acquiescence. At the moment, human development indices for Somaliland are particularly disappointing.

Infant mortality is high, with one in five children dying before the age of five. Education and medical care are minimal and life expectancy is only 48 years (Morris 2000).5 In addition, the results of past wars continue to haunt the country. Somaliland has an estimated one million landmines from the Siyad Barre years and the inter-clan warfare of the mid-1990s (Abdi 1999; Esa 1994) while more than 130 000 refugees continue to live in camps in neighbouring Ethiopia. Although about 115 000 refugees have returned since 1997, their reintegration into Somaliland's society is still a serious problem (Africa Online 2000).

Characteristic of the problems that the government faces is the attempt to introduce a national currency. The Somaliland shilling circulated in late 1994 but, as the government has followed excessively expansionary monetary policies, its credibilty has been eroded, suffering sharp falls against the dollar (Mubarak 1997:2031; UNDP 1999). An effort by the Ministry of Finance to impose restrictions on the sale of foreign exchange met strong public resistance and was defeated in the parliament (Mubarak 1997:2032; The Economist 1996). The shilling is still used in the western part of the country but mainly for smaller purchases; all large transactions are carried out in US dollars.

Nevertheless, Somaliland's economic prospects are not entirely bleak and there are reasons for optimism. First, the enterpreneurial spirit of its inhabitants is perhaps one of the greatest strengths of the country. The very significant dose of laissez faire that has replaced the tight controls on business imposed by the Siyad Barre regime, acted as an important stimulus for business. In a few years, Somaliland's businessmen have created several electricity companies, one of the cheapest telephone systems in Africa, and five private airlines serving Somalia and the Gulf (Simmons 1998).

Furthermore, the view that the country lacks "any obvious assets" (Woodward 1996:192) is now being contested. First, there is the possibility of oil and gas production. The discovery of oil in Yemen has encouraged international oil business interest in northern Somalia. Although there is no evidence to support speculation that a mirror image of Yemen's Alif fields will be found in Somaliland, geological similarities imply that this possibility cannot be discounted (Kielmas 1993). In the 1970s and 1980s, some US and Italian companies (Chevron, Amoco, Conoco and Agip) carried out exploration in northern Somalia, but discovered nothing of commercial proportions. However, many oil experts believe that Somaliland has good potential for exploration, although they underline that that potential depends strongly on its international recognition. France's Total [Oil Company] spent $3.5 million to refurbish the country's oil storage facility at Berbera (the largest foreign investment in Somaliland) in exchange for a monopoly in oil supply and distribution (Morris 2000) and has recently applied for an exploration concession (Somaliland.com 2001a). In 2001 it was reported that three oil companies - Pet Giant Oil, Shell and China's Continental and Petroleum Engineering Company - had also applied to the Hargeisa government for licences to explore oil on the coast (Somaliland Net 2001a).

Apart from oil, the prospects for the gem sector also look positive. Somaliland is situated at the top of the `Mozambique belt' - from which two-thirds of Africa's gems are mined - and its gem sector already supports 5 000 livelihoods. Although the lack of mining techniques and poor gem-recognition skills have not allowed the sector to develop its full potential (UN 2001g), the recent discovery of a several-miles-long reef of high quality emeralds seems to confirm the view that Somaliland has large quantities of precious stones (The Economist 2001). From another point of view, the discovery of mineral resources (the prospects for gold and coal production should be added to oil, gas and gems) may destabilise Somaliland's fragile institutions. There is a danger that, with the absence of strong state institutions, the discovery of significant oilfields and high quality emeralds may not help Somaliland's sustained development and lead to the emergence of the well-known dysfunctions of `rentier states' (Beblawi and Luciani 1987; Karl 1997; Yates 1996). Moreover, as mineral resources may become the magnet for conflict amongst local groups, their discovery could even undermine the country's political stability (as can be seen in the role of diamonds in Sierra Leone's conflict [Hirsch 2000]). For example, the fact that the mining minister was recently fired for fixing gem prices for his own business interests (and his replacement was slow-witted) raised fears that individuals and clans do not respect the government's ownership of mineral resources (The Economist 2001).

Foreign aid - or rather the lack of foreign aid - offers another explanation for Somaliland's success in establishing peace. In the 1990s, northwestern Somalia did not suffer mass starvation. As a result, the huge international relief effort focused on southern Somalia. Despite achieving the urgent aim of eradicating starvation, humanitarian aid also fuelled the southern militias. When they were not stealing aid, the southern warlords took a cut on rent, transport and security, while many donors started to negotiate with the warlords, thus enhancing their stature. In a strange way, the lack of massive foreign aid contributed to Somaliland's stability.6 Indeed, since then, the local tranquility in Somaliland has allowed the orderly and effective distribution of foreign aid that helped to provide some public goods and services of critical importance.

Until very recently, international agencies and donors have not had a co-ordinated approach to national authority structures in Somaliland. Some worked through ministries; others worked directly with municipalities; still others preferred to work directly through local NGOs or contractors, evading ministerial efforts to direct or control their work. Only in 1999 was a co-ordination mechanism established and given a mandate to prioritise projects and recommend their financing to donors (UNDP 1999). However, donor co-ordination remains weak; it is more informative than collaborative in nature. More importantly, without international recognition, Somaliland is unable to receive official development aid from the World Bank and other international institutions. Much foreign aid to the country continues to be channelled through NGOs. Furthermore, the refusal of the international community to grant the country formal recognition is discouraging certain types of direct foreign investment. Somaliland also cannot enter into formal trade agreements with other nations and cannot have direct relations with the International Monetary Fund (Bartholet 1999). (The positive side of this situation is that "Somaliland is unable to get into debt" [Morris 2000].) Further, Somaliland's trade is adversely affected as its central bank cannot issue letters of credit. Finally, lack of international recognition affects Somaliland's economic viability in other paradoxical ways. For example, the Saudi ban on imports of livestock was "ostensibly imposed because Somaliland's veterinary certificates, giving the animals a clean bill of health, were not internationally recognised" (The Economist 1999).

The Future of Internal Politics

However, apart from its economic viability, Somaliland's prospects also depend on the viability of its current political order. On May 31, 2001 a referendum on a new constitution7 was conducted in Somaliland. The new constitution included an article on independence (Article 2) - it was in reality a referendum on independence - and the government announced on June 5 thhat 97 per cent of the voters had endorsed it (UN 2001d). Although some international election observers (from NGOs) noted that they were impressed with the manner in which the referendum was conducted, there were reports that doubted the success of voting in the northeastern regions of Sool and Sanag (UN 2001d; BBC 2001b).

Moreover, since there is no census, community elders decided on who should vote, making it difficult to estimate the `real' public support for independence. In an interview for NBC News, Mohammed Egal claimed that "85 per cent of the people of Somaliland are adamantly committed to the separation from Somalia" (NBC 2001). According to a Western observer familiar with the country, the figure is much lower: "there was probably about 70 per cent pro-independence vote" (UN 2001b).

The new constitution attempts to provide an answer to the conundrum of how to build institutions robust enough to withstand the turmoil of clan politics (Bryden 1998). Article 9 removes the present clan-based political system by laying the basis for multiparty politics. According to the legal adviser to Somaliland's parliament, Ahmed Ali Kahen: "here has been an attempt to make a framework in which parties do not divide along [clan] lines" (BBC 2001a).

The new constitution allows for only three political parties, which must gain support from at least four of the six Somaliland regions. The president and the vice-president have five-year terms of office and are elected by a secret ballot in a general election. The two chambers of the legislature will also be elected, with members of the Council of Representatives elected every five years and members of the Council of Elders every six years. According to some observers, the political reforms introduced by the new constitution reflect Mohammed Egal's personal interests (UN 2001b). Somaliland's leader - having already served two terms - has lost the support of many clan elders. For example, in July 2001, 36 members of the House of Representatives accused him of corruption and asked for his removal from the presidency (Somaliland.com 2001b). By reshaping the political landscape, Mohammed Egal's political survival may become possible.

Nevertheless (and apart from the president's personal ambitions) the implementation of the institutional reforms envisaged by the new constitution may upset currently sensitive clan balances (presidential and legislative elections are due in 2002). Although not everything is clan-based in Somaliland, it is important to note that some clan militias would not qualify as national parties and certain clans (especially non-Isaaqs such as the Dulbahante, Gadabursi, Warsengeli, and Isse) but also some Isaaq sub-clans will face exclusion from the new political system. Of course, many of the members of these clans supported independence and continue to regard Somaliland as their nation. The vice-president of the country is, for example, a member of the Gadabursi clan. However, if these clans' or sub-clans' representation in the state institutions is minimised in a winner-gets-all political system, they could afford to be indifferent to the state's survival.

A good example of the destabilising role of clans is the recent conflict with Puntland. Puntland, a non-secessionist regional state within Somalia that was established in 1998, entered a territorial dispute with Somaliland over the regions of Sanaag and Sool (Menkhaus and Prendergast 1999:215) (the regions where the success of the constitutional vote was questioned). Somaliland lays claim to Sanaag and Sool on the ground that they fall within its old colonial borders. On the other hand, Puntland claims them on the ground that representatives of those areas that belong to the (non-Isaaq) Harti clan opted to join Puntland at an assembly in 1998. In 1999 moves to establish a police and administrative presence in parts of Sanaag and Sool brought Somaliland and Puntland closer to conflict. For the time being, neither Somaliland nor Puntland exercise any meaningful authority in the two areas and, despite some bilateral discussions, the possibility of an armed escalation cannot be excluded (Stratfor 2000b). The conflict showed quite clearly that many non-Isaaqs - who do not have the Isaaq experience of persecution, exile and popular struggle - fear their own subordination within a primarily Isaaq state.8

In November 1999, when Mohammed Egal visited Borama (a non-Isaaq town in the western part of the country), he confronted a huge group of local residents led by Reqiyah Aw Al, a former Somaliland presidential candidate, who were shouting slogans against the country's secession. It was reported that this was the first time in the past few years that a group opposed to the independence of Somaliland publicly declared its stand (Horn of Africa 1999b).

The clan issue is linked to perceptions of widening regional disparities. These perceptions are the most widespread form of grievance in Somaliland, probably disguising a deeper and more potent form of discontent (Somaliland Centre for Peace and Development 1999). In the eastern parts of the country especially, a sense of alienation has existed since the declaration of independence and has been steadily fuelled by the longstanding perception that the east is being ignored. Many perceptions (or misperceptions) of lack of equity are linked to foreign aid.

In 1999, the European Union (EU) announced a project for the rehabilitation of the port of Berbera (Horn of Africa 1999a). Mohammed Egal, complaining that no one had asked for his opinion on the project, said: "Berbera is my home town, so many of the opposition believe I am favouring it. They think I have influenced [the EU] to help Berbera" (UN 1999). Moreover, apart from perceived regional grievances, growing disparities between urban and rural areas - increased by the Saudi livestock ban - are also a cause for concern.

Can an ideology such as Islamic fundamentalism (together with clan and region) serve as a mobilising factor against the current order? The answer is negative. Somaliland is experiencing an Islamic revivalism but fundamentalists are not sufficient to create a critical mass (Adam 1994:38). Although it is sometimes difficult to distinguish religious zealots from radical ideologists, the clan factor continues to be far more important than religious affiliations and there are no charismatic fundamentalist leaders who could pose a threat to the secular political institutions of the country. Although politicians in Hargeisa like to talk about an `Islamic threat', this is not a real concern: they mainly use Islamic extremism as a bargaining chip in Somaliland's efforts to obtain international recognition.

The International Environment: De Jure Recognition and Regional Geopolitics

The literature on Africa has focused on the demonstration and diffusion effects of coup d'etats and conflicts, but has rarely noted that political values may also be transmitted across national boundaries (Li and Thompson 1975; Lutz 1989; Hill and Rothchild 1987). The success of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front's quest for independence has undoubtedly sparked new thinking about the viability of secession and has encouraged the proclamation of Somaliland's secession. After all, Somaliland, like Eritrea, has existed for about 80 years as a distinct colonial territory.

From one point of view, Somaliland's secession is easier than that of Eritrea. Somaliland had not only been a separate colonial unit but actually a separate independent state for five days before joining its formerly Italian neighbour to form the Republic of Somalia on July 1, 1960. This brief period of internationally recognised sovereignty serves today as "the principal legal justification of Somaliland's right to secede" (UNDP 1999) and also as the main argument for those who argue that Somaliland's formal recognition will not encourage partition movements elsewhere. And secondly, unlike Eritrea, Somaliland has exited a disintegrating state. However, the latter is also the crucial factor that makes Somaliland's argument for independence weaker than that of Eritrea. Somaliland is unable to receive an agreed farewell that was so helpful to the latter.

Some African states have shown a remarkable capacity for revival from apparently terminal decay (Liberia and Chad are good examples). Somalia's collapse may well not be final. The state may reconstitute itself and reclaim its territorial integrity even by force. In August 2000, under UN auspices, a lengthy conference of Somali elders and civil society groups in Arta, Djibouti (The Economist 2000) elected Abdiqassim Salad Hassan - a former Minister of the Interior and Deputy Prime Minister in Siyad Barre's regime - as Somalia's new President (Lortan 2000). Abdiqassim formed a new Transitional National Government (TNG) and returned with his entourage of 90 MPs to Mogadishu, where he received an enthusiastic reception (Smith 2000). The first signs of international recognition of the TNG appeared very soon. Abdiqassim took the Somalia seats at the UN, the Arab League, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and IGAD (Barise 2001:16).

Somaliland's leadership did not participate in the Arta conference. Mohammed Egal argued that there was a UN attempt to `force' his participation which then degenerated into a bitter feud with Somaliland (UN 2001c). Thousands of people protested against the outcome of the Arta process in the streets of Hargeisa and Berbera, denouncing Abudqassim as a relic of the past, burning Somali flags and holding placards reading "No More Unity" (UN 2000c). Egal claimed that future relations "can only proceed with prior unconditional acceptance by the Transitional National Government of the Republic of Somaliland" (UN 2001c).

The new government in Mogadishu claimed that it would not give up its territorial claim to Somaliland but also stated that it had no intention of imposing itself on the north by force. However, Abudqassim's decision to appoint two northerners from Somaliland as his Prime Minister and Foreign Minister was widely perceived as an attempt to divide Somaliland's clans and undermine Mohammed Egal (Reuters 2000).

For the time being, the new government in Mogadishu is essentially powerless. Several important southern warlords (including Husein Mohamed Aideed, Muse Sudi Yalahow and Hassan Mohamed Nur Shargudud),9 unwilling to relinquish their lucrative fiefdoms, have denounced the new administration, and an attempt by the latter to reopen the Mogadishu port failed following threats from six of the city's warlords (Barise 2001:18). Unable to impose its will even in the capital, the new authority in Mogadishu is hardly a `government'. Will its failure mark the last effort of the international community to re-establish a central government in Somalia? Will it pave the way for the recognition of Somaliland?

In principle, African states are against any plans for re-drawing international borders in the continent. According to the OAU, self-determination is to be exercised only once, at the time of decolonisation from European domination. Thus, although it could be argued that the doctrine of the `inviolability' of colonial boundaries does not apply to Somaliland because it is situated within the boundaries of the former British Somaliland Protectorate, OAU member states are, in the words of Mohammed Egal, "very reluctant to take the first step" (NBC 2001). However, Somaliland's neighbours and other regional states have their own interests that complement or (sometimes) compete with their formal endorsement of the OAU principle.

Neighbouring Djibouti considers Somaliland's existence a threat to its own security. Relations between Djibouti and northern Somalis have always been sour. General Siyad Barre has been a key factor in the independence of Djibouti and during the SNM rebellion in the 1980s, Somalia's neighbour was not a safe haven for northern rebels. After 1988 the border was closed, causing considerable economic hardship to northern Somalia and Berbera (Prunier 1994:70). In the 1990s, as the Isaaq clans tended to sympathise with the Afar opposition of Djibouti (and not with their Issa Somali `brothers' [Prunier 1994:75, fn 25]), relations continued to worsen. In November 1999, Somaliland closed its border with Djibouti for a few weeks, arguing that Djiboutian `infiltrators' were seeking to convince influential elders in Somaliland to reverse the secession from Somalia (Horn of Africa 2000). In 2000, when Djibouti hosted Somalia's peace talks, bilateral relations reached an all-time low. Somaliland complained that Djibouti had expelled Somaliland's former resident representative and banned foreign companies which trade with Somaliland (UN 2001e). Although Mohammed Egal called for improved relations (UN 2001f), it is clear that Djibouti regards Somaliland's de facto independence with particular scepticism and clearly dismisses any possibility for de jure recognition.

Like Djibouti and despite the similarities with its own struggle for independence, Eritrea is also strongly opposed to Somaliland's secession and has even tried to undermine its stability. For example, during its war with Ethiopia, Eritrea attempted to revive the anti-independence opposition in Somaliland in order to stop Ethiopia from using Somaliland's port of Berbera (Africa Confidential 1999a). Today, according to an Eritrean diplomat, Asmara would not want to be portrayed as working for secessionism and is "as conservative on the issue [of Somaliland] as any other state" (UN 2001b).

In November 2000, Egal paid an official visit to Ethiopia and signed agreements on trade, transport and communications (CNN 2000). In 2001 Ethiopia recognised Somaliland passports and Ethiopian Airlines announced the first scheduled flights to Hargeisa. It was also made public that Somaliland's currency reserves are being kept in the central bank of Ethiopia, pending the opening of a branch in Hargeisa. According to many observers, the importance of the seaport of Berbera for landlocked Ethiopia is the raison d'ˆtre for this rapprochement. The war with Eritrea (which brought a loss of access to the Eritrean port of Assab) and worsening relations with Djibouti have made Berbera Ethiopia's easiest access to the sea (Africa Online 2001). For example, during the famine that hit Ethiopia in 2000, 100 000 tonnes of food aid came through Berbera. Following the formation of the new Somali government in Djibouti, Mohammed Egal argued that "Somaliland's economic relations, and virtually all its cross-border trade, are with Ethiopia and not with Somalia" (UN 2001c). Moreover, the completion of EU-financed rehabilitation projects in the port of Berbera and the road that links it with Ethiopia (Horn of Africa 1999c) is expected to strengthen further economic relations between Somaliland and its Ethiopian hinterland (Africa Confidential 1999b).

Will Ethiopia then recognise Somaliland? The answer is negative. Ethiopia has a sizeable Somali population within its southern region. As The Economist (2001) has argued, "Ethiopia would be too worried about the effect [Somaliland's independence] might have on its lawless Somali clans". However, Ethiopia's stance towards the restoration of a central authority in Mogadishu remains also ambivalent.

While continued instability in Somalia threatens to spill over into Ethiopia, a reunited Somali state also constitutes a threat to Ethiopia as it brings with it the possibility of a resurgence of Somali irredentism (Lortan 2000). From that point of view, Ethiopia shares a common concern with Kenya. Nairobi also fears that the restoration of a central state in Somalia may revive Somali nationalism as the [former] northern frontier district of Kenya is populated by ethnic Somalis (Lortan 2000).

Like the OAU, Arab states are against Somaliland's independence which, they fear, could create a very dangerous precedent. Egypt and Libya have made several high profile attempts to restore a centralised unitary government in Somalia (a member state of the Arab League), since they are both concerned that an independent Somaliland would pave the way for dividing warring Sudan into two independent countries.10 Moreover, Egypt would prefer to see a reunited Somalia acting as a leverage for the uninterrupted flow of Nile waters from Ethiopia (Swain 1997).

Finally, certain Arab governments fear that an independent Somaliland may facilitate Israel's influence in an area considered as the `soft underbelly' of the Arab world. Thus, according to some observers, the Arab League aiming to undermine Somaliland's economic viability prompted Saudi Arabia to include the country in the ban on cattle exports from the Horn of Africa (Prunier 1998:228).

Moreover, the United Arab Emirates have imposed new and expensive visa regulations to Somaliland merchants. Interestingly, Hargeisa has tried to answer these pressures by turning to Israel (Hearing 2001).

Most developed countries support the views of the OAU and of the Arab League. Susan Rice, the under-secretary of state for Africa during the Clinton administration, was flatly against recognition of breakaway regions. US policy in the region, at least during the Clinton era, focused on the establishment of a stable, central authority in Somalia. Washington feared that, without a government in Mogadishu, Somalia was vulnerable to the dangers of terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism.11

In Western Europe, Italy is strongly opposed to the recognition of Somaliland. Through intensive diplomatic efforts in the 1990s, Rome has sought to ensure that the centre of power in Somalia remained in Mogadishu. Hence, at a recent EU Africa Working Group's meeting, the Italian representative strongly lobbied for the recognition and support of Abduqassim's government (Somaliland Forum 2000). The views of several other EU member states are similar. Thus, despite the gradual promotion of the idea of decentralisation (the so-called building block approach) in international mediation efforts for Somalia (Bryden 1999:134-35), virtually no Western country has officially mentioned the possibility of redrawing the international borders in the region.

The only exception to this is Britain. The British government, without formally recognising Somaliland, was much readier than other Western powers to treat it tacitly as an independent state. For example, British relations with Somaliland are handled through its embassy in Addis Ababa, whereas those with the former Italian Somalia are handled through the high commission in Nairobi. In 2001, Britain proposed that the EU should issue a statement with regard to Somaliland's constitutional referendum which declared that it "will bring further stability, prosperity, and democracy to the people of Somaliland". Italy reacted strongly to the British proposal, arguing that the referendum "proclaims an independent republic" and is not "coherent with UN, OAU, IGAD, IPF and EU positions in favour of the unity of Somalia". Several other states (especially France, Greece and Ireland) also expressed opposition to the British proposal and, finally, the Finnish presidency announced that it "will not propose any action or statement with regard to the referendum in Somaliland".12

The reasons behind Britain's (indirect) endorsement of Somaliland's independence are not clear. However, London's policy towards its former colony seems less to reflect old-style `sphere of influence' geopolitics than British internal politics. A pro-independence Isaaq population (estimated at more than 25 000) is particularly strong in Britain (especially in constituencies of importance to the Labour party), putting significant pressure on some British MPs to take an active interest in Somaliland (UN 2001b). However, Britain does not seem ready to act alone and against the will of other EU member states. A British unilateral recognition of the independence of Somaliland would threaten to jeopardise its relations with other Commonwealth nations, many of them OAU members.

In general, the prospects for Somaliland's international recognition are limited. OAU member states (including Djibouti and Ethiopia) continue to support the `inviolability' of African borders while the Arab League considers Somaliland's independence as setting a dangerous precedent. The West (with the partial exception of Britain) is also against recognition. On the other side, Somaliland has few means of pressure - economically, for example, it can hardly buy off small, poor nations (as Taiwan has done) - and its only significant asset seems to be the total discredit of the prospects for the creation of a strong central authority in Mogadishu.

In the long run, Somaliland's prospects for international recognition will be influenced by its geopolitical position. After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, Somalia and the Bab-el-Mandeb straits declined in geostrategic importance. But it would be erroneous to assume that the region has lost all significance for Western defence planners. According to US Senate testimony by General Norman Schwarzkopf in 1990, "the Red Sea, with the Suez Canal in the north and the Bab-el-Mandeb in the south is a critical shipping link between our Pacific and European allies ... ensuring these waterways remain open to free world shipping must be a key objective [of US Central Command]" (Gibbs 2000:44). In August 2000, a US Agency for International Development delegation led by the US ambassador to Djibouti visited Somaliland and held talks with President Mohammed Egal. As this was the highest US representation that had been sent to the breakaway region, a report concluded that "Washington is all but officially recognising its autonomy" in exchange for gaining access to "the strategically located deep-water port of Berbera at the mouth of the Red Sea" (Stratfor 2000a).

Mohammed Egal has used Somaliland's `strategic position' as a bargaining chip for achieving international recognition. In a recent interview he claimed: "We hold strategic importance that an American president would appreciate ... the route of oil from Saudi Arabia and Suez Canal. ... We will be a very good friend of the United States. ... We would welcome the Americans to use our port and airbase" (NBC 2001).

Apart from the Red Sea `oil route', oil may also affect Somaliland's prospects for recognition in other ways. For example, an American businessman with experience in Somalia "strongly suspect[ed]" that the US non-recognition policy towards Somaliland resulted in part from poor relations between the Somaliland government and the principal US oil company with interests in the region, Conoco (Gibbs 2000:53, fn13). Given that the new US administration is strongly influenced by the American oil lobby (Booker 2001) and Conoco's relations with Somaliland's government have recently improved, any possibility remains open. Another factor that may contribute to a change in US policy towards the region is terrorism. As the power vacuum in Somalia continues, the region is becoming a centre for the smuggling of arms and drugs and the export of terrorism. For example, parts of the bombs that exploded in August 1998 at the United States' embassies in Kenya and Tanzania reportedly passed through Somalia (Fisher 1999b).

Moreover, Western intelligence agencies believe that Osama bin Laden, the Saudi exile who allegedly masterminded the bombings, visited Mogadishu a few months later, possibly finding out whether he could establish himself in Somalia (Bartholet 1999). How is this situation linked to Somaliland? Jeffrey Herbst, who has written in favour of Somaliland's recognition, argues that if the international community continues to deny recognition to break-away regions, local rulers who are actually exercising elements of sovereign control will focus on informal trade, often involving drugs, guns, and poached animals, to survive, rather than beginning initiatives to promote economic development that would aid all of the people in their region (1990:139).

It is an argument that may influence Western strategic planners. Trying to exploit these views, Somaliland's leadership uses the threat of Islamic terrorism as diplomatic leverage. Saad Noor, Somaliland's representative in Washington, presents a `nightmare' scenario: Clearly the forces of darkness will gleefully celebrate the eclipse of the only secular democracy in the Somali-speaking region of the Horn [of Africa] and feverishly try to fill the vacuum by establishing a Taliban-like regime. If successful, they will hook up with fellow Islamic extremists in southeast Ethiopia and shake up the very foundation of the Ethiopian regime. Djibouti will not be safe either. The crescendo will come to a thunderous roar if the coveted southern shores of the Gulf of Aden, from the entrance of the Red Sea at Bab el Mandab to Berbera basin, fall under the control of an organisation like the one that blew up the USS Cole [in Yemen] (quoted in Arnot 2001).

In July 1999, Mohammed Egal put forward the notion that an observer status in the UN, similar to the Palestinian Authority's status, would enable Somaliland to have direct links with international financial institutions and other donors (Abdi 1999). Both the UN's Kofi Annan and US officials have discussed this kind of compromise that would give Somaliland a special status, similar to the West Bank/Gaza and Kosovo, and allow the country (even without full recognition) to benefit from loans and aid from outside nations (Fisher 1999b). However, the Arta conference and the formation of a new government in Mogadishu has (temporarily) stopped the discussions (and speculation) on such a solution.

Conclusion

Robert Jackson coined the term `quasi-states' to describe those states which, despite the recognition of other states, often lack "substantial and credible statehood by the empirical criteria of classical positive international law" (1990:22).

Quasi-states do not have governments which exercise effective dominion over their peoples and territories, they are incapable of defending themselves - on their own or with allies - against external threats, and their domestic systems are weak and unstable. Quasi-states exist because they enjoy international recognition. Jackson argued that most African states are so weak in terms of `positive' (as opposed to `juridical') sovereignty that they would not exist were it not for the international norms of juridical sovereignty: in fact many African polities are not states (Jackson 1987:528). Somaliland is a strange case. If we accept Jackson's argument, Somaliland is stronger in terms of `positive' statehood than a number of internationally recognised African states. It has survived for 10 years without `juridical' sovereignty.

It can be argued that Somaliland's nationhood has far deeper roots than the instrumentalist school of nation-formation supposes.13 Somaliland is less divided along clan lines than the rest of Somalia and has a different colonial history. Further, unlike most other African countries, warfare has played a crucial role in the formation of a strong sense of identity - at least for the majority of its population. However, a strong sense of identity is far from enough to ensure a smooth state-formation. The continuing existence of Somaliland will strongly depend on three factors: economic viability, viability of its internal political order, and the external environment.

The distinction between the internal and the external environments of a country is, at least to a certain extent, arbitrary. The behaviour of external actors may influence significantly - and not always positively - its `positive sovereignty'. This seems particularly true in the case of Somaliland. In terms of internal economic viability, the main threat to Somaliland's existence is external - the Saudi cattle ban. Ethiopia's `tacit recognition' also considerably influences Somaliland's economic viability - though in the opposite direction. Thus, external relations seem to be far more important for Somaliland's future than internal economics. Even from a strict internal view, Somaliland's stability seems to depend less on economic than on political factors. In particular, the implementation of the recently introduced constitutional reforms may undermine traditional conflict-resolution mechanisms and trigger renewed inter- or intra-clan warfare.

Within a decade, Somaliland has succeeded in achieving a `quasi-juridical' sovereignty. Its failure to secure de jure recognition as a state has not prevented its de facto acceptance as a polity. Its administration has established low-key bilateral relations with several states, and has maintained informal links with regional organisations (including IGAD and the OAU). Ethiopia, Kenya, Yemen, Egypt, Italy, France and the United States have all welcomed official delegations from Somaliland's government. And the UN, the European Commission and other international organisations working in Somaliland territory often deal with its leadership as responsible authorities.

Nevertheless and despite Somaliland's de facto acceptance as a polity, its de jure recognition as a state is still not a real possibility. Although Somaliland - like Eritrea - does not base its claim for independence on redrawing colonial borders, many states in the world (especially the members of the OAU and of the Arab League as well as most Western powers, with the partial exception of Britain) regard the country's juridical sovereignty as setting a dangerous precedent. This approach of the international community should be expected to continue in the short run. In the long run, the prospects for reconstitution of political order in the south will be of paramount importance for Somaliland's formal recognition. Nevertheless, for the time being, these prospects look remote. The new `government' in Mogadishu lacks the ability even to contest Somaliland's secession.

Jeffrey Herbst has argued that, as a response to state failure in Africa, the international community should "consider the possibility of allowing for the creation of new sovereign states" (1996:136). According to Herbst, a criterion for recognition could be the breakaway area's ability to provide better functional military, police and judicial systems on its own over a significant period of time (five years) than is provided by the central government. He notes that in Somaliland, in contrast to the chaos in Mogadishu, this political order is being provided (Herbst 1996:137-38).

However, academic arguments14 and political decisions remain two different things. In the short run, Somaliland will not overcome the international systemic bias against secession. Even if, in the long run and due to its important geopolitical position and the total discredit of efforts to create a central authority in Somalia, formal recognition is granted to Somaliland, this will not herald a new era in the maintenance of national boundaries in Africa. As Crawford Young argues: "Whatever else may lie ahead, respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each [African] state, appears one of the safer political forecasts" (1983:229).

A Postscript

On May 3, 2002 Ibrahim Egal died at the age of 80 while undergoing surgery in a military hospital in South Africa. Three days later, the president of the self-declared Republic of Somaliland was buried in the port town of Berbera in front of a large crowd. The vice-president, Dahir Riyale Kahin, was inaugurated as the leader of the country. The fact that the new president is not an Isaaq - he comes from the Gudabirsi clan - has raised fears of a power struggle and possible instability (BBC 2002; IRIN 2002).

Acknowledgement

This article is an updated and longer version of a paper originally presented at the 4th Pan-European International Relations Conference at the University of Kent, Canterbury (September 2001). The author would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for useful comments on an earlier draft.

Notes

1. According to some other observers, the attempted coup was less a reaction to unity than a quarrel over the spoils (Gilkes 1994:5).
2. The last SNM chairperson, Abdurahman Tuur, tried to revive the alliance in 1994 when he renounced Somaliland's secession, relocated to Mogadishu and was named `vice-president' of Aideed's unrecognised government.
3. SNM was viewed by some observers as a mechanism for promoting "Isaaq domination of every aspect of life in the new Somaliland, including the state" (Samatar 1994).
4. Apart from this strong external dependence, cattle production may also be threatened by environmental degradation. Somaliland's lands are overgrazed and trees, that help rainfall, are being cut down. Environmental degradation coupled with the reduction of common grazing land may contribute to (or even cause) violent conflict (Moiaver 1991; Economist 1999).
5. For country `official' (but not very reliable) statistics, see the government internet site: www.somalilandgov.com/cprofile.htm. For a macro-economic analysis, see Green 1999a.
6. For an interesting approach of how charitable practices influence the formation of state structures, see Marchal 1999.
7. For the full text, see www. somalilandforum.com/Revised-Constitution.htm.
8. That is a typical problem of self-determination. See Etzioni 1992/3.
9. Osman Ali Atto was initially opposed to the TNG.
10. However, a peace plan proposed by Libya in 2000 that envisages a unified Somalia ruled by two factions was considered by some observers as likely to partition the country. It seems that Gaddhafi's interests in Somalia may also include a greater role on the continent and access to Mogadishu's port facilities and the Baledogle air base (Stratfor 2000b).
11. For the US foreign policy towards Africa after the end of the Cold War, see Schraeder 1994, 1996; Henk 1997; Huliaras 1996.
12. Information based on an interview with a diplomat in the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 10, 2001 and classified COREUs.
13. For an excellent critique of this school of thought, see Hastings 1998. 14. For a different perspective arguing that partition may be particularly destabilising, see Sambanis 2000; Spencer 1998.

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