ABSTRACT

The social basis of ecological change in Somaliland during the colonial period was politics, especially imperial politics: the division of the Somali country into various colonial spheres, the loss of territory under the 1897 Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty, and the pacification wars. These events, as it were, reduced the land available for use by the pastoralists, which led to overgrazing, soil erosion and ecological degradation. Moreover, the income of the population declined throughout the colonial period. Even though during the late colonial period the 'nominal' price of pastoral goods increased, the 'real' price of pastoral commodities did not increase to cover the loss of income caused by inflation and the high cost of imported goods. These two processes-on the one hand ecological degradation and on the other the decline of income-could be understood if they were read contrapuntally. Such reading is possible only if we give full attention to political ecology: why ecology had changed, the politics of that change, and the impact it had on the income and everyday life of the population.

In Africa, generally speaking, scholars draw a link between ecological degradation, food crisis, poverty and famine, which they explore either by reconstructing 'historical climate' (long-term climatic changes and the consequential changes in the productivity of the land) or by examining how human activities have transformed the environment in the short term (McCann 1999; Zeleza 1993; Nicholson 1979).' The question is one of primacy: whether it was human activity or historical climate that created the current environmental and economic crisis.

James McCann (1999: 273), for instance, argues that Africans were more likely to be the victims of the changing environment than the perpetrators of its destruction. The available evidence for the long-term series is at best scant; McCann has been contemptuous of scholars who constructed historical climate on dubious sources. For McCann the limiting factor in food production in Africa is rainfall, which triggered the social and economic and adaptation to climate (op. cit.: 262). The climate/social response was mediated through such factors as forage, soil, crops, and social institutions such as kinship and ownership of land (op. cit.: 277). In Somaliland, the climate/social response relation was mediated in the myriad ways the pastoralists used the ecological zones in the different seasons: the Haud, the Oogo (plateau), Golis range (mountain escarpment), and the Guban (coastal area). Each zone was used by the pastoralists depending on the availability of forage and grazing, the nature of the soil, the accessibility of water, and the level of rainfall, and so a 'pulsatory' system of managed movement was practised between the different ecological zones-especially between the Haud and the plateau-that protected the land from overgrazing and soil erosion (Gilliland 1947: 51). That is not to say, of course, that the pastoralists were tree-huggers; improvidence is a human characteristic (Fernando-Armesto 2002: 73), and that is true of hunting, pastoral or industrial cultures, albeit the damages they caused were qualitatively different. The pastoralists transformed the landscape by the callous use of fire to clear the land as much as the cutting of forests and bush. The lay of the land was a product of their management strategies, which made it possible for them to practise a productive system of pastoralism for more than two millennia. The key was their adjustment to the primary limiting factor of food production: rainfall.

"The distinction between ecology and environment is that between the physical (environment) and the biological (ecology). Environment encompasses long-term changes in climate, rainfall, temperature, level of lakes and rivers, vegetation cover. Ecology reflects the changing relation between organisms. Human beings have altered and modified the environment; indeed they have created a new 'biome', a new ecological formation (see Bates 1968; Johnson and Anderson 1988).

During the wet seasons, they abandoned the interior and moved en masse to the Haud which had dense forests and bush interspersed with plains, perfect for both camel and sheep stock; but it had no permanent water-the few water wells there were four days' journey apan (Hamilton 1911: 29). The pastoralists could use the region only during the wet seasons when the stock could survive on the moisture derived directly from nature (Archer 1963: 163). During the dry seasons the pastoralists abandoned the Haud and moved to the interior plateau, which was to the advantage of both zones: since they were used alternately, both were protected from overuse, overgrazing and deforestation. The interior plateau had three advantages over the Haud: it had permanent water; it received more rain than the Haud because of the higher elevation (2,500-7,000 ft above sea level); and it benefited from the rainfall on the Golis Range that reached the plateau as floods carried by dry river beds {tog)-one of the most persistent topographical features of the country. The dry river beds originated in the escarpment and flooded the plains and valleys of the plateau and formed 'deltaic spread' (dooho) (Gilliland 1946); a good example is Togdheer which began its course in the mountain escarpment near Sheikh and ended in Nogaal where it is known as daadheere (lit. 'the river with the long floods'). When it rained heavily in the escarpment, it was a boon for the plateau which, because of the floods and the rainfall it receives yearly, had a richer and more diverse ecology than the Haud (Hamilton 1911: 22): it alternated between open woodlands, forests, plains, hills, mountains, dry river beds and wide valleys (Jardine 1923: 18).

Drake-Brockman (1912) wrote about the biodiversity of the interior plateau-the elephants, lions, leopards, Soemerring's gazelle, beisa, dik-dik, quaint hombills, the babblers and brilliant starlings, the larks, the sweet notes of the nightingale, the tall cedars, the wooded valleys and plains covered with grass-and concluded tongue-in-cheek, 'If this is a desert, it is a pleasant one' {pp. ciu: 238). The mountain escarpment, which is 4,000-7,000 ft above sea level, received even more rainfall than the plateau because of its elevation of which the highest peak, Surad, is 8,000 ft. It consists of two ridges: one that hugs the coastal line which was of low altitude and as dry and parched as the scrubland; and a serrated inland ridge on a higher elevation that, as Jardine (1923: 17) put it, was covered with 'grass, box trees, acacia, a variety of flowering aloes with crimson and golden blossoms, gum, myrrh, and frankincense trees' and 'almost everywhere the giant

The Guban, burned scrubland as it name indicates, was a hot humid parched strip of coastal land with scattered thorn bushes that received less than five inches of rain per annum, and which during the dry season {xagaa) produced extremely hot winds that parched everything they swept over. 'It will be realised,' wrote Jardine (1923: 18), 'that the general impression of Somaliland as an add desert is derived from the narrow coastal strip; and that the traveler inland soon finds himself in a country that seems almost beautiful and luxuriant.' Despite its reputation as a semi-desert, then, Somaliland was 'nothing of the kind': it was a country 'of mountain-chains and high plateaux, of open grass plains, and of sweet-scented mimosas and flowering aloes in profusion' (Archer 1963: 54).

A testament to the richness of the ecology was the great diversity in wildlife in the countryside. Lieutenant Cruttendon (1849), one of the earliest British travellers to the country, commented on the big game that thrived in the interior: elephants, lions, leopards, white rhinoceros, ostriches, wild ass, white antelope, dik-dik, kudu, scimitarhomed antelope, cheetah, oryx, a variety of deer species, gazelle, jerboas, toucan and numerous species of birds, large and small. Major Swayne, who travelled through Somaliland seventeen times between 1884 and 1893, stated that the country was 'one of the best and most accessible of hunting grounds to be found at present anywhere in the world' (Swayne 1903: xi). His narrative was essentially about the big game that fell to his gun. In 1899 the Consul-General of Somaliland, J. H. Sadler, made a list of the wild animals, skins, and horns that sportsmen-naturalists exported from the country: lion, leopard, cheetah, zebra, wild ass, oryx, kudu, hartebeest, waterbuck, hyenas, foxes, smaller mammals, large kudu, gazelle and other deer, rhinoceros, and elephants.^ Sir Geoffrey Archer (1963: 55) called Somaliland the'Mecca, the magnet of attraction, for the sportsman-naturalist from Britain and tiie Continent'.

After mentioning the big game that attracted sportsmen-naturalists, he added, 'transcending all, is the wonderful wealth of Bird Life' {op. cit.: 56) about which he wrote a four-volume work in which he portrayed the varieties of birds and the richness of the ecology that sustained them (Archer and Goodman 1937-1961). Moreover, the rich and diverse ecology allowed the nomads to maintain large numbers of sheep, goats, and camels, which Lt Cruttendon (1849: 51) reported was 'perfectly incredible, fully realising the account given of the flocks and herd of the patriarchs of old, for many of the elders of these tribes own each more than 1500 she-camels, and their sheep are innumerable'. John Hunt (1951: 105) stated that in the pre-colonial era 'the balance [between the ecology and the herds of the pastoralists] was naturally adjusted to preserve the soil on which the nomadic tribes grazed their stock' and this balance was maintained through an elaborate and rational system of herding: the pulsatory movement of flocks from the plateau to the Haud during the rainy seasons, and from the Haud to die plateau and the Golis range during the dry seasons. The livestock during the dry season, moreover, was divided into two, a practice Somalis call xawawar. on one side the camel stock, and on the other the sheep stock. The camel stock was pastured by young men in areas further away from the hamlet and the wells since camels survived without water for one month during the dry seasons, while the sheep, goat and cattle stock were herded by the women and the older men near the wells since they required frequent watering (Lewis 1965: 59). This practice of dispersal in the dry season also protected the land from overgrazing and destruction. Once the pulsatory movement was broken during the early colonial period, the pasture areas were overused, and ecological degradation began to set in rapidly. Even though there is an extensive literature on the history of the economic and ecological crisis of colonial Africa (Hunt 1951; Glover 1947; Macfadyen 1950; Vail 1977; Beinart 1984; Vaughn 1987), the 'political ecology' (Escobar 1999; Stonich 1993; Anderson 2002) of Somaliland has not yet been explored. Political ecology transcends the limitations of cultural ecology which views nature in a purely cultural context; political ecology emphasises the interrelations between ecology and the wider political economy, and so permits us to explore how imperial policies such as the 1897 Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty distorted land usage by the demarcation of borders and the alienation of land; how the colonial pacification campaigns forced people to alter their traditional land management techniques which led to the transformation of the countryside, as Colonel Jameson'* complained, from 'park-like' environment in the late nineteenth century into 'a barren, dusty, windswept waste' by 1943; and how Somalis represented the existential crisis they faced. This paper attempts to explore these issues. The first section examines how politics and violence affected land use and the ecology; the second section relates how the economy of the country collapsed as a result of ecological degradation, and focuses especially on income, prices, inflation and trade.

The social basis of ecological decline was politics: the signing of the 1897 Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty under which the Haud and Ogaden-one third of the territory of Somaliland-^was transferred to Ethiopia (Mohamed 2002a); the imposition of boundaries which severely limited and hampered the traditional ways in which the people used and managed the land; and the wars of pacification and resistance. The imposition of boundaries was central to the whole colonial project and, as many scholars have pointed out, had a dramatic impact on the life of Africans (Homewood 1995; Maddox 1998; Anderson 2002).

Take, for instance, the case of Maasailand. During the colonial period, Maasailand was alienated to various groups for large-scale cultivation or for conservation, and was demarcated by many 'international' boundaries. These policies reduced the land available for use by the pastoralists, and played a key role in ecological degradation (Homewood 1995). In Somaliland, too, land traditionally used by the pastoralists was severely affected by the creation of 'international' borders, by the loss of territory and by insecurity. The scramble over the Somali country in the late nineteenth century led to the loss of one-third of Somali territory under the 1897 Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty, the splitting up of the Somali country into various territories, extreme insecurity, and the reduction in the land set for pastoral use. When Ethiopia took control of the Haud, it did not close it to the pastoralists since the treaty recognised their right to graze their stock there, but made life difficult for them: it imposed heavy taxes on the pastoralists^ and often raided and looted their livestock, a tradition that began even before 1897. In 1893, Sir Horace Walope, Under-Secretary of State for India, referred to the 'oppressive proceedings of the Abyssinians in regard to the levy of a daily tribute of sheep on the Yunis Jibril section of the Jibril Abokor tribe, and also to the repeated devastation of the Ogaden country by the Abyssinians'.^ The same year, Brigadier-General J. Jopp, the Political Resident at Aden, pointed to the 'Abyssinian incursions ... for raiding purposes and levy of tribute' on the pastoralists.^

E. J. Sadler, the first administrator of the protectorate, reported that Somali tribes pay a tribute to Abyssinia of'1,000 sheep a year, more or less, and the number was not fixed, but fluctuating and arbitrary'.^ Captain R. B. Cobbold, who accompanied the first Ethiopian expeditionary force against the Sayyid in 1901, noted the 'horrible looting of the friendly tribes'-in one raid the expeditionary force carried off at the least 2,000 camels, and reduced a whole tribe to destitution (Cobbold 1901). The insecurity problem in the Haud was exacerbated by the violence of the pacification wars waged against the Sayyid by the British and Italians but chiefiy by the British. When the Sayyid demanded that the British leave the country in 'one hour', the Consul-General of Somaliland, E. J. Sadler, decided to destroy 'this pest by force of arms',^ and so began the wars that lasted until 1920. In the ensuing whirlwind the pastoralists lost a great deal. As early as 1901, the first British expeditionary force organised against the Sayyid attacked Isaaq pastoralists in the Solweyne plain south of Burao and looted 'three thousand and five hundred camels and a quantity of other stock' (Swayne 1903: vii). All the other expeditionary forces did the same. According to Brigadier-General Swayne,'" the perpetual state of warfare between 1901 and 1905 and the continuous raiding of stock by the expeditionary forces devastated the flocks of the people. The Somaliland Camel Corps, which was formed in 1912 to maintain 'peace' in the interior, also raided and looted the pastoralists (Mohamed 2000: 100). So did the Sayyid. In 1900, for example, he raided Isaaq pastoralists and carried off 2,000 camels (Lewis 1965: 72) and continued to do so until the demise of his movement. He justified the looting in a peculiar way. He believed 'that camels and horses were not the private possession of anybody, but were the common property of all' (Ciise 1974: 39). Ismail Mire, the dervish general and one of the greatest poets, stated in an interview that the Sayyid's 'men would ride up to a herdsman and say, "Join me and my brother and bring all your sheep and goats and camels," and if he agreed, they let him come and, if he did not, they killed him and took the stock' (Fearson 1952: 239). The violence of the period created a world as if out of a poem or rather a world that could be represented fully only in poetry. Ismail Mire reconstructed the violence of the period in many of his poems such as Waxay Tidhi ('She said') which was a dialogue between him and a woman who accused him-and the dervish army-of a great many crimes (Ciise 1974: xi-xii). He said:

• Gelin dhexe xalaan Maxamadow giirtay oo kacaye
• Gamiina waayey hadalkay i tin gacallow naagtiiye
• Adigay gabley tin markaad gaaska wadateene
• Waxay tin aday guridhigoo malihi gaadiide
• Waxay tin adaa gelengel tubay garayartaydiiye
• Waxay tin guyaalkii adaa gaajo ii dilaye
• Waxay tin gurboodkii adaa geesuhuu dhigaye
• Guhaaddeeda aan jinn balaan gabay ka soo qaado
• Gumburo iyo Cagaarweyne iyo geedkii Daratoole
• Goobtii Jidbaale iyo Xargaga guuldanadii joogtay
• Gembigii ka dhacay Ruuga iyo gudurigii haagay
• Gabooddeeda Beerdhiga wixii la isku gooraamay
• Maydkii gabraday seerigay Good ku tumanaysay
• Gawarkaad maraysaba laftaad galayaxaa mooddo
• Ogaadeenka gaanka ah wixii geydho laga qaaday
• Iidoor cayuun godan wixii gelin la weydaarshay
• Shirshooraha gudbani cayr wuxuu gorofla meertaystay
• Garcas iyo Majerteen wixii guuyo laga dhaarshay
• Gob ninkii ahaanjirey wuxuu gibil madoobaday
• Giddigiis naflaa'iga wixiigobolba meel aaday
• Dayuuradaha gowliyo wixii samada guuraayey
• Daarihii gelgelintaa noqdiyo gebiyadii diray
• Wixii guuldarriyo hoog ka dhacay dunida guudkeeda
• Gembigiyo jahaadkii arlada gaday wixii joogey
• Gaaliyo Daraawiish wixii uunka kala gaaray
• Keligey ma wada geysannine la isku geeryooye
• Geyigii rogmaday oo dhan baad guudka ii suriye
• Waxbana hay gurraynine demnaad galabsanaysaaye
• Gaanaa maaha naag yahay inaad ii gilgilataaye
• Gashi kaama qabo oo ma layn gabanaadaadiiye
• Gambana kaama furan baan u fili gulufyadaydiiye
• Naa gefkiyo beenta daa yaadan gelin dodakii naareede.

• ('Midnight last night, Mohamed, I suddenly awoke
• I could not sleep, my dear, as I kept thinking about what the woman said
• She said you destroyed my world when you led the [dervish] army
• She said you attacked my homestead and took my burden camel
• She said you left all my family in an empty world
• She said you killed me with hunger in many rainy seasons
• She said you slaughtered the brave.
• Let me recite a poem about her curse.
• At Gumburo and Cagaarweyne and the tree of Daratoole
• And the battleground at Jidbaale and Xargaga and the disasters there
• The war at Ruuga and the men slaughtered
• The fire field around the whole area of Beerdhiga
• The dead everywhere the wild animals feasted upon
• Everywhere you went the scattered bones as numerous as the sand
• The poor Ogadeen and the camels looted from them
• The foolish Idoor and the livestock swiftly plundered from them
• The Shirshoore who were dazed by poverty
• The Garcas and Marjertyn and all they lost
• The hunger that weakened the aristocrat
• The dispersal of the whole population hither and thither
• The roaring airplanes and all that roamed the sky
• The houses reduced to dust and the walls that fell
• The death and tragedy that took place in the whole world
• The changes and the Jihad that massacred everything
• All that the infidels and the Dervishes had done.
• I did not do all that by myself; everyone took part in the killing
• You blame me for the destruction of the whole country
• Don't exaggerate the case against me for that is sin
• It is not right, woman, to attack me with such venom
• I owe you nothing-I have not killed your sons
• And I doubt my soldiers robbed your kerchief
• Stop the lies and false accusations; else you will suffer eternal damnation')."

The wars had a devastating impact on the country: they broke the traditional migratory pattern of the pastoralists between the different regions of their country which led to 'soil erosion on a large scale' from which the country 'never fully recovered';'^ and they created a large number of paupers. The new poor often migrated to the towns. As one pauper said in a verse in Berbera in 1905:

geel iyo ninkii adhi leh baa darwiish kala tegaayaaye
ma tunkuu isoo qaban hadaanan timirtahaa dhaafin?
" Translation mine.
the dervish raid men who have camels and sheep
is he going to catch me by the neck if I never go beyond that seller of dates?'"*

A great number of the new poor in the post-Sayyid period, especially in the Hargeysa and Borama districts, switched to agriculture. Throughout the continent, African agricultural practices were described as careless and dangerous to the environment (Beinart 1984: 61). The reasons varied; in general, the most persistent critique was made by Europeans in settler colonies in order to justify intervention in African agriculture and to secure the 'basis for settler agrarian production' {op. cit.: 62). Although narratives of conservation exaggerated the negative impact of African agricultural practices, this was not the case in Somaliland. Agricultural practices in Somaliland were indeed destructive, mainly because Somaliland had a natural advantage in livestock production; fanning was an unsuitable form of managing the land. ^ ^ At the beginning of the twentieth century, farming was practised in Somaliland by small communities organised as religious orders; it was just then, however, that the new poor thrown up by the wars began 'crude cultivation'^^ in Hargeysa. When the pacification wars against the Sayyid ended and the number of paupers increased dramatically, cultivation expanded in the Hargeysa district and spread into the Borama district. By the end of 1923 there were between 4,000 and 5,000 plots in both districts.

The administration attempted to regulate the expansion of cultivation by prohibiting plots from being established near wells or common grazing areas, by imposing licence fees for land ownership, by insisting the land so acquired must be used only for cultivation and that such plots must be enclosed and must have clear boundary marks-^but no big tree must be cut within the plot nor bush cleared outside the plot for making boundary marks. Between 1926 and 1928, the district administrations of Hargeysa and Berbera were flooded with requests for land registration so much so that in some places where there was only one registered plot, five, eight or ten new plots were established. Unable to control the 'grabbing of land','^ the district administrations simply gave up the controls imposed in the early 1920s. The 'wholesale land-grabbing' that took place destroyed the land because most of the land grabbed was not suitable for cultivation, and most of those who grabbed the land had no 'lasting interest in cultivation' but did so in order 'not to be out of it, and in case they may miss something'.'^ And so they often cleared the land of trees, bush, grass and other vegetation, cropped the land for two years, and then abandoned it.

Once the land was cleared and abandoned, the winds-especially the xagaa (dry season) winds-blew away the 'soil from the surface and transform [ed] the plots into clay-pan or sand plain on which i t . . . [was] impossible for grass or other seeds to find a lodgment'. Even when they did not abandon cultivation wholesale, they usually abandoned the first plot, and moved to another where they repeated the same destructive practices.'^ These practices were continued in the 1930s when cultivation was still 'enjoying quite a boom' in the western districts (Kittermaster 1928: 331) where an agrarian system of'peasant proprietorship'^" emerged in which land was parcelled in plots between one acre and fifteen acres. The administration continued to encourage the process even though it was unable to supervise it, and even though its destructive effect was obvious, mainly because it was anxious to break down what Harold Kittermaster (1928: 336; 1932: 243) called the supremacy of the 'camel-complex' of the Somali. Kittermaster borrowed Herskovits' 'cattle-complex' concept (Herskovits 1926) but modified it slightly for Somaliland by replacing one word, 'cattle', with another, 'camel'.

According to Kittermaster, the camel-complex dominated Somali culture and economy and, as in East Africa, had been the source of irrational and unproductive attachments. Its replacement with other complexes, so to speak, was essential, hence the emphasis on cultivation. But cultivation ruined the land.^' The Somali country had natural advantage in pastoralism. Glover's 1946 report used the same language in describing the impact of cultivation on the ecology as that of the 1927 annual report of the department of agriculture: the farmers cut the trees and the bush to make enclosures, then they weeded the grasses and other herbs, destroying the 'indigenous vegetation',^^ and breaking the top soil which exposed it to wind and water erosion. Since they practised shifting cultivation, the devastation was repeated again and again. By 1946 trees were markedly reduced throughout the country as they were cut for various reasons: to clear the land for cultivation and enclosure; to supply fodder for animals, palisades for graves and tombs, and poles and roofing for homes; to make 'walking' sticks {budh); to manufacture camels' bells {koor), milk vessels {haan), spoons {fandhal) and other household trinkets; to produce charcoal for which trees were burned green; for ring barking and coppicing to feed livestock. ^^

Glover and his research team made tree counts in different parts of the country to find out what proportion of the trees were dead, cut or mutilated in relation to the proportion of uncut young trees. In one sample, they counted 15,422 plants of which 11,218 were damaged and only 2,146 were young, of which 1,172 were seedlings whose chances of survival were extremely slim because grazing was 'so intense that most of them ... [were] eaten off long before they . . . [were] large enough to survive such treatment.'^'* This was as damaging as tree-cutting because if seedlings and saplings were allowed to survive they would compensate for the destruction of the big trees. But that was not taking place; as a result trees were 'greatly reduced' as well as the grasses, herbs, vegetation and bush.

When trees were cut, the pastures also disappeared especially the important grasses such as the dareemo {Chrysopogon aucherf) and dix (Sporobolus spp) that were crucial feed for livestock especially camels and sheep. The destruction of the grasses began during the height of the pacification wars when the pastoralists ended their traditional movements between the ecological zones. In one poem, for instance, the Sayyid noted the pastoralists' avoidance of the Haud: Hawdkii ugbaadsanaa, horweyn kuma ilaashaane ('In the lush Haud, they don't graze the large camel herds') (Ciise 1974: 223). They avoided the Haud because the Sayyid controlled it as well as half of the plateau. In 1913, the Sayyid controlled an area that stretched from Heis on the coast to just south of Beer (ten miles north-east of Burao), to an area north of Bohotleh;^' in 1915 the area he controlled contracted slightly, but it was still substantial and stretched from Surad on the mountain range to El-Afweyn, Fadhigaab on the Nogal valley, to Bohotleh.^^

He asserted his control over the interior through his forts at Galadi, Damot, Elmaddu, Urgai, Odergoeh, Jidali, Docmo, Surad, Badhan, Gulburiburi, Ain, Buurdhaab, and Talex.^^ His biggest fort, Talex, was located at the south-eastern edge of Somaliland, which dominated the Nogaal valley and the Ain valley and made it impossible for the pastoralists to move their stock to the Haud during the rainy seasons without confronting the dervishes. 'Formerly grazing was plentiful in British Somaliland,' one report^^ stated. But 'during the disturbances caused by the Mullah, chaotic conditions prevailed,' as a result 'intensive grazing ... rendered large parts of the Protectorate more or less barren, and is progressively rendering the grazing within the Protectorate more and more sparse.'^^ The Sayyid played an active part in the destruction of the country in many other ways: he cut down forests to use in the construction of his many forts, kraals for the livestock that he looted, and homes for his expanding army; and to create fields of fire for defensive purposes, a strategy which he probably adapted from the British who had created similar fields throughout the country especially in Burao which was a significant strategic asset-and the base of the Somaliland Camel Corps-and transformed the town into 'a dust-bowl' (Hunt 1951: 111).

The land never recovered. Burao which fifty years ago was a 'beautifial area of grass, bush, and trees'-the 'most attractive place between Berbera and the Webi Shabelle'-had become a desolate country: 'so bad are the conditions that parades can't be held out of doors during the greater part of the day . . . the dust-laden atmosphere is not only unpleasant but almost harmful and unhealthy.'^" Beer, ten miles east of Burao, had become 'desolate, ugly, and dispiriting', replete with 'stumps of dead trees on a dusty plain-the grave yard monuments of a once wooded area';^^ and further east, Saraar and Adad, once an 'excellent grazing country', had been transformed into a bleak landscape with sparse vegetation.^ The administration 'had active share in the spoiling of the country by extensive clearing of bush to provide field of fire, zaribas, and temporary buildings during the Mullah campaigns, and the ground has never recovered.'^^ The 'degeneration of pastures' and the 'wholesale destruction of grass'^* continued into the 1930s when the Ethiopio-Italian conflict further limited the movement of the pastoralists. As a result pastoralists were forced to chase rainfall and grazed their livestock 'before the newly sprouting grass has had time to establish itself, and before seeding has had time to take place'^^ and consequently the 'carrying capacity ofthe land'^^ drastically declined.

The question of 'carrying capacity' was explored throughout the continent as it was related to overstocking and overgrazing (Anderson 2002: 140). In the 1930s, the administration dealt with the issue by considering culling livestock and expanding the export of livestock to improve the homeostasis between the carrying capacity of the land and livestock population. ^^ But culling was never imposed since it would have been disastrous. Somalis would not have accepted the policy, as they would have viewed it as the first step in dispossessing them of both their wealth and their land. In 1945, for instance, the whole population and especially the pastoralists rebelled from Zeila to Badhan because of the use of poison bait to control locust infestation which they suspected was directed towards the culling of livestock and the killing off of the population of the country (Mohamed 2002b).

The administration, however, was more successful in encouraging the development of internal and external markets for livestock, an issue that would be discussed shortly. In the meantime, the administration attempted to take a census of the livestock population and determine the homeostasis between land and livestock. Different estimates were suggested: Peck's 1935 estimate^^ was 1,500,000 camels, 2,500,000 sheep, 2,000,000 goats; Hunt's 1944 estimate was 1,200,000 camels, 1,799,000 sheep, and 1,391,000 goats; Glover's 1946 estimate was 2,500,000 camels, 10,000,000 sheep, and 2,500,000 goats.^^

The figures were not based on scientific data collected directly by the census takers but were rather guesstimates. This was not necessarily the failure of the veterinary and agricultural department or other colonial departments, rather Somalis did not allow the collection of statistics about their livestock for they always attributed sinister intentions to such government activities. Nonetheless some figures were more plausible than others. Glover rejected Hunt's figures because they were contradicted by other available data such as the data about the export of skins and livestock on the hoof. The total number of skins and livestock on the hoof exported from Berbera and Zeila in 1945 was 2,291,559, which was only 898,441 or 28.6% short of Hunt's estimate for the total goat and sheep population of the whole country. It would be 'obviously absurd' if we assume that the pastoralists disposed annually of 71.4% of their livestock; they would not even dispose of 20% of their livestock because a man's wealth was judged by the number of livestock he owned.*" Moreover, since the population of the country was about 700,000, and if'one in six of the entire population is a stock owner (taking into account families and non stock owners)', then at this rate-assuming that each family (one man, one woman, and two or three children could live on a herd of 100 sheep and goats and ten milking camels and two burden camels)-the 'number of animals required in the country for every stock owner to live comfortably would be 12,000,000 sheep and goats and 1,440,000 camels, which is more than the estimated carrying capacity for the whole protectorate including the Reserved Areas."*' The figures-100 herds of sheep and ten milking camels-reflected the poverty line as Somalis understood it (Gillie 1966).'*^ Someone with that number of livestock was below the poverty line. Even that low figure would have required an average of one grazing unit (sheep or goats) per two acres'*^ which the country could not support.

The decline of the carrying capacity was related to the country becoming increasingly 'droughted',^'* subject to 'accelerated erosion','*^ and prone to a 'dearth of feed for animals' and 'diminution of trees'.*^ Even the Haud which was spared overgrazing during the disturbance was subjected to severe exploitation thereafter especially after the pastoralists began building water cisterns (ballehs) in the late colonial period with the help and encouragement of the govemment; the chief engineer ofthe project was the husband of Margaret Laurence (Laurence 1988). The administration encouraged the permanent settlement of the Haud because it wanted to disperse the pastoralists, which was partly made necessary by the growth of the population in the late colonial period (Mohamed 1999b). The result was 'a very rapid and unplanned spread of cemented rain water reservoirs' (ILO 1977: 77). The major investors in cistern building were returning Somali sailors and livestock traders. In 1957, a forty-gallon drum (180 litres) sold for œ\ (ibid.). Not everyone supported the policy. Glover, for instance, stated that to 'establish permanent water points in the Haud would be folly for it would induce the people to remain there after the "Ballehs" had dried up, and as the region is showing signs of having been overgrazed, the provisioning of permanent water would only lead to disaster.'^^ H. B. Gilliland who surveyed eastern Somaliland concluded that a region as big as the East-about 27,160 square miles or 17,383,400 acres-with a livestock population about 1,120,237 (sheep, camels and goats) and with a land density of one animal to every 15.2 acres per annum should be able to sustain the pastoral community. But that was not the case because less than 10% ofthe region had good pastures, and even that 10% was decreasing continuously and precipitously due to overgrazing.

As the traditional management ofthe land had broken, pastoralists were forced to graze their livestock in the same territory over and over again; hence the 'already too heavy pressure within' the region was intensified as soil became brittle and the 'land lost its vegetational recovery and capacity to support human and animal life.'^^ By 1959, as one observer put it, 'the only area ofthe country which is not grazed at some time or another is Govt House garden and this must be very nearly true.'^^

Ecological degradation made the country susceptible to droughts in 1910-1913, 1918, 1924, 1927-30, 1933, 1934, 1939, 1943, 1947-49, 1950, 1955, 1956, and 1959. Droughts, severe or otherwise, were nothing new in the country. In the pre-colonial era the people devised various preventive and adjustment strategies to cope with droughts: their use of the different ecological zones, for instance, were strategies for preventing economic disasters (Zeleza 1993: 32-39). These strategies, however, were undermined during the colonial period. The most devastating drought in the early colonial period, which very quickly became a famine, devastated the country in 1910-1913 when onethird ofthe population perished. In 1918 the country suffered from another drought that forced the pastoralists to seek assistance from the govemment (Mohamed 1999a). In the 1920s, two droughts affected the country: in 1924 and 1927-1930. The 1927-1930 drought-the 'Great Drought' as Captain Walsh^ø called it-was destructive. In 1927 the rains failed, then in July and August 1928 'in the midst of the poorest rainy season for many years, very large swarms, coming, apparently from the eastem and south-eastem districts, traversed the country up to the westem side of Gibileh, doing enormous damage.'^'

The locust swarms stripped trees, denuded pastures, and destroyed all standing crops.'^ At least 80% ofthe stock ofthe country perished-as Captain Walsh^^ put it, livestock 'died in thousands and the people starved'-which 'deprived the Somali of his major source of purchasing power' (Boothman 1975: 26). The govemment opened a large rehef centre at Bulhar, west of Berbera, in 1927 that remained open until the end of 1930. Another drought swept the country in 1933 that lasted until the middle of 1934 which affected most severely the people ofthe Berbera and Erigavo districts. The administration opened relief camps at Erigavo, Badhan, and Berbera. The daily average number of people in the camps was about 2,500-3,000 and 6,000 for Badhan and Berbera respectively.^* In 1939, another drought affected the whole country when 'with the exception of two or three small areas where a shower had fallen ... the country was parched and the vegetation withered'^ subsequently livestock died in 'large numbers'.^^ The livestock that survived barely did so and when 'driven to distant pasturage' all but 'tottered and fell and could not rise without help'; people were seen 'carrying animals which could struggle no further'.^^

In the late colonial period, serious droughts affected the country many times but most severely in 1943, 1950 and 1959. During the 1943 drought at least 60% of the sheep, goats, and cattle stock, and 10% of the camel stock, perished, which quickly led to famine conditions-in Borama alone, 20,000 people were fed in one camp. During the 1950 drought which is known in the Somali traditions as seega case ('season of red winds'), large numbers of livestock perished which led to destitution and starvation. The govemment opened relief camps in Garadag, El-Afweyn, Erigavo, Badhan, Burao, Borama and Berbera; by the middle of the year an average of 10,000 people-mostly women and children-were fed in the camps. During the 1959 drought large numbers of livestock perished which led to very 'harsh conditions' (Mohamed 1999b).

A literary testimony on the 1927-1930 drought gives us an insight into the extent of the deterioration and degradation of everyday life. During the drought, Ismail Mire composed his famous poem Guuguule ('Hoopoe') which he addressed to a hoopoe that was complaining too much as if the drought affected it alone.'

• Guuguulihiiyow hadaad Gu'ga u ooyeysid
• Haddaad mooddey keligaa inuu gubayo Jiilaalku
• Ama aad gabooyaha ku maran gama la diidayso
• Gidigood addoomaha waxa gaadhay seben weyne
• Abaar geed ma reeba' baa dhacidiyo Gaatamoo kale e
• Gartaa maaha keligaa inaad gaar u cabataaye
• Guumeys dro leh baan ahee waar ann ku gaadhsiiyo.
• Geellii adduunka u adkaa gobollo weydowye
• Golihii ka kid waa ragii geydho haynjiraye
• Tuuladuu il gabdh leynayaa gobol barbaarkiiye
• Hadduuna timirtan goob dhigi lahaa jiingaday geline
• Nina uma gargaareen haddaan gaadhka laga hayne
• Gumburigii badhbaa joogsadiyo gorayo-cawlkiiye
• Saryankii garbaha weyn lahaa goob ka kid waaye
• Waxa goonidaaqii habsaday gubaddadii Hawde
• Garanuugta iyo deeradii gaag yar baa hadhaye
• Gobey iyo askari geyfan baa goodirkii jaraye
• Guuyadiyo jiiskii hadday kala gol waayeene
• Kama guuxo aargoonlihii geliga Toomoode
• Shabeelkii gabraar lagu idlee Giiro layn jiraye
• Oo godadkii kama soo ciyaan gabannadiisiiye
• Hargihii nimankii gataa guuldaro u sidaye.
• Gaadiidka la dhaansanahayiyo giindhaygii maraye
• Ahminkii la gawrid jiriyo gaabey adhigiiye
• Goggii subagga laga dhoobijirey haatan gorofaadye
• Basaas baa timihii kala go'een gaaridii dumare.
• Gororkiyo dhurwaagii laftaad galayax moodaaye
• Garaad Faaraz iyo Maxamuud Garaad male gammaankiiye
• Neefkama gurxamo dooxadii garada fiicnayde
• Garoowe iyo Bookh baa harraad qaar u go'ayaaye
• Gocondho iyo daal bay qabaan garow la'aaneede
• Ayaxii geyiga joogi jirey guuto lagu saatye.
• Gubniyaa hareeraha ka galay gariyaal wada e
• Geedihii sun baa loogu daray geerina u badaye
• Waxna ma galabsannine maalin baa loo gudoonsadaye.
• Galowga iyofiintii naf bay giida la hayaane
• Gurxankiyo cabaadkiyo haddaad gooha demin weydo
• Adigaaba lagu gaadayaa gooshkan dabadeede
• Gaagaabso oo aamus yaan gaadh lagaa qabane.

  [quoted in Idaajaa 1974: 156-158]

• ('O Hoopoe, when you shed your tears,
• Crying for the rains of spring
• And spuming the lightest wink of sleep
• Just because your craw is empty.
• Do you imagine that you, and you alone
• Are scorched by this drought?
• No, a great disaster has befallen
• All God's servants, everyone of them-
• A drought is come that leaves nothing in its wake.
• Just like the one that men called the Stalker.
• Can it be right, then, to air your grievance
• As if the suffering were yours alone?
• Listen, O Hoopoe, to my tidings.
• For I am an elder, grown grey-haired with experience.
• There are camels, once the strongest of the herd.
• That now look spare and gaunt-
• There are men, once rich with milch-beasts.
• Who are now too weak to rise at the assembly-ground.
• Young men drift to the villages, loitering, looking about
• In the shops there are dates, and guard must be kept
• For they would take those dates and run
• But for the fear of the tin-roofed jail.
• The ostrich hen no longer stirs.
• Nor half the asses of the wilderness.
• In vain do the brawny-shouldered oryx bucks
• Strive to raise themselves up from the ground
• Those solitary grazers sink down in the burnt scrubland.
• A scant few gazelles among garanuug and deero survive
• But for the sakaaro and her fawns there is no chance.
• The Kudu is slaughtered, his flesh cut up for meat
• Even by nobly-born men and soldiers in full array.
• Never does the lion of the rocks now roar on Toomo plain
• And the leopards that once were killers of goats
• Have perished themselves at the hands of hunters
• Their cubs miaul no more from their cavern lairs.
• For the men who buy skins have brought disaster on them.
• Gone are the burden camels, gone are all the short-homed cattle
• Sheep and goats, fattened for slaughter, are scarcely to be seen
• The skin flask from which the ghee was served
• Is shriveled and musty from disuse
• For want of oil the hair of goodly wives
• Is now so brittle that it splits and falls.
• Look, O Hoopoe, at those shining shapes
• You see around you on the ground-
• They are the bones of hyenas, bones of vulture, even.
• Men like Maxamuud Garaad and Garaad Faarax
• Have lost the horses they once owned.
• In the vale that used to yield fine grazing
• No beast now bellows.
• Thirst-stricken folk are dying in Garoowe and Bookh,

• Exhausted, their bodies pricked by gocondho thorns
• They have no grain, but what would it avail?
• See, a band of men has been dispatched
• Against the locusts that live here in this land.
• Soldiers in trucks appear from every side.
• Poison is scattered on the grass
• And there is death abounding.
• But had those locusts done anything
• To bring this fate upon themselves?
• No, a decision was made one day to kill them, that was all.
• So, Hoopoe, stop your wailing and your moaning
• Or you may soon be hunted in your tum-
• Stay quiet, speak softly, and you may yet escape arrest.')^*

In analysing the 1972-74 Ethiopia famine, for instance, Amartya Sen distinguished between regions (the Wollo and Harar provinces) and modes of life (pastoral and agricultural). During the famine no 'abnormal reduction in food output' took place and the impact of the famine differed between the pastoral and agricultural regions for different reasons. The price of food in the Wollo province was the same as the pre-famine prices, yet people could not command food because of 'extensive entitlement failures of various sections ... of the population'. In the southern region, the famine affected the pastoralists because the 'growth of commercial agriculture, displace [d] some of these communities from their traditional dry-weather grazing land.' In addition, the worsening of the terms of trade of animals for grain disrupted the pastoralist's method The translation is taken from Andrzejewski (1993: 52-53), of meeting his food requirements: the 'pastoralist, hit by the drought, was decimated by the market mechanism' (op. cit.: 112). In Somaliland, the pastoralists lost land entitlements which reduced the land available for pasture and led to ecological degradation. In addition, the income of the pastoralists was diminished by the market mechanism. The most important aspect of the trade of Somaliland was between the town and the country. The town sold to the country imported manufactures, dates and other commodities; the country sold to the town livestock, hides and skins and other commodities. The dearer the former (imports), the cheaper the latter (rural produce); as a mle whatever leads to an increase in the price of imports tends to lower the price of the produce of the country and therefore diminishes the income of the rural producers (Smith 1999b: 272).

Colonial rule initially stimulated the market economy of the country because the administration lifted all the restrictions and taxes that the Egyptians had imposed on the trade of the main ports of Somaliland-Bulhar, Berbera, and Zeila-from 1870 to 1884, which boosted the trade of these by 58% from 1885 to 1890. The trade of Zeila, for instance, increased from œ64,000 in 1885 to œ315,022 in 1890-91;'^ and almost every year between 1885 and 1900, exports exceeded imports (Geshekter 1972: 124). The overall value of trade of the coastal towns of Berbera, Bulhar and Zeila increased almost threefold, from a total of œ264,047 in 1885 to œ705,875 in 1892-93, to œ751,266 in 1893-94.^ø The economy of the three main ports expanded even further from 1898 to 1900. In 1898-1899 the value of trade of the three main ports reached œ805,031, and rose more slightly to œ844,190 in 1899-1900.^^ Furthermore, the trade of what used to be called the 'non-flag' ports (Heis, Las Korey, Mait, Shallow, Karin, Hashow, Raguda, Ainterad) increased from 1885 to 1900.^^ i ^ g growth of the economy made Somaliland in the 1890s the only territory in East Africa that paid its expenditure 'from local revenue, without any financial aid or contribution from the British or Indian exchequer' (Walsh n.d.: 280), and even managed to produce surplus revenue.

Moreover, the economic boom made the towns, particularly Berbera, dynamic centres of commerce and culture; Berbera especially attracted all kinds of people-the ambitious trader, the pauper, the poet and the theologian-all eager either to make a quick fortune or administer to the spirituality of the townsfolk. Sayyid Muhammad Abdulla Hassan lived in Berbera in the mid-1890s. Unlike the majority of the population of the town he 'inveighed against the luxury of the age' but found the townsfolk a 'somewhat bored and unsympathetic' audience, more interested in participating in the dynamic life and commerce of the town than in supporting him Qardine 1923: 39). He moved to the interior and declared a war of independence; shortly thereafter the British and other colonial powers waged a pacification campaign. One of the results was the decline in the volume and value of trade from 1900 to 1920; for instance, the fall in the value of trade of the main ports of Zeila, Berbera and Bulhar from 1899 to 1903 was almost 50%.

The 'continual depression of trade consequent [to] the unsettled state in the interior'^^ affected all ports whether flag or non-flag ports. The economic state of Heis and Karin which were 'within the recently disturbed area ... indicate a greater tendency to sink below rather than rise above their former prosperity'.^* Zeila, which was affected by both the war and the establishment of the railway between Harar and Djibouti, experienced a steep decline in trade. TTie report predicted correctly that the Zeila trade with Ethiopia would continue to decline 'until a time will arrive when the Zeila trade with Harar will practically cease'.^^ From 1904 to 1905, the value of trade of Berbera, Bulhar, Zeila, Karin and Heis, declined: the 1904-05 report stated that 'it is apparent that the merchandise ... brought into the country declined 6 percent at Berbera, 45 percent at Bulhar, 51 percent at Karin, and 48 percent at Heis, and though the export percentage at Berbera was 6 [per cent] greater, shipments from the other three ports decreased 1 percent, 24 percent, and 15 percent respectively.'^^ Berbera was the exception, the report noted, because, being the capital of the protectorate, the expenditure of the government on public works, and provisions for the war against the Sayyid stimulated its economy or at least kept it afloat. Total trade (export and import) of Berbera nonetheless declined. If in 1893-94 the total trade of Berbera and Bulhar was œ464,377, the value of that trade declined to œ339,500 in 1904-05.^^ The 1905-06 report noted the further decline in the 'purchasing power of the people' which 'led to a diminution of 12 percent in the value of imports' and the 'dramatic decrease in the trade of Zeila' as well as all other ports.^^ The fall in the importation and purchase of such commodities as rice, flour, tea, sugar and dates was caused by tlie 'poverty of the people'. The report also noted the rise in the incidence of crime against property in Berbera which was of the town, consequent on a large influx of "miskeens", or destitute persons, at the end of the military expeditions against the Mullah.'^^

In 1907, the total imports of the country from Aden decreased by 8.02%, while exports to Aden, the principle market of goods from Somaliland, decreased by 22.65%.^ø By 1908 the total value of exports fell by more than 60% from their 1900 level. If in 1900 the total value of exports was œ362,021 (see TABLE 1), the total value of exports reached a low level of œ158,469 in 1908.^^ The 1910-1911 report stated that the importation of dates, sugar, tea, cotton, silk, building materials, beads, drugs, jute bags, tobacco and earthen glassware, which depended on the 'general prosperity of the country' declined because of the 'disturbed condition in the interior'.^^ The decline in the importation of sugar and tea, for instance, reflected the 'winding up of a large number of coffee shops in the interior'^^ as a result of the disturbances. The net decrease in the value of trade in 1910-1911 was œ567,806;""* even when goods were imported, they often remained unsold in the coastal towns; moreover, traders stopped importing expensive luxury goods and other necessary goods to the territory. The 1915-1916 report referred to the decline of such imports as cotton goods, silk, flour, rice, cereals and petroleum. The First World War exacerbated the situation, since economic regulations imposed on Bombay and Aden restricted the exportation of certain items.^^ The 1918-19 report noted the further reduction of both exports and imports, and made reference in particular to the 'falling off in the quantity of livestock exported to Aden',''^ and to the reduction in the 'exportation' of all commodities 'due to general trade depression'.^'' Overall, the disturbances in the interior from 1900 to 1920 drastically reduced the income and purchasing power of the pastoralists, which never recovered either in the 1930s or the late colonial period.

TABLE 1 Value of trade of main ports, 1899-1903
             Imports (œ) Exports (œ)  Total (œ)
1899-1900      452,503   392,375   844,190
1900-1901      393,957   362,021   755,978
1901-1902      355,174    348,920  704,094
1902-1903      259,800   228,100   487,900

Sources: PRO, CO. 879/87, Treasury to Colonial Office, 5 April 1905; British Parliamentary Papers, 'Report on Somaliland for 1904-1905', 1906 Cd.2684-14, vol. Lxxv.

Traditionally two factors regulated how much of their herds the pastoralists turned into expon commodities: droughts (Samatar 1989: 50), and the market season (from March to October) when navigation of the sea was possible as determined by the monsoons. The administration wanted to encourage the market-oriented aspect of the pastoralist's involvement in the world economy by developing 'organized markets'.^^

This was to be the elixir to indirectly controlling overgrazing and livestock overpopulation. The government's ambition in this regard was encouraged by the growth of the towns, and the expansion of the urban economy, especially after the merchants began effectively to penetrate the rural economy by motor vehicles in the early 1930s. By the 1940s, the pastoralists were deeply enmeshed in the market, but not to their advantage. Their income was eroded by the 'price revolution' (Ramsey 1971) which was caused by the scarcity of commodities, the growth of the population of the country, the decline of productivity in the rural areas because of droughts, and the absence of^ new ways of absorbing labour in the towns. Inflation was especially unmanageable during the war. A major task of the Ministry of Food, for instance, was to control it partly through the control release system. Somaliland's quota of bulk commodities such as rice, sugar, tea, flour, grey sheeting and white long cloth passed through the Middle East Supply Control in Aden.^^

Unlike the rest of the empire, the end of the war did not end the control release system in Somaliland. It continued for various reasons chiefly because the Somali merchant class was weak. The old commercial class that was active in the late nineteenth century disappeared during the disturbances and never recovered. They were replaced in the 1930s by a new class that made its money out of the transit trade between Ethiopia and Somaliland; in the 1940s, it was still a fledgling class with little capital and expertise. In 1944, for example, out of sixty registered importers, only thirty-five were Somali.^ø

The Governor, G. T. Fisher, attempted to involve more Somali traders in the import business without success.^' In 1949, for instance, the administration transferred the importation of sugar hitherto 'entrusted to a European business house' to three local firms: one was to supply the districts of Berbera, Burao, Erigavo, Las Anod and Borama/Zeila; another the Hargeysa district; and a third the Awareh and Au Barre districts. The Somali firms were unable to import their quota of sugar because they did not have the capital to finance the transactions and so in November 1950 the supply of sugar reverted to the European firm.^^ The control release system was supposed to control inflation but in reality exacerbated it. The administration sold imported commodities at Berbera to local traders who were supposed to sell in the interior at controlled prices that had been publicly announced by the govemment. The consumers were informed about the controlled prices as set by the government and were encouraged to report any deviation from it. But these anti-inflationary precautions proved 'ineffective owing to the lack of co-operation of the consumer in coming forward with information'.^^ The traders ignored the controlled prices, sold commodities at the highest possible price, and made huge profits. For instance, the average price of sugar per ton at Berbera (sale price to local merchants) increased from œ36 15s. in 1945 to œ85 8s. in 1950 at the set pricej in the interior, the price increased by 30% as profit for wholesalers and retailers, '10% and 20% respectively'.^'* The price of one bag of sugar, for instance, increased from 22 rupees in 1939 to 184 shillings (about 123 rupees) in 1947.^^ In areas where the transportation cost was high such as Erigavo the cost of commodities became too high and 'normal trade' became 'practically non-existent'.^^ In general, the price of imported necessities increased by more than 300% (Samatar 1989: 63). Inflation had a devastating impact on the cost of living in both the rural and urban areas. On 26 August 1942, a cost of living index for towns (A) and the rural areas (B) was compiled which was fixed at 100 for each; by the end of 1943, index 'A' had increased to 148 and index 'B' to 146 (see TABLE 3).^^

The rise in the cost of living reduced the purchasing power of the pastoralists even though exports especially of livestock and skins and hides increased substantially, which should have improved their income. But higher exports did not improve the income of the pastoralists because the price of rural products was low. In a transaction, the commodity exchanged has a real and nominal price: the 'real price' consists in the quantity of other necessary goods and 'convenience of life' it could purchase; the nominal price is merely the 'quantity of money' paid for it. The seller is rich or poor 'in proportion to the real, not to the nominal price' (Smith 1999a).

The key, in other words, is how much one could purchase with whatever money he was paid for the commodity he sold-the exchange value of the price itself is key to the value of the transaction. As we shall see below, the nominal price of most local commodities increased but their real price decreased. The skins trade, for instance, was always an important source of income for the pastoralists, particularly sheep skins which had a 'high repute' in the United States and the United Kingdom; in 1959, 50% of all skins were exported to the United States and the rest were exported to the United Kingdom, Italy, and France;^^ the poor quality skins were exported to India. Throughout the late colonial period almost 2 million skins were annually exported,^^ but the increased exports hardly improved the income ofthe pastoralists. In 1905, for instance, the export price of the best (waafi) sheepskin was just over one rupee,^" that would be just over one and a half shillings. The price of the commodity increased in the late 1930s, when it reached 3 shillings.^^ During the first two years of the war, however, the skin trade collapsed and so did the price of waafi sheepskins. In late 1943, the price began to recover and in 1944 rose to about 2 shillings.^^ By the last quarter of 1950, the price of best quality sheepskins rose to above 6 shillings (Sh. 6/75)^^ in Berbera and Hargeysa; in the same quarter the price of best quality goat skins also improved to Sh. 6/75 in Berbera and Sh. 6/00 in Hargeysa.^* In the first quarter of 1952, prices fell: best quality sheepskins to Sh. 4/75 in Berbera and to Sh. 4/50 in Hargeysa; best quality goat skins to Sh. 4/75 in Berbera and Sh. 4/00 in Hargeysa.^' These became the equilibrium prices throughout the 1950s; sometimes the prices might move up to Sh. 6/00 or down to Sh. 4/50. In the first quarter of 1957, for instance, the best quality skin of sheep was valued at Sh. 4/76 in Berbera and Sh. 4/66 in Hargeysa; and in the same quarter the price of best quality goat skins was Sh. 4/53 in Berbera and Sh. 4/66 in Hargeysa.^^ In the second quarter of 1957, the prices remained the same except in Hargeysa where best quality sheep sldns reached Sh. 6/13.^^

The price of livestock for export also increased especially from 1954 onwards when a 'valuable new market for these [skins and livestock] has been found in Jeddah'.'^ Throughout the 1930s, livestock exports hovered around 100,000; in January-December 1942 they reached 275,292; and by 1959 an average of 400,000 were exported annually from Berbera. In 1905, the price of sheep was between 7 and 8 rupees (say, around 11 to 12 shillings)^^ and remained the same during the late i920s and 1930s."^ø During the war, the price of sheep increased to three times their pre-war level.'ø' By October 1953, the average price of sheep was between Sh. 63 and Sh. 75 in Hargeysa, Sh. 63 in Burao, and a slightly less in other towns such Berbera (Sh. 45), Erigavo (Sh. 45), and Borama (Sh. 42).'ø^ The price of camels rose as well: in 1905 the price of gool (castrated camel for export) was between 25 and 40 rupees (say, between 38 and 60 shillings); by 1953, the price oigool reached Sh. 217/- in Hargeysa.'"^ In general, the export price of livestock was much higher than the price for locally consumed (daabax) livestock. Even though the price of skins and livestock had risen, nonetheless, the 'real' price of these commodities was low. As already pointed out, the 'real' price was much lower than the 'nominal' price due to inflation which diminished the income of the pastoralists. In addition, the profits-the amount by which revenue exceeds cost-accrued to the traders rather than to the producers. If anything, the pastoralists were swindled, as Ismail Mire complained in his famous poem, Afka Reer Magaalaha ('Language of the Townsfolk'):