http://www.progressio.org.uk/

Steve Kibble

Somaliland Focus (UK) and Progressio (formerly CIIR)

28th June 2006.

Introduction:

SFUK welcomes the formation of this APPG and thinks it a timely moment for a number of reasons:

- World attention is at present concentrated on events in Mogadishu after the Islamist victory over (some) warlords. We need to examine carefully what is really happening in (southern) Somalia, are there genuine hopes for peace after the Khartoum agreement between the ‘transitional federal government’ and UIC Islamists, how much polarity is there really between warlords on one hand and Islamists on other in a situation where clan advantage has also to be taken into account (and where Somalilanders allege that the fight for Mogadishu is an inter- Hawiye clan battle).

- An African Union fact-finding mission declared last year that Somaliland's status was "unique and self-justified in African political history," and that "the case should not be linked to the notion of 'opening a Pandora's box.'?

- The International Crisis Group, a nonprofit advocacy group based in Brussels that tries to prevent and resolve conflicts, recommended in a recent report "Somaliland, Time for African Union leadership" that the African Union address the issue soon "to prevent a deeply rooted dispute from evolving into an open conflict." The report called on the African Union to name a senior envoy to consult with key players and report back to the African Union's Peace and Security Council. In addition, the report called on the AU's Peace and Security Council to familiarise its members with the case of Somaliland. Finally it calls on the AU, meanwhile, to grant Somaliland interim observer status. The report asks ‘Is it fair to keep Somaliland hostage to events in Mogadishu and the surrounding areas or should Somaliland be rewarded for creating stability and democratic governance out of a part of the chaos that is the failed state of Somalia?’

- The anniversary of independence from British on June 26 1960 and a month or so after independence (May 18) from Somalia.

- It is coming up for a year or so after parliamentary elections in Somaliland.

- President Riyale’s six-state visit to East Africa where he was largely received by heads of state - in the context of the AU report which is promising for the recognition issue in a technical sense, although politically of course much remains to be done, as examination of the past shows.

- But getting recognition from the rest of the world has proved troublesome. African leaders are hesitant to acknowledge the claim for fear of stirring up more chaos in Somalia. They also do not want to encourage rebels elsewhere on the continent who desire independent states of their own.

- There is a need for new thinking - many outside interventions have been based on misunderstandings of Somalia and Somali culture and ‘tradition’. Or alternatively how that culture has interacted with the imposition of a colonial and then post colonial state (and regional impacts and interests). Has Somaliland or the region yet completely come to terms with the way that a decentralised [for men] egalitarian clan-based system had come into unequal contact with a modernist centralised colonial system. Three historical eras that followed this collision - all marked by violence.

There are a number of relevant questions we can ask here.

- In what particular areas are Somalilanders themselves looking for change (and outside assistance)? What practical steps in democratisation can outsiders help with? What are they already doing? How linked to the recognition issue should this be? Areas might be effective role of political parties, human rights training, media freedom issues, equality of gender representation etc 1.

- What is/are the next step(s) after the AU report on recognition and what is the most helpful role for outsiders (in this and indeed other areas)? What are the dangers of recognition? Could there be violence from the south?

- Is getting Somalia support for Somaliland recognition a vital element for reconciliation etc? Is a big bang or a brick by brick approach between Somaliland and Somalia better? Where would we start? Are there civil society groups in Somalia that support Somaliland's democratisation process?

- How do we deal with the dispute between the Puntland part of Somalia and Somaliland on who should control parts of Sool and Sanaag regions?

- What of sensitive issues around political Islam? Who do Somalilanders speak to, who do friends of Somaliland talk to and who is excluded?

- How equipped is Somaliland to deal with issues of foreign direct investment, and to monitor and ascertain the genuineness of interested outsiders that support Somaliland's democratisation process?

Details of SF (UK) An independent body of UK-based people providing information on Somaliland and Somalilanders:

- To bring to the UK public audience an awareness of the situation in Somaliland and of Somalilanders

- To provide and distribute information on the situation in Somaliland to interested parties in the UK (and EU) in particular opinion formers, policy makers and other stakeholders

- To bring to the attention of stakeholders the issues involved in the democratisation process in Somaliland and its existence as a coherent political entity

- To make the case for increased outside assistance to and cooperation with the government, parliament and people of Somaliland

- To liaise with like-minded bodies in other parts of the world on issues facing Somaliland and Somalilanders. And I think we can now add, to help the APPG in whatever way we can, although regretfully not financially, but in the provision of secretariat assistance when the group is formally constituted.

Somaliland - background and history

After being a British protectorate since 1884, Somaliland became an independent country on June 26, 1960. The rest of present-day Somalia, then administered by Italy, became independent several days later. Within days, the two lands decided to merge. But Somalilanders felt slighted almost from the start, since most of the power went to the south of the country. Somalilanders rejected a referendum on a unitary constitution in June 1961 and, later that year, military officers in Hargeisa began an unsuccessful rebellion to reassert Somaliland's independence.

Over the years, the leaders in Mogadishu fought to keep control of Somaliland. In 1988, a full-scale civil war broke out between the Mogadishu-based government and Somaliland rebels.

In May 1991, as Somalia descended into anarchy with the fall of the government of Gen. Mohamed Siad Barre, Somaliland declared itself independent. A decade later, a referendum in Somaliland on the issue showed 97 percent of the population in favour of independence, and Somaliland has essentially ruled itself, given the lack of a central government in Somalia - despite 15 attempts brokered by outsiders. Even now the outside- brokered Transitional Federal Government (TFg) is very weak with the country divided by and clan and region and now by Islamic courts militia opposing the TFG to complicate matters further. While Somaliland’s independence is contested externally and internally, the desire to be treated separately from Somalia - for the majority of people - is very real.

The proclamation of independence in 1991 meant that the new Somaliland state had the opportunity to break with former corrupt, military and unrepresentative forms of government. The lack of formal international recognition for Somaliland has its costs. Without it the country does not qualify for bilateral donor assistance or the support of international financial institutions for reconstruction. Lack of recognition has discouraged foreign investments and constricts trading practices. The meagre international assistance received, however, has meant that reconstruction has been largely achieved from the resources and resourcefulness of Somalilanders themselves. The main source of finance has been remittances from the Somalis living abroad. Since 1998 these have replaced the income from livestock exports as the mainstay of the economy.

Lack of recognition also meant that Somalilanders had the opportunity to build their own system tailored to their needs. For the first twelve years this was a hybrid system combining traditional institutions of clan governance (or male pastoral democracy) with formal Western-style government institutions.

The government has signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; overseen the restoration of peace; demobilised former combatants; brought about social and economic rehabilitation and overseen the drafting of a constitution based on universal suffrage, decentralisation and multi-partyism. There is a war crimes commission looking into the human rights abuses of the Siad Barre years. There is a reasonably high level of personal security for citizens. However, apart from its economic viability, Somaliland’s prospects also depend on the viability of its current political order.

The recognition issue is a key litmus test. In 1999, the then President Egal argued that democratisation would facilitate international recognition of Somaliland. In May 1999, the Hargeisa government approved a plan to move from the clan-based system to a multi-party political system -providing the proposed parties were not based on tribal or religious lines and drew support from all regions. There were to be votes for women, although no women were actually consulted in drawing up the draft. In 2001 a referendum on the new constitution was conducted in Somaliland. In Dec 2002 and April 2003, the local government district councils and the presidential elections were held respectively in a reasonably free and fair manner as commented on by international observers such as my own institute 2.

In 2005 CIIR was officially requested by the National Electoral Commission (NEC) to invite and assemble the 76-strong international election observation (IEO) team for the September 2005 elections for the House of Representatives. In addition to the IEOs selected from across four continents, there were a number of Somalilanders from the diaspora and expatriate staff of international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) 3.

We visited over a third of the 900 polling stations and found the atmosphere highly positive. As with the 2002 elections, there were problems that we outlined in our interim report to the NEC of October 2005 and in the final report. Some of the problems in question related to the lack of a census and hence a registration process; a largely illiterate population; very complicated ballot papers with symbols for all candidates (transparency being rated more highly than secrecy of the ballot); Sanaag and Sool security constraints; governing party use of money, vehicles, fuel, and airtime and attempted multiple voting. The major concern of IEOs and those Somalilanders with whom we work with was the very unequal, but we hope improving, representation of women.

In contrast to neighbouring countries like Ethiopia, the elections were carried out peacefully yet again. The diaspora played a visible role and contributed extensive experience of other democratisation processes. The parties, although combative and unequally privileged, were disciplined. We have made recommendations to the NEC, the international donor community, political parties and to Somaliland civil society including donor support to make the NEC a permanent body.

We are now beginning to see the working out of a situation unique in Africa of a government without a numerical majority in parliament: perhaps another example - such as the hybrid system - of Somaliland providing lessons to the rest of Africa? Whilst we believed and declared the elections ‘reasonably free and fair’ (given the prioritising of transparency above secrecy), we were keen to stress throughout that this was just the beginning of the democratisation process. We are still assessing the effects of these democratic gains and intentions against the background of clan, patriarchal and business interests as well as tensions emanating from political Islam.

What is the way forward and what are the challenges facing Somalilanders? How can (www. As above) the rest of us help build on these positive steps and work with all Somalilanders to overcome their problems?

Problems, positives and negatives

Economically:

- The vulnerability of pastoral communities, especially in the eastern regions of Sool and Sanag, due to drought and loss of sales of livestock as a result of the ban on livestock export to Saudi Arabia and initially the Gulf countries is a concern. The drought and loss of livestock in the rural areas led to rural to urban migration, where water and social services are inadequate.

- Lack of recognition means lack of access to funding although not all or to all investment. Somaliland is not in a position to drive hard bargains from outsiders wishing to exploit natural resources etc. Social

- Qat chewing issue - which has economic, environmental, gender as well as productivity implications.

- Gender - patriarchal structures and practices despite the sometimes highly educated nature of Somaliland women including their involvement in political, civil society and business matters

- Terrorism is an internal as well as external. Somaliland blamed the jihadists attack just before the September 2005 elections on Mogadishu. But we know that Somalilanders were involved and talk of brainwashing, criminal warlord gangs etc, is to touch on only part of the problem. It must also be faced as an internal problem linked to wider international concerns Additionally how can Somaliland make use of the US war on terror? According to Ioan Lewis some time ago the latter should consider moving from striking deals with individual warlords to investigating the stable conditions provided by a functioning state in terms of predictable antiterrorist cooperation. He asks: 'what better partner than Somaliland?' One might wish his advice had been followed earlier perhaps. Electoral/political

- There have been worries over human rights, an independent judiciary and the rule of non-executive law with creeping corruption and an increasing investment in internal security. The security mindset of the Siad Barre era and the continuation of certain personnel) means that that acceptance of formal legal process (rather than arbitrary political action is perhaps still not understood by all ministers and parts of the government who have, in the past, appeared surprised at objections to its practice.

- A functioning parliament. The first few months of the new parliament started off turbulently as its members and the parties negotiated their relationship with one other and with the executive. In a sense not a lot has happened since the elections, but there are interesting pointers in matters of consensus, democratisation and nation building. It seems as though there was, after the intervention of the Guurti, recognition by government and others that they could not continue in the old way and just expect Parliament to fall into line in some kind of Cromwellian way. There has been the formation of three new subcommittees - which point to greater involvement in national affairs - justice and human rights, anti-corruption and environmental and rural communities.

- The development in the relationship between civil society groups, political parties and the government will be another challenge. Women’s groups and civil society groups are waiting on Parliament to sort itself out and then engage with them but are hopeful of a good working relationship: not least because several former civil society activists are MPs. Recently civil society, the media and NEC were engaged in discussion with a major donor. They pointed to a number of key areas, including support for the creation of a strong link between the newly elected MPs, CSOs and Media. This will help the MPs to understand the issues and policies that need to be addressed, in other words awareness raising for the new MPs. There needs to be the establishment of the new NEC as a sustainable and effective institution after the five years of the current NEC expires.

- The majority of the MPs are new and while many of them will be better educated than their predecessors, they lack experience and are unfamiliar with the functions of parliament - although we know that the diaspora here has been providing information. Achieving political consensus has been the cornerstone of stability in Somaliland, to the extent that uncomfortable compromises have been made at times. In the new parliament, the opposition is looking to form an alliance and challenge the government on a number of fronts. There has been surprising unanimity of all parties on occasion in relation to government.

- Functioning political parties. The two non-governing parties have been successful in exerting party discipline - picking a speaker and two deputies. Before that they had been seen as weak institutions showing little life outside election campaigns, with little internal democracy capacity/commitment to policy formulation. A major constraint has been resources. Do we yet see signs of differentiations between themselves, their internal dynamics as well as programmes and policies? How do they see coalition-building and internal discipline - in order to hold the executive to account?

- Revoking the emergency laws - a review of the constitution to curb the powers of the executive, to review the size of parliament, and to review the restrictions on political parties. This might include a proposal to create a post of prime minister.

- Measures to reduce the size of the cabinet from 50 to between 12 or 18 ministers.

- Measures to transfer to Parliament a degree of effective power from Presidentially appointed and non-Parliamentary Ministers with significant executive power.

- Measures to increase fiscal accountability and transparency in the executive through greater control and oversight over the national budget, a review of foreign investment contracts, a review of fishing concessions, a review of the management of Berbera port and the establishment of a commission to tackle corruption.

- A review of the media law.

- A review of the security sector budget.

- Voter registration and census - seen as essential both for holding elections and as part of the state-building process (by defining and counting citizens).

- A review of electoral law - to consolidate and iron out contradictions in the existing legislation.

- Strengthening local government laws for the decentralisation of government.

- Review of the role and length of tenure of the unelected and solely male Council of Elders (Guurti) and its appointment. Its mandate is due to expire in 2006 and a decision will need to be made as to whether it should become an elected chamber or remain an appointed one. Its attempts to extend its shelf life to four years undermined its standing which before had been that of a unique institution that has been at the heart of clan-based, power-sharing and consensual politics in Somaliland - linking modern political institutions to traditional political organisation and, by extension, inter-communal politics to national politics. The public recognises the role it played in mobilising the population in the war against Siad Barre and in shepherding Somaliland through the minefields of post-war politics and state-building. There are numerous sources of legitimacy and authority in societies and although the authority of the Guurti is not based on a popular vote, it has been no less legitimate for that.

- The validity of a three-party system in a plural democracy 4. Some argue that the restricted system is a sensible solution to clan-based politics, preventing social cleavages or parties becoming a reflection of the clan. Others argue that the restriction on the number of parties is a direct contradiction of the right to free association. The constitution also effectively gives the parties eternal life. While the parties are unlikely to push for a change, there is likely to be popular pressure to review the restriction and allow for an increased number of parties or an alternative mechanism.

- Women - Given that this was the first parliamentary election in 36 years (and the first time women were democratically elected to any Somali parliament) Somaliland has some claim in the progress of women’s representation. The lack of (but paradoxically growing) female representation and the wider political and economic participation overall have led to demands for an increase in set quotas/reserved seats for women in parliament. The parties will also be under pressure from women and civil society organisations to review their policies on female candidacy, ensuring that changes are made to structures, policies and personnel. Women in and out of parliament have called not only for affirmative action but also for exposure visits to learn from other African countries experience such as Uganda.

Wider questions

Somaliland might be said to be poised between ‘traditional’ structures arising from clan society and the ideas emanating from civil society (often influenced by time spent in the diaspora) on more Western forms of democratisation. Who negotiates this exchange? It seems as though some of the key actors are beginning to move the hybrid form along to reflect more clearly the developing Somaliland - women’s groups, civil society, urban youth, some of the business sector. How the more traditional elements exemplified perhaps by the ruling party UDUB and a number of clan leaders react to such movement will reflect the Somaliland post-election path. However we should also be aware that this is unlikely to be a linear path or indeed take the form of binary opposition between ‘so-called progress’ and ‘tradition’ particularly given what has been said about the Guurti and their (possibly rather more compromised) place in consensus and reconciliation.

International support and role:

How best do outsiders, however sympathetic, concentrate on the issues of democratisation and development and perhaps more immediate questions facing people, parliament and government? There is plenty of necessary work to be undertaken by friends of Somaliland without necessarily having to concentrate on the recognition issue. Equally it seems clear that the latter process has to be an Africanrun one not European.

Having staged three elections, the commitment of the Somaliland people and the political elite to a democratic form of politics cannot easily be questioned or ignored. To do so would make a mockery of the West’s commitment to support democracy. As one parliamentary candidate remarked: ‘In Somalia you just need to kill 100 people to be recognised by the international community as a player. But you do not get any recognition if several thousand people vote for you here’. A lack of support for democratic Somaliland would not go unnoticed in neighbouring countries. And to ignore what has been achieved in a democratic Islamic country would also send the wrong message to Somalia and to countries in the region and the Middle East.

The international community has, to date, shown its support for democratisation in Somaliland by funding the elections. And following the elections, Somaliland received messages of congratulations from several countries and international bodies. These include the Arab League, whose representative visited Hargeisa in October 2005, and the US Government State Department which issued a press release from the making favourable reference to the poll. The United Nations through the Secretary General's Special Representative for Somalia, Ambassador Francois Lonseny Fall, commended people in Somaliland for the progress they have made towards security and democracy. Obviously at present the Arab League is concentrating more on South Somalia which has historically leant more towards the Arab world than the North. Hence it being quick off the mark with the Khartoum agreement between the Islamic courts and the TFG.

Moves by the African Union - discreetly helped along by South Africa earlier in 2005 to investigate Somaliland’s (SL) claim for independence - indicate that other African governments are not averse to giving this serious consideration. Indications from Riyale’s six nation tour of East Africa is that he was received cordially. I was informed that Pretoria/ Tshwane is working behind the scenes and that ‘Kenya, Zambia, Rwanda are on board on the SL case. Rwanda really wants to move quickly and is well versed with the SL case. Tanzania said it will give it 'serious consideration' and I think Uganda will, with time, come on board.’

But words alone will be insufficient. The institutions in place to sustain a democratic system in Somaliland need assistance. These include the NEC, parliament, the judiciary and the government itself. It will also be important for people in Somaliland to see the benefits of democracy, by investment in the country’s infrastructure and services and providing information on democratisation (not that Somaliland should accept or believe all of this uncritically).

In the various Somali peace negotiations, the strategy of regional and international mediators was to park the issue of Somaliland, in order to protect the stability in the region. The message from Somaliland’s leadership is that the international community should of course support a resolution to the crisis in the south, but in a way that does not hold Somaliland hostage to developments there.

What is happening in Somalia?

From February to June 2006, Somalia saw violent and unexpected developments - the revival of the TFG, sustained warfare in Mogadishu between a US-backed counter-terrorism alliance and the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), and the decisive victory by the Islamists, giving them control of Mogadishu and its hinterland. These changes upset a decade of political paralysis and produced new political opportunities as well as uncertainties.

Just to backtrack a little. In 2000 a national government was formed in exile, and in 2004 the TFG came into being with its (entirely male) assembly electing as president one of the warlords, Abdullahi Yusuf, former president of Puntland (the semiautonomous region that borders Somaliland and occupies some of the latter’s claimed territory). But it has been marked by internal clan and other-based division and has not been able to locate itself in the capital. The three warlords who divided the capital between them did not recognise its authority The cabinet to put it bluntly is composed of differing clan warlords and the new president’s writ does not cover much territory, even it has formal political recognition.

Meanwhile Somali businessmen, tired of warlord misrule and of their goods stolen and businesses disrupted by militias, began funding Islamic courts in Mogadishu to try to establish some law and order. Presided over by Islamic lawyers, the courts formed a Union in 2004, although they remained clan-based. Enter the USA who thought the courts were protecting al-Qa'ida activists and therefore hired (some of) Mogadishu's warlords to combat them. It seems well attested that in February and March CIA planes delivered hundreds of thousands of dollars through Isaley airstrip north of Mogadishu. The three warlords, armed with new weaponry, created the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism.

As Richard Dowden wrote ‘The reaction was devastating - if utterly predictable. Somalia is a very open society, and everyone knew within days about the planeloads of money. For keeping Somalia at war for 15 years, the warlords are already widely hated. So is American meddling. Somalis bitterly remember the bungled American intervention in 1991 which ended with some thousand Somalis and 18 American soldiers killed in a single night - the Blackhawk Down incident. The subsequent abandonment of Somalia by the US and the UN has allowed the country's wounds to fester ever since. Somalis may be divided by their very Somali-ness but they are united by two factors: their Muslim faith and a xenophobic opposition to interference by outsiders. In May young men with guns poured into the capital from all over Somalia to attack the warlords. After a few fierce battles, it was all over. The warlords fled. At a stroke Washington had achieved the very opposite of what it intended and added an extraordinary and unintended bonus: peace in much of Somalia.’

As Dowden says, this, however oddly, has produced a new opportunity for peace in Somalia and a window for Somaliland - but there are large questions to be answered and peace is extremely delicately balanced. There is a chance with goodwill and compromise from key actors that Somalia stands a chance to convert a disaster - a four month war which left over 350 dead and thousands displaced - into a golden opportunity. If the TFG and UIC leadership can begin serious negotiations over a power-sharing deal bringing the UIC into the government, prospects for peace and state revival would be given an enormous boost.

Immediately after UIC’s victory, hopeful moves were made. The TFG leadership, based in the provisional capital of Baidoa, sought dialogue with the UIC. The then UIC Chairman Sheikh Sharif made reassuring statements to the international community, committing it to peace and democracy and disavowing terrorism. The US government expressed hope that it could work with the UIC. Mogadishu citizens broadly welcomed the prospect of a unified UIC administration of the city.

Then as Ken Menkhaus has observed there was a period of joint provocation. ‘The UIC’s first provocation was its June 5 communiqué to the international community. Though the letter was widely interpreted as conciliatory, it made no mention of the TFG at all and omitted Ethiopia from the list of states receiving the communiqué. The UIC appeared to be going out of its way to snub the two most important actors with which it needed to negotiate. The UIC then broke off talks with the TFG when the Parliament began deliberating on legislation [the former] deeply opposed. On June 14 its militia attacked and captured the town of Jowhar, where remnants of the counterterrorism alliance had regrouped, and pushed northwest toward the border with Ethiopia. By capturing Jowhar and walking from talks, the UIC sent dangerous signals that it was seeking military solutions rather than dialogue.

For its part, the TFG intentionally torpedoed dialogue with the UIC by raising the issue of regional peacekeeping forces in parliament, knowing that that issue would provoke the UIC into breaking from the talks. The parliament’s 14 June vote to authorise regional peacekeeping forces guaranteed a walkout of most Mogadishu MPs. The same conflict lines that divided the country throughout 2005 - a Mogadishu-based opposition versus a pro-Ethiopian, Yusuf-led TFG - were instantly revived by raising the same peacekeeping proposal that split the TFG in early 2005. The African Union has already mandated the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to deploy a peace-support mission to Somalia. IGAD, which sponsored the reconciliation process that culminated in the creation of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2004, has given Sudan and Uganda the responsibility of mobilising troops for deployment in Somalia. IGAD comprises Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. The proposed deployment of foreign troops in Somalia initially divided Somalia's fledgling transitional government, with a group led by the speaker of parliament, Sharif Hassan Shaykh Aden, bitterly opposed to sending in troops from the country's immediate neighbours. President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed and Prime Minister Ali Muhammed Gedi, on the other hand, insisted the peacekeeping force include soldiers from neighbouring states.

On Wednesday, however, the president, prime minister and speaker all supported the motion, according to sources in Baidoa. "No one was opposed to the idea of peacekeepers, but I and others who voted against it were objecting to bringing any troops from the frontline states," said Muhammad, the Baidoa MP. The approved motion - which allows the deployment of foreign forces in Somalia "no matter what country they are from" - would make it difficult for the TFG to engage in dialogue with the Islamic courts that control a number of regions in southern Somalia, which believe their militia could provide the necessary security, he said.

Worse, the authorisation of regional peacekeepers may prompt Ethiopia to inject troops into southern Somalia within days. If it does, the deployment is almost certain to result in armed clashes with the UIC.

The results will be unthinkable. Hardline Islamists in the UIC will use the presence of Ethiopian forces on Somali soil to invoke jihad and will tap into fierce popular opposition to Ethiopian intervention. Ethiopia will justify its operation as protecting itself and the TFG from a rising jihadist threat. Somalia will become a theatre of an internationalised war attracting foreign Islamist radicals and a possible quagmire for Ethiopia. Moderate Islamists in the UIC who only last week seemed to be a source of hope for the country will be marginalised. The transitional parliament will again be paralysed.

Leaders in the TFG and UIC will both claim that their mutual provocations were merely defensive responses to aggressive actions taken by the other. But Somalis are adept at the art of negotiation; they know how to send signals that reassure rather than provoke. The more plausible explanation is that hardliners on both sides pre-empted dialogue which they found threatening, preferring to perpetuate a state of conflict and polarisation. The spoilers may soon get their wish’.

For the US, this unfolding scenario is a counter-terrorism disaster, partially of its own making. The question is asked by many ‘Is the CIA/ Pentagon or the State Dept running policy? For neighbouring states, not least Somaliland it promises more instability spilling over from Somalia. For the Somali people, it could mean more years of conflict, state collapse, and humanitarian crisis, and yet another betrayal by their own leaders.

‘Time is quickly running out to avert this crisis. Ethiopia must be convinced not to deploy troops; the UIC must withdraw its militia presence back to Jowhar, away from the Ethiopian border region; and the regional organization IGAD must affirm that deployment of a regional peacekeeping force in the context of a divided TFG will produce war, not peace, and must go record that it will not consider peacekeepers to Somalia until a government of national unity is established. Thereafter, the TFG and UIC must sit and negotiate a power-sharing accord, and must be made to feel every ounce of pressure that can be mustered by international actors and local citizens. There is no other way out of this very dangerous mess’ - Ken Menkhaus.

Within the last week (late June) Somalia's three top leaders went to Sudan, for peace talks with the Islamic group which controls Mogadishu and negotiated the Khartoum agreement which provides for mutual recognition although tensions and mutual suspicions remain high. The subsequent formation of the Supreme Council of Somali Islamic Courts under hardliner Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys is not promising however - the US has accused him of links with Al QQuaida and he has expressed support for the ‘resistance’ to the US in Iraq. In addition, Aweys has in the past in Puntland clashed violently with the present TFG President (formerly president in Puntland) who ejected him and his Islamist militia from that region in 1991-2. Aweys himself has long been recognised as leader of the Al_Itihad group, although in recent years they have become invisible to outsiders. More recently, Islamist militias allied to Aweys have attempted to impose their form of sharia law, shooting at and closing down cinemas which prompted violent reactions from Mogadishu youth who were furious at not being able to watch the World Cup. It seems unlikely that hardliners will accept Somaliland independence given their rhetoric as seeing it, and the TFG as pawns of Ethiopia.

So Somalia is still balanced between the promise of negotiated peace and a government of national unity and renewed war, radicalisation, and external intervention. It is also not clear that the Islamists want to topple the transitional government just yet. Given their wide popular support and ambitions to build a new Somalia where Islamic law would be key rather than clan loyalty, they may prefer to consolidate power with some kind of electoral mandate, perhaps in 2007. However internal divisions - clan, religious and political - may also undermine them as might their links with the warlords not in the ARPCT.

What is the Islamist agenda for Somaliland?

They see Somaliland as a secular Ethiopian-backed state and want to change that but there are different strands. Some Somalilanders believe the UIC/ Supreme Council will eventually fall apart and the warlord element may predominate (given that only it is some warlords that the UIC is fighting against). There are already reports of rapes etc in Jowhar. Will warlords and militias sign up for UIC and carry on as before? Rumours abound. Former UIC Chairman Sheikh Sharif is reported to have said ‘Somalilanders are brothers and it is up to them to seek their own path’ (but equally whilst proclaiming Somali ‘unity’). For others in UIC their propaganda is that those opposed to them are trying to uproot Islam from Somalia - eg US and Ethiopian ‘crusaders’. Somaliland is seen as a possible other Djibouti ie a US base. There are also worries that Somaliland’s native extremists are getting stronger eg in Burco and that Islamist antiforeigner rhetoric has resonance inside the country. Do Somalilanders including the young see the government doing enough for the country? There is obviously a sensitive outsiders’ role here.

What people of Somaliland think/ do/ likely to do

In all parts of Somalia, identity questions underlie both stability and instability but clan remains stronger than religion. There is already a strong Somaliland identity with a continuing historic and important commitment to clan negotiation. Somalis of all types have a strong cultural tradition of dancing/theatre/ poetry which could come under threat from the actions in Mogadishu of extreme Islamists. Language might be under threat from Arabisation according to some.

Somaliland has a stronger army than others, but has worries about a fifth column which leads to dangers of internal repression and regional impact. There have been government restraints on the ‘morality police’ in Hargeisa and on certain forms of public preaching - issues that could be used by political Islamists.

What of the role of business and diaspora?

Ethiopia

Yusuf and Hargeisa for the moment are both on the same side. There is danger of military actions e.g. provocation including Ethiopia and Kenya etc with reports that Ethiopian troops have entered Somalia to protect the Baidoa-based TFG. The visceral dislike of Ethiopia amongst Somalis (including, when pushed, in Somaliland) means that the TFG calling for outside peacemaking forces is very unpopular even in Baidoa. According to sources there TFG personnel can’t go out on the streets at the moment.

UK role

Many in Somaliland believe the UK government has an influence and role - in and out of Contact Group, especially inside the EU, Nepad and G8 (see below on possible APPG role). They see it as being useful in combating the danger of Somaliland being put on the back burner when what is needed is a multi track approach, assisting the TFG/UIC negotiations and Hargeisa at the same time. It will need to stress the need for security and assurance for Somaliland as one element of stability as well as need for negotiations between TFG and UIC. In this, the UIC as well as Hargeisa need to guarantee social and human rights. There is need to be proactive in a fast changing situation.

This underlines the need for outside assistance to Hargeisa on questions of democratisation given that the government and political parties still appear, according to sources there, unsure of the basic rules of running a democracy and there is therefore a danger of reversion to what they know - executive dictat and grandstanding - which would undercut their hard-earned democratisation process. At the same time outsiders need to understand the hybrid form of Somaliland politics with the Guurti as an element of stability. There is need to engage those of ‘fundamentalist’ persuasion but who would never resort to violence.

Questions for APPG to consider:

- Was Somaliland maybe naïve in thinking that the democratic path would lead to recognition when ‘who needed buying off’ e.g. warlords in the south was a more important question for outsiders? How should Somaliland be rewarded for its democratic and stability steps and by whom? Can we move now beyond ‘sort out Somalia first and then deal with Somaliland’?

- How would recognition in some form affect the dynamics of the south?

- Does it matter that the south would find it extremely difficult to accept in a formal way the independence of Somaliland (although see the ICG report for a view on how to get round this)?

- Do we need to consider the effect on unrecognised ‘nations’/ separatist struggles elsewhere in Africa?

- The ‘international community’ was seemingly about to line up behind AU as it looked at the case for recognition, but now the ‘Islamist threat’ threatens to put Somaliland on back burner. In fact a multi-track approach is needed including the ICG notion of giving Somaliland observer status at AU whilst question of legitimate claim to recognition sorted out. Plus we need an understanding of clan dynamics including how the warlord issue intertwines with the Islamist one in Somalia.

- Should the US be persuaded to back off (including letting others take lead in Contact Group) given its deep unpopularity in Somalia in backing warlords (and the Ethiopia connection)? And should there be pressure on Ethiopia to stop its sabrerattling (whether or not it actually entered southern Somalia)?

- How suspicious should Somaliland be of any IGAD/ TFG inspired peacekeeping force? Or does it depend on whom it might comprise?

- This is linked with the need to avoid an external and internal alliance of extreme political Islamists - in Somaliland as well as Somalia. Here there is need for a conversation with ‘moderate conservative’ Islamists who have similar views to the political Islamists but who are opposed to violence. It also means dealing with the recognition question, providing capacity and assistance to avoid economic downturn feeding into identity concerns etc.

- Given the high profile of Arab League who else should be involved and how - IGAD, AU, South Africa, Kenya as counterweights?

- How do we deal with the question of Sool and Sanag (and some would say with the west of Somaliland once Riyale as a non-Isaaq goes)? Negotiate for recognition with the proviso that one can tweak borders through peaceful negotiation afterwards?

- How does Somaliland deal with Puntland in general?

- Most importantly let us not reinvent a process that has no purchase in Somaliland or indeed in Somalia. What we should look at is the way that the people of Somaliland brought peace through indigenous and understood forms - mechanisms of dialogue, clan structures, elders (and women’s input even if only behind the scenes?)? There is some resonance here with the rhetoric of the UIC that they are running a peoples revolution (which has some truth to it for some)

- The UK government has stressed (at e.g. the recent Lord Triesman talk at Chatham House) the need for a regional approach to capacity building for conflict resolution. This appears a good case to put your money where your mouth is.

- The UK Addis embassy could have a strong role in all of this as could those in the countries that President Riyale recently visited.

- South Africa is also playing a strong role behind the scenes which could be supported through parliamentary and governmental exchanges.

What do we want APPG to do?

- Provide assistance to the emerging democratisation process. Areas might be effective role of political parties, human rights training, media freedom issues, equality of gender representation etc.

- Visiting the country to follow up the visit by Tony Worthington etc.

- Practical suggestions on HMG’s peace/ negotiations role.

- Suggest UK MPs liaise with their counterparts in select African and European states to raise the profile of the case of Somaliland via parliamentary questions, briefings and encouraging their respective governments to encourage the development of a follow-up mechanism to the AU 2005 Fact-Finding report to Somaliland. Focus on states which are members of the AU's Peace and Security Council.

- Encourage and nurture joint investment opportunities in Somaliland.

- Lobby via UK government sponsorship for the G8 to provide grants for road infrastructure, expanding of Berbera port, schools and clinics, as part of the Gleneagles agreement to provide poor countries with grants. The UK government could engage with the Nepad secretariat to look into post-conflict infrastructure development.

- Liaising with the various Somalilander organisations and support organisations in the UK. Although the primary focus is Somaliland links with the Anglo-Somali Society are also useful of course.

- Help in overcoming the ostensibly Rift Valley Fever-motivated ban on livestock exports to Saudi Arabia?

- Push for greatly increase development and democratisation assistance to Hargeisa.

- Helping make the case that Somaliland is an existing fact and a coherent political entity. Draw the parallels with what is happening in South Sudan (suggestion from Tony Worthington).

- Pursue the agenda that the ICG has put forward.

- Help with people-people initiatives. Tony Worthington suggests education as a priority here.

- Take up the offer of links with the South African government and ruling party made recently through the good offices of Professor Iqbal Jhazbhay.

Conclusion

In a sense this is a wider story about how the mix of traditional and understood structures change, at what speed, and who controls and wants to control the process. Given the mix of clan system and autocracy the government’s authority is weak and dependent on its management of clan relations and the patronage of Somaliland’s big businessmen. Is the clan system the big problem? What is the future here given that it, along with religion, is a force for stability when there are few safety nets? Is the clan system capable of adaptive change and opening out, including letting women into the closed world? Economic development is often said to be the key - currently the clan is the support system - and the government is not capable yet of really supporting society. Until that begins to change, a move in politics away from clan lines is difficult.

Finally one can see the declaration of Somaliland independence within the second wave of democratisation in the early 1990s; arguably it had more success in legitimating the state in the eyes of its citizens at least because it was based on well understood and historically strong foundations that neither colonialism nor scientific socialism were able to wipe out - in essence a social contract which regulates political and economic relationships between pastoral kinship groups rather than delegating responsibility to a central government. Somaliland’s recent history of conflict resolution has involved a bottom-up approach to building societies from local communities upwards, gradually widening the arena of political agreement and political consensus.

According again to Ioan Lewis, this method of widening political consensus works when societies are as in the Somali case, highly fragmented and decentralised, and do not conform to assumptions about the universality of civil society and Western multiparty democracy. How does outside assistance sensitively deal with such a process? The formation of the APPG should look at how it can help.

Thank you.

Steve Kibble - 4th July 2006

NOTES

1 There are a number of interesting suggestions in Tony Worthington’s paper to the launch of the Democracy Network for Somaliland June 2006.
2 Abokor, Bradbury, Kibble etc ‘Very much a Somaliland-run election’: Report of the Somaliland local elections. 2003. CIIR. www.progressio.org.uk
3 Abokor and Kibble ‘Further Steps to Democracy: Parliamentary Elections in Somaliland. 2006. Progressio.
4 The three parties arose from those that were the leading political groupings in the 2002 local elections as a mechanism to ensure that parties did not represent single clans and had broad-based support across regions - although clan as ever is the unstated invisible fact of Somaliland politics.