House of Commons 10th January 2006
Input and report launch by Dr Steve Kibble, advocacy coordinator for Africa and Yemen, Progressio
Thanks chair. I am very pleased to be here to launch this report with many friends of Somaliland, Somalilanders including the leader of the opposition, Ahmed Siilanyo, the Mayor of Sanaag, MPs and UK parliamentarians. I am sorry to hear about the father of our other speaker - UK minister for development, Gareth Thomas.
Thanks to our hosts from the House (Tony Baldry and Alun Michael) who have shown a long-term commitment to Somaliland and Somalia. I should also like to welcome fellow members: our joint hosts Somaliland Focus (UK) (many of them IEOs) and indeed the Anglo-Somali Society. I am also happy that our South African IEO friends in the delegation sent a message of support. I also welcome colleagues at Progressio, possibly better known to you under its former name the Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR), and the publisher of this report that we are launching tonight in London and at some point soon in Hargeisa. So, after more thanks than an Oscar winner I should just say that my remarks are personal ones and are not intended to merely replicate the report. It is humbling to be invited to speak before so many Somalilanders who know far more than I and I hope my remarks can be seen as those of an outside friend keen to push along debates on the major issues facing their country.
Introduction
As we know, Somaliland has been building systems of legitimate and accountable governance with some form of social contract with its people and/or civil society - a term we might dispute in relation to Somaliland but let us use for the time being. The proclamation of independence in 1991 meant that the new state had the opportunity to break with former corrupt, military and unrepresentative forms of government. While the lack of international recognition meant a lack of governing support granted to many post-conflict countries, it did give Somalilanders the opportunity to build their own system tailored to their needs. For the first twelve years this was a hybrid system combining traditional institutions of clan governance (or male pastoral democracy) with formal Western-style government institutions. However, although rooted in popular consciousness, these institutions played a minimalist role. In May 1999, the Hargeisa government approved a plan to move from the current clan-based system to a multi-party political system -providing the proposed parties were not based on tribal or religious lines and drew support from all regions. There were to be votes for women, although no women were actually consulted in drawing up the draft. While Somaliland’s independence is contested externally and internally, the desire to be treated separately from Somalia - for the majority of people - is very real.
With the 2001 referendum, the local elections of 2002, the presidential elections of 2003 and - more recently - the parliamentary elections of 2005, we are still assessing the effects of these democratic gains and intentions against the background of clan, patriarchal and business interests as well as tensions emanating from political Islam.
As you may already know, Progressio/ CIIR/ ICD has been working in Somaliland since 1995. Internationally, this has involved advocating and lobbying for recognition of the country’s achievements in development and democratisation. Furthermore, Progressio has been engaged in the formation of Somaliland Focus (UK) - a group aimed at bringing greater awareness of Somaliland and its achievements to the attention of policy makers and a wider audience in general.
The parliamentary elections of September 2005
CIIR - as we were formerly known - sent a team of official election observers to observe the various referendums and elections. As officially requested by the National Electoral Commission (NEC), our greatest challenge was to invite and assemble the 76-strong international election observation (IEO) team for the September 2005 elections for the House of Representatives. In addition to the IEOs selected from across four continents, there were a number of Somalilanders from the diaspora and expatriate staff of international non-governmental organisations (INGOs). In all, this was a great experience.
In the report we pay tribute to the 800,000 Somaliland voters who - after spending hours walking to the polling station - queued for six hours in the heat to vote. Despite some major logistical issues, the NEC ran a successful election (with the help of some experienced consultants). We had both constructive dialogue and a couple of standoffs with the NEC but it all came right in the end. International NGOs loaned vehicles and radios, without which our mission would not have been possible. We visited over a third of the 900 polling stations and found the atmosphere highly positive. As with the 2002 elections, there were problems that we outlined in our interim report to the NEC of October 2005 and in this report. Some of the problems in question related to the lack of a census and hence a registration process; a largely illiterate population; very complicated ballot papers with symbols for all candidates (transparency being rated more highly than secrecy of the ballot); Sanaag and Sool security constraints; governing party use of money, vehicles, fuel, and airtime and attempted multiple voting. The major concern of IEOs and those Somalilanders with whom we work with was the very unequal, but we hope improving, representation of women.
In contrast to neighbouring countries like Ethiopia, the elections were carried out peacefully yet again. The diaspora played a visible role and contributed extensive experience of other democratisation processes. The parties, although combative and unequally privileged, were disciplined. We have made recommendations to the NEC, the international donor community, political parties and to Somaliland civil society.
We now await the working out of a situation unique in Africa of a government without a numerical majority in parliament: perhaps another example - such as the hybrid system of Somaliland - providing lessons to the rest of Africa.
Whilst we believed and declared the elections ‘reasonably free and fair’, we were keen to stress throughout that this was just the beginning of the democratisation process and, in many ways, its most difficult phase. What is the way forward and what are the challenges facing Somalianders? How can the rest of us help build on these positive steps and work with all Somalilanders to overcome their problems?
In order to answer this we have to ask: where is Somaliland?
1) Background
As well as running three peaceful elections, the government has signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; overseen the restoration of peace; demobilised former combatants; brought about social and economic rehabilitation and overseen the drafting of a constitution based on universal suffrage, decentralisation and multi partyism. There is a war crimes commission looking into the human rights abuses of the Siad Barre years. There is a reasonably high level of personal security for citizens. The background is about the kind of transition we are looking at. Do we know and can we agree on from and where we are moving? (On a previous occasion at SOAS in November last year, I asked a historical question posed by Mark Bradbury: whether Somaliland or the region had yet completely come to terms with the way that a decentralised [for men] egalitarian clan-based system had come into unequal contact with a modernist centralised colonial system. Mark Bradbury points to the three historical eras that followed this collision - all marked by violence. Is the inheritance yet overcome?)
2) The practice of government
This government has been participatory in so far as structures for consultation and consensus do exist, but is it yet democratic in its practice? (A key question to ask anywhere, given the lack of a parliamentary vote we have here in the UK on small matters like going to war.)
As everywhere, the government needs to demonstrate its respect for civil liberties, human rights standards and the rule of law. Since 2002, Somaliland’s reputation for this has been called into question by some high profile legal cases, creeping corruption and an increasing investment in internal security. Immediately following the elections, the government once again demonstrated its intolerance of perceived ‘enemies’ by declaring the European Union delegate to Somaliland Ahmed Washington, persona non grata. The security mindset of the Siad Barre era and the continuation of certain personnel) means that that acceptance of formal legal process (rather than arbitrary political action is perhaps still not understood by all ministers and parts of the government who have, in the past, appeared surprised at objections to its practice. The same applies to the relationship with the media. As we said at SOAS in November, such arbitrary action will not win Somaliland foreign friends.
3) A functional parliament
The regularisation of political representation in parliament should, in theory, provide support in resolving conflict peacefully and avoid a return to the instability that has plagued Somaliland and Southern Somalia. A measure of Somaliland’s democracy will be the way in which its elected institutions function and are utilised by the parties and the public alike. The first few months of the new parliament started off turbulently as its members and the parties negotiated their relationship with one other and with the executive. The majority of the MPs are new and while many of them will be better educated than their predecessors, they lack experience and are unfamiliar with the functions of parliament - although we know that the diaspora here has been providing information. Achieving political consensus has been the cornerstone of stability in Somaliland, to the extent that uncomfortable compromises have been made at times. In the new parliament, the opposition is looking to form an alliance and challenge the government from a number of fronts.
4) Political parties
The two non-governing parties have been successful in exerting party discipline - picking a speaker and two deputies. Before that they had been seen as weak institutions showing little life outside election campaigns, with little internal democracy capacity/commitment to policy formulation. The parties’ links with and control over members elected in their name to the district councils has been tenuous. The regional structures that existed disappeared once the parliamentary election campaign got going. The parties operated as united political forces in the presidential election, with funding and campaigning centralised. A major constraint facing the parties has been to do with resources. In the parliamentary election they received only a limited amount of public funding from the government for core salary costs - relying on the patronage of clan and businesses. The leaders of the parties did not themselves stand in the election and they are likely to find it difficult to enforce adherence to the party or its policies among their MPs. For the candidates, the parties were a legal mechanism for entering parliament. The sitting MPs may seek to reform the parties by insisting that they become members of the parties’ executive committees. Some may decide to join other parties. One of the few forms of leverage that the parties have over their MPs is for the party to refuse to re-nominate a candidate who does not tow the party line.
Do we yet see signs of differentiations between themselves, their internal dynamics as well as programmes and policies? How do they see coalition-building and internal discipline - holding the executive to account?
5) The opposition agenda for parliament is enormous and includes:
- Revoking the emergency laws - a review oof the constitution to curb the powers of the executive, to review the size of parliament, and to review the restrictions on political parties. This might include a proposal to create a post of prime minister.
- Impeach the president. Although openly discussed in the elections, opposition party leaders have cooled this fervour. There may be a push for early presidential elections, although this is likely to be rejected on grounds of cost.
- Measures to reduce the size of the cabinet from 50 to between 12 or 18 ministers. It is likely that parliament will exercise its powers to reject cabinet appointments and may push for the removal of certain unpopular ministers.
- Measures to increase fiscal accountability and transparency in the executive through greater control and oversight over the national budget, a review of foreign investment contracts, a review of fishing concessions, a review of the management of Berbera port and the establishment of a commission to tackle corruption.
- Measures to open up and stimulate the economy, including plans for the leasing of Berbera port.
- A review of the media law.
- An open debate on Somaliland’s relationship with Somalia and the status of the contested eastern regions.
- A review of the security sector budget, with the aim of cutting it and putting more resources into social services.
- Voter registration and census - seen both as essential for holding elections and as part of the state-building process (by defining and counting citizens).
- A review of electoral law - to consolidate and iron out contradictions in the existing legislation.
- Strengthen local government laws for the decentralisation of government.
- A review of the role of the Guurti and its appointment.
- Renewal of the mandate of the NEC (which has another year on its mandate).
6) Debate continues in Somaliland on the validity of a three-party system in a plural democracy.
Some argue that the restricted system is a sensible solution to clan-based politics, preventing social cleavages or parties becoming a reflection of the clan. Others argue that the restriction on the number of parties is a direct contradiction of the right to free association. The constitution also effectively gives the parties eternal life. While the parties are unlikely to push for a change, there is likely to be popular pressure to review the restriction and allow for an increased number of parties or a mechanism that would enable the de-selection of a party that fails to deliver.
7) Traditional structures
The role of the traditional structures - notably the house of elders or Guurti -has been highly visible and effective in terms of stability and reconciliation since independence. This, however, remains an unelected legislative institution.
Its mandate is due to expire in 2006 and a decision will need to be made as to whether it should become an elected chamber or remain an appointed one. As people in Somaliland experiment with democratic multi-party politics, they will be challenged to maintain and incorporate the positive attributes of a pastoral democracy within the system of government (namely consensus building, mediation and arbitration) whilst minimising its more negative influences. The question is: can the Guurti continue to do this?
Although the chamber has been criticised for becoming too institutionalised and reliant on government to be able to act as the objective mediator in Somaliland’s national politics, it remains a unique institution that has been at the heart of clan-based, power-sharing and consensual politics in Somaliland - linking modern political institutions to traditional political organisation and, by extension, inter-communal politics to national politics. The public recognises the role it played in mobilising the population in the war against Siyad Barre and in shepherding Somaliland through the minefields of post-war politics and state-building. There are numerous sources of legitimacy and authority in societies and although the authority of the Guurti is not based on a popular vote, it is no less legitimate for that.
Indeed, there appears to be a general consensus among the parties, the NEC and the public that the Guurti should remain a nominated body, and the country cannot afford another election. The Guurti can be a place where imbalances in political representation as a result of elections are restored, with seats being made available for minority clans and possibly women. Meanwhile, following the 2005 elections, the Guurti has certainly shown that it has had an important role to play in assisting the new parliament to settle in and be a reconciling force.
8) Civil society
The development in the relationship between civil society groups, political parties and the government will be another challenge. How do the people of Somaliland ensure that their voice is heard and responded to? Civil society is busy organising itself in terms of gender representation, provision of social services, budget-tracking and human rights practice. How will political parties and government respond to this? Although parliament includes several MPs who were formerly active in civil society, it remains to be seen whether it proves to be more amenable to external advocacy or will actively seek opinion from civil society groups.
9) Women
Given that this was the first parliamentary election in 36 years (and the first time women were democratically elected to a Somali parliament) Somaliland has some claim in the progress of women’s representation. The lack of (but paradoxically growing) female representation and the wider political and economic participation overall have led to demands for an increase in set quotas/reserved seats for women in parliament. The parties will also be under pressure from women and civil society organisations to review their policies on female candidacy, ensuring that changes are made to structures, policies and political agendas that will affirm the participation of women (and other minorities) in politics. IEOs had discussions in Somaliland as to whether or not women could be represented in the upper house/Guurti. The chair indicated it was a possibility that would strengthen the position of women ‘further down’.
10) South Somalia and region
It was also apparent that the process in Somaliland has had exemplary (if unintended) consequences in Mogadishu and Puntland and may be a useful lesson for the region and its people pushing for a voice in their governance. Again, we can mention Ethiopia. The presence of an Arab League election observer was also seen as significant. We are still evaluating the significance, in November 2005, of Somali Prime Minister Mohamed Geedi’s statement that they would go along with - but not initiate - recognition and the subsequent furore and withdrawal of that statement. Politicians, like foreign footballers and rock stars, can always claim to have been misquoted or had remarks taken out of context. The parliamentary election serves to reinforce the contrast between Somaliland’s elected administration and the Transitional Federal Government in Somalia, which is struggling (amongst other problems) to sustain a semblance of parliamentary consensus. Reactions by people in Somalia to the parliamentary election in Somaliland were mixed. Somaliland received messages of support from southern civil society groups after the election.
11) Recognition and democratisation
The recognition issue is a key litmus test for Somalilanders and one that many are keen to push. In 1999, President Egal argued that democratisation would facilitate international recognition of Somaliland. However, while the parties campaigned on a pro-independence platform and many voters themselves saw voting as a patriotic act, these elections were not put on for external purposes. They were about changing the internal balance of power. Nevertheless, the parliamentary election was also another step in building an independent state and it has implications for the status of Somaliland and its relationship with Somalia. But perhaps there are more immediate questions facing people in government concerning democratisation and development. We are aware that success here may bring recognition closer or strengthen the case for it, but perhaps as a by-product. Is the democratisation process an inherent part of the recognition process or can/should we delink them? Perhaps the democratisation process was initially seen as part of the fight for recognition but has developed a life and an unstoppable momentum of its own.
12) What steps need to be taken to ensure an independent and trained judiciary?
13) Terrorism - 2 aspects.
Somaliland blamed the jihadists on Mogadishu. But we know that Somalilanders were involved and talk of brainwashing, criminal warlord gangs etc, is indeed to touch on part of the problem. But it must also be faced as an internal problem linked to wider international concerns - Iraq, Abu Ghraib, Israel/Palestine etc. The reasons for, and manifestations of, terrorism have to be dealt with. Somaliland is not alone in this; given that tube trains and a number 30 bus were blown up very close to here last summer by people from my own city. How can Somaliland make use of the US war on terror? According to Ioan Lewis the latter should consider moving from striking deals with individual warlords to investigating the stable conditions provided by a functioning state in terms of predictable anti-terrorist cooperation. He asks: 'what better partner than Somaliland?'
14) International support and role:
How best do outsiders, however sympathetic, concentrate on the issues of democratisation and development and perhaps more immediate questions facing people, parliament and government? We are aware that success here may bring recognition closer or strengthen the case for it, but without making recognition the key part of their solidarity work - not just because of charity laws or whatever - but because it may, in fact, be counter-productive (Africanise not Europeanise).
Having staged three elections, the commitment of the Somaliland people and the political elite to a democratic form of politics cannot easily be questioned or ignored. To do so would make a mockery of the West’s commitment to support democracy. As one parliamentary candidate remarked: something is wrong. In Somalia you just need to kill 100 people to be recognised by the international community as a player. But you do not get any recognition if several thousand people vote for you here. A lack of support for democratic Somaliland would not go unnoticed in neighbouring countries. And to ignore what has been achieved in a democratic Islamic country would also send the wrong message to Somalia and to countries in the region and the Middle East.
The international community has, to date, shown its support for democratisation in Somaliland by funding the elections. And following the elections, Somaliland received messages of congratulations from several countries and international bodies. These include the Arab League, whose representative visited Hargeisa in October 2005, and the US Government, which issued a press release from the State Department that made favourable reference to the poll. The United Nations through the Secretary General's Special Representative for Somalia, Ambassador Francoise Lonseny Fall, commended people in Somaliland for the progress they have made towards security and democracy.
Moves by the African Union - discreetly helped along by South Africa earlier in 2005 to investigate Somaliland’s claim for independence - indicate that other African governments are not averse to giving this serious consideration. In the meantime, the message from the elections is that people in Somaliland are getting on with building a state and hope that the international community will accept and support them in this. Regionally, in Mogadishu, there was little mainstream criticism of the elections and several LNGOs spoke out in support of the process. There was also considerable interest in Kenya. The recent visit of UN Secretary-General’s special rep Francois Lonseny Fell saw a promise that he would take back to Kofi Annan the pungently expressed view of President Riyale that the UN was holding the people of Somaliland hostage through lack of recognition. In fact Somaliland was seemingly not then discussed, although Somalia and the arms embargo was.
But words alone will be insufficient. The institutions in place to sustain a democratic system in Somaliland need assistance. These include the NEC, parliament, the judiciary and the government itself. It will also be important for people in Somaliland to see the benefits of democracy, by investment in the country’s infrastructure and services and providing information on democratisation (not that Somaliland should accept or believe this uncritically).
In the Somali National Peace Conference in Mbgathi, the strategy of regional and international mediators was to park the issue of Somaliland, in order to protect the stability in that region. The message from Somaliland’s leadership is that the international community should of course support a resolution to the crisis in the south, but in a way that does not hold Somaliland hostage to developments there.
Recently civil society, the media and NEC were engaged in discussion with a major donor. They pointed to a number of key areas, including support for the creation of a strong link between the newly elected MPs, CSOs and Media. This will help the MPs to understand the issues and policies that need to be addressed, in other words awareness raising for the new MPs. Establishment of the new NEC as a sustainable and effective institution after the five years of the current NEC expires.
For women in parliament: affirmative actions and exposure visits to learn from other cases in Uganda and elsewhere. Training the new MPs: second phase of the Somali Democratisation Project.
There need to be more such discussions, of course.
Since our report what has happened and what are the trends we can deduce?
In a sense not a lot has happened since the elections, but there are interesting pointers in matters of consensus, democratisation and nation building. It seems as though there was, after the intervention of the Guurti, recognition by government and others that they could not continue in the old way and just expect Parliament to fall into line in some kind of Cromwellian way. The President’s statement after the crisis was resolved that it was ‘a blessing in disguise’ backed up by his invitation to Parliament to work together for the good of the nation. Tributes from opposition leaders that this showed maturity were also encouraging (although you can't get too cosy).
For the moment attention is still focused on what is happening in the new Parliament. Internal regulations (by-laws) have not been very clear and have seemed in contradiction to the constitution - in part making the November crisis inevitable, perhaps. Furthermore, there has been the formation of three new subcommittees - which point to greater involvement in national affairs - justice and human rights, anti-corruption and environmental and rural communities. Whilst these are being finalised and while the President was out of the country seeking oil agreements in Norway and better health in Germany, it seems as though December was quiet. Parliament has been awaiting the submission of a new government budget and will no doubt be dying to show its mettle when it gets in, even if the amount is likely to be small.
Women’s groups and civil society groups are waiting on Parliament to sort itself out and then engage with them but are hopeful of a good working relationship: not least because of several former civil society activists now being MPs.
We still await resolution of a major issue. At the first public meeting of the newly formed Somaliland Focus (UK) we pointed out that the declaring of EU delegate Ahmed Washington made it difficult for those working outside the country to promote the case for Somaliland’s democratisation process. Since then the President has agreed that Ahmed should return. This is slightly complicated by the fact that he was on the point of being replaced anyway. A further complication is that the Minister of Planning said in a press conference that the PNG decision was not going to be reversed. We await clarity on this and also look to the rule of constitutional law and parliamentary supervision reigning in these matters rather than executive dictat.
It also seems as though parliamentarians are developing a taste for checking the over-mighty powers of the security people. MPs investigating the treatment of demonstrators by the Hargeisa police were themselves physically abused, and as representatives of the people are investigating the way that the police consider themselves above the law.
What happened in Parliament in November shows the key role in consensus played by the most traditional institution: the Guurti. A key Somaliland journalist involved in our report said: ‘The value of traditional wisdom in resolving conflicts was again demonstrated as a determinant factor in this process. When asked by the chairman of the Council of Elders as to why they did not leave this issue for the Supreme Court to decide, his answer was direct, instant and comprehensive: “The decision of the Supreme Court will be final and they consider the issue from the legal point of view. This means there is always a possibility that one party may appear dissatisfied, but ours will be a compromising one and consensus based, considering the issue from the perspective of the supreme interests of the nation”.
The role of the Council of Elders in Somaliland has always been done through the typical African traditional mechanism of conflict management on which a rich culture of reconciliation, concession and consensus was built. How does transformation of this institution occur with the changing Somaliland polity? Adam Jibril Musse says that the high awareness of the Somaliland people, on the grass-root level, provided the method of resolving and solving conflict. How much do we want to lose that strength? Incremental change?
Conclusion
In a sense this is a wider story about how the mix of traditional and understood structures change, at what speed, and who controls and wants to control the process. Given the mix of clan system and autocracy the government’s authority is weak and dependent on its management of clan relations and the patronage of Somaliland’s big businessmen.
Although the report mentions how the election reflected the shifting balances of power within, and between, clans I leave this element to questions and to those more knowledgeable in the audience. I would merely ask: ‘Is the clan system the big problem? What is the future here given that it, along with religion, is a force for stability when there are few safety nets? Is the clan system capable of adaptive change and opening out, including letting women into the closed world? Economic development is often said to be the key - currently the clan is the support system - and the government is not capable yet of really supporting society. Until that begins to change, a move in politics away from clan lines is impossible.
Finally - in response to the question I recycled from Mark Bradbury - one can see the declaration of Somaliland independence within the second wave of democratisation in the early 1990s; arguably it had more success in legitimating the state in the eyes of its citizens at least because it was based on well understood and historically strong foundations that neither colonialism nor scientific socialism were able to wipe out - in essence a social contract which regulates political and economic relationships between pastoral kinship groups rather than delegating responsibility to a central government. Somaliland’s recent history of conflict resolution has involved a bottom-up approach to building societies from local communities upwards, gradually widening the arena of political agreement and political consensus. According again to Ioan Lewis, this method of widening political consensus works when societies are as in the Somali case, highly fragmented and decentralised, and do not conform to assumptions about the universality of civil society and Western multiparty democracy.
How does this fit with the ideas emanating from civil society often influenced by time spent in the diaspora on other (more Western) forms of democratisation? Who negotiates this exchange? It seems as though some of the key actors are beginning to move the hybrid form along to reflect more clearly the developing Somaliland - women’s groups, civil society, urban youth, some of the business sector. How the more traditional elements exemplified perhaps by the ruling party UDUB and a number of clan leaders react to such movement will in reality reflect the Somaliland post-election path. However we should also be aware that this unlikely to be a linear path or ideed binary opposition between ‘so-called progress’ and ‘tradition’ particularly given what has been said about the Guurti and their place in consensus and reconciliation.
As my colleague in Hargeisa puts it - the curtain is down on the first act and we await with interest the second. I commend our report to you.
Thank you.
Steve Kibble
10 January 2006