The 1999 Elections: Before - and After?
The 1999 General Elections have come - and gone? The run-up to these elections saw its share of drama, intrigue, controversies ending in law-suits, party-hopping by ambitious candidates, blatantly shameless and opportunistic vote-catching strategies mainly on the part of the ANC Alliance out to harvest two-thirds of the votes that would be cast, and a display of scepticism by a significant number of the electorate who withheld their votes, reluctant to be duped again as after the 1994 elections.
The first scenes in the election drama involved the government ruling that only a bar-coded identity document (or a certificate proving that such a document had been applied for) would be valid to register for voting and for identification at the polling booths. The New National Party (NNP) and the Democratic Party (DP), who devised their own manoeuvres, saw the advantages for the Alliance in this strategy. The NNP and DP argued that most potential Alliance voters would have applied for their ID documents only after bar-coded documents had been introduced whereas NNP and DP (largely) white voters still had the uncoded books. Their court challenge on the constitutionality of such a ruling failed, but had delayed the naming of an election date. There was the dramatic resignation of Mr. Justice Kriegler as head of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), on the grounds of inadequate government funding, and an inability to complete the arrangements for voting by April/May. His deputy Ms Brigalia Bam took over and saw the process through to 2 June, the election date proclaimed by Pres. Mandela before the rise of parliament in May.
The ANC Alliance went into the election campaign with almost all the cards stacked in its favour. Of the R53m of State funds allocated proportionally to only those parties already in parliament, the Alliance received R30m. The other 11 parties shared the remaining R23m to run their campaigns. Donations from local and foreign interests brought the Alliance total to a reported R1 billion. This enabled it to pay 130 000 election field-workers; hire helicopters, cars, buses; print thousands of election placards, T-shirts, flags and photographs, and propaganda literature.
Further assistance came from Tony Blair's Labour Party - who put the expertise of its election manager and his team at the ANC's disposal. In addition the local press, radio, TV, the Internet went all out in their efforts to punt the ANC Alliance. The press bosses and the lords of international capitalism-imperialism were determined to have the ANC back. President Mandela and his government had in their first period of office in no way endangered capitalist interests. In the face of threats by major South African conglomerates to move overseas the ANC had acted swiftly to show its commitment to creating an investor-friendly milieu in the country. This despite the potentially adverse consequences of such a move to the SA economy and the workers. At the same time, though, the capitalist puppet-masters had to guard against the ANC's gaining almost total power and had probably funded other parties - the United Democratic Party (UDM) - that could dilute this possibility.
To further strengthen their chances the ANC Alliance indulged in the kind of vote-catching manoeuvres that are now quite common to political parties in government. They had saved for just the right moment pieces of evidence of how they were "delivering" to the people. Just before the elections monetary compensation was given to a handful of those whose houses had been stolen during Group Areas removals; people were "resettled" on "their own" land; people were seen smiling their gratitude to a Minister who had provided their homes with taps or electricity, or handed over to them a house or clinic or school. And of course the media were there to ensure that people throughout the country saw and hoped.
At another ceremony President Mandela gave formal recognition to the Traditional Leaders, oiled their palms with hefty salaries and was sure he would receive the votes of the people they controlled. In his wooing of the "Coloured" Western Cape vote Mandela stooped again to exhibiting the two "Coloured" ministers in his Cabinet to prove that the ANC had nothing against the "Coloured people".
The Madiba Magic was a major factor, with vast numbers of people coming in their thousands to the roadshows to wonder, worship and render unto Caesar… With all this going for them how could the ANC Alliance not win the elections? They believed that they would gain clear victories in KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape. But these victories eluded them.
On the lighter side there was the comic opera shufflings and dartings between parties by those greedy, ambitious, self-serving MPs whose sole reason for entering parliament was what they could get out of it. Many of them were disappointed in their hopes that their new party would ensure their stay in or entry into national or provincial government.
And then there was the election itself - the votes that were cast and those that were not. The opposition parties that had naÎvely challenged the government's bar-coded ID books/certificate requirement had been right in smelling a rat. But while they were wasting time on lawsuits the Alliance embarked on a vigorous campaign to ensure that potential voters would register. The 1996 census figures had revealed an estimated 25 million eligible to vote. This number was later reduced to 20 million. By June 2 the IEC declared 18 million persons duly registered and expected to vote. Reducing the total number of registered voters to 18 million of those most likely to vote would raise the percentage poll; create the impression that the Alliance had overwhelming support and that the mass of the electorate accepted the constitutional framework. This would suggest, too, that the prospect of revolt against the present rulers was remote - which would reassure both the local bourgeoisie and the imperialist bosses. This tampering with and adjusting the numbers of the registered voters would serve also to mask any evidence of a voter stay-away or boycott.
Very significant in voting patterns was the fact (revealed in a Cape Times voting summary) that fewer votes were cast in 1999 than in 1994 although this time there were more persons over the age of 18. Newspaper and other reports indicated that in all the provinces large numbers had not registered and so had not voted. Even registered voters stayed away from the polls. Many had indicated in press, radio and TV surveys that they were uncertain about whether to vote.
In the Western Cape 700 000 fewer votes were cast - 30 000 in Manenberg alone - despite the high-power campaigning by the Alliance's top officials. In the Eastern Cape there was a drop of 102 000 on the 1994 poll. The majority of the non-voters gave as the reason for their decision the fact that nothing had changed in their lives. They were highly sceptical that a Government that had not kept their 1994 promises would do any better after the 1999 elections.
One of the shameful roles in the election campaign was that of the ANC's partners in government - the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) and the South African Communist Party (SACP). The people who run this trade union congress do not deserve the title of union leaders. Theirs was a total neglect of workers' interests, their main concern being to keep their seats in parliament or, in the case of some candidates, to ensure their "getting-in". They did not challenge the ANC's failure to improve the lives of the workers, to eliminate poverty, to provide houses. They did not explain on whose instructions the Finance Minister refuses to allocate a bigger percentage of the budget for vital social services - health, social grants and pensions, education. There was no voter-education on the role played by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank - creatures of international Capitalism-Imperialism - to keep the poor poor, the exploited exploited. There was no reference even to the failure of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (Gear) strategy or the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP).
After the ANC's election victory congratulations poured in from G7 country leaders. But there were none from liberation movements anywhere in the world - recognition that the ANC liberation movement government have put behind them what the liberation struggle was about.
Lots of rancour, anger, energy were expended over who was "to rule" in the Western Cape, the formation of a coalition, the failed attempt to get them the compromise in KwaZulu-Natal that would see an ANC Premier in that province.
New Ministerial brooms have swept into action. Tshwete is going to pull the police service into line and solve the horrendous crime problem quick, quick. Minister of Education Kader Asmal is horrified at his 'discovery' that the education system is in a crisis, and is going to change everything even more quickly.
The mass of people still regard as their first priorities, jobs, housing, education, health services, security, clean piped water, electricity. The ANC again promised these would be provided. But in less than two months after the elections scores of thousands of jobs have been lost and thousands more threaten to go. Corruption in government departments continues unabated with no comment at all from Mbeki, possibly because he depends on the loyal support of the culprits. Crime is on the increase.
Will all the dust disturbed by the new brooms again merely hang in the air to blind people to the non-fulfilment of what were the governments 1999 election promises?
[THE EDUCATIONAL JOURNAL VOL.69 #4, OFFICIAL ORGAN
OF THE TEACHERS' LEAGUE OF SOUTH AFRICA, JULY-AUGUST 1999]
EDITOR: Mrs. HN Kies, 15 Upper Bloem Street, Cape Town, 8001