Societies are built on a strong sense of community and group feeling. The community feelings can also turn into communal hatred and discrimination against other communities.  But communal and sectarian conflicts become a source of out let only in those societies where  social and economic structure and political system fail to respond and solve the problems of the society. Under these circumstances, as a result of fear and threat from a community, the other groups and communities create a sense of homogeneity and unite themselves  against the challenges. To give a monolith shape to its solidarity, each community creates, constructs, and develops symbols, rituals, and festivals. They become so holy and venerated that if they are violated  or desecrated , the whole community comes forward to defend them. This leads to bloody communal or sectarian violence: cow slaughter by the Muslims or playing music in front of mosque by the Hindus caused deadly riots in India.

 Moreover, there are individuals and groups who take advantage of communal tension to fulfil their self interests. Such communal feelings are aroused in order to collect funds for construction of a place of worship or to celebrate a festival. These feelings can also lead to the subversion of the state institutions as happened in the case of the Babri mosque at Ayudhiya, where a Hindu fanatic mob demolished the mosque  on 6 December 1992, violating the Supreme court order. It is also evident that land grabbing mafia also used communal conflict  either to eject people from their property or possess a plot by constructing a place of worship to legitimise its possession.

 1997 recalls the incident of a communal conflict occurred in Calcutta in 1897. This involved Hindus and Muslims when the Muslims refused to give possession of a plot of land to its Hindu owner under the order of the court as the land contained a mosque. The land belonged to Maharaja Jatindra Mohan Tagore. The tension became so acute that the police had to intervene. As a result of the police firing, several Muslims were killed. As most of the Muslims involved in the conflict belonged to the lower strata of the community, the educated and elite Muslims felt threatened of the British government response, so they intervened and secured a fatwa from the ulema that no one could build a mosque on another’s land, and no mosque could be built on a land which was not waqf (endowment), and if a landlord did not give his permission then it is not lawful to offer Juma prayer on his land. The fatwa and persuasion of the Muslim elite kept a check on the conflict.

 Hundred years later, in 1997, occurred another communal riot in Pakistan. This time it was not between the Hindus and the Muslims but between the Christians and the Muslims. According to the reports of the newspapers and different organizations it was triggered by the arrest of Raj Mashi for being involved in gambling and illegal sale of alcohol in Khanewal on January 17^th, 1997. During their search the police knocked over a copy of Bible, and did not allow Raj Mashi to pick it up from the floor. On their return from the police station, the household members witnessed the desecration of the Bible and the news spread all over the village. As a result people gathered in Shantinagar and took out a large procession against the desecration of the Bible. They demanded immediate action against the responsible policemen. The accused, however, were set free on bail after their arrest. When the people protested they were assured that the accused would not be spared. But the DSP Chaudhry Habib Ahmad Ghuman used his influence and pressurised the Christians to compromise with the accused, and threatened them if they refused to do so.

 On February 5^th, 1997, the Muslims found few burnt pages of the Quran at a mosque at Pull Pachasi Hazara. The imam announced for immediate agitation from the mosque and within a very short period of time a large band of angry Muslims gathered in the Khanewal city. They attacked the Catholic church, the Christian Boys Hostel; a number of houses were burnt and looted. Young girls and women suffered the most. When asked about the attack they said that the assailants told them that they would be spared only if they recited the kalma and embraced Islam. The whole city singed in the fire of communal hatred. The administration, the army, the police failed to curb the agitation and help the residents of Khanewal.

 One can draw several conclusions from the above mentioned riots. The Hindu-Muslim riot of 1897 took place when the British Raj had firmed its control in the country and, therefore, the government was in a position to handle the problem tactfully, satisfying both communities. Secondly and importantly, there was a presence of a saner element within the communities by which they realised the gravity of the situation. Therefore the two communities did not plunge themselves in the bloody conflict. Thirdly, the role of the ulema, under the presence of the Ashraf Muslims, had some significance. They made use of the fatwa to avert the crisis. These were some of the factors which could suppress the bubbling communal tension.

 Contrarily the 1997 communal riot at Shantinagar shows the inability of the state and its institutions to control the situation. The institutions which keep check on lawlessness and violence were involved in the conflict. Even afterwards, the state did not compensate the victims for their losses and did not punish the perpetrators. Cases of the victims were left pending in the courts.

 It also reveals the apathy of the society, which did not protest or condemn such a dire event. Except for the Human Rights and Christian organisations, the entire society remained unconcerned. Ulema and religious parties were also silent.

 Thus as time progressed and lapsed into hundred years we see the intensification of communal hatred and remission of tolerance towards other communities. It shows a strange stagnation of our society: it is not moving forward nor is it going backwards.