A
few hours after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon,
the Bush administration concluded without supporting evidence, that "Osama
bin Laden and his al-Qaeda organisation were prime suspects". CIA Director
George Tenet stated that bin Laden has the capacity to plan ``multiple attacks
with little or no warning.'' Secretary of State Colin Powell called the attacks
"an act of war" and President Bush confirmed in an evening televised
address to the Nation that he would "make no distinction between the terrorists
who committed these acts and those who harbor them". Former CIA Director
James Woolsey pointed his finger at "state sponsorship," implying
the complicity of one or more foreign governments. In the words of former National
Security Adviser, Lawrence Eagleburger, "I think we will show when we get
attacked like this, we are terrible in our strength and in our retribution."
Meanwhile, parroting official statements, the Western media mantra has approved
the launching of "punitive actions" directed against civilian targets
in the Middle East. In the words of William Saffire writing in the New York
Times: "When we reasonably determine our attackers' bases and camps, we
must pulverize them -- minimizing but accepting the risk of collateral damage"
-- and act overtly or covertly to destabilize terror's national hosts".
The following text outlines the history of Osama Bin Laden and the links of
the Islamic "Jihad" to the formulation of US foreign policy during
the Cold War and its aftermath.
Prime suspect
in the New York and Washington terrorists attacks, branded by the FBI as an
"international terrorist" for his role in the African US embassy bombings,
Saudi born Osama bin Laden was recruited during the Soviet-Afghan war "ironically
under the auspices of the CIA, to fight Soviet invaders". 1
In 1979
"the largest covert operation in the history of the CIA" was launched
in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in support of the pro-Communist
government of Babrak Kamal.2:
With the
active encouragement of the CIA and Pakistan's ISI [Inter Services Intelligence],
who wanted to turn the Afghan jihad into a global war waged by all Muslim states
against the Soviet Union, some 35,000 Muslim radicals from 40 Islamic countries
joined Afghanistan's fight between 1982 and 1992. Tens of thousands more came
to study in Pakistani madrasahs. Eventually more than 100,000 foreign Muslim
radicals were directly influenced by the Afghan jihad.3
The Islamic
"jihad" was supported by the United States and Saudi Arabia with a
significant part of the funding generated from the Golden Crescent drug trade:
In March 1985, President Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive
166,...[which] authorize[d] stepped-up covert military aid to the mujahideen,
and it made clear that the secret Afghan war had a new goal: to defeat Soviet
troops in Afghanistan through covert action and encourage a Soviet withdrawal.
The new covert U.S. assistance began with a dramatic increase in arms supplies
-- a steady rise to 65,000 tons annually by 1987, ... as well as a "ceaseless
stream" of CIA and Pentagon specialists who traveled to the secret headquarters
of Pakistan's ISI on the main road near Rawalpindi, Pakistan. There the CIA
specialists met with Pakistani intelligence officers to help plan operations
for the Afghan rebels.4
The Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) using Pakistan's military Inter-Services Intelligence
(ISI) played a key role in training the Mujahideen. In turn, the CIA sponsored
guerrilla training was integrated with the teachings of Islam: Predominant themes
were that Islam was a complete socio-political ideology, that holy Islam was
being violated by the atheistic Soviet troops, and that the Islamic people of
Afghanistan should reassert their independence by overthrowing the leftist Afghan
regime propped up by Moscow.5
Pakistan's
Intelligence Apparatus
Pakistan's ISI was used as a "go-between". The CIA covert support
to the "jihad" operated indirectly through the Pakistani ISI, --i.e.
the CIA did not channel its support directly to the Mujahideen. In other words,
for these covert operations to be "successful", Washington was careful
not to reveal the ultimate objective of the "jihad", which consisted
in destroying the Soviet Union.
In the words
of CIA's Milton Beardman "We didn't train Arabs". Yet according to
Abdel Monam Saidali, of the Al-aram Center for Strategic Studies in Cairo, bin
Laden and the "Afghan Arabs" had been imparted "with very sophisticated
types of training that was allowed to them by the CIA" 6
CIA's Beardman
confirmed, in this regard, that Osama bin Laden was not aware of the role he
was playing on behalf of Washington. In the words of bin Laden (quoted by Beardman):
"neither I, nor my brothers saw evidence of American help". 7
Motivated
by nationalism and religious fervor, the Islamic warriors were unaware that
they were fighting the Soviet Army on behalf of Uncle Sam. While there were
contacts at the upper levels of the intelligence hierarchy, Islamic rebel leaders
in theatre had no contacts with Washington or the CIA.
With CIA
backing and the funneling of massive amounts of US military aid, the Pakistani
ISI had developed into a "parallel structure wielding enormous power over
all aspects of government". 8 The ISI had a staff
composed of military and intelligence officers, bureaucrats, undercover agents
and informers, estimated at 150,000. 9
Meanwhile,
CIA operations had also reinforced the Pakistani military regime led by General
Zia Ul Haq: 'Relations between the CIA and the ISI [Pakistan's military intelligence]
had grown increasingly warm following [General] Zia's ouster of Bhutto and the
advent of the military regime,'... During most of the Afghan war, Pakistan was
more aggressively anti-Soviet than even the United States. Soon after the Soviet
military invaded Afghanistan in 1980, Zia [ul Haq] sent his ISI chief to destabilize
the Soviet Central Asian states. The CIA only agreed to this plan in October
1984.... `the CIA was more cautious than the Pakistanis.' Both Pakistan and
the United States took the line of deception on Afghanistan with a public posture
of negotiating a settlement while privately agreeing that military escalation
was the best course.10
The Golden
Crescent Drug Triangle
The history of the drug trade in Central Asia is intimately related to the CIA's
covert operations. Prior to the Soviet-Afghan war, opium production in Afghanistan
and Pakistan was directed to small regional markets. There was no local production
of heroin. 11 In this regard, Alfred McCoy's study confirms
that within two years of the onslaught of the CIA operation in Afghanistan,
"the Pakistan-Afghanistan borderlands became the world's top heroin producer,
supplying 60 percent of U.S. demand. In Pakistan, the heroin-addict population
went from near zero in 1979... to 1.2 million by 1985 -- a much steeper rise
than in any other nation":12
CIA assets
again controlled this heroin trade. As the Mujahideen guerrillas seized territory
inside Afghanistan, they ordered peasants to plant opium as a revolutionary
tax. Across the border in Pakistan, Afghan leaders and local syndicates under
the protection of Pakistan Intelligence operated hundreds of heroin laboratories.
During this decade of wide-open drug-dealing, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency
in Islamabad failed to instigate major seizures or arrests ... U.S. officials
had refused to investigate charges of heroin dealing by its Afghan allies `because
U.S. narcotics policy in Afghanistan has been subordinated to the war against
Soviet influence there.' In 1995, the former CIA director of the Afghan operation,
Charles Cogan, admitted the CIA had indeed sacrificed the drug war to fight
the Cold War. `Our main mission was to do as much damage as possible to the
Soviets. We didn't really have the resources or the time to devote to an investigation
of the drug trade,'... `I don't think that we need to apologize for this. Every
situation has its fallout.... There was fallout in terms of drugs, yes. But
the main objective was accomplished. The Soviets left Afghanistan.'13
In the
Wake of the Cold War
In the wake of the Cold War, the Central Asian region is not only strategic
for its extensive oil reserves, it also produces three quarters of the World's
opium representing multibillion dollar revenues to business syndicates, financial
institutions, intelligence agencies and organized crime. The annual proceeds
of the Golden Crescent drug trade (between 100 and 200 billion dollars) represents
approximately one third of the Worldwide annual turnover of narcotics, estimated
by the United Nations to be of the order of $500 billion.14
With the
disintegration of the Soviet Union, a new surge in opium production has unfolded.
(According to UN estimates, the production of opium in Afghanistan in 1998-99
-- coinciding with the build up of armed insurgencies in the former Soviet republics--
reached a record high of 4600 metric tons.15 Powerful
business syndicates in the former Soviet Union allied with organized crime are
competing for the strategic control over the heroin routes.
The ISI's
extensive intelligence military-network was not dismantled in the wake of the
Cold War. The CIA continued to support the Islamic "jihad" out of
Pakistan. New undercover initiatives were set in motion in Central Asia, the
Caucasus and the Balkans. Pakistan's military and intelligence apparatus essentially
"served as a catalyst for the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the
emergence of six new Muslim republics in Central Asia." 16.
Meanwhile,
Islamic missionaries of the Wahhabi sect from Saudi Arabia had established themselves
in the Muslim republics as well as within the Russian federation encroaching
upon the institutions of the secular State. Despite its anti-American ideology,
Islamic fundamentalism was largely serving Washington's strategic interests
in the former Soviet Union.
Following
the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989, the civil war in Afghanistan continued
unabated. The Taliban were being supported by the Pakistani Deobandis and their
political party the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI). In 1993, JUI entered the
government coalition of Prime Minister Benazzir Bhutto. Ties between JUI, the
Army and ISI were established. In 1995, with the downfall of the Hezb-I-Islami
Hektmatyar government in Kabul, the Taliban not only instated a hardline Islamic
government, they also "handed control of training camps in Afghanistan
over to JUI factions..." 17
And the
JUI with the support of the Saudi Wahhabi movements played a key role in recruiting
volunteers to fight in the Balkans and the former Soviet Union. Jane Defense
Weekly confirms in this regard that "half of Taliban manpower and equipment
originate[d] in Pakistan under the ISI" 18
In fact,
it would appear that following the Soviet withdrawal both sides in the Afghan
civil war continued to receive covert support through Pakistan's ISI. 19
In other
words, backed by Pakistan's military intelligence (ISI) which in turn was controlled
by the CIA, the Taliban Islamic State was largely serving American geopolitical
interests. The Golden Crescent drug trade was also being used to finance and
equip the Bosnian Muslim Army (starting in the early 1990s) and the Kosovo Liberation
Army (KLA). In last few months there is evidence that Mujahideen mercenaries
are fighting in the ranks of KLA-NLA terrorists in their assaults into Macedonia.
No doubt,
this explains why Washington has closed its eyes on the reign of terror imposed
by the Taliban including the blatant derogation of women's rights, the closing
down of schools for girls, the dismissal of women employees from government
offices and the enforcement of "the Sharia laws of punishment".20
The War
in Chechnya
With regard to Chechnya, the main rebel leaders Shamil Basayev and Al Khattab
were trained and indoctrinated in CIA sponsored camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
According to Yossef Bodansky, director of the U.S. Congress's Task Force on
Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, the war in Chechnya had been planned during
a secret summit of HizbAllah International held in 1996 in Mogadishu, Somalia.
21 The summit, was attended by Osama bin Laden and high-ranking
Iranian and Pakistani intelligence officers. In this regard, the involvement
of Pakistan's ISI in Chechnya "goes far beyond supplying the Chechens with
weapons and expertise: the ISI and its radical Islamic proxies are actually
calling the shots in this war". 22
Russia's
main pipeline route transits through Chechnya and Dagestan. Despite Washington's
perfunctory condemnation of Islamic terrorism, the indirect beneficiaries of
the Chechen war are the Anglo-American oil conglomerates which are vying for
control over oil resources and pipeline corridors out of the Caspian Sea basin.
The two
main Chechen rebel armies (respectively led by Commander Shamil Basayev and
Emir Khattab) estimated at 35,000 strong were supported by Pakistan's ISI, which
also played a key role in organizing and training the Chechen rebel army: [In
1994] the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence arranged for Basayev and his
trusted lieutenants to undergo intensive Islamic indoctrination and training
in guerrilla warfare in the Khost province of Afghanistan at Amir Muawia camp,
set up in the early 1980s by the CIA and ISI and run by famous Afghani warlord
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. In July 1994, upon graduating from Amir Muawia, Basayev
was transferred to Markaz-i-Dawar camp in Pakistan to undergo training in advanced
guerrilla tactics. In Pakistan, Basayev met the highest ranking Pakistani military
and intelligence officers: Minister of Defense General Aftab Shahban Mirani,
Minister of Interior General Naserullah Babar, and the head of the ISI branch
in charge of supporting Islamic causes, General Javed Ashraf, (all now retired).
High-level connections soon proved very useful to Basayev.23
Following
his training and indoctrination stint, Basayev was assigned to lead the assault
against Russian federal troops in the first Chechen war in 1995. His organization
had also developed extensive links to criminal syndicates in Moscow as well
as ties to Albanian organized crime and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). In
1997-98, according to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) "Chechen
warlords started buying up real estate in Kosovo... through several real estate
firms registered as a cover in Yugoslavia" 24
Basayev's
organisation has also been involved in a number of rackets including narcotics,
illegal tapping and sabotage of Russia's oil pipelines, kidnapping, prostitution,
trade in counterfeit dollars and the smuggling of nuclear materials (See Mafia
linked to Albania's collapsed pyramids, 25 Alongside the
extensive laundering of drug money, the proceeds of various illicit activities
have been funneled towards the recruitment of mercenaries and the purchase of
weapons.
During his
training in Afghanistan, Shamil Basayev linked up with Saudi born veteran Mujahideen
Commander "Al Khattab" who had fought as a volunteer in Afghanistan.
Barely a few months after Basayev's return to Grozny, Khattab was invited (early
1995) to set up an army base in Chechnya for the training of Mujahideen fighters.
According to the BBC, Khattab's posting to Chechnya had been "arranged
through the Saudi-Arabian based [International] Islamic Relief Organisation,
a militant religious organisation, funded by mosques and rich individuals which
channeled funds into Chechnya".26
Concluding
Remarks
Since the Cold War era, Washington has consciously supported Osama bin Laden,
while at same time placing him on the FBI's "most wanted list" as
the World's foremost terrorist.
While the
Mujahideen are busy fighting America's war in the Balkans and the former Soviet
Union, the FBI --operating as a US based Police Force- is waging a domestic
war against terrorism, operating in some respects independently of the CIA which
has --since the Soviet-Afghan war-- supported international terrorism through
its covert operations.
In a cruel
irony, while the Islamic jihad --featured by the Bush Adminstration as "a
threat to America"-- is blamed for the terrorist assaults on the World
Trade Centre and the Pentagon, these same Islamic organisations constitute a
key instrument of US military-intelligence operations in the Balkans and the
former Soviet Union.
In the wake of the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, the truth must prevail to prevent the Bush Adminstration together with its NATO partners from embarking upon a military adventure which threatens the future of humanity.
Endnotes Hugh Davies, International: `Informers' point the finger at bin Laden; Washington on alert for suicide bombers, The Daily Telegraph, London, 24 August 1998. See Fred Halliday, "The Un-great game: the Country that lost the Cold War, Afghanistan, New Republic, 25 March 1996): Ahmed Rashid, The Taliban: Exporting Extremism, Foreign Affairs, November-December 1999. Steve Coll, Washington Post, July 19, 1992. Dilip Hiro, Fallout from the Afghan Jihad, Inter Press Services, 21 November 1995. Weekend Sunday (NPR); Eric Weiner, Ted Clark; 16 August 1998. Ibid. Dipankar Banerjee; Possible Connection of ISI With Drug Industry, India Abroad, 2 December 1994. Ibid See Diego Cordovez and Selig Harrison, Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal, Oxford university Press, New York, 1995. See also the review of Cordovez and Harrison in International Press Services, 22 August 1995. Alfred McCoy, Drug fallout: the CIA's Forty Year Complicity in the Narcotics Trade. The Progressive; 1 August 1997. Ibid Ibid. Douglas Keh, Drug Money in a changing World, Technical document no 4, 1998, Vienna UNDCP, p. 4. See also Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 1999, E/INCB/1999/1 United Nations Publication, Vienna 1999, p 49-51, And Richard Lapper, UN Fears Growth of Heroin Trade, Financial Times, 24 February 2000. Report of the International Narcotics Control Board, op cit, p 49-51, see also Richard Lapper, op. cit. International Press Services, 22 August 1995. Ahmed Rashid, The Taliban: Exporting Extremism, Foreign Affairs, November- December, 1999, p. 22. Quoted in the Christian Science Monitor, 3 September 1998) Tim McGirk, Kabul learns to live with its bearded conquerors, The Independent, London, 6 November1996. See K. Subrahmanyam, Pakistan is Pursuing Asian Goals, India Abroad, 3 November 1995. Levon Sevunts, Who's calling the shots?: Chechen conflict finds Islamic roots in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 23 The Gazette, Montreal, 26 October 1999.. Ibid Ibid. See Vitaly Romanov and Viktor Yadukha, Chechen Front Moves To Kosovo Segodnia, Moscow, 23 Feb 2000. The European, 13 February 1997, See also Itar-Tass, 4-5 January 2000. BBC, 29 September 1999).