Although Iraq is in a critical humanitarian situation, international development and cooperation organizations are few in the country. Apart from the United Nations organizations (FAO/WFP, UNICEF and WHO), only six NGOs are active on the ground in Iraq, and, of these six, three are small, independent, European NGOs. If we compare Iraq's situation with other countries facing humanitarian crises in sub-Saharan Africa or in Eastern Europe, the large international NGOs, like OXFAM or Save the Children, are conspicuous in Iraq by their absence.

This absence is mainly the result of two factors: the Iraqi government's refusal to accept international aid, on the one hand, and the United Nations embargo, on the other. In the first case, it must be understood that Iraq used to be quite a rich country with a well-developed infrastructure and universal health and education systems. The Iraqis are very proud of these achievements, and are thus reluctant to accept that their country needs international assistance to survive while they are prevented from selling their oil. As for the embargo, it is clear that a good number of NGOs rely on government funding to carry out their projects in the field. Since western governments are taking part in the embargo, western NGOs do not find it easy to justify why they should be in Iraq. For example, the majority of Canadian NGOs are funded by CIDA, a Canadian government agency. Finally, there is a lack of clear, reliable information on the humanitarian situation in Iraq, and, as a result, NGOs tend not to get involved.

 

The work of the international NGOs

The NGOs that are currently in Iraq mainly carry out frontline work. The French NGOs, Première Urgence and Enfants du Monde, distribute clothing, food and school supplies, and rehabilitate hospitals and orphanages. Un Ponte per Bagdad, an Italian NGO, works to rehabilitate schools and distribute educational material. These NGOs operate under supervision of the Iraqi Red Crescent which exercises a certain degree of control over their projects and sometimes makes decisions that restrict their capacity to act. For example, the Red Crescent recently decided that the NGOs could no longer distribute medicine. From now on, the Red Crescent will be exclusively responsible for this task.

Although the work of these organizations is necessary and meets certain needs for children, schools and hospitals, it is only humanitarian emergency work. Distributing food and clothing meets immediate needs, but does not deal with long-term problems. Handing out school supplies does not solve the problem of poorly motivated teachers who are paid $2—4 per month. According to Hans von Sponeck, the UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq, the NGOs working in Iraq have no long-term strategy to propose. Even the UN program itself, which is supposed to be "temporary and supplementary" has become permanent, due to enforcement of the embargo for the past nine years.

According to all the NGOs we met, the current humanitarian situation in Iraq is going to continue to deteriorate if the embargo is maintained. The NGOs in Iraq suffer from two types of constraint: either they do not have enough means (i.e., they are too small), or they do not have the mandate (like the UN member organizations) to enable them to plan sustainable development projects aimed at making Iraq self-sufficient At the same time, the embargo keeps the Iraqi population in a "struggle for survival" mode in which it is dependent on the emergency humanitarian measures currently being provided. Some UN officials said that the situation is in the process of creating a "asking-hand" mentality in the Iraqi population, a mentality that did not exist before. It is clear that even if the embargo were lifted tomorrow, the problems of development in Iraq would not be over at all. The current situation which is keeping an entire, formerly prosperous, people in a state of underdevelopment, is the result of nine years of sanctions, and rebuilding the country is bound to take at least as many years. Canadian NGOs must therefore get involved in educational and awareness campaigns to denounce this embargo, and not simply confine themselves to aid projects.

 

 IX. THE "OIL FOR FOOD" PROGRAM

Anyone reading this report so far, might well wonder: "Yes, but isn't there a United Nations program, called "Oil for Food," that should indeed allow Iraq to sell its oil and then use the revenue to meet the basic needs of its people?"

In fact, this program does exist, and it is the largest program ever launched in order to meet a single country's basic human needs. It is also the program whose last two coordinators resigned in an uproar, calling for the immediate, unconditional lifting of sanctions.

Security Council resolutions concerning the embargo

Let us remember that it was Security Council Resolution (SCR) 661, adopted on August 6, 1990, a few days after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, that instituted the sanctions. The resolution ordered a total embargo of all exports and all imports, except for food or other medical or humanitarian supplies approved by the sanctions committee , which, exceptionally, is composed of representatives of all 15 member countries of the United Nations Security Council. The following month, the Iraqi government instituted a system of food rationing.

In April 1991, SCR 687 set out the cease-fire terms: the disarming of Iraq in order to remove its capacity to manufacture weapons of mass destruction.

As early as March 20, 1991, United Nations Under-Secretary-General Martti Ahtisaari warned that a humanitarian catastrophe was imminent in Iraq. Also in 1991, the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) and other independent investigators issued similar warnings. SCRs 706 and 712, in August and September 1991 respectively, proposed to Iraq that it sell oil for a value of $1.6 billion for every six-month period in order to meet humanitarian needs . These resoluations were rejected by Iraq.

On April 14, 1995, the Security Council adopted the so-called "oil for food" resolution, SCR 986. This resolution authorized Iraq to sell oil for a value of $2 billion for every period of six months and to use this money for "humanitarian needs". Intense negotiations with the Iraqi government led to the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding on May 20, 1996, which set out how SCR 986 was to be implemented. The first barrels of oil were exported on December 10, 1996, and the first imported food arrived in March 1997.

In February 1998, SCR 1153 raised the ceiling on allowable oil exports to $5.265 billion per six-month period. However, Iraq was unable to meet this figure because of the condition of its oil production equipment. Following a report by a group of independent oil industry consultants retained by the Security Council, SCRs 1175, 1210 and 1242 were adopted in 1998 and 1999. These further resolutions authorized the use of $300-million installments through the program to purchase equipment and spare parts for the Iraqi oil industry.

 

How does the program operate?

It should first be pointed out that Iraq does not get a penny from the sale of its oil under the terms of the program. The proceeds from the oil sold are deposited in a "sanctions account" with the Banque Nationale de Paris in New York.

Second, the oil-for-food program's name does not suit it very well . . . SCR 986, in fact, stipulates that the proceeds from the sale of Iraq's oil should be allocated in the following way:

• 30% for the Fund to compensate Kuwait, companies and individuals for damage suffered as a result of the Iraqi invasion and the Gulf War;
• 13% for humanitarian needs in three autonomous governorates in Northern Iraq (representing 14% of the country's population) with distribution being carried out by UN agencies;
• 53% for humanitarian needs for the 15 governorates in Central and Southern Iraq (representing 86% of the country's population) with distribution being carried out by the Iraqi government; and
• 4% for the program's operating costs , distribution supervision teams, customs and oil industry inspection teams, the special disarmament commission (UNSCOM), bank charges, and so on.

When the Security Council authorizes the use of oil revenues up to a value of $2 billion per six-month period (a limit that was later increased to $5.265 billion), in fact, only half of these amounts can be used to meet the needs of the 20.9 million Iraqis living under the central government's authority. On an annual basis, this represented a ceiling of $101.44 per person before 1998 and $267.03 per person since. According to the UN's own standards, this places the Iraqi population in a state of underdevelopment equivalent to that of certain poor countries in sub-Saharan Africa.

The oil-for-food program is coordinated in New York by the Office of the Iraq Programme (OIP) with Benon Sevan as Executive Director. On a regular basis, the OIP and the United Nations Secretary-General report directly to the Security Council. In-field operations are coordinated by the office of the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq (UNOHCI), which reports to the OIP. The UNOHCI's office has its own civil servants, but it mainly collaborates with the many UN agencies already established in Iraq: UNICEF, WHO, FAO, WFP, UNESCO and UNDP (the United Nations Development Program).

The program operates by six-month periods. Phase I began on December 10, 1996, and ended on June 7, 1997; we are currently in Phase VII.

At the beginning of every new phase, the Iraqi government submits a distribution plan (DP) for the UN Secretary-General's approval. This plan lists the needs for which it plans to use the oil revenues from the next phase.

On approval of the Secretary-General, the pumping and exportation of oil for that phase begins. In New York, two international oil trade experts act as supervisors and approve the sales contracts on behalf of the 661 Committee. A private company, Saybolt BV Nederland, acts as an independent inspection agent in Iraq to verify that the oil exported complies with what has been authorized in New York; a total of 14 inspectors are assigned to supervise the oil facilities and the loading and transfer of oil.

In addition, each purchase contract between Iraq and its foreign suppliers has to be submitted for approval by the 661 Sanctions Committee. After the contracts are approved, a complex supervisory network checks that the goods arrive, reach their destinations, and are used as intended; in addition, numerous observers regularly assess to what extent the purchases allowed by the program help to improve the humanitarian situation in Iraq or not.

Specifically, since February 1999, the Swiss company, Cotecna Inspections SA, provides independent inspection services at the four approved entry points with the neighbouring countries . Overall, the oil-for-food program is closely monitored by a three-tier mechanism:

• First, between 60 and 80 sector inspectors , belonging to various United Nations agencies, make regulars reports on the aspects of the program that fall under their agency's mandate.
• Second, a special Geographical Observation Unit (GOU) verifies the actual distribution of food over the entire territory of Iraq; this unit employs up to 55 generalists and international experts.
• Third, a special Multidisciplinary Observation Unit (MDOU) covers a wide range of fields: food, logistics, electricity, health, water and wastewater treatment, agriculture and education. This is the body that sets the standards and guidelines for all the supervisory and inspection work; it receives regular reports from the other two levels and can either conduct its own investigations or authorize the GOU to do so. The MDOU systematically follows up all the authorized goods.

The UNOHCI's office also collates and synthesizes the results from the first two levels of observation. Its regular reports contribute to the UN Secretary-General's quarterly reports to the Security Council. In addition, the MDOU reports to the OIP in New York.

 

A program that does not prevent the situation from deteriorating

Our delegation had a very enlightening conversation with George Somerwill, the UNOHCI's information officer. He explained to us that, in spite of the higher oil export ceiling granted Iraq, the country had never been able to reach this level during the period from February 1998 to August 1999. The very most it was able to reach was oil exports worth $3.4 billion. In the most recent phase, however, Iraq had exceeded the ceiling, not because of increased production, but because of increased prices. In fact, Iraq's oil industry infrastructure is in dire need of repair and maintenance; according to Mr. Somerwill, the industry is currently operating under worrisome conditions that pose serious risks, in terms of explosions or fires, for workers, nearby populations, and the environment, in general.

The overall process has resulted in major delays for the program. The approval of several contracts has been accelerated, but there is often a very long timelag between submission of a contract and delivery of the corresponding goods. At the time of our meeting when Phase VII was due to start, only 2—3% of Phase VI merchandise was in process of being distributed!

Under the oil-for-food program, Iraq has not the option of using normal business avenues of recourse. Thus, the country is not able to reject merchandise that is defective, expired or spoiled, and then be reimbursed, if necessary. It would appear that it is always the same four or five countries (some western and some Arab) that take advantage of this situation . . .

With respect to American criticism to the effect that the Iraqi government has deliberately blocked distribution of medicine, Mr. Somerwill indicated that the UNOHCI submits monthly reports on this question. He confirmed that, in February 1999, there was indeed a large quantity of medicine that was blocked. However, 85—95% of such distribution problems are caused by logistical difficulties, such as lack of means to test some of the medicine and trucks to transport refrigerated goods or delicate equipment . In certain situations, Iraq has had no choice but to store the goods and wait. The following case seems to bear this view out: dental clinic chairs worth a total of $65 million remained in storage because the contract for the compressors needed for the chairs to operate had not been approved! In addition, all Iraqi ministries suffer from workforce shortages. While even the most experienced managerial staff earn only $5—10 per month, several simply just leave Iraq, while others are clearly not motivated to work.

Some civil servants with the UN office in Irak explained to us that the 661 Committee is totally dominated by the United States and Great Britain. This domination is facilitated by the committee's makeup: for the most part, "junior" officers who, because they are afraid of reprisals and eager for promotion, are easily manipulated by their respective ambassadors. In practice, the American and British representatives have blocked contracts for a total value of $1.5 billion, mostly for spare parts for infrastructure and for the oil industry. Iraq has recently requested that the oil-for-food program include a component for housing and also cover Iraq's contribution arrears to the United Nations . Both requests were rejected.

 

So, what's the result?

At the time of our visit to Iraq, three independent evaluations, including two commissioned by the UN and one by Great Britain, had already concluded that the humanitarian situation in Iraq was continuing to deteriorate. The oil-for-food program had helped slow down this deterioration, but it had not prevented it. Its most important effect is probably the improvement in the individual food ration, which increased from 1,275 kilocalories in 1996 to around 2,200 kilocalories. However, this ration still does not contain any meat, vegetables or fruit; as a result, problems of malnutrition persist.

The oil-for-food program was intended to be temporary, but it has lasted for a good number of years. It was intended to be an emergency, complementary program, but in practice, it had to substitute for the entire economy of a country with 24 million inhabitants. Thus, it is clear that the situation would have been a lot worse, if the program had not existed. However, independently of the noble intentions that may or may not motivate its managers and civil servants, one cannot help thinking about the particularly pernicious and revulsing nature of this whole situation for the Iraqi people. Iraq used to be a prosperous country, but it has been almost literally sacked, and brutal sanctions prevent it from rebuilding itself. Iraq has been impoverished and forced, in effect, to live on an assistance program – and all at its own expense. It is a country forced to use a major part of the meagre resources granted to it to compensate Kuwait, certain corporations and certain rich individuals, while its own children die at terrifying rates, and while it is not allowed to take care of them. Beyond this material deprivation, this state of affairs constitutes a deep humiliation inflicted on this very proud people.

We asked Mr. Somerwill if, in practice, the oil-for-food program was not just one further sanction against Iraq. He replied: "I think that perhaps it was not intended to be one, but that is certainly what it has turned out to be."

In December 1999, the Security Council adopted resolution 1284, alleviating the embargo but making this alleviation conditional on additional inspections. The whole resolution was couched in ambiguous language that will undoubtedly allow the United States and Great Britain to continue their systematic blocking within the sanctions committee. Iraqi officials explained to us that this resolution meant in practice that they would suffer both the embargo and the inspection program, without significant improvement in either.

It is the civilian population of Iraq that has been the first victim of this form of war, the UN economic embargo. The oil-for-food program has not prevented a deterioration of the humanitarian situation. This deterioration has been confirmed by reports from UN organizations and the UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq, Hans von Sponeck. In fact, Mr. von Sponeck resigned because he felt that, under present conditions, he was no longer able to fulfil his mandate.

Sanctions have seriously affected the Iraqi economy with disastrous consequences on people's individual lives. The Iraqi population has been deprived of its most basic rights in health and education, and perhaps even more deprived of its right to human dignity. The Iraqi dinar is now worth no more than 1/6000^th of what it was worth ten years ago. This situation has forced all those who rely on employment income into misery in a slow and pernicious way, and it has paralyzed all government institutions responsible for social services.

We were able to observe how Iraqi institutions, both governmental and civil society institutions, have been broken down. Iraq used to be a rich society, with oil, a significant agriculture sector, and an enviable social service system in health and education. It used to be an example for many developing countries. Years of sanctions have paralyzed this system by depriving it of financial means and of certain material requirements that it is prohibited from importing. Its social services are now comparable with countries classified as "the poorest" by international institutions. In a country where social expenditures have fallen to 10—15% of their pre-sanctions levels, the country's entire social and health infrastructure has been paralyzed. Millions of human beings live in miserable conditions that are a far cry from the developed system operating ten years ago. A generation of young people without future prospects is beginning to lose hope and there are many who just want to get out. Nine years of sanctions have, in the end, affected people in their most profound being.

The consequences of this situation on the people's health has been disastrous. Infant mortality, one of the most robust indicators of a country's health, which used to be, in Iraq, one of the lowest of all developing countries, has increased dramatically. UNICEF officials estimate that more than 500,000 of the infant deaths that have occurred in Iraq between 1991 and 1998 should be attributed to the effects of economic sanctions. Several infant illnesses, like polio, that had been practically eradicated in Iraq have resurfaced after sanctions were imposed. Iraq is now experiencing a resurgence of diseases, such as measles, infantile diarrhea and tuberculosis, all symptomatic of Third World countries devastated by decades of war and famine. One in four children suffers from severe, chronic malnutrition. According to UNICEF researchers, the shortage of vital medicine and antibiotics is directly attributable to the sanctions program. An abnormally high number of children have also been found with leukemia and other forms of cancer, as well as some multiple congenital malformations, which several researchers attribute to the presence of depleted uranium in the munitions used by the allied forces.

The Iraqi education system has been severely affected, as the inflation caused by the devaluation of the dinar making its budget ridiculously low. We saw schools in a terrible state of deterioration, underpaid teachers and children too undernourished to benefit from what is left of the system. We observed the phenomenon of "street children", reflecting the alarming school dropout statistics provided by UNICEF. An entire generation, perhaps even two, are currently being sacrificed. Although a rich cultural tradition is being maintained in spite of the embargo, cultural activities have been seriously compromised by the embargo.

Two main reasons make it difficult for foreign NGOs to work in Iraq. First, the pro-sanctions policies of their respective governments (who are often their sources of funding) and, second, the overly controlling attitude of the Iraqi authorities. The basic mindset of Iraqi officials is that their country has no need for foreign aid, but just needs to be left alone to use its own resources to develop itself.

We cannot remain indifferent to this state of affairs. We consider that Canada's support for the sanctions and for the bombing of Iraq constitutes a grave violation of the Iraqi people's human rights, rights that are recognized by the international charters Canada subscribes to. Such support contradicts the loudly proclaimed humanitarian principles that are supposed to guide Canadian foreign policy. We feel that the authoritarian character of the Iraqi regime is no justification at all for a program of sanctions that affects first and foremost the civilian population of Iraq. We believe that these sanctions cannot be justified either morally or politically.

CONSEQUENTLY,

• We urge the people of Quebec and of the rest of Canada to object to the current Canadian policy of supporting the sanctions against Iraq and the bombing of its territory.
  
• We urge both individuals and associations to mobilize and support mobilization efforts to convince the Canadian government to change its policy.
• We request the Canadian government to immediately withdraw its support for sanctions and for the bombing of Iraq, and to use its current membership in the Security Council to promote this point of view.

The humanitarian catastrophe, caused by the 1991 bombing campaign and by the sanctions that have been in effect for almost ten years, is probably one of the best documented situations of this type. Here is a partial list of the reports published by various international bodies. We also give the references to the specialized journals that we have quoted.

 

"We are destroying an entire society. It is as simple and as terrifying as that."

• Denis Halliday, former coordinator of the UN Humanitarian Program in Iraq, who has resigned in protest. Since his resignation, Mr. Halliday has not stopped denouncing the sanctions against Iraq. During his visit in Ottawa in December 199 and in March 2000, he stated that these sanctions amounted to genocide.

 

"The country is finished…. Even if sanctions were stopped tomorrow, this country will need another 30 or 40 years to get back to what it used to be."

• Francesca Noè, Coordinator of the Iraq section of the Italian NGO Un Ponte per … Ms Noè has been living in Bagdad for the last year. January 2000.

 

"The humanitarian situation here in Irak is continuing to deteriorate."

• George Somerwill, Spokesperson and Information Officer at the United Nations Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq (UNOHCI). January 2000.

 

"We are not here as useful idiots for the Iraqi officials."

• Hans von Sponeck, reacting with anger to American criticism that he is doing propaganda for Saddam Hussein when he denounces the humanitarian consequences of the sanctions. January 2000. Mr. von Sponeck, who succeeded Denis Halliday as Humanitarian Coordinator in Irak, has also resigned. He considers that the program does not provide the essential needs of the Iraqi population and that Security Council Resolution 1284 will be difficult to apply.

 

"The calls of Iraqi children, transmitted to us by our sons of the Church of Iraq, have deeply moved us. They refuse to die from hunger, and they want to live and act for peace. We call on the United Nations Organization to lift the embargo on Iraq, whose civilian popultation, women, children, the elderly, the sick and the poor pay the price which is very high. It is a grave injustice to oppress innocents in this way."

• Final Declaration of the Patriarchs and Bishops of the Catholic Churches of the Middle East, May 1999.

 

"It is time for a new approach to Iraq. We cannot turn a deaf ear to the suffering of the Iraqi people or a blind eye to the moral consequences of current U.S. policy."

 

"This embargo is also inflicting psychological damage on everyone. It will undoubtedly foster a strong resentment towards the West. What were they hoping for? A rebellion against the regime? That’s ridiculous!. ª

 

" Tell me what purpose does this embargo fulfil, in whose name has it lasted for the last ten years, and especially against whom? We will never cease to repeat that it constitutes a senseless and inhuman scandal and its ill-fated consequences only affect the poor. It is an act against justice and against the cause of human peace around the world."

"The United States want to kill Iraq, kill Iraq at the mental, psychological, and intellectual levels. The imagination, the thinking of the people are being targeted. In ten more years, there will no longer be a people. It will be dead. It is being killed, far beyond food rationing; it is physical and mental, emotional and intellectual. It is the very expression of emptiness, of nothingness; all these people die waiting, for nothing. There is no frustration, only vacuum. These families waiting, these women alone with their children, their heads bowed. Passivity every day of the week. Reflection. Sadness. Examine my sculptures representing people looking at an empty box: it is ourselves, the Iraqis, we are staring at life, this vacuum, this empty box, our life under the embargo."

"The embargo is worse than war, because in war you can only meet death from a single side: in front. Whereas with the embargo, we are surrounded by death, threatened by it, whenever we meet friends, when we venture into making projects, or planning our personal lives. For war, there is eventually a last day. But the embargo does not even have a set definition. There is no horizon beyond which an end could be in sight. The embargo is overwhelming, crushing the human being within ourselves. And we are made only false promises."