Going fast have you got yours a full record of 2001 all pages(weeks) are included, so catch up on all that's been happening.
EAST TIMOR ONLINE
Concerns as Timor troops told to stay
By PAUL DALEY
DEFENCE CORRESPONDENT
CANBERRA
Thursday 3 August 2000
Morale has slumped radically among Australian Air Force personnel guarding East Timor's main airport since they received orders to stay in Dili for up to four months longer than their original deployment.
Members of 383 Squadron, the newest unit in the Royal Australian Air Force, were deployed on June 8 with a finishing date of October 30.
But due to a United Nations hiccup and unprecedented pressure on Australian Defence Force resources because of the 2000 Olympics, the squadron was told on July 7 that its five-month tour of East Timor would be extended until February 28 next year.
RAAF sources told The Age that some members of 383 Squadron - which comprises Air Defence Guards from across Australia - are suffering anxiety because of the sudden decision to extend their deployment.
Some fear the decision to extend the mission could put pressure on their marriages and long-term relationships, while others are already planning to leave the Air Force after their deployment.
Sources said that some of the guards selected to go to East Timor did so on the understanding they would be home with their families by Christmas.
"No real explanation has been given and morale has plummeted, in particular among those members who have to tell their families the news ... several are openly expecting divorce," one RAAF officer told The Age.
A spokesman for the RAAF confirmed that 383 Squadron's deployment had been extended until the end of February because the United Nations - which is in control of East Timor - had not been able to finalise a contract for airport security at Dili's Comoro Airfield.
The new arrangements for airport security, which has been managed mainly by Australian Defence Force personnel since the deployment of InterFET late last year, had been expected to begin in October.
"There has been no specific complaints from the Air Defence Guards. But we understand that this does place some strain on members of 383 Squadron who have families," the spokesman said. "But the bottom line here is that Australia has an operational commitment in East Timor and a major part of that commitment involves security at Comoro."
Sources said the decision to extend the squadron's deployment came after anecdotal and official assessments had shown the high personal cost of deployment to some personnel.
Pyschological assessments on some units leaving East Timor after four-month deployments showed that up to 25per cent were experiencing, or expected to experience, marital problems or relationship breakdown. Some assessments also showed that up to 40per cent of personnel from some units would seek discharges after ariving home.
Australian peacekeepers shot dead one pro-Jakarta militiaman and wounded at least one other in an exchange of fire near the East Timor border yesterday.
It was the first time a militiaman had been killed by UN peacekeepers since they replaced the Australian-led Interfet force in February, and follows increased tension along the border after a New Zealand soldier was shot dead last Monday.
At least one other militia member was wounded during yesterday's firefight, which occurred shortly after midday northeast of the border town of Maliana.
The dead man was wearing Indonesian camouflage fatigues and was armed with a military assault rifle.
Military spokesman Captain Dan Hurren said the gunfight started when the militia opened fire with semi-automatic weapons and grenades on a platoon of more than 30 men from Sixth Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment.
There were no casualties among the peacekeepers, who had been tracking up to five militia after receiving a tip-off from local people.
Australian and New Zealand helicopters were involved in the operation
Please read and feel very, very angry towards this women, as I do.
Charles "Blue" Parsons.
Subj: KEEP THIS MOVING ACROSS AMERICA HONORING A TRAITOR This is for all the
kids born in the 70's that do not remember this, and didn't have to bear the
burden, that our fathers, mothers, and older brothers and sisters had to
bear.Jane Fonda is being honored as one of the "100 Women of the Century."
Unfortunately, many have forgotten and still countless others have never
known how Ms. Fonda betrayed not only the idea of our country but specific
men who served and sacrificed during Vietnam.
The first part of this is from an F-4E pilot. The pilot's name is Jerry
Driscoll, a River Rat. In 1978, the former Commandant of the USAF Survival
School was a POW in Ho Lo Prison-the "Hanoi Hilton." Dragged from a stinking
cesspit of a cell, cleaned, fed, and dressed in clean PJs, he was ordered to
describe for a visiting American "Peace Activist" the "lenient and humane
treatment" he'd received. He spat at Ms. Fonda, was clubbed, and dragged
away.
During the subsequent beating, he fell forward upon the camp Commandant's
feet, which sent that officer berserk. In '78, the AF Col. still suffered
from double vision (which permanently ended his flying days) from the
Vietnamese Col.'s frenzied application of a wooden baton.
From 1963-65, Col.Larry Carrigan was in the 47FW/DO (F-4Es). He spent
6 -years in the
"Hilton"- the first three of which he was "missing in action". His wife
lived on faith that he was still alive. His group, too, got the cleaned,
fed, clothed routine in preparation for a "peace delegation" visit.
They, however, had time and devised a plan to get word to the world that
they still survived. Each man secreted a tiny piece of paper, with his SSN
on it, in the palm of his hand. When paraded before Ms. Fonda and a
cameraman, she walked the line, shaking each man's hand and asking little
encouraging snippets like: "Aren't you sorry you bombed babies?" and "Are
you grateful for the humane treatment from your benevolent captors?"
Believing this HAD to be an act, they each palmed her their sliver of paper.
She took them all without missing a beat. At the end of the line and once
the camera stopped rolling, to the shocked disbelief of the POWs, she turned
to the officer in charge and handed him the little pile of papers. Three men
died from the subsequent beatings. Col. Carrigan was almost number four
but he survived, which is the only reason we know about her actions that
day.
I was a civilian economic development advisor in Vietnam, and was captured
by the North Vietnamese communists in South Vietnam in 1968, and held for
over 5 years. I spent 27 months in solitary confinement, one year in a cage
in Cambodia, and one year in a "black box" in Hanoi. My North Vietnamese
captors deliberately poisoned and murdered a female missionary, a nurse in a
leprosarium in Ban me Thuot, South Vietnam, whom I buried in the jungle near
the Cambodian border.
At one time, I was weighing approximately 90 lbs. (My normal weight is 170
lbs.) We were Jane Fonda's "war criminals."
When Jane Fonda was in Hanoi, I was asked by the camp communist political
officer if I would be willing to meet with Jane Fonda. I said yes, for I
would like to tell her about the real treatment we POWs received different
from the treatment purported by the North Vietnamese, and parroted by Jane
Fonda, as "humane and lenient." Because of this, I spent three days on a
rocky floor on my knees with outstretched arms with a large amount of steel
placed on my hands, and beaten with a bamboo cane till my arms dipped.
I had the opportunity to meet with Jane Fonda for a couple of hours after I
was released. I asked her if she would be willing to debate me on TV. She
did not answer me.
This does not exemplify someone who should be honored as part of "100 Years
of Great Women." Lest we forget..."100 years of great women" should never
include a traitor whose hands are covered with the blood of so many
patriots. There are few things I have strong visceral reactions to, but
Hanoi Jane's participation in blatant treason, is one of them.
Please take the time to forward to as many people as you possibly can. It
will eventually end up on her computer and she needs to know that we will
never forget.
" Added to our Blue Beret Index Page "
If you havn't noticed i have added a calendar to highlite upcoming events thoughout the coming year if there is anything that you would like to add to our calender please email me and i'll add the details required.
The POM.
Note as i said i'm sorry about the short notice but theres another Stale Biscuit get together at the POM's joint 90 Station St Weston on Friday the 25th at about 10-00am.
No. 2 Squadron (Canberra bombers)
Serial No.................. Period of Service...................... Remarks
A84-228............May 67-Mar 71......Shot down by SAM
A84-230................Apr 67-Jun 71
A84-231................Apr 67-Nov 70............... Lost without trace
A84-232................Aug 67-Jun 71
A84-233................Sep 67-Jun 71
A84-234................Apr 67-May 71
A84-235................May 67-Aug 70
A84-236..................Apr 67-Jun 71
A84-237..................Apr 67-Mar 71
A84-238....................Jul 69-Feb 71
A84-240...................Apr 67-Jun 70
A84-241.....................Jun 68-Jul 70................RTA after landing accident
A84-242...................Apr 67-Jun 71
A84-244...................May 68-Jun 71
A84-245....................Apr 67-Jun 71
A84-246......................Jul 67-Jun 71
A84-247.......................Jul 69-Feb 71
A84-248.....................Jun 67-Mar 71
No. 9 Squadron (Iroquois helicopters)
Serial No................... Period of Service*....... Remarks
UH-1B
A2-1 018.................................Jun 66-Oct 66........ Crashed and burnt
A2-1 019................................Jun 66-Feb 68
A2-1020.................................Jun 66-Feb 68
A2-1021................................ Jun 66-Mar 68
A2-1022..................................Jun 66-Oct 68
A2-1023................................. Jun 66-Feb 68
A2-1024................................. Jun 66-Jan 68
A2-1025.................................. Jun 66-Jan 69
Serial No................... Period of Service*......... Remarks
UH-1D
A2-085............Nov 66-Mar 68.........Numbered A2-041 until May 67
A2-649.............Nov 67-Mar 68
UH-1H
A2-110............Dec 69-Dec 71
A2-149.............Jan 69-Dec 71
A2-376.............Feb 68-Dec 71
A2-377.............Feb 68-Dec 71
A2-378..............Feb 68-Dec 71
A2-379..............Feb 68-Dec 71
A2-380..............Feb 68-Dec 71
A2-381...............Feb 68-Oct 69.........Crashed; destroyed by SAS
A2-382...............Feb 68-Jun 70........Written off
A2-383................Feb 68-Dec 71
A2-455.................Jun 71-Dec 71
A2-703....................Jul 70-Dec 71
A2-723.....................Jul 70-Jun 71............... Crashed on ops
A2-766......................Jul 68-Dec 71
A2-767......................Jul 68-Apr 71............... Crashed and burnt
A2-768.........................Jul 68-Jul 70.............. Crashed and burnt
A2-769........................Jul 68-Oct 69.............. Crashed; destroyed by SAS
A2-770........................Jul 68-Dec 71
A2-771........................Jul 68-Dec 71
A2-772.........................Jul 68-Dec 71
A2-773.........................Jul 68-Dec 71
A2-915..........................Jul 71-Dec 71
RTFV/No. 35 Squadron (Caribou transports)
Serial No................Period of Service*........... Remarks
A4-140....................Nov 68-Jun 71
A4-152.....................Oct 67-Nov 68............ RTA for major repairs
A4-159.......................Jul 68-Jun 71
A4-171....................Aug 64-Aug 67............. Crashed and written off
A4-173.....................Aug 64-Feb 72
A4-179......................Aug 64-Feb 72
A4-185.......................Aug 64-Nov64.........Crashed and written off
A4-191........................Aug 64-Jun 71
A4-193......................Aug 64-Mar 70............... Destroyed by enemy mortar fire
A4-208........................Jun 65-Feb 72
A4-210..........................Mar 65-Jul 68............. RTA for major repairs
A4-234........................May 70-Feb 72
* Note: Dates of service do not show periods when aircraft out of Vietnam for servicing/repairs, etc.
(The average cost per B-52 mission during Vietnam was $41,421, with an average of 27 tons of munitions dropped.)
No Doubt many a gunner would have recalled this familier Airstrip" Luscombe Field" at Nui-Dat.
Taken by the POM on one of his many escapades joy riding around Vietnam.
Many years ago the POM got the chance to do a (TIF) trial introductory flight in a( R22 Robinson) Helicopter, and after about an hour of basic instruction it proved one thing to me that i'll never pinch one of these bloody things.
Talk about agrivated palm trees they can have them.
But I'm sure had money AND along with plenty of patience maybe i would have achieved that goal, but fixed wings will do me for the present at least they glide better.
Allies From Down Under
Their numbers may have been small, but the Aussie advisers' contingent in Vietnam was on hand for 10 years -- and for many a tough combat operation.
By John Brown
In August 1962, when the numbers of American advisers in Vietnam were increasing in response to mounting Viet Cong insurgency, 29 officers and warrant officers (senior non-commissioned officers) of the Australian Army arrived in Saigon as fellow advisers to the South Vietnamese. They had been sent to Vietnam as a gesture of solidarity with the United States in its defense of South Vietnam against Communist aggression.
The Aussie advisers were called the Australian Army Training Team Vietnam (AATTV), generally referred to as "the Team." Each man was highly trained in jungle warfare and counter-insurgency, and most had had experience in Malaya fighting Communist insurgency there. Their orders were to train South Vietnamese units in jungle warfare, counter-insurgency tactics and village defense.
Like the early U.S. contingents in Vietnam, they were specifically forbidden to engage in combat. Nonetheless, the Australian advisers, their personnel and roles changing over time and their numbers varying up to 200 (many returned for second and third tours of duty), were to stay in Vietnam for 10 ½ years. Australia and neighboring New Zealand also deployed combat units to Vietnam, more than 10,000 men, before the war ended.
The "Team's" commander, Colonel F. P. Serong, established himself in Saigon with three aides from the Team and sent 10 of its members to join American advisers at the Vietnamese National Training Center, Dong Da; 10 to the Civil Guard Training Center, Hiep Khanh; four to the Vietnamese Ranger Training Center, Duc My; and two to the CIA's Combined Studies Division. For the Aussies there now began many months of dull, boring, often frustrating training and teaching.
It soon became clear that the training being given by the Australians -- in small-scale jungle warfare and counter-insurgency tactics, with emphasis on individual skills and a high level of leadership at section and platoon level -- was quite different from American training, which was concerned with building up large forces to combat anticipated mass invasion from the North. Team members guessed that as soon as their trainees left the training centers and were absorbed into the general stream, their Australian training was forgotten. It galled the Aussies not to be allowed to accompany them on operations to ascertain what effect, if any, their training had had. They demanded that the ban on combat be lifted, but it wasn't officially lifted for two years -- not until July 1964, when, with the United States becoming more deeply involved in Vietnam, the Australian Government agreed to send additional officers and senior NCOs to the Team, these to be posted as operational advisers. This move effectively lifted the ban on combat.
Some of the Team, however, already had seen action in the course of carrying out their training activities -- as, for example, when caught in Viet Cong ambushes or as a result of being re-assigned to U.S. Special Forces.
In April 1964, Captain Noel Delahunty had taken a 56-man unit of Vietnamese Special Forces and local troops, with two American Special Forces sergeants, on a secret patrol close to the Laotian border in Quang Nam Province to find a site for a new Special Forces post that would be used as a base for raiding enemy reinforcements and supplies moving along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. From the first, Delahunty enforced standard Australian Army jungle patrol routine -- and he wasn't very popular. This routine meant breaking camp in the darkness before dawn and ensuring that nothing was left to tell an enemy anyone had been there that night; then, without food or cigarettes, moving at first light. About 9 a.m. there was a halt for a hot meal, after ensuring that fires and smoke and the smell of cooking wouldn't be detected, and with sentries posted in relays while others ate. And then on again through the morning and afternoon until about 5 p.m., when a camp site was selected and secured, sentries posted, followed by a cold meal, no fires and sleep.
But the routine paid off. The patrol wasn't detected until, having selected a place called A Ro for the Special Forces post and having started on its way back, some of the patrol's sentries posted during the hot-meal break left their positions and sneaked back to camp for food. Without warning, a Viet Cong unit attacked. The patrol beat off the attack but now it was known to be in the area, and several attempts at interception and ambush were made before the 19-day patrol was over. Three of the patrol were killed and 12 wounded, the latter including Captain Delahunty.
Working with U.S. Special Forces ideally suited the Australians and a special relationship soon developed between them. On July 6, in the famous fire fight that produced the war's first U.S. Medal of Honor, the Special Forces outpost at Nam Dong was attacked just before dawn by Viet Cong in battalion strength in the middle of the night. Warrant Officer Kevin Conway of the Aussie Team and Special Forces Master Sgt. Gabriel Alamo were awakened by the blast of the first mortar rounds. They grabbed their weapons and, firing at Viet Cong already at the wire around the outpost, ran for a mortar pit to help another Green Beret who was beginning to fire mortar flares to light up the attack. Both were hit as they reached the pit. Their bodies were found together beside the mortar when the attack was beaten off. (It was U.S. Special Forces Captain Roger Donlon who earned the Medal of Honor in the same battle -- See Beret Team's Brave Stand, Winter 1988 issue of Vietnam Magazine.)
In August 1963, another Team member, Captain Barry Peterson, a veteran of the anti-guerrilla campaign in Malaya, had been sent by the CIA Combined Studies Division to Darlac Province in the Central Highlands to train and organize para-military political-action teams among the area's Montagnards. He became proficient in the language of these mountain people and gained their confidence. When Warrant Officer Bevan Stokes was posted to assist him, they began teaching offensive tactics, in addition to defense. Peterson intensified weapons training, demolition, navigation and radio operation, his idea being the systematic infiltration and disruption of Viet Cong supply routes by raiding and ambushing. By 1965 he commanded an efficient and potentially very effective guerrilla force, already tested in action, of more than 1,000 men and was personally honored by being made a Montagnard "tribal chief." But the South Vietnamese government, wary of Montagnard aspirations for independence and fearful that Petersen's growing guerrilla force might someday be used against it, demanded that Petersen be posted out of Vietnam. He was, but returned five years later for a tour of duty as a company commander with the Australian Task Force of that latter period.
With reinforcements and postings as operational advisers from 1964 onwards, members of the Team were soon represented in most battalions of the first two divisions of the South Vietnamese I Corps, with the Ranger battalions and, later, with armored and artillery units. Like their comrades in Special Forces, the Aussie battalion advisers at times were involved in failures as well as successes.
In 1970, to stop North Vietnamese (NVA) infiltration into the western I Corps area, an interlocking series of firebases was to be constructed covering the infiltration lines. The first was to be on a bare hill called Tun Tavern, 70 kilometers west of Hue and eight kilometers from the Laos border. The 2nd Battalion, 54th ARVN (South Vietnamese) Regiment, engineers and artillerymen, would be inserted. Defenses and sites for a battery of howitzers would be quickly prepared. Success depended on surprise and speed.
Advisers to the 2nd Battalion, 54th Regiment, were an American Marine Corps captain and an Australian warrant officer. Three American signalers were attached to the battalion. Since the plan called for one company of the battalion to give cover from a hill a kilometer from Tun Tavern, Captain Bill Deane and Warrant Officer Tom Waters, both of the Team, were temporarily attached as advisers to the cover company.
Early morning of May 31, the cover company was helicoptered to a clearing near the hill it was to occupy and came under heavy mortar fire. Whether the deployed troops were just unlucky or the operation had been betrayed, they never knew. The rest of the battalion soon arrived, and those men, too, came under fire. Airstrikes were called in, and the company and the battalion made it to their positions and began to dig in. The NVA mortaring and rocketing died down to a low level, and casualties were evacuated. Next day, a bulldozer was delivered by helicopter and work on the firebase went ahead in relative peace and quiet. Then, before dawn on the third day, the NVA struck, hurling barrage after barrage of mortar rounds and rockets onto Tun Tavern and raking it with machine guns, obviously preparatory to an attack.
At 6 a.m., Captain Deane's company was ordered to the assistance of the battalion on Tun Tavern; when he and his men reached it, the NVA was already inside the defense perimeter, but the company fought its way in and the NVA broke off the attack. Dust and smoke hung around the hill -- dead and wounded littered the ground. One of the American radio operators was dead, the other two wounded. The Australian warrant officer assigned to 2nd Battalion was wounded and able only to crawl. Deane radioed for medivac helicopters, and they arrived almost immediately. Then, panic set in, as the lightly wounded and unwounded rushed the helicopters, leaving the more seriously wounded to fend for themselves. Deane and Warrant Officer Waters carried the more seriously wounded American signaler to a helicopter and fought their way through the milling troops to get him aboard. As they then got their wounded warrant officer on another helicopter, several choppers lifted off with soldiers clinging to the landing struts.
Meanwhile, shelling had started again and the command post had been hit, badly wounding the USMC battalion adviser. All the ARVN officers had been wounded, most only slightly, but all demanded evacuation. Their headquarters detailed one of the South Vietnamese officers to stay on as the American adviser's contact with the troops. The others left as soon as they could.
The adviser, a USMC Captain McCann, ordered more and better defenses and set the troops to work, inspecting them as best he could while Australians Deane and Waters, often talking directly to the pilots of planes above, guided them onto targets. They called in more medivac helicopters and this time supervised the loading, turning back the lightly wounded -- and those fakers who had smeared themselves with blood and wrapped themselves in bandages. That evening, mortar-bomb splinters ripped into Waters' leg, crippling him. He was evacuated that night.
With only advisers McCann and Deane and the lone ARVN officer left, a Vietnamese colonel was helicoptered in to take command. He arrived before dark, was slightly wounded, and then he was evacuated.
That night the NVA probed and fired into the position but did not attack, and early the next morning medivac helicopters once again began arriving to take out the wounded. McCann, who had been wounded again, was evacuated, leaving only Deane and the ARVN officer.
Deane organized the preparation of the positions for the howitzers, if and when they would come, and began reorganizing and trying to inspire the defense, stopping only to direct an airstrike when he could. The shelling continued, and then the order came to withdraw from Tun Tavern.
At 2:30 p.m. the troops left the hill, carrying their wounded to an evacuation zone 500 meters away, leaving Deane, the ARVN officer and an engineer on the hill. The ARVN officer ordered the engineer to blow up the bulldozer and Deane to cover him while he did it, then hurried off after the others. Deane and the engineer blew the bulldozer and ran for the evacuation zone, reaching it safely. The performance of the 2nd Battalion, 54th Regiment, had been abysmal. Deane, it is said, left Tun Tavern a very disgusted man.
Just the year before, also in May, the NVA had laid siege to the strategically placed Special Forces outpost of Ben Het in the Vietnam-Laos-Cambodia border area. The NVA 66th Regiment was suspected to be infiltrating down the Ho Chi Minh Trail to add muscle to the siege. At Pleiku to the south the ARVN 1st and 5th Mobile strike (Mike) Force Battalions were ordered to locate the infiltration route, find the NVA 66th Regiment and stop it from reaching Ben Het -- or at least hold it until reinforcements arrived.
The 1st Mike Force Battalion was temporarily under command of its executive officer, an American Lieutenant D. James, Jr. Its three companies were commanded by Warrant Officer Barry Tolley (the Team), Warrant Officer Keith Payne (the Team) and Sergeant "Monty" Montez of U.S. Special Forces. Payne's 212th Company of 89 Montagnards included 37 with only 12 days' Special Forces training, since they were replacements for losses sustained in a previous fight. They were in three platoons commanded by Warrant Officer Kevin Latham of the Team and two Special Forces sergeants, Jack Clement and Gerard Dellwo.
The 1st and 5th Mike Battalions were helicoptered to a ridge within nine kilometers of Ben Het and arrived under heavy fire. The 1st Battalion was ordered to clear the ridge. Payne and Montez took their companies forward, with Tolley's company bringing up the rear collecting weapons and the dead and wounded. They found the main enemy position on a hilltop only 700 meters away and realized they had found the 66th NVA Regiment right away -- they were in its midst! An airstrike was called on the position, and when it was over Payne's and Montez' companies occupied it. The NVA had disappeared. But not for long. Twenty minutes later the NVA, who had evacuated the position in anticipation of an airstrike, were back with machine guns, rockets and mortars, and all hell broke loose.
Encouraging his inexperienced soldiers, Warrant Officer Payne ran from point to point of the perimeter, firing his Armalite and taking grenades from his men and throwing them at the North Vietnamese, who were very close. A rocket-propelled grenade decapitated his radio operator and tore the Armalite from his hands. Bleeding from a head wound, he picked up an M60 machine gun and continued blazing away at the enemy. They faltered and then came on again -- the Montagnards panicked and ran. Payne took a short-cut across open ground and caught them, stopping the retreat and, bleeding again from mortar splinters in his hands and arms, formed a new defensive position for his and Montez' mixed companies. Montez himself was missing. Then two armed helicopters arrived and laid down protective fire around Payne and his men.
When darkness came, Payne obtained permission from the battalion commander, who was himself wounded, to go out and find their missing and wounded and bring them in. He went alone. Only one of the Team and U.S. Special Forces was unwounded, Sergeant Dellwo. Not only could he actively supervise the occupied position, but his medical training was needed where he was.
Payne went out four times, through enemy lines as far as the hill, and each time returned with wounded and stragglers. In the first batch he brought in the badly wounded Sergeant Montez. During his forays he sometimes heard single shots -- the NVA finishing off wounded Montagnards -- and he himself was fired upon again and again. When he brought back the fourth batch, there was no defensive position awaiting him. It had moved. The battalion commander had ordered what was left of the battalion to find the 5th Battalion base and get help. Payne followed the departed unit's tracks with his wounded and stragglers until he came upon Sergeant Dellwo and a U.S. Special Forces medic from the 213th Company; they had stopped, staying behind to attend to Montez and four very badly wounded Montagnards. Knowing that if he could follow the trail left by the battalion the NVA also could, Payne got the whole party on the move, the unwounded and lesser wounded carrying and helping the more serious cases. All told, there were Payne, three U.S. Special Forces sergeants (including Montez) and 40 Montagnards. Payne radioed repeatedly for a medivac helicopter for Montez, who obviously would die if he wasn't evacuated quickly. Finally one came, and Payne located an opening in the jungle canopy through which Montez could be winched to the helicopter. But "Monty" Montez died on the way to the military hospital.
Payne next arranged for an aircraft to keep flying overhead to drown out the noise he and his men were making as they continued their slow, agonizing way over steep and treacherous ground. At last, they staggered into the 5th Battalion base and were met by what was left of Tolley's 211th Company, which had found its way to the base earlier. Little more than a third of the 1st Battalion had managed to survive the engagement with the North Vietnamese Army.
Payne was awarded the Victoria Cross, the highest award for bravery among British Commonwealth nations, for "sustained and personal efforts [that] undoubtedly saved the lives of his indigenous soldiers and several of his fellow advisers."
Three other members of the Aussie Team in Vietnam were awarded the Victoria Cross for similar services, two of them being killed while performing their acts of heroism.
Through 1969 and 1970, the NVA and Viet Cong had been attacking, and wiping out when they could, the Special Forces outposts that formed a chain north to south in the Central Highlands. In April 1970, it was to be the turn of Dak Seang in Kontum province, an outpost of more than 300 Montagnards led by South Vietnamese Special Forces, assisted by U.S. Special Forces advisers.
Two NVA regiments and an artillery regiment moved down from the surrounding hills and, hidden by jungle and bamboo, dug fighting pits and bunkers within a few hundred meters of the outpost. A barrage from guns, mortars and rocket launchers began the siege of Dak Seang, and soon the outpost was in desperate need of help. Once again it was the 1st Mike Force Battalion at Pleiku that was ordered to the rescue.
The battalion was now commanded by Major Patrick Beale of the Team. Its 211th Company of half-trained Montagnards was commanded by Team Captain Peter Shilston, assisted by Warrant Officers Sanderson, Cochrane, John Pettit and "Geordie" Jamieson. The 212th Company was commanded by Warrant Officer "Aggy" White, assisted by Warrant Officers Barnes and Alec McCloskey, and the 213th was under U.S. Special Forces command. The Battalion had returned from a three-week operational sweep south of Pleiku just the day previous to 250 of them being helicoptered to a landing zone 2,500 meters from Dak Seang, the remainder being unable to land because of darkness.
Major Beale had asked for the landing zone to be neutralized, but there were no aircraft available for the task. Inevitably, the NVA had all likely landing zones covered, and the landing was met by a withering barrage of rifle, machine-gun and rocket fire. Captain Shilston and his Warrant Officer Sanderson were in the first helicopter to land and led their Montagnards in a charge against a heavy machine-gun emplacement. Sanderson was hit in the leg but kept going. Over them another helicopter came in to hover only meters away from the emplacement. Warrant Officer Cochrane leaped out and with grenades wiped out the emplacement. Six bunkers were attacked and cleared in the immediate vicinity as more troops landed, and they then dug in for a night of mortar rounds, rockets and bullets.
The remainder of the battalion came in next morning in a hail of NVA fire, along with smoke and dust so thick that some of the guns on the helicopters fired into the battalion area, killing one Montagnard and wounding seven others, including the U.S. Special Forces captain commanding the 213th Company.
Major Beale got the Battalion on the move for Dak Seang 2,500 meters away, Shilston's 211th Company leading. They hadn't gone far when the forward platoon came under fire from a bunker complex. Three Montagnards were hit and Warrant Officer Pettit crawled forward to give them first aid. He then sprang to his feet and charged the nearest bunker, firing as he ran. He was shot down within two meters of it.
The company had kept moving but, 50 meters on, came under fire from more bunkers. Shilston and his warrant officers led a charge against these bunkers, cleared five of them and then withdrew to allow an airstrike to clear the rest.
At the end of the day, helicopters brought in food, water and ammunition and evacuated out the wounded. The Battalion established a defensive position. It had fought its way only 500 meters closer to Dak Seang; there were still 2,000 meters to go.
Sanderson, immobilized by his leg wound, had been evacuated, together with the seriously wounded Special forces commander of the 213th, and Pettit was dead. Next morning Warrant Officer "Locky" Scowcroft arrived among some Montagnards as replacement for Pettit. The Battalion moved on but almost immediately came up against another line of bunkers. An airstrike was called, and when it was over the troops moved in with grenades to finish off what was left.
The Battalion moved cautiously on into more open country -- and an unearthly silence. Its men were 1,300 meters from Dak Seang when the silence was shattered by gunfire as the NVA attacked. The attack was only broken when a "Spooky" (C-47 gunship) arrived and "hosed" the area around the Battalion with its multi-barreled gun.
But the NVA attacked again and again through the day and most of the night, only airstrikes preventing them massing for a decisive attack. The strikes were so close that on one occasion a napalm canister fell among the Montagnards, killing four and wounding 17.
Next day, continual attacks assisted by airstrikes could not push the NVA back -- the situation of the Battalion became progressively worse as the NVA counter-attacked. Finally, with the Battalion out of water and food and almost out of ammunition, many of its men wounded, the end seemed very close. But the Battalion held on into the next day, when the more seriously wounded Montagnards began dying to the death chants of their comrades and the NVA continued mortaring and machine-gunning the position. Late in the afternoon helicopters made a dangerous dash into the position with ammunition and supplies, and it began to rain. The Battalion was given a new lease on life and on the next day launched more attacks, preceded by airstrikes, against the NVA. But the attacks were repelled -- the NVA was still too strong. Major Beale called for reinforcements and planned his next attacks.
Reinforcements came in the following morning, into fire so heavy that many went back as casualties on the very helicopters they had arrived in. In the afternoon the 4th Battalion, 2nd Mike Force, was flown in.
Next day, Warrant Officers White, Barnes and McCloskey and their Montagnards fought their way into bunkers that had been an NVA regimental headquarters. It consisted of 17 large bunkers protected by a perimeter of weapon pits and covered an area 250 by 100 meters.
If the Mike Force had broken out, meanwhile, the battle was by no means finished. Close-quarter fighting continued throughout the next day as the Mike Force units continued their painstakingly slow progress toward Dak Seang, resupplied by helicopters. The ammunition boxes and supplies were passed from the hovering choppers into the hands of the soldiers on the ground. Three U.S. Special Forces advisers were wounded during the day.
The following day, the relief force was again stopped by a bunker system, only 300 meters from Dak Seang's defenses. The 213th Company mounted a frontal attack on the bunkers, while Shilston and White led flanking attacks. The 213th cleared the bunkers.
From the edge of the jungle the battered survivors now could look out across the clearing around Dak Seang to what it had taken them seven days of hell to reach, a smashed and smoldering fort covered with craters and surrounded by the black scars of napalm. A few Montagnards came out of the fort to meet them.
Dak Seang had been reached, but the siege still wasn't broken -- the NVA began bombarding again, even while the would-be rescuers sized up the situation at Dak Seang. Once again the Mike Force went into a defensive position. But the NVA main forces appeared finally to be pulling back, and the next day Beale took his reinforced battalion on the offensive. Covered by airstrikes, he began circling the perimeter of Dak Seang, attacking bunkers and fortified positions, and the next day clearing the NVA from the scrub around the fort. Another U.S. Special Forces advisor was among the latest to be seriously wounded.
On April 13, clearing patrols finally found they were unopposed. The NVA had moved back. Aerial reconnaissance showed they were now in positions 3,000 meters from Dak Seang. The siege had been broken.
Soon after Dak Seang, the Team's association with the American Special Forces began to wind down as the Mike Forces were transferred to Regional Force and Ranger battalions in line with the program of Vietnamization. By the end of 1970, the eight-year association had come to an end.
Most of the Team moved on to attachment to the newly-formed Mobile Advisory and Training Teams (MATTs), but these were found to be not as effective as hoped and, by the end of 1971, the Team had been reduced to 65 men. Once again they were forbidden to engage in operations. By the end of the next year, the last of these highly decorated Australian professionals had left Vietnam, to pass on their skills and experience to younger soldiers at home.
John Brown is a free-lance writer specializing in military affairs and based in Australia. Related readings: Vietnam: A History, by Stanley Karnow; The Green Berets at War, by Shelby Stanton.